In re C.J.H.

2024 Ohio 1233

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 1, 2024
• Docket: CA2023-04-024 CA2023-04-025 CA2023-04-026 CA2023-04-027 CA2023-04-028
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re C.J.H., 2024-Ohio-1233.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

CLERMONT COUNTY

IN RE: :

C.J.H., et al. : CASE NOS. CA2023-04-024 CA2023-04-025 : CA2023-04-026 CA2023-04-027 : CA2023-04-028

: OPINION 4/1/2024 :

APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS JUVENILE DIVISION Case No. 2022 JA 57022, 57026, 56938, 56939, 56940

Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas Horton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Brafford Law, LLC, and Suellen Brafford, for appellee, C.J.H.

Glaser Law Office, and Angela J. Glaser, for appellee, P.S.

Crousey Law Firm, and Joshua R. Crousey, for appellee, R.B.

HENDRICKSON, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals from the Clermont County Juvenile

Court's entry denying the state's motion for mandatory bindover. For the reasons outlined Clermont CA2023-04-024 CA2023-04-025 CA2023-04-026 CA2023-04-027 ________CA2023-04-028

below, we reverse the juvenile court's decision and remand the matter for further

proceedings.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On July 14, 2022, Rusty and Ryan Larison were shot and killed at the

Richmond Estates Mobile Home Park in New Richmond, Clermont County, Ohio. The

state alleges appellees, C.J.H., 17 years old; P.S., 16 years old; and R.B., 17 years old,

along with another juvenile, C.M., killed the Larisons during a robbery.

{¶ 3} On July 16, 2022, the state filed numerous complaints against C.M.,

including multiple counts of aggravated murder and murder, related to the deaths of Rusty

and Ryan Larison.

{¶ 4} Over the next few months, the state filed a total of 18 complaints against

C.J.H, 19 complaints against P.S., and 19 complaints against R.B. Relevant to this case,

each appellee was charged with: two counts of aggravated murder under R.C.

2903.01(A); two counts of aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(B); two counts of

murder under R.C. 2903.02(A); and two counts of murder under R.C. 2903.02(B), all

related to the deaths of Rusty and Ryan Larison.

{¶ 5} After a joint probable cause hearing, the juvenile court found probable

cause to believe C.M., as principal offender, committed each of the complaints for

aggravated murder and murder. The juvenile court further determined that C.J.H., P.S.,

and R.B. did not act as principal offenders for each of the aggravated murder and murder

complaints, but found that there was probable cause to believe they were complicit for

each of the complaints. On April 13, 2023, based on a perceived conflict in the law on

the issue of complicity and mandatory bindover, the juvenile court denied the state's

-2- Clermont CA2023-04-024 CA2023-04-025 CA2023-04-026 CA2023-04-027 ________CA2023-04-028

motion for mandatory bindover of C.J.H., P.S. and R.B., retained jurisdiction, and set the

matter for an amenability hearing in preparation for potential discretionary bindover.

{¶ 6} The state appealed on April 21, 2023.

II. Legal Analysis

Motion to Dismiss the Appeal

{¶ 7} Before addressing the merits of appellant's assignment of error, we must

first decide P.S.'s August 4, 2023 motion to dismiss the state's appeal.1 In the motion,

P.S. asserts that the juvenile court's entry denying the state's motion for mandatory

bindover is not a final appealable order and the state failed to file a motion for leave to

appeal under App. R. 5(C). The issue, then, is whether the state has an absolute right to

appeal a juvenile court's denial of the state's request for mandatory bindover without first

seeking leave to appeal.

{¶ 8} The Ohio Supreme Court ruled on this issue in its decision in In re A.J.S.,

120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307. In that case, the high court held that "The order of

a juvenile court denying a motion for mandatory bindover bars the state from prosecuting

a juvenile offender as an adult for a criminal offense. It is therefore the functional

equivalent of a dismissal of a criminal indictment and constitutes a final order from which

the state may appeal as a matter of right." Id. at syllabus.

