In re: C.M., K.L.M., C.L.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: June 17, 2026
• Docket: 25-1109
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge Tom Murry

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-1109

Filed 17 June 2026

Henderson County, Nos. 23JA000109-440, 23JA000110-440, 23JA000111-400

IN THE MATTER OF: C.M., K.L.M., C.L.

Appeal by Respondent from judgment entered 18 August 2025 by Judge

Kimberly G. Justice in Henderson County District Court. Heard in the Court of

Appeals 21 May 2026.

Attorney Patricia M. Propheter, for Respondent–Appellant Mother.

Assistant Henderson County Attorney Susan F. Davis, for Petitioner–Appellee Henderson County Department of Social Services.

Administrative Office of the Courts, by N.C. Guardian ad Litem Staff Attorney Michelle FormyDuval Lynch, for Appellee Guardian ad Litem.

MURRY, Judge.

Respondent (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her

parental rights to her three children, C.M. (Conner), K.L.M. (Kyle), and C.L.

(Catherine).1 On appeal, Mother does not challenge the trial court’s conclusions that

1 In accordance with North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), we refer to the minor children by pseudonyms to protect their identities. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE: C.M., K.L.M., C.L.

Opinion of the Court

grounds existed to terminate her parental rights and that termination was in her

children’s best interests. Instead, she argues that the trial court erred by denying her

counsel’s oral motion for a continuance where Mother was not present at the

termination hearing and that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the

following reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s

parental rights and dismisses her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

I. Background

This matter arises out of a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to

her three minor children, Conner, Kyle, and Catherine, filed by the Henderson

County Department of Social Services (HCDSS). HCDSS began working with Mother

in July 2023 based on concerns that she and her boyfriend were abusing drugs while

caring for the children. HCDSS asked Mother to submit to three drug screens. She

tested positive for fentanyl on 19 July 2023, refused testing on 13 September 2023,

and tested positive for both fentanyl and marijuana on 19 September 2023. On 6

November 2023, HCDSS received a report that Mother had threatened to kill herself

in the presence of the children. After an investigation, HCDSS filed a petition on 23

November 2023 alleging the children were neglected juveniles under N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-101(15). The trial court placed them in the non-secure custody of HCDSS that

same day, which temporarily placed them with relatives. On 25 January 2024, the

trial court adjudicated the minor children neglected juveniles based upon Mother’s

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consent.2 In the resulting consent adjudication orders, Mother stipulated to the drug-

test results and suicidal ideation as described.3

That same day, the trial court entered disposition orders requiring Mother to

“follow and successfully complete all the recommendation[s] of the assessment,”

“[s]ubmit to random drug screens,” “[c]omplete parenting classes,” “cooperate with

and pay Child Support,” “obtain stable income . . . sufficient to meet the family’s basic

needs,” “[o]btain and maintain a safe and appropriate residence for the juveniles,”

and “maintain face-to-face contact with the Social Worker” for her “to achieve

reunification.” Through a series of permanency-planning review hearings over the

next year, the trial court changed the permanent plan from reunification to adoption

pending the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

On 11 March 2025, HCDSS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental

rights. At the outset of the termination hearing, Mother did not appear, and her

counsel moved for a continuance as follows:

Out of abundance of caution, I am going to make a motion to continue. [Mother] was present [at the trial court] this morning. I did speak with her. I did tell her to come back at 2:00 . . . . She indicated that she had a meeting with Section 8 at 3:00 . . . and she was going to try to do it during lunch so that we didn’t have a time constraint with [indiscernible]. I have tried to call her, text her, email her.

The trial court denied the motion and proceeded with the hearing in Mother’s

2 Each minor child’s respective father is deceased.

3 The trial court entered identical adjudication and disposition orders for each child.

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absence. During the hearing, Mother’s counsel informed the trial court that Mother

had contacted her stating that she was “having some car trouble,” but that “she

understood” the hearing was “proceeding without her.” Following the hearing, the

trial court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights, finding in relevant

part that Mother consistently failed to “participat[e] in medication management[,] . . .

therapy[,] . . . [or] peer support”; failed or avoided fifteen “drug screens requested by

HCDSS”; and was arrested on multiple occasions since the initial disposition order

“for Possession of Methamphetamines and Drug Paraphernalia” and “for Felony

Possession of a Schedule II Controlled Substance and Drug Paraphernalia.” The trial

court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights under

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3) and that termination was in the children’s best

interests. Mother timely appealed.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to hear Mother’s appeal because the trial court’s

“order . . . terminate[s her] parental rights.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(7) (2025).

