In Re City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee and Chris Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley, City Manager of Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton, in Their Official Capacities v. the State of Texas
Opinion
FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/19/2025 4:35:10 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk FILED: 2/6/2025 10:26 AM David Trantham Denton County District Clerk By: Aime Sanchez, Deputy
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE McGEE, § and CHRIS WATTS, Members of the City § Council of Denton; SARA HENSLEY, City § Manager of Denton; and DOUG § SHOEMAKER, Chief of Police of Denton; § in their official capacities, § Defendants. 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DISCOVERY ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Depositions and Written Discovery and
Response to Defendants’ Motion to Quash and Motions for Protective Order and Defendants’
Motion to Quash and Motion for Protection from Deposition Notices. After due consideration of
each motion and applicable law, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s Motion should be and hereby
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and that Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN
PART subject to reconsideration. The Court ORDERS as follows:
A. Defendants’ objections are overruled as to Plaintiff’s interrogatories 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21. Defendants’ objections are likewise overruled as to
Plaintiff’s requests for production 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, and as to
Plaintiff’s requests for admission 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15. Defendants shall
respond to the foregoing discovery requests;
B. Defendants’ objections are sustained as to Plaintiff’s interrogatory 7, Plaintiff’s request
for production 23, Plaintiff’s requests for admission 7 and 14;
MR 0001 Copy from re:SearchTX C. Defendants’ objections are sustained as to Plaintiff’s interrogatory 8. Plaintiff may re-
propound its interrogatory 8 using clearer language on or before the 10th day after the
issuance of this Order;
D. The phrase “about confusion” is stricken from Plaintiff’s interrogatory 20. The scope of
Plaintiff’s interrogatory 20 is limited to inquiries made after November 22, 2022.
Defendants’ objections are otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s interrogatory 20.
Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff’s interrogatory 20 as if it did not contain the phrase
“about confusion”;
E. The scope of Plaintiff’s requests for production 1 and 4 is limited to communications and
documents that were sent after November 22, 2022. Defendants’ objections are
otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s requests for production 1 and 4. Defendants shall
respond to Plaintiff’s requests for production 1 and 4;
F. The scope of Plaintiff’s request for production 7 is limited to communications and
documents that were produced or received by Defendants. Defendants’ objections are
otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s request for production 7. Defendants shall respond to
Plaintiff’s request for production 7;
G. The scope of Plaintiff’s request for production 9 is limited to documents that already exist
or existed. Defendants’ objections are otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s request for
production 9. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff’s request for production 9;
H. The scope of Plaintiff’s request for production 10 is limited to communications and
documents that were sent or received after November 22, 2022. Defendants’ objections
are otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s request for production 10. Defendants shall
respond to Plaintiff’s request for production 10;
I. The scope of Plaintiff’s request for production 12 is limited to communications and
documents concerning enforcement of laws related to marijuana use. Defendants’
objections are otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s request for production 12. Defendants
shall respond to Plaintiff’s request for production 12;
Page 2 of 5 Cause No. 24-1005-481; Texas v. City of Denton, et al. MR 0002 Copy from re:SearchTX J. The scope of Plaintiff’s requests for production 15, 16, 21 and 22 is limited to exclude
individualized reports of citations or arrests. Defendants’ objections are otherwise
overruled as to Plaintiff’s requests for production 15, 16, 21 and 22. Defendants shall
respond to Plaintiff’s requests for production 15, 16, 21, and 22;
K. Plaintiff’s requests for admission 1 and 4 shall be construed so that “adopt” is given its
plain meaning. Defendants’ objections are otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s requests
for admission 1 and 4. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff’s requests for admission 1 and
4;
L. The scope of Plaintiff’s request for admission 6 is limited to instances when employees of
the City of Denton have been directed by any Defendant or have acted at the direction of
any Defendant to not cite or arrest individuals for misdemeanor levels of marijuana and
misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia. Defendants’ objections are
otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s request for admission 6. Defendants shall respond to
Plaintiff’s requests for admission 6;
M. Defendants shall complete their discovery responses on or before the 60th day after the
issuance of this Order;
N. Defendants’ objections to the depositions of Councilmembers Brian Beck and Joe
Holland are sustained subject to reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
2/6/2025 ______________, 2025.
Page 3 of 5 Cause No. 24-1005-481; Texas v. City of Denton, et al. MR 0003 Copy from re:SearchTX Agreed as to Form and Entry Requested:
KEN PAXTON /s/Zachary L. Rhines Attorney General of Texas ZACHARY L. RHINES Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Texas Bar No. 24116957 First Assistant Attorney General Zachary.Rhines@oag.texas.gov
RALPH MOLINA KYLE S. TEBO Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Special Counsel Texas Bar No. 24137691 AUSTIN KINGHORN Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RYAN D. WALTERS Special Litigation Division Division Chief P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Special Litigation and Division Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone: 512-463-2100 Fax: 512-457-4410
Page 4 of 5 Cause No. 24-1005-481; Texas v. City of Denton, et al. MR 0004 Copy from re:SearchTX APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
Page 5 of 5 Cause No. 24-1005-481; Texas v. City of Denton, et al. MR 0005 Copy from re:SearchTX Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
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FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/19/2025 4:35:10 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk FILED: 2/6/2025 10:26 AM David Trantham Denton County District Clerk By: Aime Sanchez, Deputy
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE McGEE, § and CHRIS WATTS, Members of the City § Council of Denton; SARA HENSLEY, City § Manager of Denton; and DOUG § SHOEMAKER, Chief of Police of Denton; § in their official capacities, § Defendants. 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DISCOVERY ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Depositions and Written Discovery and
Response to Defendants’ Motion to Quash and Motions for Protective Order and Defendants’
Motion to Quash and Motion for Protection from Deposition Notices. After due consideration of
each motion and applicable law, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s Motion should be and hereby
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and that Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN
PART subject to reconsideration. The Court ORDERS as follows:
A. Defendants’ objections are overruled as to Plaintiff’s interrogatories 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21. Defendants’ objections are likewise overruled as to
Plaintiff’s requests for production 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, and as to
Plaintiff’s requests for admission 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15. Defendants shall
respond to the foregoing discovery requests;
B. Defendants’ objections are sustained as to Plaintiff’s interrogatory 7, Plaintiff’s request
for production 23, Plaintiff’s requests for admission 7 and 14;
MR 0001 Copy from re:SearchTX C. Defendants’ objections are sustained as to Plaintiff’s interrogatory 8. Plaintiff may re-
propound its interrogatory 8 using clearer language on or before the 10th day after the
issuance of this Order;
D. The phrase “about confusion” is stricken from Plaintiff’s interrogatory 20. The scope of
Plaintiff’s interrogatory 20 is limited to inquiries made after November 22, 2022.
