§ 17a-112 — (Formerly Sec. 17-43a). Termination of parental rights of child committed to commissioner. Cooperative postadoption agreements. Placement of child from another state. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.

Connecticut § 17a-112

• Jurisdiction: Connecticut
• Title 17a: Social and Human Services and Resources
• Ch. 319a: Child Welfare

Text

(a) In respect to any child in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families in accordance with section 46b-129, either the commissioner, or the attorney who represented such child in a pending or prior proceeding, or an attorney appointed by the Superior Court on its own motion, or an attorney retained by such child after attaining the age of fourteen, may petition the court for the termination of parental rights with reference to such child. The petition shall be in the form and contain the information set forth in subsection (b) of section 45a-715, and be subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of said section. If a petition indicates that either or both parents consent to the termination of their parental rights, or if at any time following the filing of a petition and before the entry of a decree, a parent consents to the termination of the parent's parental rights, each consenting parent shall acknowledge such consent on a form promulgated by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator evidencing that the parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of such parental rights. No consent to termination by a mother shall be executed within forty-eight hours immediately after the birth of such mother's child. A parent who is a minor shall have the right to consent to termination of parental rights and such consent shall not be voidable by reason of such minority. A guardian ad litem shall be appointed by the court to assure that such minor parent is giving an informed and voluntary consent. (b) Either or both birth parents and an intended adoptive parent may enter into a cooperative postadoption agreement regarding communication or contact between either or both birth parents and the adopted child. Such an agreement may be entered into if: (1) The child is in the custody of the Department of Children and Families; (2) an order terminating parental rights has not yet been entered; and (3) either or both birth parents agree to a voluntary termination of parental rights, including an agreement in a case which began as an involuntary termination of parental rights. The postadoption agreement shall be applicable only to a birth parent who is a party to the agreement. Such agreement shall be in addition to those under common law. Counsel for the child and any guardian ad litem for the child may be heard on the proposed cooperative postadoption agreement. There shall be no presumption of communication or contact between the birth parents and an intended adoptive parent in the absence of a cooperative postadoption agreement. (c) If the Superior Court determines that the child's best interests will be served by postadoption communication or contact with either or both birth parents, the court shall so order, stating the nature and frequency of the communication or contact. A court may grant postadoption communication or contact privileges if: (1) Each intended adoptive parent consents to the granting of communication or contact privileges; (2) the intended adoptive parent and either or both birth parents execute a cooperative agreement and file the agreement with the court; (3) consent to postadoption communication or contact is obtained from the child, if the child is at least twelve years of age; and (4) the cooperative postadoption agreement is approved by the court. (d) A cooperative postadoption agreement shall contain the following: (1) An acknowledgment by either or both birth parents that the termination of parental rights and the adoption is irrevocable, even if the adoptive parents do not abide by the cooperative postadoption agreement; and (2) an acknowledgment by the adoptive parents that the agreement grants either or both birth parents the right to seek to enforce the cooperative postadoption agreement. (e) The terms of a cooperative postadoption agreement may include the following: (1) Provision for communication between the child and either or both birth parents; (2) provision for future contact between either or both birth parents and the child or an adoptive parent; and (3) maintenance of medical history of either or both birth parents who are parties to the agreement. (f) The order approving a cooperative postadoption agreement shall be made part of the final order terminating parental rights. The finality of the termination of parental rights and of the adoption shall not be affected by implementation of the provisions of the postadoption agreement. Such an agreement shall not affect the ability of the adoptive parents and the child to change their residence within or outside this state. (g) A disagreement between the parties or litigation brought to enforce or modify the agreement shall not affect the validity of the termination of parental rights or the adoption and shall not serve as a basis for orders affecting the custody of the child. The court shall not act on a petition to change or enforce the agreement unless the petitioner had participated, or attempted to participate, in good faith in mediation or other appropriate dispute resolution proceedings to resolve the dispute and allocate any cost for such mediation or dispute resolution proceedings. (h) An adoptive parent, guardian ad litem for the child or the court, on its own motion, may, at any time, petition for review of any order entered pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, if the petitioner alleges that such action would be in the best interests of the child. The court may modify or terminate such orders as the court deems to be in the best interest of the adopted child. (i) The Superior Court upon hearing and notice, as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-717 , may grant a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of the parent's parental rights with respect to such child. If the court denies a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent, it may refer the matter to an agency to assess the needs of the child, the care the child is receiving and the plan of the parent for the child. Consent for the termination of the parental rights of one parent does not diminish the parental rights of the other parent of the child, nor does it relieve the other parent of the duty to support