In re Colon

558 B.R. 563, 2016 WL 5820026
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedSeptember 30, 2016
DocketCASE NO. 06-04675 (ESL)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 558 B.R. 563 (In re Colon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Colon, 558 B.R. 563, 2016 WL 5820026 (prb 2016).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

Enrique S. Lamoutte, United States Bankruptcy Judge

The issue pending in this case is whether Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (hereinafter referred to as “Banco Popular” or “BPPR”) and its affiliate Popular Auto,' Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Popular Auto”) failed to comply with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) because at the time the involuntary petition was filed (November 22, 2006) against Dr. Edgar Abner Reyes Colón (hereinafter referred to as “Involuntary Debtor” or “Dr. Reyes”) Dr. Reyes had more than twelve (12) creditors. This court, in the opinion and order entered on May 23, 2012 (docket # 404) (‘the “Opinion and Order”), In re Colon, 474 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012), found that as of petition date the Involuntary Debtor had 15 creditors and that there are only two petitioning creditors. However, the court also concluded that the judicially created “special circumstances exception” to the numerosity requirement in § 303(b) may apply if the petitioning creditors establish fraud, artifice or scam “based upon the alleged fraudulent transfers made by the Involuntary Debtor to various corporations prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.” Thereafter, “if the petitioning creditors prove that special circumstances are indeed present in this case, then the court would have to determine whether the Involuntary Debtor was ‘generally not paying such debtor’s debts as such debts become due’ pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) in order to grant the order of relief in this case.” See order entered on August 10, 2015 (dkt. # 488).

This case is also before the court upon the Involuntary Debtor’s renewed motion to dismiss the involuntary petition. The Involuntary Debtor reasserts its contention that the involuntary petition must be dismissed because the same fails to comply with the statutory provisions in 11 U. S. C. § 303(b)(1) and (2), requiring that whenever there are more than 12 creditors, at least three undisputed creditors must join the petition. The Involuntary Debtor also reaffirms its legal conclusion that after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Law v. Siegel, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014), the “special circumstances exception” addressed in this court’s order of May 12, 2012 is not applicable, and that it has so been determined by recent decisions.

The travel and facts of this case are found in the opinion of May 12, 2012. In re [565]*565Reyes Colon, 474 B.R. 330 (Bkrtcy. D.P.R. 2012) (Lamoutte, BJ). See also the orders entered on August 10, 2015 (dkt. #488) and October 28, 2015 (dkt. #540). The issue pending after these decisions was whether there were facts warranting that the “special circumstances exception” to the creditor numerosity requirement, as determined in In re Moss, 249 B.R. 411 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000), be applied in this case. After a thorough analysis of all the evidence presented to this court and the applicable law, the court concludes that there are special circumstances due to the Involuntary Debtor’s scheme to misrepresent his financial condition, but that such misconduct may not override the statutory requirement that three or more creditors join in the filing of an involuntary petition when there are 12 or more creditors. In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges that after Law v. Siegel, its equitable powers have been significantly diminished.

The court held evidentiary hearings in November and December 2015 to consider whether there are special circumstances warranting the exception to the three or more creditor requirement in section 303(b). The minutes of said hearings include a detail of both the documentary evidence and the testimony of the witnesses presented. See docket numbers 633, 704, 706, 709, 716 and 720. The court incorporates said minutes and attaches the same hereto as constituting its findings of fact. The inferences from the testimony of the witnesses presented by the petitioning creditors, that is, professionals who have worked with or for the Involuntary Debt- or, show that these professionals (accountants[Mr. Félix Román Dávila], certified public accountants [CPA Félix N. Negron Román], attorneys [Eric Y. Reyes Colón, Esq.], notary publics [Maria Torres Cart-agena, Esq.], friends and associates [Dr. Francisco J. Quintero Peña]) related to Dr. Reyes exhibited convenient or selective amnesia to blur the economic scenario of Dr. Edgar A. Reyes and to orchestrate a seheme to deceive creditors by misrepresenting transactions to transfer assets, as well as the financial condition of the Involuntary Debtor and related entities, which misrepresentations ultimately were aimed at benefiting the Involuntary Debtor. These individuals voluntarily agreed to misinform creditors. The uncontroverted testimony and the reports (Exhibit 41 and Exhibit 42) of the expert witness, CPA Eduardo Soria, CPA/ABV, CVA, CIA, CFE, Esq., pellucidly established the involuntary debtor’s fraudulent actions and scheme. The witnesses’ testimony, as incorporated and analyzed by CPA Eduardo Soria, evince a puppet scheme approach on the part of Dr. Edgar- A, Reyes to defraud Banco Popular. Therefore, the court finds that the scheme to defraud constitutes special circumstances.

However, only two creditors joined the petition, and the Involuntary Debtor had more than twelve creditors. Therefore, the court is compelled to balance the statutory requirements for filing an involuntary petition and the application of equity principles in the administration of bankruptcy proceedings.

The view that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity was summarized in The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corporation v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 567 (3d Cir. 2003), as follows:

The Supreme Court has long recognized that bankruptcy courts are equitable tribunals that apply equitable principles in the administration of bankruptcy proceedings. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240, 54 S.Ct. 695, 78 L.Ed. 1230 (1934) (“[C]ourts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently pro[566]*566ceedings in equity.”). The enactment of the Code in 1978 increased the degree of regulation Congress imposed upon bankruptcy proceedings, but it did not alter bankruptcy courts’ fundamental nature. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 359 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315 (stating that, under the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he bankruptcy court will remain a court of equity”) (citing Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 240, 54 S.Ct. 695). Any lingering doubt on that point is dispelled by a string of post-enactment Supreme Court decisions — see Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50, 122 S.Ct. 1036, 152 L.Ed.2d 79 (2002) (“[B]ankruptcy courts [] are courts of equity and ‘apply the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.’ ”) (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939)); United States v. Energy Resources Co.,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
558 B.R. 563, 2016 WL 5820026, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-colon-prb-2016.