Defendants’ objections are otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s interrogatory 20.
Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff’s interrogatory 20 as if it did not contain the phrase
“about confusion”;
E. The scope of Plaintiff’s requests for production 1 and 4 is limited to communications and
documents that were sent after November 22, 2022. Defendants’ objections are
otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s requests for production 1 and 4. Defendants shall
respond to Plaintiff’s requests for production 1 and 4;
F. The scope of Plaintiff’s request for production 7 is limited to communications and
documents that were produced or received by Defendants. Defendants’ objections are
otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s request for production 7. Defendants shall respond to
Plaintiff’s request for production 7;
G. The scope of Plaintiff’s request for production 9 is limited to documents that already exist
or existed. Defendants’ objections are otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s request for
production 9. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff’s request for production 9;
H. The scope of Plaintiff’s request for production 10 is limited to communications and
documents that were sent or received after November 22, 2022. Defendants’ objections
are otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s request for production 10. Defendants shall
respond to Plaintiff’s request for production 10;
I. The scope of Plaintiff’s request for production 12 is limited to communications and
documents concerning enforcement of laws related to marijuana use. Defendants’
objections are otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s request for production 12. Defendants
shall respond to Plaintiff’s request for production 12;
Page 2 of 5 Cause No. 24-1005-481; Texas v. City of Denton, et al. MR 0002 Copy from re:SearchTX J. The scope of Plaintiff’s requests for production 15, 16, 21 and 22 is limited to exclude
individualized reports of citations or arrests. Defendants’ objections are otherwise
overruled as to Plaintiff’s requests for production 15, 16, 21 and 22. Defendants shall
respond to Plaintiff’s requests for production 15, 16, 21, and 22;
K. Plaintiff’s requests for admission 1 and 4 shall be construed so that “adopt” is given its
plain meaning. Defendants’ objections are otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s requests
for admission 1 and 4. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff’s requests for admission 1 and
4;
L. The scope of Plaintiff’s request for admission 6 is limited to instances when employees of
the City of Denton have been directed by any Defendant or have acted at the direction of
any Defendant to not cite or arrest individuals for misdemeanor levels of marijuana and
misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia. Defendants’ objections are
otherwise overruled as to Plaintiff’s request for admission 6. Defendants shall respond to
Plaintiff’s requests for admission 6;
M. Defendants shall complete their discovery responses on or before the 60th day after the
issuance of this Order;
N. Defendants’ objections to the depositions of Councilmembers Brian Beck and Joe
Holland are sustained subject to reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
2/6/2025 ______________, 2025.
Page 3 of 5 Cause No. 24-1005-481; Texas v. City of Denton, et al. MR 0003 Copy from re:SearchTX Agreed as to Form and Entry Requested:
KEN PAXTON /s/Zachary L. Rhines Attorney General of Texas ZACHARY L. RHINES Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Texas Bar No. 24116957 First Assistant Attorney General Zachary.Rhines@oag.texas.gov
RALPH MOLINA KYLE S. TEBO Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Special Counsel Texas Bar No. 24137691 AUSTIN KINGHORN Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RYAN D. WALTERS Special Litigation Division Division Chief P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Special Litigation and Division Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone: 512-463-2100 Fax: 512-457-4410
Page 4 of 5 Cause No. 24-1005-481; Texas v. City of Denton, et al. MR 0004 Copy from re:SearchTX APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
Page 5 of 5 Cause No. 24-1005-481; Texas v. City of Denton, et al. MR 0005 Copy from re:SearchTX Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Bonnie Freymuth on behalf of Zachary Rhines Bar No. 24116957 bonnie.freymuth@oag.texas.gov Envelope ID: 97002047 Filing Code Description: ORDER Filing Description: (Discovery) Status as of 2/10/2025 8:36 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: The City Of Denton, Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Amy Hoffee amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Mack Reinwand mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Jose E.de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
James F.Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Gabrielle C.Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Sydney P.Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Gerard Hudspeth
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Brian Beck
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Vicki Byrd
MR 0006 Copy from re:SearchTX Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Bonnie Freymuth on behalf of Zachary Rhines Bar No. 24116957 bonnie.freymuth@oag.texas.gov Envelope ID: 97002047 Filing Code Description: ORDER Filing Description: (Discovery) Status as of 2/10/2025 8:36 AM CST
Associated Case Party: Vicki Byrd
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Paul Meltzer
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Joe Holland
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Brandon Chase McGee
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: The State Of Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Kyle Tebo Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Bonnie Freymuth bonnie.freymuth@oag.texas.gov 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Zachary Rhines zachary.rhines@oag.texas.gov 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Chris Watts MR 0007 Copy from re:SearchTX Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Bonnie Freymuth on behalf of Zachary Rhines Bar No. 24116957 bonnie.freymuth@oag.texas.gov Envelope ID: 97002047 Filing Code Description: ORDER Filing Description: (Discovery) Status as of 2/10/2025 8:36 AM CST
Associated Case Party: Chris Watts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Sara Hensley
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Doug Shoemaker
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 2/5/2025 10:26:15 AM SENT
MR 0008 Copy from re:SearchTX FILED: 1/31/2024 2:45 PM David Trantham Denton County District Clerk By: Jenny Hernandez, Deputy
24-1005-481 Cause No. _____________________
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § In the District Court of Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § Denton County, Texas BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and CHRIS WATTS, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § DOUG SHOEMAKER, Chief of Police of § ________ Judicial District Denton; in their official capacities, § Defendants. Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition, Application for Temporary Injunction and Permanent Injunction