{¶ 9} The Court went on to note that "In certain situations specified by statute, the

juvenile court is required to transfer a case to the general division of the common pleas

court for prosecution of the juvenile defendant as an adult. R.C. 2152.12. These transfers

1. The state filed its response opposing the motion on August 14, 2023. By entry dated August 30, 2023, we deferred consideration of this motion until the case was submitted to a panel for decision on the merits.

-3- Clermont CA2023-04-024 CA2023-04-025 CA2023-04-026 CA2023-04-027 ________CA2023-04-028

are referred to as 'mandatory bindovers' because if the statutory conditions are met, the

judge must transfer jurisdiction." Id. at ¶ 1, fn. 1. "Despite the general rule that the juvenile

court has exclusive original jurisdiction over any child alleged to be delinquent, the court

has a duty to transfer a case when it determines that the elements of the transfer statute

are met." Id. at ¶ 22. "Mandatory transfer removes discretion from judges in the transfer

decision." State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90 (2000).

{¶ 10} Here, the juvenile court denied the state's motion for mandatory bindover,

finding that, although probable cause had been established, the criteria for mandatory

bindover set forth in R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a) had not been met where appellees were

charged with complicity to aggravated murder and complicity to murder (as opposed to

being charged as principal offenders). The state's present appeal challenges the juvenile

court's finding that the applicable statutory criteria for mandatory bindover has not been

met in this case. This is a legal issue which must be determined in order to resolve

whether the juvenile court erred in finding that this was a discretionary bindover, and if it

did in fact err, it would then lack jurisdiction to proceed as it did below. This is because a

juvenile court may not retain jurisdiction over a case subject to mandatory bindover.

{¶ 11} While the present case differs somewhat from A.J.S., where the juvenile

court had denied mandatory bindover for lack of probable cause, the same rationale

applies here: the juvenile court's decision has terminated the state's ability to secure a

criminal indictment for the acts charged, and therefore it is the functional equivalent of the

dismissal of a criminal indictment. Therefore, we hereby deny P.S.'s motion to dismiss

the state's appeal and proceed to the merits.

Mandatory Bindover for Complicity Offenses

-4- Clermont CA2023-04-024 CA2023-04-025 CA2023-04-026 CA2023-04-027 ________CA2023-04-028

{¶ 12} The state's sole assignment of error states:

THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED BY NOT BINDING C.J.H., P.S., AND R.B. OVER TO THE ADULT DIVISION OF THE CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS UNDER SECTION 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i).

{¶ 13} In its sole assignment of error, the state argues the juvenile court erred

when it found that appellees were not subject to mandatory bindover and instead

scheduled them for an amenability hearing in preparation for potential discretionary

bindover. We agree with the state.

{¶ 14} Ohio law requires the mandatory transfer of certain juvenile cases to the

general division of the common pleas court where the juvenile offenders are tried and

punished as adults. See R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12. R.C. 2152.10(A)(1) provides that a

child charged with a "category one offense"—murder or aggravated murder—who is 16

years of age or older at the time of the offense is eligible for mandatory transfer and shall

be transferred as provided in R.C. 2152.12. In turn, R.C. 2152.12(A)(1) provides:

(a) After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child for committing one or more acts that would be an offense if committed by an adult, if any of those acts would be aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted murder if committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing shall transfer the case if either of the following applies:

(i) The child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of the act charged that would be aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted murder and there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged.

(ii) The child was fourteen or fifteen years of age at the time of the act charged that would be aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted murder, section 2152.10 of the Revised Code provides

-5- Clermont CA2023-04-024 CA2023-04-025 CA2023-04-026 CA2023-04-027 ________CA2023-04-028

that the child is eligible for mandatory transfer, and there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged.

***

Here, the complaints filed against appellees allege that each committed murder and

aggravated murder, and appellees were 16 or 17 years old at the time of the alleged

offenses.

