Opinion issued April 15, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00570-CV ——————————— IN RE COMMITMENT OF NATHANIEL HAWKINS
On Appeal from the 177th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 0727433-0101Z
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a civil-commitment action under the Sexually Violent Predators Act
(“SVP Act”). See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 841.001–.209. The State of
Texas brought this case to have Nathaniel Hawkins civilly committed for
involuntary treatment and supervision as a sexually violent predator. The jury
unanimously found in favor of Hawkins, and the trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. The State raises a single issue on appeal, arguing the trial court
improperly denied it the right to present a rebuttal argument in closing. We affirm.
I. The SVP Act
The SVP Act requires the State to prove that a person is a “sexually violent
predator” before he can be civilly committed. See id. § 841.062. A sexually violent
predator is someone who (1) is a “repeat sexually violent offender” and (2) “suffers
from a behavioral abnormality that makes [him] likely to engage in a predatory act
of sexual violence.” Id. § 841.003(a). A person is a repeat sexually violent offender
if he is convicted of more than one “sexually violent offense” and a sentence is
imposed on at least one of those convictions. Id. § 841.003(b). A behavioral
abnormality is a “congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person’s
emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent
offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of
another person.” Id. § 841.002(2). The State must prove these elements “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” and in a jury trial, the verdict must be unanimous. Id. § 841.062.
II. Background
At trial, the State presented testimony from two witnesses: Hawkins and Dr.
Christine Reed, a clinical and forensic psychologist who evaluated Hawkins for a
behavioral abnormality under the SVP Act. The State also presented documentary
evidence in the form of Dr. Reed’s curriculum vitae and three “penitentiary packets”
2 reflecting Hawkins’ convictions and sentences. Other than his cross-examination of
Dr. Reed and his direct testimony, Hawkins did not present any evidence.
A. “Repeat sexually violent offender” element
Regarding the “repeat sexually violent offender” element, the State introduced
evidence that Hawkins had been convicted of two sexually violent offenses. First,
in 1972, he was convicted of rape for which he was sentenced to ten years’
confinement. This conviction involved an incident when Hawkins was seventeen
years old and working at a cemetery. The victim, a sixty-nine-year-old woman, was
placing flowers on her deceased husband’s grave when Hawkins attacked her with
his fists, raped her, locked her in the trunk of her car, and then drove her to a nearby
parking lot. Hawkins generally denied that he committed the offense to Dr. Reed
and at trial.
Second, in 1997 and when he was forty-two years old, Hawkins was convicted
of aggravated sexual assault of a child for which he was sentenced to thirty-five
years’ confinement. This conviction involved an instance in which Hawkins was
babysitting his eleven-year-old niece. Hawkins masturbated in front of her in a car
and then made her get in the back seat, where he sexually and physically assaulted
her. The niece escaped and told police Hawkins was smoking crack before the
incident. Again, Hawkins generally denied that he committed the offense to Dr.
Reed and at trial.
3 B. “Behavioral abnormality” element
To establish the “behavioral abnormality” element, the State relied on Dr.
Reed’s testimony. Dr. Reed testified that after completing her education, she began
working in the field of forensic psychology in 2008 and has been a forensic
psychologist ever since. Dr. Reed explained that in her role as a forensic
psychologist, she does not perform therapeutic work with patients aimed at
rehabilitation; instead, her practice consists exclusively of assessments and
evaluations for use in the legal system or in the employment-screening context. On
cross-examination, Dr. Reed testified that her last involvement in the treatment of
patients was during a fellowship in 2007, that she is not board certified in forensic
psychology, and that she has not published in the field of sexually violent predators
or performed research in recidivism. She has not previously testified for the defense
in a civil-commitment proceeding. Dr. Reed testified that she has conducted
approximately ninety behavioral-abnormality evaluations.
To conduct her behavioral-abnormality evaluation of Hawkins, Dr. Reed
reviewed Hawkins’ criminal-history records, his medical- and mental-health
records, his prison records, and notes from his sex-offender treatment. She also
interviewed him twice, once in January 2021 and again in November 2022. Those
interviews were conducted via videoconference; Dr. Reed never met with Hawkins
in person. Nor did she speak to Hawkins’ family members or friends. Dr. Reed
4 testified she did not get a “complete history” for Hawkins, but she “feel[s] like [she]
got an adequate history.”
Based on her assessment, Dr. Reed opined that Hawkins suffers from a
behavioral abnormality. She reached this opinion because Hawkins displayed the
two most significant risk factors for sexual recidivism: sexual deviance and an
antisocial lifestyle. Dr. Reed testified that sexual deviance is “sexual behavior that
significantly deviates from the norm,” and an antisocial lifestyle is one that is marked
by a person’s “persistent disregard [for] or violation of the rights of others.” Dr.