The City of Denton (“Denton”), a home-rule city, adopted an ordinance designed to eliminate marijuana enforcement, knowing full well that “the City does not have the authority to implement” the ordinance. See Letter from City Manager to City Council (Exhibit 1). This ordinance and any corresponding Denton Police Department general order or directive, constitute a policy under which Denton will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs, including Chapter 481. Chapter 481 makes possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia an offense. Thus, the ordinance and any corresponding Denton Police Department general order or directive violate and are preempted by section 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code: “The governing body of a municipality [or a] municipal police department … may not adopt a policy under which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs, including Chapters 481 and 483, Health and Safety Code, and federal law.” The ordinance is also unconstitutional. “[N]o…ordinance passed under [Denton’s] charter shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.” TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
Consequently, the State of Texas files this Original Petition and Application for Temporary and Permanent Injunction asking the Court to (1) declare the ordinance and any corresponding
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 1 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0009 Copy from re:SearchTX Denton Police Department general order or directive ultra vires and (2) order Defendants to (a) repeal the Ordinance, (b) cancel any corresponding Denton Police Department general order or directive, (c) fully enforce the drug laws in chapter 481, (d) not discipline any employee of the City of Denton for enforcing the drug laws in Chapter 481, and (e) modify city policies and internal operating procedures to the extent that they have been updated in response to the ordinance.
Discovery Control Plan
1. If discovery were needed, it would be intended to be conducted under Level 2 of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 190.3. But this is a case of pure law and discovery is unneeded.
Claims for Relief
2. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. Therefore, this suit is not governed by the expedited actions process in Tex. R. Civ. P. 169.
Venue
3. Venue is proper in Denton County under section 15.002(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code.
Sovereign Immunity Inapplicable
4. Neither sovereign immunity nor governmental immunity applies to the State of Texas’s ultra vires claim. “The basic justification for th[e] ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity is that ultra vires acts—or those acts without authority—should not be considered acts of the state at all.” Hall v. McRaven, 508 SW.3d 232, 238 (Tex. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, “ultra vires suits do not attempt to exert control over the state—they attempt to reassert the control of the state over one of its agents.” Id.
5. Further, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sec. 37.006(b) states “In any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the municipality must be made a party and is entitled to be heard.” This has been consistently construed as a legislative waiver of governmental immunity in situations like the one at issue here. Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 2 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0010 Copy from re:SearchTX S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex. 1994); Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010).
Parties
6. Plaintiff is the State of Texas. State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400, 410 (Tex. 2020) (citing State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 790 (Tex. 2015) (“As a sovereign entity, the State has an intrinsic right to enact, interpret, and enforce its own laws.”); Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 205, 221, 281 S.W. 837, 842 (1926) (“That the state has a justiciable ‘interest’ in its sovereign capacity in the maintenance and operation of its municipal corporations in accordance with law does not admit of serious doubt.”)).
7. Defendant City of Denton is a home-rule municipality.
8. Defendant Gerard Hudspeth is the Mayor of Denton.
9. Defendant Brian Beck is the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2.
10. Defendant Vicki Byrd is Councilmember for District #1.
11. Defendant Paul Meltzer is Councilmember for District #3.
12. Defendant Joe Holland is Councilmember for District #4.
13. Defendant Brandon Chase McGee is a Councilmember At-Large.
14. Defendant Chris Watts is a Councilmember At-Large.
15. Defendant Sara Hensley is City Manager of Denton.
16. Defendant Doug Shoemaker is Chief of Police of Denton.
17. All Defendants are sued in their official capacities.
18. All Defendants may be served with process through Sara Hensley, City Manager, at 215 E. McKinney Street, Denton, Texas 76201.
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 3 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0011 Copy from re:SearchTX Facts
19. Through the ballot initiative process, the citizens of Denton placed Proposition B on the November 8, 2022, ballot. Proposition B contained a city ordinance which would regulate how Denton Police Department enforces certain marijuana laws governed by Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. Proposition B passed.
20. The day after the election, Denton City Manager Sara Hensley sent a memo to Denton City Council advising them that the ordinance was approved by voters and would become effective after the election is canvassed by City Council. The memo outlines reasons why the City does not have the authority to implement some of the provisions of Proposition B. For instance, Ms. Hensley acknowledges that “Proposition B imposes explicit prohibitions on Denton Police Department’s ability to enforce laws related to low-level marijuana possession,” but concedes that “those prohibitions are in direct conflict with, and are superseded by, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” (Exhibit 1).
21. Ms. Hensley, perhaps in an effort to appease both the voters and the State, writes that “[i]n practice, a Denton Police Officer will continue to have authority to enforce state laws relating to marijuana. Neither the City, the City Manager, nor the Chief of Police has the authority to direct officers to do otherwise or to discipline an officer when they are acting in accordance with state law.” Exhibit 1 (emphasis added). Meanwhile, the Ordinance provides for discipline of Denton City Police Officers for violating it.
22. The Denton City Council codified and published the ordinance anyway. The ordinance is now in effect as City of Denton Code of Ordinances Chapter 21 – Offenses, Article V - Marijuana Enforcement (“the Ordinance”). 1
23. The Ordinance reads as follows:
1 Available at https://library.municode.com/tx/denton/codes/code_of_ordinances/423747?nodeId=SPACO OR_CH21OF_ARTVMAEN
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 4 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0012 Copy from re:SearchTX ARTICLE V. - MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT
Sec. 21-80. - Ending citations and arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana.