{¶ 15} Although the juvenile court determined the juveniles were not the principal

offenders, it still found probable cause to believe they were complicit to murder and

complicit to aggravated murder. "'Under the principle of complicity or accomplice liability,

an individual may be found guilty if he solicits, aids, abets or conspires with another

individual to commit an offense and shares the criminal intent of an individual who

commits the principal offense."' State v. Buell, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2021-12-026,

2022-Ohio-3102, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Horton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-855, 2014-

Ohio-2785, ¶ 8. There is no distinction between a defendant convicted of complicity or

convicted as a principal offender. Buell at ¶ 17. Pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(F), "[a] charge

of complicity may be stated in terms of [that] section, or in terms of the principal offense."

{¶ 16} Where there is probable cause to believe that a juvenile (who is 16 years

old or older) committed murder or aggravated murder through complicity, that juvenile is

subject to mandatory bindover. In re B.W., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0071, 2017-

Ohio-9220, ¶ 28. Initially, in State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86 (2000), the Supreme

Court of Ohio broadly stated that the complicity statute, R.C. 2923.03, does not apply to

the juvenile bindover criteria as set forth under former section R.C. 2151.26 (currently

R.C.2152.10 and R.C. 2152.12). In Hanning, the Court held that the concept of complicity

-6- Clermont CA2023-04-024 CA2023-04-025 CA2023-04-026 CA2023-04-027 ________CA2023-04-028

could not be used to support mandatory bindover of Hanning, an accomplice juvenile,

based on the principal offender's use of a firearm in a category two offense: aggravated

robbery. However, one year later in Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St.3d 540 (2001), the Court

clarified that the Hanning rationale does not apply to all mandatory bindover proceedings,

but rather only to those based upon a firearm specification. Thus, juvenile courts will

mandatorily transfer cases for adult prosecution even if the evidence shows that the

juvenile was not a principal offender but was merely complicit in committing the offense.

State v. Legg, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 14CA23, 2016-Ohio-801, ¶ 42, appeal not accepted,

146 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2016-Ohio-3390; State v. Bishop, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89184,

2007-Ohio-6197, ¶ 26.

{¶ 17} The juvenile court's reliance on State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-

Ohio-274, and State v. Taylor, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-396, 2022-Ohio-2877, in its

entry denying mandatory bindover is misplaced. In Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court held

that a juvenile court may only bindover charges for which it has found probable cause

and that the general division of the court of common pleas has no jurisdiction over charges

for which the juvenile court has found no probable cause. 2022-Ohio-274, ¶ 33-36, 44.

In Taylor, the juvenile court found probable cause to believe Taylor had committed

purposeful murder, but after Taylor was bound over to the general division, he was also

charged with felony murder by felonious assault. 2022-Ohio-2877, ¶ 19. The Tenth

District concluded that complicity to purposeful murder is not an equivalent "act charged"

to felony murder by felonious assault for purposes of transferring jurisdiction from the

juvenile division to the general division; therefore, pursuant to Smith, the general division

did not have jurisdiction over Taylor's felony murder charge. There is no such

-7- Clermont CA2023-04-024 CA2023-04-025 CA2023-04-026 CA2023-04-027 ________CA2023-04-028

discrepancy in the charges in the present case.

{¶ 18} Here, the juvenile court found that there was probable cause to believe

appellees were complicit in committing murder and aggravated murder, category one

offenses. The use of a firearm is not necessary for mandatory bindover to apply to

category one offenses. Therefore, Hanning does not apply to the present case, and

appellees are subject to mandatory bindover.

Conclusion

{¶ 19} In light of the foregoing, we conclude the juvenile court erred in denying the

state's motion for mandatory bindover. Therefore, the state's sole assignment of error is

sustained and this matter is reversed and remanded to the juvenile court with instructions

to transfer appellees' cases to the general division of the common pleas court for further

{¶ 20} Judgment reversed and remanded.

PIPER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.

-8-