Reed came to these conclusions based in part on Hawkins’ criminal history.
Dr. Reed considered it significant that Hawkins’ victim in the 1972 rape was
a stranger, because “[h]aving victims that are strangers to you is considered a risk
factor for re-offending.” She also considered the following offenses significant
because Hawkins has engaged in criminal behavior beyond sexual offenses as
somebody “that violates the rules,” which is evidence of anti-sociality.
In 1980, about a year after he was released from prison for the 1972 rape
conviction, Hawkins was convicted of false imprisonment for using a firearm to
restrain his wife. Hawkins told Dr. Reed that he was separated from his wife at the
time, that she had become jealous of him, and that “he just didn’t have any time for
it.” Dr. Reed characterized Hawkins’ explanation as “minimiz[ing] his behavior”
5 and “not taking responsibility for his actions.” Hawkins received a sentence of six
months in jail for this offense.
In 1990, Hawkins was convicted of two counts of criminal mischief and two
counts of aggravated assault on a police officer, stemming from an incident in which
he kicked in the window of his girlfriend’s car and then attacked the police officers
who apprehended him. Hawkins testified he had no recollection of this incident.
In 1994, when Hawkins was forty-one, he was convicted of indecent exposure
and indecency with a child by exposure. These convictions stemmed from an
instance in which Hawkins exposed his genitals to a two-year-old girl. The girl’s
mother asserted she saw Hawkins masturbating and exposing himself to her daughter
while making profane comments. When the police arrived, they found Hawkins
nearby with his genitals exposed. The police described Hawkins as smelling of
alcohol, and they found drug paraphernalia near him. Hawkins denied having
committed the offense to Dr. Reed and, at trial, claimed he knew the mother, who
fabricated the story to get revenge against him.
In 1996, when warrants were issued for Hawkins’ arrest about four months
after the aggravated sexual assault against his niece, Hawkins bit and punched two
of the officers who came to arrest him. He was convicted of two counts of
aggravated assault on a police officer and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.
These assault charges also resulted in the revocation of Hawkins’ probation for the
6 indecency charges, thus imposing a ten-year prison sentence for those crimes. At
trial, Hawkins denied biting or punching the officers.
Hawkins has also received disciplinary violations while in prison, including
for sexual misconduct. In addition to being written up for non-sexual infractions
such as fighting and threatening to kill an officer, Hawkins received approximately
twelve disciplinary violations for conduct such as exposing himself and
masturbating in the direction of female correctional officers. The most recent was
in 2020, when Hawkins was sixty-six years old. Hawkins generally denies these
offenses and blames others, including stating that the victim of his 2020 exposure
was “one of those hot mama officers that wants everybody’s attention and she
thought it was happening, but it wasn’t.” Dr. Reed considered these significant
because Hawkins again blames his victims and engages in nonconsensual sexual
behavior.
Dr. Reed also found it significant that Hawkins’ victims ranged in age from
two to sixty-nine and that he engaged in both contact and noncontact sexual offenses.
She viewed this “broad range of potential victims” and “different behaviors” as
supporting a “risk to re-offend sexually.” She also found meaningful the fact that
Hawkins was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of many of his
offenses because that “puts you at risk for re-offending.” She gave Hawkins a score
on the Static-99 test which places him at an above-average risk of re-offending
7 compared to other sex offenders. And she also concluded Hawkins’ age of sixty-
nine years old was not a factor that reduced the risk of re-offending for him because
he had engaged in sexual offenses after the ages of forty and sixty years old, which
are generally markers when offending behavior declines.
Although Hawkins completed a nine-month sex offender treatment program
while in prison, Dr. Reed determined that, because he denied committing any sexual
offenses, “[h]e was just submitting to what the program wanted him to do.”
However, she also admitted research shows that “successful completion of sex
offender treatment can reduce someone’s risk for re-offending.” Hawkins testified
the program helped him “a whole lot,” and he had not been cited for any sexual
misconduct after completing the program.
Dr. Reed ultimately diagnosed Hawkins with three conditions relating to
sexual deviancy—pedophilic disorder, exhibitionistic disorder, and unspecified
paraphilic disorder with sadistic interests noted—explaining these can “predispose
a person to commit a predatory act of sexual violence.” But she admitted it is
possible for a person to be diagnosed with all three of these conditions and not have
a behavioral abnormality. She stopped short of diagnosing Hawkins with antisocial
personality disorder, saying she did not have sufficient information about his
childhood. She also did not classify Hawkins as a psychopath, which is a risk factor
for re-offending, because he scored twenty-six on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist,
8 whereas a score of thirty is generally required to classify someone as a psychopath.
And Dr. Reed conceded she could not predict at any percentage, such as fifty percent,
that Hawkins would commit a sexual offense in the future and testified Hawkins “is
someone that can control his behavior when he chooses to do so.”