(a) Denton Police Officers shall not issue citations or make arrests for class A or class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, except in the limited circumstances described in subsection (b).
(b) The only circumstances in which Denton Police Officers are permitted to issue citations or make arrests for class A or class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana are when such citations or arrests are part of (1) the investigation of a felony level narcotics case that has been designated as a high priority investigation by a Denton Police Commander, assistant chief of police, or chief of police; and/or (2) the investigation of a violent felony.
(c) In every instance other than those described in (b), if a Denton Police Officer has probable cause to believe that a substance is marijuana, an officer may seize the marijuana. If the officer seizes the marijuana, they must write a detailed report and release the individual if possession of marijuana is the sole charge.
(d) Denton Police Officers shall not issue any charge for possession of marijuana unless it meets at least one of the factors described in subsection (b).
Section 21-81. - Citations for possession of drug residue or drug paraphernalia shall not be issued in lieu of a possession of marijuana charge.
(a) A class C misdemeanor citation for possession of drug residue or drug paraphernalia shall not be issued in lieu of a possession of marijuana charge.
Section 21-82. - Prohibition against using city funds or personnel to conduct THC concentration testing.
(a) No city funds or personnel shall be used to request, conduct, or obtain tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) testing of any cannabis-related substance to determine
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 5 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0013 Copy from re:SearchTX whether the substance meets the legal definition of marijuana under state law, except in the limited circumstances of a police investigation pursuant to subsection 21-80(b).
(b) This prohibition shall not limit the ability of Denton Police to conduct toxicology testing to ensure public safety, nor shall it limit THC testing for the purpose of any violent felony charge.
Section 21-83. – Prohibition against city police using the odor of marijuana or hemp has probable cause for search or seizure.
(a) Denton Police shall not consider the odor of marijuana or hemp to constitute probable cause for any search or seizure, except in the limited circumstances of a police investigation pursuant to subsection 21-80(b).
Section 21-84. - Training and policy updates; community involvement.
(a) The city manager and chief of police shall ensure that Denton Police Officers receive adequate training concerning each of the provisions of this ordinance.
(b) The city manager shall work with the Denton Police Chief and other relevant stakeholders identified in (c) to update city policies and internal operating procedures in accordance with this article. Actions that may be necessary include, but are not limited to: updating the Denton Police Department General Manual; updating the training bulletin; training officers; and updating internal databases and systems.
(c) The city manager shall arrange regular meetings to discuss the development of policies, procedures, and practices related to this article, which shall include community stakeholders including: the police chief’s advisory panel; other interested stakeholders and community organizations; individuals directly impacted by arrests within the city; immigrant communities; and communities of color. These meetings shall be open to public participation, have minutes and agendas publicly accessible, and have audio and video recordings uploaded to the city's website.
Section 21-85. - Discipline.
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 6 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0014 Copy from re:SearchTX (a) Any violation of this chapter may subject a Denton Police Officer to discipline as provided by the Texas Local Government Code or as provided in city policy.
Section 21-86. - Reporting.
(a) Within three (3) months of the adoption of this article, and once per year thereafter, the city manager or their designee shall present to the city council, at a public meeting subject to the Texas Open Meetings Act, a report concerning the city’s implementation of this article.
Legal Analysis
24. Because Denton is a home-rule municipality, it has “the full power of self- government” and does not need a special grant from the Legislature to enact local ordinances. S. Crushed Concrete, LLC v. City of Houston, 398 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. 2013). However, “no…ordinance passed under [Denton’s] charter shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.” TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
25. Under State law, “The governing body of a municipality … [or] a municipal police department … may not adopt a policy under which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs, including Chapters 481 and 483, Health and Safety Code, and federal law.” Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 370.003.
26. Chapter 481 of the Health and Safety Code provides that possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia are offenses. Tex. Health and Safety Code §§ 481.121, .125.
27. Section 21-80 of the Ordinance prohibits Denton police officers from issuing citations or making arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Thus, it is a policy under which Denton will not “fully enforce … Chapter 481.” Therefore, section 21-80 violates § 370.003.
28. Section 21-81 of the Ordinance prohibits Denton police officers from issuing Class C misdemeanor citations for “possession of drug residue [sic; there is no such offense] or drug
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 7 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0015 Copy from re:SearchTX paraphernalia … in lieu of a possession of marijuana charge.” Thus, it is a policy under which Denton will not “fully enforce … Chapter 481.” Therefore, section 22-81 violates § 370.003.
29. Section 21-82 of the Ordinance prohibits city funds and personnel “to request, conduct, or obtain tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) testing of any cannabis-related substance to determine whether the substance meets the legal definition of marijuana under state law” except in certain circumstances. Thus, section 21-82 is a policy under which Denton will not “fully enforce … Chapter 481.” Therefore, it violates § 370.003.
30. Section 21-84 of the Ordinance requires that Denton Police Officers “receive adequate training concerning each of the provisions of this article”, requires city policies and internal operating procedures to be updated “in accordance with this article”, and requires “regular meetings to discuss the development of policies, procedures, and practices related to this article, which shall include community stakeholders … community organizations [and] communities of color.” The Ordinance violates state law, so having meetings to discuss implementation of the Ordinance is a policy under which Denton will not “fully enforce … Chapter 481.” Therefore, section 21-84 violates § 370.003.
31. Section 21-85 of the Ordinance states, “Any violation of this chapter may subject a Denton Police Officer to discipline….” This is a policy under which Denton will not “fully enforce…Chapter 481.” In fact, Denton threatens officers who do not enforce Chapter 481 with “discipline.” Therefore, section 21-85 violates § 370.003.
32. Section 21-86 requires the city manager to submit regular reports to the city council “concerning the city’s implementation of this ordinance.” The Ordinance violates state law, so reports discussing implementation of the Ordinance is a policy under which Denton will not “fully enforce … Chapter 481.” Therefore, section 21-86 violates § 370.003.
