In Re Daniel C., (Jul. 22, 1999)

1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 10170
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJuly 22, 1999
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 10170 (In Re Daniel C., (Jul. 22, 1999)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Daniel C., (Jul. 22, 1999), 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 10170 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
These are actions brought by Department of Children and Families (DCF) seeking (1) to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and biological father of Daniel C., Jr. and Kimberly C. and (2) seeking an adjudication of the children as neglected. Further, there are pre-trial motions by the parents heard together with this trial in which one or both of the CT Page 10171 parents have filed (1) a Motion for Contempt, and (2) a Motion for Order Re: Unsupervised Visitation.2

The biological mother is Linda C. The biological father is Daniel C. Sr. They are married. As of the time of the trial on the merits, these parents live together.

The children are currently in the custody of DCF pursuant to an Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) issued on April 9, 1998. In the trial before this court, the mother and father each had pending a motion for this court to vacate the order, claiming that the cause for that order no longer existed. After the inception of the trial, those motions were withdrawn by both parents.

The neglect petitions subject of this action were filed on April 9, 1998, at the same time as the Motion for Order of Temporary Custody. The standard of proof that DCF must satisfy in its neglect petition is a fair preponderance of the evidence. On May 14, 1998, DCF filed the petitions for termination of parental rights.

Kimberly C. was born on December 16, 1991; Daniel C., Jr. was born on July 3, 1989.

DCF alleges the following grounds for the termination of the parental fights of the biological mother and biological father. DCF alleges as to each of the parents, regarding Daniel C., Jr. and Kimberly C. that (1) the child has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for, and, each parent, respectively has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, that parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-112 (c)(3)(B); and/or (2) the child has been denied by reason of an act or acts of commission by the respective parent the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well being. Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(B); (3) in regard to Kimberly C. only, DCF further alleges as a ground for the termination of the parental rights of the mother that Kimberly C. being under the age of seven years and who is neglected or uncared for, that the mother has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief CT Page 10172 that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of Kimberly C. that the mother could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, and the mother's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families. Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(E).

In pretrial proceedings, DCF disclosed that it could not find certain of its records which constituted social worker narratives for the period of time from September 15, 1995 to December 31, 1996 for this family. They included, but were not limited to, records of communications to and from DCF to the parents, the children, foster parents and service providers. These narratives had been sought by both the mother and father in preparation of the trial. DCF acknowledged that the social worker(s) for that time period would not be able to testify with any independent recollection of the events of that period. Instead, it was represented to the court that these social worker witnesses would rely on their social studies and/or affidavits, which were prepared from the narrative, before it became missing for that time period. The absence of the narratives would deprive the parents of the ability to meaningfully prepare and cross-examine the social worker witnesses for that time period. Pursuant to Practice Book § 13-14, the court ordered that the petitioner was barred from offering evidence in support of its petitions for the period of time from September 15, 1995 through December 3, 1996. The court further ordered, however, if either parent introduced evidence from that covered period in defense against the petitioner, then DCF could present rebuttal evidence from the covered period.3

The standard of proof for petitions for the termination of parental rights is clear and convincing evidence. The adjudication date is May 14, 1998.

At the inception of the trial, the mother, Linda C., raised for the first time the possibility of North American Indian heritage of herself and the children. Her affidavit presented to the court did not allege sufficient facts for the court to conclude that the proceedings were subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act. However, the court directed the Attorney General's Office to make inquiries regarding the same on an expedited basis. After filings from the Mashentucket Pequot Tribal Nation disclosed no tribal assertion of interest in these proceedings or the children in any way subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act. CT Page 10173 The court finds that the mother provided no information indicative of her or the children's tribal membership in a North American Indian tribe. The court concludes that these proceedings are not subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act.

The mother, father and children were each represented by their own counsel throughout these proceedings. The children's counsel supported the DCF petitions. Mother and father vigorously defended against them. Both the mother and the father presented witnesses and evidence at trial. The minor children's counsel participated in the examination of the petitioner's and DCF's witnesses. The trial of these matters continued for three days. The court heard testimony from DCF workers and supervisors, a DCF aide, Dr. Bruce Freedman, a clinical psychologist who was the court appointed evaluator, a principal of one of the children's schools, a special education supervisor in one of the son's school system, two police officers, a therapist for Daniel C., Jr., a psychiatrist who evaluated both children, the father, the DCF Director of Adoptive Services, the coordinator of a substance abuse treatment program for the mother, and a substance abuse counselor for the father. These were various documents in the court file of which the court took judicial notice. There were 26 full exhibits.

The court carefully considered all of the evidence presented at trial. The court applied the burdens of proof applicable to each portion of the coterminous petitions as detailed above. Only evidence relevant to adjudication dates were considered as a part of adjudication findings on the neglect and termination petitions.

The Motions for Contempt were filed by the father and mother on June 15. 1999. The DCF interposed an objection on June 21, 1999. The import of the motions is that DCF denied visitation in June, 1999 to the parents in violation of a court order of visitation issued on October 5, 1998. DCF denied the visitation after it learned that the mother had once again relapsed into substance abuse. They required confirmation of treatment before resumption. Notice of this new requirement was received too late for compliance to be made before the next scheduled visitation date.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 10170, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-daniel-c-jul-22-1999-connsuperct-1999.