During his testimony, Hawkins, who had been in prison for twenty-seven
years, admitted he exhibited antisocial traits when he was younger but believes he
no longer has them. He testified the sex offender treatment he completed helped
“[a] whole lot.” He explained the disciplinary infractions he received early on for
fighting in prison was him standing up for himself. Hawkins also said he had not
consumed alcohol or drugs while in prison and he performs volunteer work, takes
vocational courses, and participates in a Bible study. Overall, Hawkins believes he
is “wiser and more mature” than when he first entered prison. Hawkins does not
believe he will commit another sex offense or that he is a sexually violent predator.
C. Closing argument
After the evidence closed and the trial court read the charge to the jury, the
parties presented closing argument. Before they began, the parties agreed each side
would be allowed fifteen minutes for closing. The State did not specifically ask to
reserve any portion of its allotted time for rebuttal, nor did the trial court ask the
State if it wanted to reserve time for rebuttal.
9 The State’s counsel began closing argument at 11:14 a.m. She spent the first
minute discussing the “repeat sexually violent offender” element and then seven
minutes discussing the “behavioral abnormality” element. The State’s counsel noted
Dr. Reed’s “extensive experience” in assessing behavioral abnormalities and
explained in detail the work Dr. Reed performed in diagnosing Hawkins, the
foundations for her diagnoses, and why she believes he is a sexually violent predator
who suffers from a behavioral abnormality that predisposes him to re-offend. The
State’s counsel reiterated Dr. Reed’s testimony about Hawkins’ risk factors of sexual
deviance and anti-sociality, his “wide victim pool,” the variety of his sexual
offenses, some of which involved violence, his age and therapy not being mitigating
factors, and his refusal to accept responsibility but to blame his victims. The State’s
counsel concluded her eight-minute argument at 11:22 a.m., with seven minutes
remaining of the fifteen minutes allotted to each side.
Hawkins’ counsel began closing argument at 11:23 a.m. He explained that
the purpose of a civil commitment is not to add punishment for past crimes but to
decide if a person has a behavioral abnormality that makes him a threat to society.
He then challenged Dr. Reed’s opinions, noting that Dr. Reed opined Hawkins can
control his behavior when he wants and cannot predict the future. Hawkins’ counsel
attacked Dr. Reed’s methodology and testing, including arguing that the Static-99
test is flawed and that Dr. Reed could not say Hawkins has a fifty-percent chance of
10 re-offending. Hawkins’ counsel also challenged the factual foundations of Dr.
Reed’s diagnoses regarding pedophilia, unspecified paraphilic disorder, sadism, and
exhibitionistic disorder, emphasizing Hawkins’ testimony regarding the lifestyle
changes he has made in prison and that Dr. Reed failed to research Hawkins’
childhood and education. Hawkins’ counsel also briefly challenged Dr. Reed’s
credentials and biases, specifically that she has not published regarding sex
offenders, lacks a board certification, and testifies mainly for the State. Hawkins’
counsel ended his fifteen-minute closing at 11:38 a.m.
When the defense finished its argument, the trial court started to instruct the
jury to begin deliberations, and the State’s counsel requested a bench conference.
At the bench, the State’s counsel requested an opportunity to rebut the defense
argument, to which the trial court responded, “You didn’t say at the beginning that
you wanted to rebut and break your time up. I wrote it down. You used your 15
minutes up like we agreed to.” The trial court repeated this multiple times to the
State’s counsel. The State’s counsel requested additional time for rebuttal if she did
use up the fifteen minutes. The trial court asked Hawkins’ counsel if she would
agree to give the State additional time, and she said, “We prefer not to.” The trial
court denied the State’s request for additional time.
The jury then began its deliberations. After around thirty-five minutes, the
jury asked to review all physical evidence, and the trial court sent all exhibits to the
11 jury. After around one hour and fifty minutes, the jury was brought in and its
unanimous verdict finding Hawkins is not a sexually violent predator was read.
III. Analysis
The State’s sole issue is that the trial court committed reversible error when it
precluded the State’s counsel from presenting its rebuttal closing argument.
A. Relevant law
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 269 governs closing argument and, in relevant
part, provides, “[t]he party having the burden of proof . . . shall be entitled to open
and conclude the argument[.]” TEX. R. CIV. P. 269(a). We review a trial court’s
rulings regarding closing argument for an abuse of discretion. See In re Commitment
of Dodson, 434 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied). An
abuse of discretion regarding closing argument is subject to harmless-error analysis
and does not require reversal unless it “probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); Bryant v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 175 S.W.3d
845, 850 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied). In considering harm, we examine
the entire record. See Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 676 (Tex. 2018). Whether
an error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment “necessarily is a
judgment call entrusted to the sound discretion and good senses of the reviewing
court.” McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1992).