the child. (j) The Superior Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-717 , may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b , unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b , or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, (2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) (A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child; (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected, abused or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child; (C) the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission including, but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being, except that nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a child shall constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental commission or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights; (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child; (E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected, abused or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families; (F) the parent has killed through deliberate, nonaccidental act another child of the parent or has requested, commanded, importuned, attempted, conspired or solicited such killing or has committed an assault, through deliberate, nonaccidental act that resulted in serious bodily injury of another child of the parent; or (G) the parent committed an act that constitutes sexual assault as described in section 53a-70 , 53a-70a , 53a-70c , 53a-71 , 53a-72a , 53a-72b or 53a-73a or compelling a spouse or cohabitor to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force or by the threat of the use of force as described in section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, if such act resulted in the conception of the child. (k) Except in the case where termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent. (l) Any petition brought by the Commissioner of Children and Families to the Superior Court, pursuant to subsection (a) of section 46b-129 , may be accompanied by or, upon motion by the petitioner, consolidated with a petition for termination of parental rights filed in accordance with this section with respect to such child. Notice of the hearing on such petitions shall be given in accordance with sections 45a-716 and 45a-717 . The Superior Court, after hearing, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (i) or (j) of this section, may, in lieu of granting the petition filed pursuant to section 46b-129 , grant the petition for termination of parental rights as provided in section 45a-717 . (m) Nothing contained in this section and sections 17a-113 , 45a-187 , 45a-606 , 45a-607 , 45a-707 to 45a-709 , inclusive, 45a-715 to 45a-718 , inclusive, 45a-724 , 45a-725 , 45a-727 , 45a-733 , 45a-754 and 52-231a shall negate the right of the Commissioner of Children and Families to subsequently petition the Superior Court for revocation of a commitment of a child as to whom parental rights have been terminated in accordance with the provisions of this section. The Superior Court may appoint a statutory parent at any time after it has terminated parental rights if the petitioner so requests. (n) If the parental rights of only one parent are terminated, the remaining parent shall be the sole parent and, unless otherwise provided by law, guardian of the person. (o) In the case where termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian of the person or statutory parent shall report to the court not later than thirty days after the date judgment is entered on a case plan, as defined by the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time, for the child which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules. At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the court on the progress made on implementation of the plan. The court may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b-129 for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child not more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b-129 , whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child remains in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families. For children where the commissioner has determined that adoption is appropriate, the report on the implementation of the plan shall include a description of the reasonable efforts the department is taking to promote and expedite the adoptive placement and to finalize the adoption of the child, including documentation of child specific recruitment efforts. At such hearing, the court shall determine whether the department has made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan. If the court determines that the department has not made reasonable efforts to place a child in an adoptive placement or that reasonable efforts have not resulted in the placement of the child, the court may order the Department of Children and Families, within available appropriations, to contract with a child-placing agency to arrange for the adoption of the child. The department, as statutory parent, shall continue to provide care and services for the child while a child-placing agency is arranging for the adoption of the child. (p) The provisions of section 17a-152 , regarding placement of a child from another state, and the provisions of section 17a-175 , regarding the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, shall apply to placements pursuant to this section. (q) The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed. See Sec. 45a-764 re adoption procedures.

Legislative History

(1959, P.A. 184, S. 1; February, 1965, P.A. 488, S. 9; P.A. 73-156, S. 4; P.A. 74-164, S. 3, 20; P.A. 75-420, S. 4, 6; P.A. 76-226; 76-436, S. 589, 681; P.A. 77-452, S. 7, 72; P.A. 82-202, S. 1; P.A. 83-355, S. 2; 83-387, S. 1; 83-478, S. 1; P.A. 84-449, S. 1, 7; P.A. 87-555, S. 1; P.A. 93-91, S. 1, 2; 93-193, S. 1; P.A. 94-81, S. 1; P.A. 95-238, S. 3; P.A. 96-130, S. 39; 96-246, S. 18; P.A. 98-241, S. 8, 18; P.A. 99-166, S. 4; P.A. 00-75, S. 1; 00-137, S. 1; 00-196, S. 15; P.A. 01-159, S. 3; 01-195, S. 21, 22, 181; P.A. 03-243, S. 1; P.A. 06-102, S. 7, 8; P.A. 15-159, S. 1; P.A. 16-28, S. 15; 16-70, S. 1; 16-105, S. 1, 2; P.A. 19-189, S. 3.) History: 1965 act changed “no degree of interest” to “reasonable degree of interest” in Subdiv. (a), deleted “totally” from before “failed” in Subdiv. (b) and added Subdiv. (c) and allowed waiver of requirement that one year expire before termination of parental rights; P.A. 73-156 added provisions re transfer of contested case from probate court to juvenile court, deleted detailed