33. Because the Ordinance violates section 370.003 of the Local Government Code, Defendants “may not adopt” it. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003.
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 8 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0016 Copy from re:SearchTX 34. Although local ordinances are presumed valid, if an ordinance is unmistakably and clearly at odds with a statute, the ordinance is preempted. Dall. Merchant's & Concessionaire's Ass‘n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1993).
35. In a preemption challenge, a local ordinance - even a reasonable one - “is unenforceable to the extent it conflicts with the state statute.” Id. (citation omitted).
36. The Ordinance directly conflicts with the state statute; thus it is unenforceable. See id. (citing City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 796 (Tex.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 570 (1982)).
37. Moreover, the Ordinance is unconstitutional. “[N]o…ordinance passed under [Denton’s] charter shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.” TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
38. In an ultra vires case, a plaintiff must allege, and ultimately prove, that an officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a ministerial act. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009).
39. Defendants lack legal authority to adopt the Ordinance and any corresponding police department general order or directive. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003.
40. Defendants lack the constitutional authority to adopt the Ordinance. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
Request for a Declaratory Judgment
41. The State of Texas requests that the Court issue a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance and any corresponding police department general order or directive are ultra vires and void.
Application for a Temporary Injunction
42. The State is entitled to a temporary injunction. To obtain a temporary injunction, the State must prove (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought;
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 9 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0017 Copy from re:SearchTX and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002).
43. The State has a cause of action against Defendants for ultra vires acts. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d at 405.
44. The State has a probable right of recovery. The City of Denton has no authority to authority to pass the Ordinance and the Denton Police Department has no authority to issue a corresponding general order or directive. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003; TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
45. “When the State files suit to enjoin ultra vires action by a local official, a showing of likely success on the merits is sufficient to satisfy the irreparable-injury requirement for a temporary injunction.” Hollins, 620 S.W.3d at 410.
46. Further, “An injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in damages, or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard.” Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; City of Dallas v. Brown, 373 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
47. Consequently, the State is entitled to a temporary injunction.
48. The Court should issue a temporary injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing the Ordinance and any corresponding Denton Police Department general order or directive and ordering Defendants to (a) repeal the Ordinance, (b) cancel any corresponding Denton Police Department general order or directive, (c) fully enforce the drug laws in Chapter 481, (d) not discipline any employee of the City of Denton for enforcing the drug laws in Chapter 481, and (e) modify city policies and internal operating procedures to the extent that they have been updated in response to the Ordinance.
Application for Permanent Injunction
49. The State of Texas requests trial on the merits, where it will seek a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing the Ordinance and any corresponding Denton Police Department general order or directive and ordering Defendants to (a) repeal the Ordinance, (b)
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 10 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0018 Copy from re:SearchTX cancel any corresponding Denton Police Department general order or directive, (c) fully enforce the drug laws in Chapter 481, (d) not discipline any employee of the City of Denton for enforcing the drug laws in Chapter 481, and (e) modify city policies and internal operating procedures to the extent that they have been updated in response to the Ordinance.
Prayer
Therefore, the State of Texas seeks the following relief:
a. A temporary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing Chapter 21, Article V of the City of Denton Code of Ordinances.
b. A temporary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to repeal the Ordinance.
c. A temporary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to cancel any corresponding Denton Police Department general order or directive.
d. A temporary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to fully enforce the drug laws in Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
e. A temporary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants not to discipline any Denton employee for enforcing the drug laws in Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
f. A temporary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to modify city policies and internal operating procedures to the extent that they have been updated in response to the Ordinance.
g. All other relief as the Court deems equitable and just.
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 11 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0019 Copy from re:SearchTX Date: January 30, 2024 Respectfully submitted.
KEN PAXTON /S/ JACOB PRZADA Attorney General JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 First Assistant Attorney General HEATHER DYER GRANT DORFMAN Special Counsel Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Tex. State Bar No. 24123044
RALPH MOLINA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station RYAN D. WALTERS Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Chief, Special Litigation Division Tel.: (512) 463-2100 Heather.Dyer@oag.texas.gov Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 12 The State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al.
MR 0020 Copy from re:SearchTX ___________Judicial
Cause No.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § In the District Court of Plaintiff § § V. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tern of Denton; VICKI § Denton County, Texas BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and CHRIS WATTS, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § DOUG SHOEMAKER, Chief of Police of § District Denton; in their official capacities, § Defendants.
Declaration ofJacob Przada
My name isJacob Przada. I am over eighteen years of age, am of sound mind, and am capable
of making this declaration. I am Special Counsel in the Special Litigation Division of the Office of the
Texas Attorney General.
I have read the above Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction
and Permanent Injunction. I verify that the facts stated therein are within my personal knowledge
and are true and correct.
Sworn and subscribed before me - ,2024.
JESSICA YVARRA Notary PUbflo.St of Texas Notary ID #13127814.2 Commission Exp. SEPT. 13, 20251 Notary without Bond
Plaintiff’s Original Verified Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Page 13 The State of Texas i’. City ofDenton, et al.
MR 0021 Copy from re:SearchTX Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Jacob Przada on behalf of Jacob Przada Bar No. 24125371 jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov Envelope ID: 84002644 Filing Code Description: Plaintiff's Original Petition Filing Description: Application for Temporary Injunction and Permanent Injunction Status as of 2/1/2024 9:42 AM CST
Associated Case Party: The State Of Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Jessica Yvarra jessica.yvarra@oag.texas.gov 1/31/2024 2:45:34 PM SENT
Jacob Przada 24125371 jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov 1/31/2024 2:45:34 PM SENT
Heather Dyer 24123044 heather.dyer@oag.texas.gov 1/31/2024 2:45:34 PM SENT
MR 0022 Copy from re:SearchTX City Manager’s Office DENTON 215 E. McKinney St., Denton, TX 76201 • (940) 349-8307
TO: City Council
FROM: Sara Hensley, City Manager
RE1 : Proposition B Implementation
DATE: Nov. 9, 2022
In yesterday’s election, an ordinance relating to marijuana enforcement, Proposition B, was approvedby voters. This ordinancewill become effective after the election is canvassed by the City Council, currently scheduledto be considered during a Special Meeting on Friday, Nov. 18.