III. Analysis

On appeal, Mother does not challenge the trial court’s conclusions that grounds

existed to terminate her parental rights and that termination was in her children’s

best interests. Instead, she argues that this Court should “vacate[ ] . . . and

remand[ ]” the termination order “for a full and fair trial” because the trial court erred

in denying her counsel’s motion to continue. Mother also claims that she received

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ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we disagree on both

counts and affirm the trial court’s order.

A. Motion to Continue

Mother first argues that the trial court’s denial of her motion to continue

violated her due-process rights because she “was present at the courthouse on the

morning of trial, advised her attorney that she had an important meeting to attend

with Section 8 Housing that afternoon, but would try to get it done over lunch so she

could be on time for the trial that afternoon, but then was delayed due to car trouble.”

For the following reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying her motion.

At the outset, Mother’s counsel failed to assert that “a continuance was

necessary to protect a constitutional right.” In re A.M.C., 381 N.C. 719, 723 (2022).

Because Mother did not move for a continuance on constitutional grounds, she has

waived appellate review of that issue, and this Court is “constrained to review the

trial court’s denial of a motion to continue for abuse of discretion.” In re S.M., 375

N.C. 673, 679 (2020); see In re J.E., 377 N.C. 285, 290 (2021) (holding that a

continuance motion based on parental absence is not constitutional grounds); N.C. R.

App. P. 10(a)(1). A trial court abuses its discretion by entering a ruling that “is

manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the

result of a reasoned decision.” In re C.A.D., 298 N.C. App. 1, 4 (2025) (quotation

omitted). “Moreover, regardless of whether the motion raises a constitutional issue or

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not, a denial of a motion to continue is only grounds for a new trial when the

respondent shows both that the denial was erroneous, and that she suffered prejudice

as a result of the error.” In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. 515, 517 (2020) (citation modified).

Under our Juvenile Code, a trial court may grant a “continuance[ ] that

extend[s] beyond [ninety] days after the initial petition . . . only in extraordinary

circumstances when necessary for the proper administration of justice.” N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-1109(b). Because our trial courts disfavor continuances as a matter of public

policy, movants have “the burden of showing sufficient grounds for” them. C.A.D., 298

N.C. App. at 4. Thus, for the trial court to grant a continuance of a termination

proceeding beyond ninety days from the date of the initial petition, the movant must

show “extraordinary circumstances for the continuance and its necessity for the

proper administration of justice.” S.M., 375 N.C. at 681.

Because Mother moved for a continuance 121 days after HCDSS filed its

petition, the trial court could only grant it in the event of “extraordinary

circumstances.” Id. When making the oral motion, Mother’s counsel represented that

Mother knew of the hearing date and had visited the courthouse earlier that day but

left for “a meeting with Section 8.” Although not required, Mother’s counsel neither

presented supporting evidence nor argued that Mother planned to testify to the

contrary. Contra State v. Cody, 135 N.C. App. 722, 726 (1999) (deeming filing of

supporting affidavit to be “the better practice to support a motion for continuance”).

But given the representations to the trial court and the record before us here, Mother

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cannot show how the circumstances leading to her absence were “extraordinary” such

that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her continuance. See In re D.W.,

202 N.C. App. 624, 627 (2010) (declining to hold that “parental absence, without more,

constitutes extraordinary circumstances necessitating a continuance”). Because the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s motion to continue, we

affirm the denial.

Even assuming arguendo that Mother had demonstrated extraordinary

circumstances and that the trial court had erred by denying her motion to continue,

Mother nonetheless fails to show prejudice. See In re C.A.B., 381 N.C. 105, 125 (2022).

Mother’s absence from the termination hearing, standing alone, is not per se

prejudicial. See J.E., 377 N.C. at 290 (“A parent’s absence from termination

proceedings does not itself amount to a violation of due process.”). Mother’s counsel

never represented to the trial court that Mother intended to testify, much less provide

an offer of proof “demonstrating the significance” of any such testimony. A.L.S., 374

N.C. at 518 (citation modified); see In re C.C.G., 380 N.C. 23, 27 (2022) (holding no

prejudice where the “respondent’s counsel neither indicated [that the] respondent

intended to testify nor provided an affidavit or offer of proof of [the] respondent’s

potential testimony”). Likewise, on appeal, Mother identifies no specific testimony or

evidence that her absence prevented her from presenting, nor does she explain how

her presence would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. See In re H.A.J., 377