12 B. Analysis
Assuming the trial court abused its discretion when it disallowed the State’s
counsel from presenting rebuttal argument when she had time left, we conclude the
error was not harmful.1
The State contends the error was reversibly harmful because it precluded the
State from rebutting Hawkins’ “prolonged attacks on Dr. Reed’s qualifications,
training, knowledge, methods, conclusions, bias, and ultimate opinion.” The State
does not suggest what additional argument it would have made during rebuttal that
was critical for the jury to understand regarding Dr. Reed and that was not already
made during the State’s presentation of the evidence and its eight-minute closing
argument. See Vasquez v. State, 484 S.W.3d 526, 532–33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“In evaluating whether a defendant was harmed by the trial
court’s exclusion of the defendant’s argument, an appellate court may consider the
extent to which the defendant communicated his argument despite the trial court’s
rulings.”).
1 In arguing reversible error, the State relies on a 1945 case in which the trial court’s refusal to permit rebuttal argument was held to be erroneous and presumed injurious even though there was no record of the four days of trial testimony. Stolpher v. Bowen Motor Coaches, 190 S.W.2d 376, 379–80 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1945, writ ref’d w.o.m.). Because Stolpher was decided before the adoption of harmless- error analysis in Rule 44.1(a), and because we have the full record of trial testimony allowing us to conduct a harmless-error analysis, we conclude Stolpher is distinguishable.
13 This case did not involve dense, confusing evidence and convoluted issues
that the parties’ argument would particularly aid the jury in deciphering. See Dang
v. State, 154 S.W.3d 616, 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (recognizing factors to be
considered in determining whether trial court improperly limited time for closing
include “the quantity of the evidence,” “the duration of the trial,” “conflicts in the
testimony,” and “the complexity of the case”). The parties presented their evidence
in one day, during which only two witnesses testified, Dr. Reed and Hawkins. As
set forth above, the State presented evidence regarding Hawkins’ past sexually
violent offenses, his long history of additional sexual and non-sexual offenses and
disciplinary issues in prison, and Dr. Reed’s detailed opinions regarding Hawkins’
diagnoses and bases for those opinions. Hawkins likewise presented testimony for
why he is a different person after twenty-seven years in prison and not a continuing
threat. Only four exhibits were admitted with a combined total of thirty-six pages.
The jury requested and was provided with these exhibits during deliberations. The
first exhibit was Dr. Reed’s curriculum vitae detailing her educational background,
including her doctoral and post-doctoral emphasis in psychology, and her extensive
professional, clinical, research, and teaching experience. The remaining exhibits
were penitentiary packets regarding Hawkins’ criminal convictions. The jury charge
was not complicated, contained instructions that tracked the requirements of the SVP
14 Act, and had a single question asking whether the jury found “beyond a reasonable
doubt that [Hawkins] is a sexually violent predator[.]”
Accordingly, the jury reviewed Dr. Reed’s qualifications and the details of
Hawkins’ offenses as it deliberated Dr. Reed’s opinions that Hawkins’ is a sexually
violent predator predisposed to re-offend, and Hawkins’ testimony that he has
changed his ways and is not a threat to society. Notwithstanding the absence of a
rebuttal argument, the jury heard competing argument from the State and Hawkins
regarding the credibility of Dr. Reed’s opinions. After almost two hours of
deliberation, the jury unanimously chose to disbelieve Dr. Reed’s ultimate opinion
that Hawkins is a sexually violent predator, as was its prerogative to do. See In re
Commitment of Williams, 539 S.W.3d 429, 440–41 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2017, no pet.) (explaining jury has discretion to resolve conflicts regarding expert’s
opinion defendant is a sexually violent predator). The State has not explained why,
nor do we conclude, the lack of additional argument (which, of course, is not
evidentiary2 and likely would have been cumulative of what had already been
presented) probably caused the jury to rule this way.
Analogously, courts have held that improper closing argument in commitment
cases did not probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment. See, e.g., In re
2 See Fallon v. M.D. Anderson Physicians Network, 586 S.W.3d 58, 75 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (recognizing lawyers’ arguments are not evidence). 15 Commitment of Summers, No. 01-19-00738-CV, 2021 WL 3776751, at *16 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that, even if
State made improper argument, it would not result in reversible error because “the
record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could conclude
that Summers is a sexually violent predator”); In re Commitment of Alexander, No.
09-11-00650-CV, 2013 WL 5425557, at *9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 26, 2013,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding State’s improper argument did not warrant reversal
because it did not likely cause “the jury to disregard their instructions to ‘not let bias,
prejudice, or sympathy play any part in your decision’”). Just as an improper closing
argument may not be harmful error depending upon a case’s circumstances, we
conclude that, under this case’s circumstances, the denial of rebuttal argument was
not harmful. We overrule the State’s sole argument.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Andrew Johnson Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.