ImplementationConsiderations for Proposition B While we continue to be dedicated to serving the community by making marijuana possession a low priority and recognize the statement expressed by voters regarding marijuana enforcement, the passage of Proposition B presents a challenge to the City regarding our ability to implement its provisions. These issues have previously been described in briefings to the City Council but can essentially be reduced to the issue of certain provisions of Proposition B being in direct conflict with statelaw. Chapter 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code prohibits the City Council and Police Department from adopting a policy that does not fully enforce state and federal laws relating to drugs, including marijuana. While Proposition B imposes explicit prohibitions on the Denton Police Department’s ability to enforce laws related to low-level marijuana possession, those prohibitions are in direct conflict with, and are superseded by, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which vests police officers with the authority and duty to enforce state law, including the ability to use the smell of marijuana as probable cause to conduct a search or seizure, the right to make an arrest, and where appropriate, the right to issue a citation for the possession of marijuana or drug paraphernalia, regardless of the quantity of marijuana. In short, the City does not have the authority to implement some provisions of Proposition B without changes to current drug laws by Congress and the Texas Legislature.
In practice, a Denton Police Officer will continue to have the authority to enforce state laws relating to marijuana. Neither the City, the City Manager, nor the Chief of Police has the authority to direct officers to do otherwise or to discipline an officer when they are acting in accordance with statelaw.
Proposition B further prescribes obligations on the part of the City Manager. In Section 21-84(b) of the ordinance, the City Manager is directed, along with the Chief of Police, to “update city policies and internal operating procedures in accordance with this ordinance” including updates to the Denton Police Department General Orders. The Chief of Police cannot adopt a General Order thatis in conflict with statelaw and I, as the City Manager to whom the Chief of Police reports, do not have the authority to direct him to act in violation of state law.
EXHIBIT 1 MR 0023 Copy from re:SearchTX In addition,PropositionB prohibitsthe City from using City funds or personnelto request, conduct, or obtain THC testing of any cannabis-related substance. While Council has budgetary authority, this provision of Proposition B is in direct conflict with the City Charter, which expressly excludes the appropriation of money from an initiative ordinance, though the Council may choose to amend the budget at its discretion. The passage of Proposition B will also not impact the city’s existing employee drug testing policies.
Public StatementRegarding Proposition B Given the above challenges in implementation, the recognition that other law enforcement agenciesare not subject to Proposition B, and the legal distinctions between marijuana and other THC derivatives, the City has drafted and released the attached public statement.
I am and City staff are concerned with the potential for incorrect information regarding the applicability and enforceability of Proposition B to quickly spread in the community, which could leadto a confrontationbetweenthe police and a member of the community should an officer act in accordancewith State law, while the community member mistakenly believes that action violates Proposition B. Therefore, staff have shared this statementwith the media and community stakeholders in order to mitigate the negative effects stemming from incorrect information.
Ongoing Approach to Marijuana Enforcement Prior to the passing of Proposition B, the City of Denton Police Department already significantly revised its marijuana enforcement policy and practices which are enumerated in its General Orders. Between June 2021 and July 2022, of the 65 arrests that the Denton Police Department made for marijuana possession under 4 ounces, 15 of these charges accompanied other controlled substances unrelatedto marijuana, and weapons were involved in 31 of these cases.
Going forward, Chief Shoemaker has affirmed that enforcementof marijuana possession will continueto be a low priority for the Denton Police Department. However, public safety requires the Police Department’s ability to use the smell and possession of marijuana, regardless of the amount, as well as the possession of drug paraphernalia, as probable cause to conduct further investigation,which as noted above, may lead to more serious crimes being charged, including the possession of a firearm and crimes of violence against members of our community.
Next Steps In accordance with Section 21-86 of the ordinance, I will report to Council within three months’ time regarding its implementation.
Attachment
CC: Mack Reinwand, City Attorney Frank Dixon, Assistant City Manager Doug Shoemaker,Chief of Police City Manager’s Office
MR 0024 Copy from re:SearchTX FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Stuart Birdseye (940) 349-8009 Stuart.Birdseye@cityofdenton.com
Information on the Passing of Proposition B, Relating to Marijuana Possession
DENTON, TX, Nov. 9, 2022 – Following the passage of Proposition B, which outlines actions to be taken regarding marijuana possession in the City of Denton, there is important information to share to help understand what this means for the Denton community. This ordinance, which was approved by voters, will become effective after the election is canvassed by the City Council, currently scheduled to be considered during a Special Meeting on Friday, Nov. 18.
Current Practices Prior to the passage of Proposition B, the City of Denton Police Department already significantly revised its marijuana enforcement policy and practices which are enumerated in its general orders. Between June 2021 and July 2022, of the 65 arrests that the Denton Police Department made for marijuana possession under 4 ounces, 15 of these charges accompanied other controlled substances unrelated to marijuana, and weapons were involved in 31.
The existing policy leaves officers with the discretion to continue an investigation after the discovery of marijuana if other crimes are suspected, such as driving while impaired, unlawful carrying of a weapon, or possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone (such as a school, park, or daycare).
“As a forward-thinking agency, marijuana possession alone has not been a priority for the Denton Police Department for several years,” said Police Chief Doug Shoemaker. “This will continue to be the case. With that said, officers must maintain discretion to be able to keep our community safe from harm. When marijuana possession pairs with other crimes that affect public safety, including offenses such as driving while intoxicated or firearms violations, such acts cannot and will not be ignored.”