provisions re one year waiting period and re effect of termination of parental rights on child's religious affiliation or inheritance rights; P.A. 74-164 deleted provisions re transfer of case from probate to juvenile court, added provisions re grounds for terminating parental rights and Subsecs. (b) and (c); P.A. 75-420 replaced welfare commissioner with commissioner of social services; P.A. 76-226 replaced commissioner of social services with commissioner of children and youth services and allowed attorney representing child to bring petition for termination of parental rights; P.A. 76-436 replaced juvenile court with superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-452 reiterated changes of 1976 act; P.A. 82-202 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provision requiring finding upon standard of “clear and convincing evidence”; P.A. 83-355 amended Subsec. (a) by providing that “The petition shall be in the form and contain the information set forth in subsection (b) of section 45-61c and be subject to the provisions of subsections (c) and (d) of said section”; P.A. 83-387 inserted a new Subsec. (b) to require the court to consider and make written findings concerning certain factors in its determination of whether to terminate parental rights, and relettered the remaining subsections accordingly: P.A. 83-478 amended Subsec. (a) by requiring the court prior to granting a petition for termination to find that “the termination is in the best interest of the child”, rephrasing the grounds for termination and inserting in Subdiv. (3) the provision that “nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a child shall constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental commission or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights”; P.A. 84-449 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) by revising procedure for consent termination of parental rights, amended Subsec. (d) by providing that the requirement of written findings by the court does not apply in the case where termination is based on consent, amended Subsec. (e) by authorizing the commissioner of children and youth services in certain circumstances to petition for termination of parental rights with respect to a child who has not been committed to him, added Subsec. (g) re the remaining parent as sole parent and guardian, added Subsec. (h) re the parental rights and duties of the remaining parent and added Subsec. (i) re a case plan for a child where termination of parental rights is granted based on consent; P.A. 87-555 amended Subsec. (i) by deleting “based on consent”, deleting “six” and substituting “twelve”, requiring department of children and youth services to make a report to the court, adding “subsequent to the report the” and deleting “no less than” and substituting “at least”; Sec. 17-43a transferred to Sec. 17a-112 in 1991; P.A. 93-91 substituted commissioner and department of children and families for commissioner and department of children and youth services, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 93-193 amended Subsec. (c) by adding provision re abandonment of child under the age of 6 months as evidence that waiver is necessary to promote best interest of child, amended Subsec. (d) by adding requirement of written findings re efforts to reunite family pursuant to federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, and amended Subsec. (e) to permit consolidation of petitions of neglect and termination; P.A. 94-81 amended Subsec. (i) by specifying that 90-day report deadline begins from the date judgment is entered, by making subsequent reports the responsibility of guardian or statutory parent rather than department of children and families and requiring such reports to be made twice a year rather than annually and by adding provision that court shall convene hearing for review of case plan no more than 15 months from date of judgment and at least once a year thereafter; P.A. 95-238 amended Subsec. (b) by requiring the court to find that the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent prior to granting a petition, except where such reasonable efforts were not possible, added Subsec. (c)(2) re children under age 7 and made technical changes; P.A. 96-130 added Subsec. (j) re liberal construction in best interests of child; P.A. 96-246 revised section, amending Subsec. (b) to include granting petitions based on consent and procedure when denial of petition based on consent, amending Subsec. (c) re grounds for granting petition for termination and amending Subsec. (e) by adding “and made available” after “provided”; P.A. 98-241 added Subsec. (c)(3)(B)(2) re finding that child is neglected or uncared for and that child has been in custody for at least 15 months, added “including, but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse” to Subsec. (c)(3)(C) and added Subsec. (c)(3)(F) and (G) re death or injury of another child or conviction of parent of sexual assault resulting in conception of a child and deleted former Subsec. (d) re conditions for waiving requirement that one year expire before termination of parental rights, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 99-166 amended Subsec. (c)(3)(G) by adding “provided the court may terminate such parent's parental rights to such child at any time after such conviction” and amended Subsec. (h) by changing 90 to 60 days for report from statutory parent or guardian from date judgment is entered, adding requirement that case plan include measurable objectives and time schedules, requiring subsequent report by statutory parent or guardian on progress made on implementation of plan and changed hearing re review of plan from no more than 15 months to no more than 12 months from date judgment is entered; P.A. 00-75 amended former Subsec. (c), redesignated as Subsec. (j), by adding “or the Probate Court” in Subdiv. (3)(B); P.A. 00-137 added new Subsecs. (b) to (h), inclusive, re cooperative postadoption agreements, redesignated former Subsecs. (b) to (i), inclusive, as Subsecs. (i) to (p), inclusive, made technical changes in Subsec. (i), amended Subsec. (j)(3) to make technical changes in Subparas. (B) and (C) and to add “as an adult or a delinquent” in Subpara. (G), made conforming technical changes in Subsec. (l), and amended Subsec. (o) to change reporting time frame from 60 days to 30 days of date of judgment, to add provision re court determination that adoption plan has become finalized, to add provision re report on implementation of adoption plan by department, including reasonable efforts of