In re Crumb's Estate

127 N.Y.S. 269
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1911
StatusPublished

This text of 127 N.Y.S. 269 (In re Crumb's Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Crumb's Estate, 127 N.Y.S. 269 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1911).

Opinion

KILEY, S.

On May 23, 1906, Sarah M. Crumb, the above-named testatrix, was about 80 years of age. On that date she signed what purports to be her last will and testament. Pour witnesses subscribed their names and post-office addresses to the instrument at the time she signed her name. On September 25, 1908, she died. On January 8, 1909, the above-mentioned will was admitted to probate, without objection, by a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of Madison county which court had jurisdiction thereof. On January 3, 1910, a petition was filed under the then existing law by Jane Wiggins, sister of the testatrix, asking for a revocation of the probate of said will. The grounds alleged in the petition are the usual grounds: Failure of execution; lack of testamentary capacity; fraud and undue influence. The issues thus presented were controverted by the proponents. A long trial was had. The record contains 1,425 typewritten pages, besides voluminous documents put in as exhibits by both sides. Hereafter, in this memorandum, for convenience, those seeking to sustain the probate will be designated as proponents; those seeking to overthrow the will contestants.

Sarah M. Crumb resided at De Ruyter, this county, the widow of Joseph H. Crumb. Her husband predeceased her by many years. He left her his property, and at his death she was worth about $70,-000, all of which came from Mr. Crumb by gift before death and by will at death. She nor her immediate family, so far as the record shows, never possessed large properties by virtue of their own exertions or accumulating faculties. The property left by Joseph H. Crumb was about one-third personal and two-thirds real estate, the latter largely made up of farms in and about the township of De Ruyter, N. Y. Mrs. Crumb was one of 11 children, of which, as I understand from this record, one brother, De Volson Smith, and two sisters, Amy Smith and Jane Wiggins, survive. Mrs. Crumb’s maiden name was Smith.

The first issue tendered by the contestants is the insufficiency of the execution of the will. It may be taken as proved that the testa[271]*271trix signed her name before the signatures of the witnesses were affixed to the instrument. To this extent the difficulty encountered in Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153, is avoided. The conditions existing in case of Burke v. Nolan, 1 Dem. Sur. 436, do not exist here, in that the testator was in extremis, and no claim is made that he acknowledged after execution. In this case testatrix was up and dressed, sat at a table in a room which was used as a dining room and library. Troup v. Reid, 2 Dem. Sur. 471, follows the rule which seems to obtain at the present time. The will in question was signed by four witnesses. The witnesses, Coon, Smith, and Murray swore that they were asked by testatrix to sign her will as witnesses. The contestants claim that these requests so long antedated the execution of the will that' it should not be held as a matter of fact that it was the same will they signed as witnesses. I cannot find that this question has been heretofore raised, and am inclined to think that her request would apply to any will that she subsequently signed before these same witnesses. It was for her to say what will she would finally execute. As they signed only one before her as witnesses, her request could not apply to any other. The only question remaining is, Was it published? Two witnesses, Dr. Coon and Ira Smith, swear that in reply to Dr. Coon’s question she said it was her last will, and she desired them to sign it as witnesses.

This presents a state of facts to be passed upon, not a question of credibility of witnesses, because none swore positively that she did not state it was her will. We have not the situation where all of the witnesses do not recall the publication, or where any of the required number swear positively that the requirements of the statute were not substantially observed. This feature distinguishes this case from many of those cited by contestants, and, while, there is nothing to spare, I find that the necessary requirements of the statute were observed. In making this finding I am not unmindful of the provisions of section 2588 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the holding in Matter of Laudy, 148 N. Y. 403, 42 N. E. 1061, and hazard) the observation that, no matter which way this contest is decided, upon an appeal it would be sent back for a jury trial.

