In Re Cram

406 B.R. 17, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1535, 2009 WL 1544385
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. New York
DecidedJune 3, 2009
Docket1-19-10349
StatusPublished

This text of 406 B.R. 17 (In Re Cram) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Cram, 406 B.R. 17, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1535, 2009 WL 1544385 (N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

DECISION & ORDER

JOHN C. NINFO, II, Bankruptcy Judge.

BACKGROUND

On March 24, 2004, Richard and Pamela S. Cram (the “Debtors”) filed a petition initiating a Chapter 13 case and George M. Reiber, Esq. was appointed as trustee (the “Trustee”).

On their Schedule B of Personal Property, the Debtors answered question No. 20 by indicating that they had no “[ojther contingent and unliquidated claims of [any] nature.... ” 1

On April 30, 2004, this Court orally confirmed their Chapter 13 Plan (the “Plan”), and on October 5, 2004 an Order confirming the Plan was entered (the “Confirmation Order”).

On June 14, 2005, the Debtors filed an Amendment (the “Amendment”) to their Schedule B of Personal Property, which amended the answer to question No. 20 regarding contingent and unliquidated claims, as follows:

*19 Medical malpractice claim against Mark F. Anthony, M.D., Dawn M. Heil, M.D., and Southern Tier Plastic Surgery Associates, P.C., for acts and omissions committed during the period June 19, 2001 through February 18, 2002, in an undetermined amount. Action has been sued out and is pending in New York Supreme Court, County of Chemung under Index No. 2004-1865. 2

There is no indication on the Court’s docket that between June 14, 2005 and April 7, 2008 the Debtors or their attorneys either: (1) notified the Court of the existence of the prepetition medical malpractice claim set forth in the Amendment (the “Malpractice Claim”), which was a Section 541 asset of the estate at the time the Court confirmed their Plan, even though in confirming their Plan pursuant to Section 1325(a) the Court believed that the requirement of Section 1325(a)(4), 3 that the creditors would receive at least as much under the Plan that they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation (the “Best Interests Test”) had been met; or (2) filed a modification of their confirmed Chapter 13 Plan in order to provide that any nonexempt proceeds they might receive from the Malpractice Claim would be paid into the Plan and distributed to creditors in order to meet the Best Interests Test.

On April 7, 2008, in accordance with the procedures for cases filed prior to the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the office of the Trustee submitted an Order Discharging Debtor After Completion of Chapter 13 Plan (the “Discharge Order”) in the Debtors’ case. The Discharge Order was signed on April 7, 2008 and entered on April 8, 2008.

On May 13, 2008, the Trustee filed an ex-parte Application (the “Application”) and proposed Order to Revoke the Debtors’ Discharge (the “Revocation Order”). The Application indicated that the Debtors’ case should have remained open because of a newly discovered undisclosed prepetition asset. On May 15, 2008, the Court entered the Revocation Order.

On May 22, 2008, the Debtors filed a Motion to Vacate the Revocation Order (the “Motion to Vacate”), which asserted that: (1) Section 1328(e) 4 provided that any request by a party-in-interest to revoke a discharge required notice and a hearing, and the Trustee had never notified the Debtors or their attorneys of his Application; (2) in order to revoke a debt- or’s discharge, the debtor must have obtained the discharge through fraud and the party requesting the revocation must have been unaware of the fraud until after the discharge was granted; and (3) to the extent that the Trustee was asserting that *20 the Debtors’ fraud consisted of failing to originally schedule the Malpractice Claim, the Debtors did file the Amendment to include the Malpractice Claim, and the Trustee was aware of the Amendment and the Malpractice Claim prior to the entry of the Discharge Order.

On June 23, 2008, the Trustee interposed a Response to the Motion to Vacate and a Cross Motion (the “Cross Motion”), which asserted that: (1) the Trustee was advised of the Malpractice Claim in May 2005 when he received notice from a personal injury attorney who had commenced a New York State Court action on the Claim; (2) in June 2005, the Trustee notified the Debtors’ personal injury attorney and their bankruptcy attorneys that they must notify him of any settlement offers; (3) on April 28, 2008, after the Discharge Order had been entered on April 7, 2008, Southern Tier Plastic Surgery, a scheduled creditor of the Debtors who was also a defendant in the Malpractice Claim, advised the Trustee that the Claim had been settled on or about February 20, 2008 for $125,000 (the “Settlement”); (4) neither the Debtors, their bankruptcy attorneys nor their personal injury attorney ever notified the Trustee of the Settlement or any prior settlement offers that may have ultimately resulted in the Settlement; (5) the submission of the Discharge Order by the office of the Trustee was an inadvertent clerical error that resulted because the staff member who submitted the Order was unaware of either the originally unscheduled Malpractice Claim or the Trustee’s involvement in attempting to administer the Claim on behalf of the Chapter 13 estate; (6) the Court correctly entered the Revocation Order pursuant to Rule 9024 because the Discharge Order had been entered as the result of a clerical error; (7) in view of the Settlement that liquidated the Malpractice Claim, the Debtors’ confirmed Plan did not meet the Best Interests Test; and (8) the Court should deny the Motion to Vacate and it should dismiss the Debtors’ bankruptcy case. 5

On June 25, 2008, the Trustee filed a motion, pursuant to Section 1329(a), 6 to modify the Debtors’ Plan (the “Motion to Modify”), which asserted that the Plan did not meet the Best Interests Test when it was confirmed because of the undisclosed Malpractice Claim that had now been liquidated, so that the Court should approve a modification of the Plan requiring the Debtors to turnover proceeds from the Settlement to the extent required to pay their unsecured creditors a total dividend of 100% plus 9% interest (the New York State judgment rate), which was the amount that the unsecured creditors would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation case.

The Debtors failed to interpose Opposition to the Motion to Modify, but the Debtors orally opposed the Motion to Modify at the hearing on July 25, 2008. Upon oral argument, the Motion to Modify was granted and an Order was entered by the Court on July 28, 2008 (the “Modification Order”). 7

*21 On December 18, 2008, the Trustee filed a Motion to Convert the Debtors’ Chapter 7 Case, pursuant to Section 1307(c) 8 (the “Motion to Convert”), which asserted that: (1) because of the Debtors’ bad faith in not turning over the proceeds of the Settlement, as required by the Modification Order, there was sufficient cause for the Debtors’ case to be converted to a Chapter 7 case.

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Related

Power of court
11 U.S.C. § 105
Conversion or dismissal
11 U.S.C. § 1307
Confirmation of plan
11 U.S.C. § 1325
Discharge
11 U.S.C. § 1328

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
406 B.R. 17, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1535, 2009 WL 1544385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-cram-nywb-2009.