department to promote and expedite adoption placement and finalization, to add provision authorizing the court to order the department, within available appropriations, to contract with child-placing agency to arrange for adoption of child, and to add provision requiring the department to continue to provide care and services to child while agency is arranging adoption; P.A. 00-196 made technical changes in former Subsec. (c), redesignated as Subsec. (j); P.A. 01-159 amended Subsec. (o) by requiring report re progress made on implementation of plan not less than every 3 months, adding provision that court may convene hearing on filing of report for purpose of reviewing plan not more than 12 months from judgment or date of last permanency hearing, and adding provision that at the hearing, the court shall determine whether department has made reasonable efforts to achieve permanency plan; P.A. 01-195 made technical changes in Subsecs. (e) and (o), effective July 11, 2001; P.A. 03-243 added new Subsec. (p) re application of Secs. 17a-152 and 17a-175 to placements pursuant to this section and redesignated existing Subsec. (p) as Subsec. (q); P.A. 06-102 amended Subsec. (j) to reference Sec. 17a-111b(a), delete reference to Sec. 17a-110(b), substitute “efforts are not required” for “efforts are not appropriate”, and make technical changes and amended Subsec. (o) to require a permanency hearing pursuant to Sec. 46b-129(k), substitute yearly reviews while the child remains in the custody of commissioner for yearly reviews until adoption plan is finalized, and make technical changes; P.A. 15-159 amended Subsec. (j) to add “abused” in Subdiv. (3)(B) and (E), effective July 2, 2015; P.A. 16-28 amended Subsec. (k)(2) by replacing “Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended” with “Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time”, effective July 1, 2016; P.A. 16-70 amended Subsec. (j)(3)(G) by replacing provisions re conviction of sexual assault with provision re commission of act constituting sexual assault or compelling spouse or cohabitor to engage in sexual intercourse and by deleting provisions re exception for violation of Sec. 53a-71 or 53a-73a and re termination of parental rights after conviction, effective July 1, 2016; P.A. 16-105 amended Subsecs. (k)(2) and (o) by replacing references to Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 with “Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time” and making technical changes, effective June 3, 2016; P.A. 19-189 amended Subsec. (j)(3)(G) by adding “of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019” re Sec. 53a-70b. Annotations to former section 17-43a: Cited. 165 C. 435, 436; 168 C. 421. Statute requires establishing the complete absence of an ongoing relationship. 177 C. 648. Cited. 179 C. 155; 181 C. 638; 182 C. 545; 183 C. 11; 187 C. 431; 188 C. 259. Due process requires proof of allegations by clear and convincing evidence rather than the preponderance of evidence standard of proof. 189 C. 58. Cited. Id., 66; Id., 276. Principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel as applied to petitions to terminate parental rights discussed. 190 C. 310. Cited. 194 C. 252; 195 C. 344; 196 C. 18; 210 C. 157; 215 C. 31; Id., 277; 217 C. 459. Cited. 1 CA 298; Id., 463; 2 CA 705; 3 CA 30; 4 CA 653; 6 CA 194; Id., 360; 9 CA 506; Id., 598; Id., 608; 10 CA 36; 11 CA 497; Id., 507; 13 CA 23; Id., 91; Id., 605; Id., 626; 15 CA 367; 16 CA 693; 18 CA 806; 19 CA 20; Id., 371; 20 CA 228; Id., 725; 23 CA 207; 24 CA 135; Id., 338. Where statutory requirements are met, a mother's prenatal conduct can be basis of a finding of neglect or termination of parental rights. 25 CA 586; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 492. Cited. 26 CA 414; 29 CA 112; Id., 600; 30 CA 839. Cited. 31 CS 271; 41 CS 23; Id., 145. Subsec. (a): Subdiv. (3): Termination of parental rights and relation thereto of adoptability of minor child discussed. 189 C. 66. Failure to rehabilitate cited; no ongoing parent-child relationship cited. 194 C. 252. Cited. 217 C. 459. Subsec. (b): Simultaneous hearing under statute not violation of due process rights on its face and as applied. 179 C. 155. Cited. 201 C. 229. Subdiv. (2): Court dismissed as not proven alternate ground for termination of parental rights where parents have failed to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation that would allow them to assume a responsible position in their child's life; the dismissal of this alternate ground was not at issue in case. 2 CA 705, 707. Subdiv. (4): No ongoing parent-child relationship discussed. Id., 705. Cited. 3 CA 194; Id., 507; 9 CA 490; 15 CA 455; 22 CA 656; 24 CA 338; 30 CA 839; 35 CA 490; 38 CA 214. Annotations to present section: Cited. 223 C. 492. Court held legislature intended provisions of Sec. 52-212a and this section to coexist so Superior Court has limited jurisdiction to open judgment for termination of parental rights for 4 months after its rendering but not thereafter in absence of waiver of consent. 224 C. 263. Cited. 229 C. 345; 234 C. 194. Commissioner not required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that reasonable efforts were made to reunite parent with children as a predicate to terminating parental rights; provision requiring commissioner to make reasonable efforts to reunite parent and child does not apply retroactively. 250 C. 674. In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under section, petitioner required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that department has made reasonable efforts to reunify family, termination is in best interest of child, and there exists any of the 7 grounds for termination delineated in Subsec. (j)(3). 268 C. 614. A child has standing to appeal from termination of parental rights because the rights of the child are inextricably intertwined with those of the parent. 290 C. 131. Section requires the department to make reasonable efforts at reunification, including taking the parent's mental condition into consideration, and failure to provide adequate services because of the parent's mental condition would violate section and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 326 C. 480. Legislature's enactment of Subsecs. (b) to (h) did not reflect an intention to abrogate or limit the courts' common-law authority, as codified in Sec. 46b-121(b)(1), which includes the ability to order posttermination visitation as long as it is necessary or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of the child; instead the legislature intended Subsecs. (b) to (h) to be more limited in scope and codify and make regular the process by which parties accomplish cooperative post adoption agreements. 