Implementation With the voter approval of Proposition B, City staff has been working to determine which portions of the ordinance will be incorporated into the Police Department’s General Orders, also known as department policies. This review is necessary since Chapter 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code prohibits the City Council and Police Department from adopting a policy that does not fully enforce state and federal laws relating to drugs, including marijuana, as well as the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure which vests police officers with the authority and duty to enforce state law, including the possession of marijuana. Because portions of Proposition B conflict with and may be superseded by existing state and federal laws, some provisions of Proposition B may not be implemented without changes to those laws by the United States Congress and Texas Legislature.
OUR CORE VALUES Inclusion Collaboration Quality Service Strategic Focus Fiscal Responsibility
ADA/EOE/ADEA www.cityofdenton.com TDD (800) 735-2989
MR 0025 Copy from re:SearchTX It is also important to note, especially for students and visitors, that City policies and the Denton Police Department’s General Orders do not apply to the other law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction to enforce state law within the City of Denton. These agencies include, but are not limited to, the University of North Texas Police Department, Texas Woman’s University Department of Public Safety, the Denton County Sheriff’s Office, and the Texas Department of Public Safety, which all have their own policies and practices when it comes to marijuana investigations and arrests and are not subject to Proposition B.
Another important distinction is that the possession of marijuana and the possession of THC products are entirely different offenses. Per Texas state law, possessing any amount of THC, which is often the substance in edibles or vape cartridges, is a felony offense and this is not covered by Proposition B. As a result, possessing a single vape cartridge or a single edible would be classified as a felony. Also, when THC is added to any other substance, such as brownies or cookies, state law takes the total weight of the combined substances into consideration rather than the pure weight of the added THC. Meaning, per state law, if you bake a small amount of THC into a pound of brownies, you could be charged with possessing a pound of THC, a first- degree felony.
The Denton Police Department is dedicated to serving the community in a fair and safe manner. The department understands that, with the voter approval of Proposition B, voters wish to reduce punishments for low-level marijuana possession. The department is committed to continuing the innovative policies that are in place, which have resulted in a significant reduction in arrests since implemented in 2019 and updated in 2022, but must do so within the parameters of state and federal law. The Police Department will continue to assess all aspects of this ordinance, as passed by voters, to determine what may be implemented in accordance with both the current law as well as the voices of the population we serve.
###
Visit www.cityofdenton.com for more news and to stay updated.
MR 0026 Copy from re:SearchTX 1/23/24, 2:13 PM Denton, TX Code of Ordinances
ARTICLE V. - MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT
Sec. 21-80. - Ending citations and arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana.
(a) Denton Police Officers shall not issue citations or make arrests for class A or class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, except in the limited circumstances described in subsection (b). (b) The only circumstances in which Denton Police Officers are permitted to issue citations or make arrests for class A or class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana are when such citations or arrests are part of (1) the investigation of a felony level narcotics case that has been designated as a high priority investigation by a Denton Police Commander, assistant chief of police, or chief of police; and/or (2) the investigation of a violent felony. (c) In every instance other than those described in subsection (b), if a Denton Police Officer has probable cause to believe that a substance is marijuana, an officer may seize the marijuana. If the officer seizes the marijuana, they must write a detailed report and release the individual if possession of marijuana is the sole charge. (d) Denton Police Officers shall not issue any charge for possession of marijuana unless it meets at least one of the factors described in subsection (b). ( Ord. No. 22-1198 , § 2, 7-26-22, ratified 11-8-22)
Sec. 21-81. - Citations for possession of drug residue or drug paraphernalia shall not be issued in lieu of a possession of marijuana charge.
(a) A class C misdemeanor citation for possession of drug residue or drug paraphernalia shall not be issued in lieu of a possession of marijuana charge. ( Ord. No. 22-1198 , § 2, 7-26-22, ratified 11-8-22)
Sec. 21-82. - Prohibition against using city funds or personnel to conduct THC concentration testing.
(a) No city funds or personnel shall be used to request, conduct, or obtain tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) testing of any cannabis-related substance to determine whether the substance meets the legal definition of marijuana under state law, except in the limited circumstances of a police investigation pursuant to subsection 21-80(b). (b) This prohibition shall not limit the ability of Denton Police to conduct toxicology testing to ensure public safety, nor shall it limit THC testing for the purpose of any violent felony charge. ( Ord. No. 22-1198 , § 2, 7-26-22, ratified 11-8-22) EXHIBIT 2 about:blank MR 0027 1/2 Copy from re:SearchTX 1/23/24, 2:13 PM Denton, TX Code of Ordinances
Sec. 21-83. - Prohibition against city police using the odor of marijuana or hemp as probable cause for search or seizure.
(a) Denton Police shall not consider the odor of marijuana or hemp to constitute probable cause for any search or seizure, except in the limited circumstances of a police investigation pursuant to subsection 21-80(b). ( Ord. No. 22-1198 , § 2, 7-26-22, ratified 11-8-22)
Sec. 21-84. - Training and policy updates; community involvement.
(a) The city manager and chief of police shall ensure that Denton Police Officers receive adequate training concerning each of the provisions of this article. (b) The city manager shall work with the Denton Police Chief and other relevant stakeholders identified in subsection (c) to update city policies and internal operating procedures in accordance with this article. Actions that may be necessary include, but are not limited to: updating the Denton Police Department General Manual; updating the training bulletin; training officers; and updating internal databases and systems. (c) The city manager shall arrange regular meetings to discuss the development of policies, procedures, and practices related to this article, which shall include community stakeholders including: the police chief's advisory panel; other interested stakeholders and community organizations; individuals directly impacted by arrests within the city; immigrant communities; and communities of color. These meetings shall be open to public participation, have minutes and agendas publicly accessible, and have audio and video recordings uploaded to the city's website. ( Ord. No. 22-1198 , § 2, 7-26-22, ratified 11-8-22)
Sec. 21-85. - Discipline.
(a) Any violation of this chapter may subject a Denton Police Officer to discipline as provided by the Texas Local Government Code or as provided in city policy. ( Ord. No. 22-1198 , § 2, 7-26-22, ratified 11-8-22)
Sec. 21-86. - Reporting.