N.C. 43, 37 (2021) (concluding no prejudice where respondent–parent “has not

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demonstrated how her case would have been better prepared, or a different result

obtained, had a continuance been granted”). Thus, this Court affirms the trial court’s

denial of her motion to continue.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mother next argues that her counsel’s performance was constitutionally

ineffective because her counsel “failed” to “make any argument whatsoever,” “put on

any evidence or testimony in either phase of the trial, . . . ask any questions on direct

or cross[-]exam[ination], . . . make any objections,” or “make an opening or closing

argument on behalf of Mother.” We disagree and dismiss Mother’s

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

A parent in a termination proceeding has a statutory right to counsel that

“encompasses the right to effective assistance from that counsel.” In re N.N., 296 N.C.

App. 159, 169 (2014); see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1(a). To prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, a parent must “demonstrat[e] that (1) counsel’s performance

was deficient; and (2) such deficient performance by counsel was so severe as to

deprive [her] of a fair hearing.” In re Z.M.T., 379 N.C. 44, 48 (2021). To show

deprivation of a fair hearing, the parent show “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, there would have been a different result in the proceedings.” State

v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563 (1985)—i.e., “prejudice,” N.N., 296 N.C. App. at 169.

We often resolve “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on the [parent’s] failure

to show prejudice.” In re B.B., 381 N.C. 343, 358 (2022). Absent any “reasonable

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probability that in the absence of counsel’s alleged errors the result of the proceeding

would have been different,” we decline to assess “whether counsel’s performance was

actually deficient.” In re L.N.H., 382 N.C. 536, 541–42 (2022) (quoting Braswell, 312

N.C. at 563).

We “strong[ly] presum[e] that counsel’s conduct falls within the range of

reasonable professional assistance,” id. (quotation omitted), so as to “giv[e] counsel

wide latitude in matters of strategy,” State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 623 (2007). While

an attorney must “advocate on behalf of [he]r clients,” In re S.N.W., 204 N.C. App.

556, 560 (2010), her “failure to advocate [there]for [doe]s not necessarily indicat[e]

ineffective assistance,” In re C.D.H., 265 N.C. App. 609, 613 (2019) (ellipses omitted).

“[S]uch a choice . . . may be the result of strategy or because ‘resourceful preparation

reveal[ed] nothing positive to be said for’ the respondent-parent in a particular

hearing.” N.N., 296 N.C. App. at 170 (quoting C.D.H., 265 N.C. App. at 613). A

respondent correspondingly bears a “heavy” “burden to show that counsel’s

performance fell short of the required standard.” L.N.H., 382 N.C. at 539.

Here, Mother asserts that her counsel “failed to make any argument

whatsoever . . . despite making a half-hearted attempt to request” a continuance. But

she also argues that “the trial court erred in denying [her] oral motion to continue.”

Either Mother’s counsel moved for a continuance and the trial court erred in denying

it or her counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to make the motion. But

Mother cannot frame her counsel’s action as both a legally sufficient motion to

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continue and “half-hearted attempt” at making one.

Regardless, any logical inconsistencies are immaterial because Mother fails to

demonstrate prejudice. Assuming arguendo the deficiency of counsel’s performance,

Mother cannot prevail on her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because she fails

to show “that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have been a different result in the

proceedings.” L.N.H., 382 N.C. at 541; see B.B., 381 N.C. at 359 (“A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”).

Because Mother does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings of fact or

conclusions of law regarding grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) of

that termination was in her children’s best interest, we “deem[ ]” all of the trial court’s

unchallenged findings of fact “supported by competent evidence and . . . binding on

appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019). Based on our review of the

unchallenged findings of fact and conclusions of law, Mother fails to demonstrate a

reasonable possibility of a different result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 694 (1984) (requiring consideration of the “totality of the evidence,” including

trial court’s “factual findings . . . unaffected by the errors” and “the effect of the errors

on the remaining findings”); In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 74 (2005) (rejecting

respondent’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim where she failed to show

prejudice where “the record contain[ed] overwhelming evidence supporting

termination”). Thus, we dismiss Mother’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

IV. Conclusion

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For the reasons above, this Court affirms the trial court’s order terminating

Mother’s parental rights and dismisses her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

AFFIRMED; DISMISSED.

Judges ZACHARY and CARPENTER concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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