336 C. 545. Where statutory requirements are met, a mother's prenatal conduct can be basis of a finding of neglect or termination of parental rights. 25 CA 586; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 492. Cited. 26 CA 58; Id., 414; 28 CA 247; 29 CA 112; Id., 600; 30 CA 839; 35 CA 276; Id., 490; 40 CA 366; 46 CA 69. Jurisdiction for terminating parental rights lies either in Probate Court or Superior Court pursuant to this section and Sec. 45a-715(a) and (g); administrative hearing officer in department has no authority to hear or determine a petition for termination of parental rights; there is no statutory requirement that department file a treatment plan as condition precedent to filing of a termination petition; in a termination proceeding, burden is on department to prove by clear and convincing evidence that sufficient grounds exist for termination and that termination would serve the best interests of the child. 49 CA 706. Section requires trial court to analyze respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. Id., 763. Parent failed to achieve personal rehabilitation when, as of date of the petition, parent is unrecovered, active alcoholic and substance abuser, unable to provide for care and custody of the children, and termination of parental rights is in best interest of the children where trial court made specific findings regarding the seven statutory factors. 51 CA 446. Trial court did not err in finding the parent had not rehabilitated herself and could not assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time. Id., 829. Res judicata does not bar reliance on provision authorizing termination of parental rights where a child has been found in prior proceeding to have been neglected. 52 CA 576. Burden of proof was not shifted to respondent father as to whether department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the child because department made reasonable efforts specifically directed to respondent by offering him over the course of 3 years at least 6 services to facilitate reunification. 56 CA 776. 7 factors set forth in section serve simply as guidelines to court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven by clear and convincing evidence before termination can be ordered. 60 CA 96. Use of clearly erroneous standard of review on appeal from a termination of parental rights proceeding does not deny respondent adequate procedural safeguards. 85 CA 528. Even when there is a finding of a bond between parent and a child, it still may be in child's best interest to terminate parental rights. 104 CA 744. Court properly found parents had failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation. 105 CA 515. There is no requirement that a previously adjudicated child on whose behalf a petition to terminate parental rights is filed must have been in the custody of petitioner for any specific period of time before such petition may be filed. 139 CA 239. Determination of child's best interests occurs only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence, and it is improper for termination of parental rights to be grounded on finding that child's prospective home will be “better” than life with one or more biological parent. 154 CA 488. The interconnection among Subsecs. (j)(1), (j)(3) and (k) reveals a legislative intent that, in attempting to reunify the parent with the child pursuant to Subsec. (j)(1), the department must make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in addressing and overcoming the specific impediments preventing reunification, i.e., the statutory grounds advanced by the department pursuant to Subsec. (j)(3). 170 CA 833. Cited. 43 CS 108; 44 CS 101; Id., 169; Id., 551. Discussed. 45 CS 364. Subsec. (a): Authority to draft and sign petitions to terminate parental rights is not limited to attorneys. 247 C. 1. Cited. 40 CA 366. Subsec. (i) (former Subsec. (b)): Cited. 221 C. 903; 226 C. 917; 229 C. 345. Cited. 24 CA 338; 25 CA 536; Id., 741; 26 CA 58; 30 CA 839; 33 CA 12; 38 CA 214; 39 CA 353; 42 CA 664; 44 CA 80. Trial court properly found abandonment, that department did all it could to give respondent custody and did not shift the burden of permanency planning. 47 CA 124. Grounds of failure to achieve personal rehabilitation and nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury of child discussed. 49 CA 229. Cited. Id., 541. Subdiv. (2): Court properly granted coterminous petitions on basis of failure to achieve personal rehabilitation and a new adjudication of neglect was not required because court's reliance on prior adjudications of neglect was not improper. 63 CA 339. Subsec. (j) (former Subsec. (c)): Cited. 229 C. 345. Not unconstitutional as applied to termination of parental rights of an unfit mother upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that her child has been, among other things, uncared for. 270 C. 382. Even if the evidence had established that additional family therapy might have been beneficial, trial court's finding that department made reasonable efforts at reunification was not clearly erroneous. 290 C. 131. Under 2003 revision, department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify parent and child or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. 293 C. 539. Where prior neglect adjudication must be opened, there was no longer any basis for trial court's finding that the children were neglected, regardless of whether parent raised claim on appeal, because court's finding was based on the prior neglect adjudication. 301 C. 345. A prior order of specific steps toward rehabilitation is required for any termination of parental rights grounded solely on a parent's failure to rehabilitate, except that, under the particular circumstances of this case, failure to provide specific steps constituted harmless error. 310 C. 485. It was necessary for the trial court to consider events subsequent to the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights when determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify child with respondent. 321 C. 523. Subdiv. (1): Finding of reunification efforts not required under section and Sec. 17a-111b is an independent basis on which to terminate parental rights. 322 C. 231. Department's failure to make reasonable modifications to its services, programs or activities to accommodate a parent's disability would likely preclude a finding under Subdiv. (1) that the department's reunification efforts were reasonable under the circumstances. 