This situation arises somewhat from the fact that all surrogates have the tendency, and growing propensity, to uphold testamentary dispositions; not consciously, but unconsciously they lean toward the idea that he who has property, and gives it away, should be allowed to do as he desires with that which he has earned!, accumulated, or saved. This feeling is not confined to surrogates. We find the Court of Appeals laying down the rule in Clapp v. Fullarton, 34 N. Y. 197, 90 Am. Dec. 681:

“The right of a testator to dispose of his estate depends neither on the justice of his prejudices nor the soundness of his reasonings. He may do what he will with his own; and if there he no defect of testamentary capacity, and no undue influence or fraud, the law gives effect to his will, though its provisions are unreasonable and unjust.”

We now reach the second ground urged by the petitioner why the probate of this will should be revoked, viz., lack of testamentary capacity. If this issue stood alone and free from the one that fol[272]*272lows, viz., fraud and undue influence, it would not be difficult of a correct solution. We are bound by the rule laid down by the Court of Appeals early in its history and followed to the present day, as traced in the following decisions: Delafield v. Parish, 25 N. Y. 9. “A testator who has sufficient capacity to comprehend perfectly the condition of his property, his relations to the persons who were, or should, or might have been, the objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his will, is a person of sound mind! and memory within the meaning and intent of the statute of wills.” Horn v. Pullman, 72 N. Y. 269. Holds substantially it cannot be inferred from an enfeebled condition of mind or body that such a rule would be dangerous in the extreme, that the laws wisely sustain testamentary dispositions made by persons of impaired mental and bodily powers, provided the will is testator’s free act, and he has sufficient intelligence to comprehend the condition of his property and the meaning and scope of the provisions of his will. To like effect and tenor are Dobie v. Armstrong, 160 N. Y. 584, 55 N. E. 302; Pringle v. Burroughs, 185 N. Y. 375, 78 N. E. 150: But this issue of incompetency cannot be entirely separated from the issue raised as to fraud and undue influence.

Mrs. Crumb at the time of making this will was about 80 years of age. She was feeble in both mind and body. The result was not only of old age, but in the latter part of her life she passed through frequent and severe periods of sickness, so that at the díate of making this will her former naturally strong constitution and vigorous mind was well overthrown. Notwithstanding these conditions, the record shows, without contradiction, that she kept her grasp upon a multitude of business matters down to near the time of her death, over two years after the will was executed. Undue influence, as made out by the contestants, with the rules of evidence applicable to the state of facts adduced!, is the chief cause urged for the revocation of the will. Without incompetency to an extent that it takes away the power of the testatrix to resist importunity, the issue cannot be successfully urged and sustained.

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Related

Dobie v. . Armstrong
55 N.E. 202 (New York Court of Appeals, 1899)
Pringle v. . Burroughs
78 N.E. 150 (New York Court of Appeals, 1906)
Horn v. . Pullman
72 N.Y. 269 (New York Court of Appeals, 1878)
Delafield v. . Parish
25 N.Y. 9 (New York Court of Appeals, 1862)
In Re the Probate of the Will of Snelling
32 N.E. 1006 (New York Court of Appeals, 1893)
Jackson v. . Jackson
39 N.Y. 153 (New York Court of Appeals, 1868)
Rollwagen v. . Rollwagen
63 N.Y. 504 (New York Court of Appeals, 1876)
Clapp v. . Fullerton
34 N.Y. 190 (New York Court of Appeals, 1866)
In Re the Probate of the Will of Budlong
27 N.E. 945 (New York Court of Appeals, 1891)
In Re the Probate of the Last Will & Testament of Laudy
42 N.E. 1061 (New York Court of Appeals, 1895)
In Re the Probate of the Will of Smith
95 N.Y. 516 (New York Court of Appeals, 1884)
In re Seagrist
1 A.D. 615 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1896)
In re the Probate of the Last Will & Testament of Spratt
4 A.D. 1 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1896)
Chambers v. Chambers
61 A.D. 299 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1901)
In re the Probate of Last Will & Testament of Donohue
97 A.D. 205 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1904)
Burke v. Nolan
1 Dem. Sur. 436 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1882)
Troup v. Reid
2 Dem. Sur. 471 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1884)

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Bluebook (online)
127 N.Y.S. 269, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-crumbs-estate-nysurct-1911.