In Re Commitment of James Edward Jarvis v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 25, 2025
• Docket: 01-23-00555-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued February 25, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00555-CV ——————————— IN RE COMMITMENT OF JAMES EDWARD JARVIS

On Appeal from the 10th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 22-CV-1653

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an action under the Texas Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent

Predators Act (“the SVP Act”). See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 841.001–.209.

A jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant James Edward Jarvis is a

sexually violent predator, and the trial court rendered final judgment on the verdict

and issued a commitment order. In a single issue, Jarvis argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing his request for a jury instruction that he is presumed not to

be a sexually violent predator. We affirm.

Background The State brought this civil-commitment action against Jarvis, alleging he is

a sexually violent predator who could soon be released on parole from incarceration

for conviction of a sexually violent offense. Through counsel, Jarvis answered and

defended against the allegations.

During the jury trial, the State presented evidence of Jarvis’s seven prior

convictions for sexually violent offenses against his four children. The State also

presented psychological and psychiatric experts who opined Jarvis suffers from a

behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual

violence in the future.

After both sides rested, the trial court conducted a charge conference during

which Jarvis’s counsel orally requested an instruction that Jarvis is presumed not to

be a sexually violent predator; the trial court refused the request. The jury

unanimously found Jarvis is a sexually violent predator. The trial court rendered

judgment on the verdict, civilly committing Jarvis so that, upon his release from

incarceration, he shall be transported immediately to a residential facility under the

supervision of the Texas Civil Commitment Office.

2 Jarvis filed a motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of law. He

now appeals.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Refusing Jarvis’s Presumption Instruction

Jarvis argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing his requested

instruction that he is presumed not to be a sexually violent predator.

A. Relevant law

A commitment proceeding under the SVP Act is a civil proceeding that

incorporates the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof typically reserved

for criminal cases. In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex.

2020); In re Commitment of Roy, No. 01-22-00682-CV, 2023 WL 8041044, at *6

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Under the SVP

Act, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is a sexually

violent predator. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.062(a). A person is a

“sexually violent predator” if two elements are proved: (1) the person is a repeat

sexually violent offender; and (2) the person suffers from a behavioral abnormality

that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Id.

§ 841.003(a).

A civil-commitment proceeding under the SVP Act “is subject to the rules of

procedure and appeal for civil cases,” but if a conflict exists between the SVP Act

and the rules of civil procedure, the SVP Act controls. Id. § 841.146(b); In re

3 Commitment of James, No. 01-19-00734-CV, 2021 WL 4597105, at *11 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 7, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We review a trial

court’s refusal to submit a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. See Thota v.

Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012); In re Commitment of Williams, 539

S.W.3d 429, 444 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). “A trial court may

refuse to give a requested instruction or definition that is not necessary to enable the

jury to render a verdict, even if the instruction or definition is a correct statement of

the law.” In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543, 554 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).

B. Analysis

Assuming Jarvis preserved his request for a presumption instruction, we

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the instruction. Jarvis

references presumptions that apply in other contexts—such as the presumption of

innocence in criminal prcoeedings or the presumptions of competency, legitimacy,

and best interest of children in civil proceedings—but cites no legal authority that

the respondent in a civil-commitment proceeding is entitled to a presumption that he

is not a sexually violent predator. The authority we found is to the contrary. See In

re Commitment of Pearson, No. 07-23-00208-CV, 2023 WL 8248052, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo, Nov. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The instruction requested by

4 Pearson is not mandated by statute or by caselaw. Nothing in the SVP Act creates a

presumption for either the State or the respondent in such proceedings.”).

Moreover, the trial court’s charge included several instructions providing

protections akin to those Jarvis sought in his request, including that (1) the jury

should not “let bias, prejudice, or sympathy play any part” in its decision, (2) the

State has the burden of proving each element of its claim beyond a reasonable doubt,

and the burden “never shifts to [Jarvis] to prove he is not a sexually violent predator,”

and (3) the jury may answer “yes” only based on a belief beyond a reasonable doubt

and must answer “no” if the jury does not make such a finding.

The jury is presumed to have followed these instructions, which made it clear

Jarvis had no burden and the State had the burden to prove its claim beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Primoris Energy Servs. Corp. v. Myers, 569 S.W.3d 745, 758

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“[W]e presume that the jury

followed the charge.”). As have other courts considering the same issue, we

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Jarvis’s requested

presumption instruction. See In re Commitment of Mueller, No. 14-23-00044-CV,

2023 WL 8943743, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 28, 2023, pet.

denied) (mem. op.) (holding no abuse of discretion because instructions provided to

jury gave substantially the same information that respondent requested in his

5 presumption instruction); In re Commitment of Pearson, 2023 WL 8248052, at *2

(same).1

We overrule Jarvis’s sole appellate issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Andrew Johnson Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

1 Even if the trial court abused its discretion by refusing the instruction, such error was harmless. Consistent with the jury instructions, the trial court, State, and Jarvis repeatedly explained during voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments that the State had the burden of proof, not Jarvis. It was conclusively established that Jarvis is a repeat sexually violent offender who pled guilty to seven different sexually violent offenses against his four children committed from 1991 to 1997 across three counties. And two experienced experts in behavioral abnormality regarding sexual offenders opined in detail why and how they determined Jarvis is predisposed to commit sexually violent offenses in the future. Any error in failing to submit Jarvis’s requested instruction most likely had no effect on the jury’s determination and did not probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a). 6