326 C. 480. Subdiv. (3)(C): “act or acts of parental commission or omission” includes both positively harmful actions of a parent and a parent's more passive failures to take action to prevent harm from occurring, and respondents' omissions, namely their failure over the course of three years to acknowledge the cause of the child's injuries and to take therapeutic steps that would prevent a similar tragedy from occurring in the future, clearly fell within the purview of Subpara. 327 C. 506. The statutory criteria must be strictly complied with before the termination of parental rights can be accomplished and adoption proceedings begun. 334 C. 314. Cited. 30 CA 839; 49 CA 510. Resolution of whether termination petitions are appropriate requires a trial court to determine, inter alia, if termination of parental rights would serve best interests of the child. Id., 706. Trial court's determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights was not clearly erroneous where trial court concluded that respondent's failure to believe child when confronted with child's account of incidents of abuse as well as with abuser's admission of abuse, and respondent's failure to protect child from further abuse, to utilize reunification services and to cooperate with police and department to ensure child's protection, constitute acts violative of Subdiv. (3)(C). Id., 763. Moving out of state relevant circumstance to determination of reasonable effort to reunite family. 50 CA 554. Provisions for granting a petition under Subsec. interpreted. 51 CA 595. “Reasonable efforts” in Subdiv. (1) defined and department required to take into consideration parent's mental condition when determining what “reasonable efforts” to make at reunification. 54 CA 463. Trial court properly found, with respect to Subdiv. (3)(D), that biological father of the minor child did not maintain an ongoing parent-child relationship and that to allow additional time for establishing such a relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the minor child who had no positive memories of and negative feelings toward her father. 55 CA 807. Subdiv. (3): Abandonment focuses on parent's conduct and occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare; to “maintain” a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern and not a sporadic showing. 56 CA 12. As used in Subdiv. (3)(B), personal rehabilitation refers to restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent; Subdiv. (3)(B) is not void for vagueness; it provides fair warning of the conduct necessary for personal rehabilitation and provides minimum guidelines for enforcement. Id., 167. Failure to achieve rehabilitation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, which is something more than preponderance of the evidence, required in neglect proceedings and in other civil cases, but something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, required in criminal cases; rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time, which is a factual determination that must be made on case-by-case basis. Id., 688. “Personal rehabilitation” under Subdiv. (3)(B), revised to 1997, defined. 57 CA 441. Discussed re parent's failure to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation and lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship; Appellate Court need only find one statutory basis to affirm decision to terminate parental rights. 58 CA 234. Father abandoned child within meaning of statute; claim is not valid that section is unconstitutionally void for vagueness because it fails to put an incarcerated parent on notice re how to prevent termination of parental rights; section does not violate double jeopardy clause of U.S. Constitution as applied to incarcerated parent. Id., 244. Subdiv. (3)(B) requires trial court to analyze respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to needs of the child and such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time; trial court's finding that respondent failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation was not clearly erroneous. 61 CA 19. Adjudication of neglect is not a prerequisite to order terminating parental rights on the basis of abandonment. Id., 185. Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to apply Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test in denying respondent's motion to bifurcate termination hearing; Subsec. protects due process rights of respondent by requiring clear and convincing evidence in the adjudicatory phase. Id., 197. Evidence and standards re determination of degree of personal rehabilitation under Subdiv. (3)(B) in adjudicatory phase of termination proceedings discussed. Id., 224. Reasonable efforts, for purposes of Subdiv. (1), means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible; relative youth of respondent not an excuse in determination of failure to achieve personal rehabilitation under Subdiv. (3)(B). Id., 248. Department's act of offering mother substance abuse evaluation and treatment, parenting skill classes, domestic violence counseling, a family reunification program, a psychological evaluation and visitation constituted “reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent”; trial court's determination to terminate parental rights based on failure to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation affirmed. 62 CA 470. Father's claim under Subsec. is moot because father did not challenge court's finding that he was unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, which finding satisfied the statute's first prong; case is distinguishable from In re Valerie D . because here it was the father's own conduct, not conduct of a third party, that prevented development of a relationship with his children. Id., 500. Subdiv. (3)(D): Trial court's conclusion that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship was factually supported by the record; evidence established that 9-year-old child had no present memories of or feelings for respondent father and had never known his father; court also found by clear and convincing evidence that it was not in child's best interest to allow further time to establish a parent-child relationship because child is very emotionally fragile and suffers from several disorders, has bonded with his maternal grandparents who are making progress with him, has a strong need for permanency and respondent father is unable to understand child's special needs. 63 CA 516. Lack of rehabilitation may be demonstrated by the length of time in which defendant waits to begin the first rehabilitative steps. 