in Re Clark Estate

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 28, 2015
Docket320720
StatusUnpublished

This text of in Re Clark Estate (in Re Clark Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in Re Clark Estate, (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In re Estate of CLARK.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH, UNPUBLISHED May 28, 2015 Appellant,

v No. 320720 Calhoun Probate Court ESTATE OF VIOLET M. CLARK, by Personal LC No. 2013-000599-CZ Representative LARRY ALLEN WYKLE,

Appellee.

Before: Boonstra, P.J., and Saad and MURRAY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Department of Community Health (“DCH” or “the Department”) appeals the trial court’s order that granted summary disposition to defendant Estate of Violet Clark. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition to the Department.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves the Medicaid estate recovery program, which allows state governments to recover certain medical expenses paid for by Medicaid upon the death of recipients aged 55 years or older. West Virginia v Thompson, 475 F3d 204, 207–208 (CA 4, 2007). As our Court recently explained, the Michigan Legislature, in 2007, designated DCH as the state entity responsible for recovering Medicaid benefits from the estates of deceased beneficiaries, through a new set of provisions contained at MCL 400.112g, et seq. In re Estate of Keyes, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2015), 2015 WL 1737621, slip op at *1. If a decedent’s estate is of modest value, the decedents’ heirs or representatives may apply for a hardship exemption from estate recovery. Id., slip op at *3.

-1- Defendant Larry Wykle enrolled his mother,1 decedent Violet Clark, in Medicaid on June 15, 2012, to help pay for Clark’s stay in a nursing home. Clark was over 55 years old at the time. As part of the enrollment application, Wykle received a list of “acknowledgements” that explained the conditions under which Medicaid would provide benefits to his mother. These enumerated conditions included a section on “estate recovery,” which informed Wykle that, upon Clark’s death, DCH might seek to recover the expenses it incurred for her care by seizing assets from her estate. In relevant part, the acknowledgement stated:

Estate Recovery. I understand that upon my death the Michigan Department of Community Health has the legal right to seek recovery from my estate for services paid by Medicaid. . . . An estate consists of real and personal property. Estate Recovery only applies to certain Medicaid recipients who received Medicaid services after the Implementation date of the program. MDCH may agree not to pursue recovery if an undue hardship exists. For further information regarding Estate Recovery, call 1-877-791-0435. [Emphasis added.]

Wykle signed the application form, and, in so doing, admitted that he had “received and reviewed a copy of the Acknowledgements that explains additional information about applying for and receiving Medicaid”—i.e., that he was aware the state could recover the cost of his mother’s medical care by seizing assets from her estate. Medicaid began to pay for Violet Clark’s nursing-home expenses in June 2012, and did so until her death on November 9, 2012. Over this five-month period, Medicaid paid Clark’s nursing home $13,360.18.

After his mother’s death, Wykle became the personal representative of her estate. The only substantial asset in Clark’s estate was her Battle Creek home, which was valued, under the state evaluation method, at $40,806 at the time of Clark’s death. Using the same evaluation method, the average price of a home in Calhoun County in 2012 was $43,325.23. As such, according to the State Plan, Clark’s home, upon application by Wykle, was likely eligible for a “hardship exemption” from estate recovery.

On December 28, 2012, DCH sent a Notice of Intent to Wykle’s home informing him that it intended to recover some or all of the $13,360.18 in Medicaid expenses from Clark’s estate.2 The notice explained that DCH might waive the estate recovery in the event of “hardship,” and detailed the application process as follows:

If no statutory exemptions apply, but an heir or beneficiary can demonstrate that recovery would result in an undue hardship, then MDCH may waive its claim against an estate. To apply for a hardship waiver, please contact our office at the address or phone number listed below. You must submit a completed Hardship Waiver Application within 60 days of the date of [the Notice of Intent.] Failure to

1 Wykle served as Clark’s authorized representative for his mother’s Medicaid application. 2 It is not disputed that Clark’s nursing home expenses are recoverable expenses under MCL 400.112g, et seq.

-2- timely submit a Hardship Waiver Application will result in denial of the Hardship Waiver Request, and MDCH will continue its recovery efforts. If you apply for a Hardship Waiver and are denied, you may appeal the decision under the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201-24.328, within 60 days of receiving the notice of denial. [Emphasis added.]

Strangely, Wykle never applied for a hardship waiver within 60 days of December 28, 2012. Instead, almost 15 months after receiving notice of the possibility DCH might seek to recover expenses from his mother’s estate, his attorneys sent DCH a letter on March 26, 2013, in which they explained that Wykle would not permit DCH to recover assets from Violet Clark’s estate. The letter noted that Clark’s estate included one asset, her Battle Creek home, which was of insufficient value to permit DCH to recover Medicaid expenses from the estate. In April 2013, DCH brought suit against Clark’s estate to recover the $13,860.18 it made in Medicaid payments during Clark’s five-month stay in the nursing home.

Wykle filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). Among other things, he claimed that MCL 400.112g prohibited DCH from recovering assets from his mother’s estate because: (1) MCL 400.112g(3)(e)(i) created a blanket exemption from recovery for homes that are valued at “equal to or less than 50% of the average price of a home in the county in which the Medicaid recipient’s homestead is located as of the date of the medical assistance recipient’s death”; and (2) MCL 400.112g(7) and MCL 400.112g(3)(e)(i) required DCH, at the time Clark enrolled in Medicaid, to notify Wykle (a) that it might seek recovery against his mother’s estate, and (b) provide him materials explaining how to seek an exemption from estate recovery for “undue hardship.”

In response, DCH moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2). It noted that Wykle had never applied for a hardship waiver from estate recovery, and argued that Wykle’s statutory arguments misinterpreted the Social Welfare Act. DCH claimed that MCL 400.112g(3)(e)(i) did not actually create a statutory mandate that prohibited estate recovery against low-valued homes, nor did it require DCH to provide Wykle with information on the hardship-waiver application process when he enrolled his mother in Medicaid. Moreover, DCH said it complied with the notice provisions of MCL 400.112g(7) when, upon Clark’s enrollment in Medicaid, it gave Wykle notice that Clark’s Medicaid benefits were subject to recovery from her estate.

The trial judge held a motion hearing and issued its opinion from the bench in January 2014. It granted summary disposition to Wykle and the estate under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and held that DCH could not recover from Clark’s estate because: (1) Clark’s estate consisted solely of a “modest homestead” within MCL 400.112g(3)(e)(i); and (2) DCH failed to comply with the notice provisions of MCL 400.112g(3)(e)(i), which required it to provide materials to Wykle on how to apply for a hardship waiver when he enrolled his mother in Medicaid in June 2012. The trial court did not address whether Wykle’s failure to apply for a hardship waiver from estate recovery made his defenses against DCH’s action irrelevant.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
in Re Clark Estate, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-clark-estate-michctapp-2015.