65 CA 538. Court properly based its decision on 217 C. 459 where respondent, rather than the state, created circumstances that caused and perpetuated the lack of an ongoing relationship between respondent and the child. 67 CA 417. Trial court's determination that department had made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent and her child was not clearly erroneous. 68 CA 342. Trial court improperly concluded that department's efforts to reunify respondent with minor child were reasonable under circumstances of case where department acknowledged that decision not to engage respondent in further reunification efforts was based on prior experiences with respondent; at department's request, respondent completed substance abuse treatment yet department did not make reasonable efforts at reunification when it should have done so; trial court's finding that respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts not supported by clear and convincing evidence. 73 CA 637. In determining whether there was an ongoing parent-child relationship, it is the character of that relationship at the time of the filing of termination petition that is relevant to court's inquiry. 75 CA 466. Subdiv. (3)(B): Personal rehabilitation refers to restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent; statute requires court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's level of rehabilitation is less than that which would encourage a belief that he or she can assume a responsible position in the child's life within a reasonable time. 83 CA 17. Consideration of best interest of child comes after a determination that termination is warranted. 85 CA 528. Statutory requirements for termination of parental rights discussed; court properly concluded that commissioner had established, by clear and convincing evidence, that, despite parental skills training provided by department to parents, parents did not have ability to care for their daughters, either at time of termination proceedings or in the immediately foreseeable future; legislature's choice of “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof under Subsec. does not violate due process provisions of state constitution; state constitution does not require court or legislature to equate terminations of parental rights with criminal convictions. 90 CA 565. Judgment terminating father's parental rights was improper and could not stand where evidence showed department made no efforts to foster a relationship between child and father prior to filing of termination petition because father's paternity had not been conclusively established. 93 CA 42. Subdiv. (3): Although “serious physical injury” in Subpara. (F) is not defined in statute, the court looked to its commonly approved usage, which is its dictionary definition; when applied to circumstances of case, there is ample evidence that the child's physical injury, a broken elbow caused by respondent mother who threw her young child across the floor and failed to seek medical attention for her injury for almost five days after the assault, was serious since the assault caused a severe fracture to child's elbow, required casting and caused distress to the child for at least three weeks after the assault. 97 CA 748. Subdiv. (3)(B)(ii): Neither Appellate Court nor trial court may speculate, or make a finding with respect to a termination of parental rights petition, on the basis of evidence that is not in the record. 104 CA 635. Subdiv. (3)(B)(ii): Issue is not whether parent has improved her ability to manage her life but whether she has gained an ability to care for the specific needs of her children. Id., 744. Subdiv. (3)(B): In making the determination as to whether the parent has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation, the proper focus is on the parent's demonstrable development in relation to the needs of the child; the critical issue in assessing rehabilitation is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. 108 CA 839. In action for the termination of parental rights, the court did not deny respondent her procedural due process rights when conducting a trial on the merits with only her counsel present as the court still required petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence not only the grounds for termination, but that it was in the child's best interest for respondent's parental rights to be terminated. 111 CA 210. Trial court properly concluded that mother's denial of drug use and refusal to submit to drug testing supported adjudication that she failed to achieve personal rehabilitation under Subdiv. (3)(B); court properly determined that mother failed to achieve personal rehabilitation under section despite extensive use of support systems. 112 CA 69. Parental rights may be terminated under Subdiv. (3)(B)(i) because a parent must be able to meet the needs of the child, which are paramount, regardless of the needs of the parent, and the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved ability to manage own life but whether the parent has gained ability to care for the needs of the child. Id., 582. Reasonable efforts to reunite respondent and child were no longer appropriate where respondent abandoned child by leaving home and not communicating with child or inquiring as to child's welfare while respondent was living and incarcerated in another state or when he returned to Connecticut, where he failed to support child and was convicted and incarcerated for sexual assault of a minor. 115 CA 111. Department made reasonable efforts to reunify child with parent where department offered mother substance abuse treatment, group and individual therapy, drug testing, supervised and unsupervised visitation, parenting education, psychological evaluation, in-home reunification services, housing assistance and transportation and mother failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation and her inability to parent prevented her from assuming a responsible position with respect to her child. 117 CA 710. Subdiv. (3)(B): Trial court must analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child and whether prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child. 120 CA 523. Subsec. not unconstitutionally void for vagueness as applied to respondent since referral for sexual offender treatment was sufficient to put respondent on notice that failure to attend could result in termination of his parental rights. 121 CA 376. Court improperly required petitioner to prove a subordinate fact by clear and convincing evidence. 123 CA 103. Subdiv. (3): Unresolved issues of domestic violence and lack of stable, safe housing support conclusion that parent failed to achieve sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation; respondent did not demonstrate that her counsel's representation resulted in prejudice to her. 126 CA 71. A 3-month time frame for achieving necessary degree of personal rehabilitation was reasonable given the age and needs of the child. 129 CA 449. Subdiv. (3)(B): “Rehabilitation” is not limited to the conduct contemplated in the prescribed specific steps. 148 CA 308. Subdiv. (3)(B): The use of “provide” in Subpara. does not require physical delivery of the specific steps to parent where parent has evaded detection or refused to respond to department's inquiries, neither is there one-size-fits-all definition prescribing steps to be taken, rather, it is more consistent with jurisprudence in this area that this issue be addressed on case-by-case basis. 185 CA 512. Subdiv. (1): Where respondent challenged only one of the two separate and independent bases for upholding court's determination that the requirements of the Subdiv. had been satisfied, court unable to provide respondent with practical relief on appeal. 190 CA 583. In analyzing issue of reasonable reunification efforts under Subsec., trial court did not improperly fail to consider events that occurred after the adjudication date as there were no obvious factors that affected the practicality of reunification efforts prior to such date. 194 CA 633. Subdiv. (3)(D): Failure to establish that no parent-child relationship existed between respondent and child does not inevitably lead to conclusion that the parent-child relationship was normal and healthy or meaningful. 202 CA 106. Subdiv. (3)(C): Although the respondent did not commit physical or sexual abuse against his own children, his sexual assault of another minor and consequent incarceration resulted in his children being abused and neglected in the custody of their mother and denied his children the care, guidance, or control necessary for their wellbeing. 211 CA 275. Subdiv. (1): Mother's failure to challenge termination of parental rights on both statutory grounds rendered complaint moot. 218 CA 424. Subdiv. (3)(B): It is well established that personal rehabilitation does not require a parent to prove ability to assume full responsibility for the child, unaided by available support systems; although respondent argued that the evidentiary sufficiency standard of review in child protection cases should be replaced by the former clear error standard, the Supreme Court's decision in 318 C. 569, holding that the appropriate standard of review is evidentiary sufficiency, is binding. 220 CA 315, 322. Cited. 44 CS 551. Legislature intended that Subdiv. (3)(F) be applied retroactively to facts which took place prior to its enactment; also, the law to be applied in a termination proceeding is the law that exists at time termination proceeding is brought. 45 CS 586. Subdiv. (3)(B)(i): Respondent's due process rights were not violated because one of the elements authorizing termination of parental rights required proof by clear and convincing evidence that a neglect finding was made in a prior proceeding and did not require a relitigation of such finding in the termination proceeding. 53 CS 402. Subsec. (k) (former Subsec. (d)): Cited. 229 C. 345. The plain language of Subdiv. (4) directs the trial court to consider the children's emotional ties with a long list of people in determining whether termination of respondent's parental rights is in their best interest; nothing in Subdiv. (4), however, required the trial court to consider only the children's emotional ties with respondent; therefore, it was appropriate for the trial court to consider the children's emotional ties to the preadoptive foster family in considering whether termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interest; although a trial court shall consider and make written findings re the factors enumerated in Subsec., the trial court's determination of the best interests of a child will not be overturned on the basis of one factor if that determination is otherwise factually supported and legally sound. 317 C. 723. Cited. 24 CA 338; 30 CA 839; 33 CA 12; 38 CA 214; 39 CA 353; 44 CA 80. Trial court's findings that department had made the statutorily required “reasonable efforts” to reunify children with their mother were not supported by clear and convincing evidence; judgments reversed. 48 CA 290. Record supported trial court's factual findings where trial court found that respondent's decision to protect abuser, to deny or disregard the effects of sexual abuse on the child and to refuse counseling services prevented respondent from having a relationship with the child, and that department offered various counseling services to assist respondent and to facilitate reunification with the child, but respondent failed to utilize them. 49 CA 763. Subdiv. (1): Although respondent mother was offered a number of services by department aimed at reunification, including overnight visitation, visitation at the school and rehabilitation center, a bus pass to facilitate transportation, a psychological evaluation and various other social worker services, she failed to take advantage of them and to become more than minimally involved in her child's life; court found by clear and convincing evidence that department made reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite respondent mother with her child. 56 CA 12. In certain instances, court may be required to make written findings concerning child's emotional ties to preadoptive family; such finding is required when child has developed significant emotional ties to preadoptive family and that family has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least 1 year. 107 CA 395. In arriving at decision in dispositional phase of whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that continuation of respondent's parental rights is not in best interest of the child, court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding the 7 factors delineated in Subsec. 120 CA 523. Under Subsec., the word “reasonable” is the linchpin on which department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof; “reasonable efforts” means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. 124 CA 650. Subdiv. (7) does not require the court to consider the effect of respondent's illness and treatment when it evaluates the evidence. 163 CA 322; judgment reversed on alternate grounds, see 323 C. 640.