(a) Within three (3) months of the adoption of this article, and once per year thereafter, the city manager or their designee shall present to the city council, at a public meeting subject to the Texas Open Meetings Act, a report concerning the city's implementation of this article. ( Ord. No. 22-1198 , § 2, 7-26-22, ratified 11-8-22)
about:blank MR 0028 2/2 Copy from re:SearchTX FILED: 5/20/2024 3:18 PM David Trantham Denton County District Clerk By: Jade Kenemore, Deputy
CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § IN THE DISTRICT COURT HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of the § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. §
CITY OF DENTON’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
The City of Denton (the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian
Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon
Chase McGee and Chris Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley,
City Manager of Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton1 (the
“Officials” and together with the City, the “Defendants”), respectfully ask the Court
to dismiss Plaintiff the State of Texas’s (the “State” or “Plaintiff”) claims against them
with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction:
1 Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton, and therefore is not a proper defendant in any ultra-vires suit against him in that capacity, as only prospective relief can be granted in such a suit. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 376 (Tex. 2009). Further, neither he, his successor, nor Sara Hensley as City Manager, could be a proper defendant because neither a municipal police chief nor a city manager are named in Texas Local Government Code Section 370.003 as persons prohibited from adopting a policy.
MR 0029 INTRODUCTION
The City of Denton and its Officials are immune from suit. The State invokes
the limited “ultra-vires” exception to immunity, suing the City of Denton and several
of its Officials for purportedly committing an ultra-vires act. But neither the City nor
any of its officials committed the illegal act alleged: adopting a policy that would not
fully enforce the State’s drug laws. With no ultra-vires act alleged against any
Defendant, there is no valid ultra-vires claim.
The State’s suit is based on a citizens’ ballot initiative—“Proposition B”—
relating to the enforcement of marijuana laws. By that initiative process, the City’s
citizens presented a petition with the requisite number of signatures, requiring the
City to place Proposition B on the ballot. The City Council performed its ministerial
duty and placed the measure on the ballot—an act that was not ultra vires and is not
alleged to be. A majority of votes cast supported Proposition B, and by operation of
the City Charter, Proposition B was self-enacted. The City Council did not pass
Proposition B—the people did directly by their votes.
Although Proposition B is on the books in the City’s official Code of Ordinances
(the “Ordinance”), neither the City Council nor any Official has adopted a policy—in
connection with the Ordinance or otherwise—that would not fully enforce the State’s
drug laws. As acknowledged by the State, the City’s Officials have declined to adopt
any policy pursuant to the Ordinance. In other words, the Officials have done what
the State says the law requires them to do.
The State’s suit thus presents no live case or controversy. Neither the City nor
any of its Officials have enforced the Ordinance, and they have no intention of doing
2 MR 0030 so. Texas law is clear that passage of an ordinance—even one that is facially void—
works no injury; there must be an act taken in furtherance of that ordinance to give
rise to a claim.
Finally, the sole statute upon which the State relies, Local Government Code
Section 370.003, does not preempt an ordinance that will not fully enforce the State’s
drug laws. The statute only prohibits the City’s governing body and certain officials
from adopting a policy not to fully enforce drug laws. Thus, the State’s request for a
declaratory judgment that the Ordinance is void has no legal basis.
Without a valid allegation of an illegal and ultra-vires act by any defendant,
the immunity of the City and its Officials stands. And without any action being taken
to enforce/operate under the Ordinance, there is no ripe case or controversy. Both
defects mean that this suit must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And, because
the Ordinance is not void or preempted by any state law, the State’s limited claim for
declaratory judgment seeking to declare the Ordinance void must fail as well.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUMMARY OF THE BASES FOR THIS JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted by Plaintiff against
Defendants in this action. Lacking such jurisdiction, all of the State’s claims should
be dismissed with prejudice.2
2 This Plea to the Jurisdiction supplements and is in addition to the Pleas to the Jurisdiction originally filed by the City and the Official Defendants on March 22, 2024, and briefs in full all bases for all Defendants’ Pleas.
3 MR 0031 A. Standard of Review.
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638
(Tex. 2004). Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the power of a tribunal to
decide a case, and without subject-matter jurisdiction a court cannot render a valid
judgment. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d, 440, 443 (Tex. 1993).
The question of whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a matter of law.
Hoff v. Nueces Cnty., 153 S.W.3d 45, 48 (Tex. 2004).
Governmental entities are generally immune from suit. See Lubbock Cnty.
Water Control & Improv. Dist. v. Church & Akin, L.L.C., 442 S.W.3d 297, 300
(Tex. 2014). “Governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’t of
Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 637 (Tex. 1999).
“Because a court must not act without determining that it has subject matter
jurisdiction to do so, it should hear evidence as necessary to determine the issue
before proceeding with the case.” Bland Indep. School Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547,
554 (Tex. 2000). “Where, as here, evidence is presented with a plea to the jurisdiction,
the court reviews the relevant evidence and may rule on the plea as a matter of law
if the evidence does not raise a fact issue on the jurisdictional question, a standard
that generally mirrors the summary-judgment standard.” Harris Cnty. Flood Control
Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 798 (Tex. 2016).
4 MR 0032 B. The Defendants are immune to the State’s suit.
Texas political subdivisions and municipalities are immune from lawsuits
under the doctrine of governmental immunity. City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d
466, 469 (Tex. 2007). To sue a governmental entity, a party must find consent to sue
in a constitutional provision or a legislative enactment. Wichita Falls State Hosp. v.
Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. 2003) (“It is settled in Texas that for the Legislature
to waive the State’s sovereign immunity, a statute or resolution must contain a clear
and unambiguous expression of the Legislature’s waiver of immunity.”). Courts
resolve any statutory ambiguities in favor of retaining immunity. Id.
1. The State has not shown that the Officials took any action outside their legal authority.
Governmental employees sued in their official capacity have the same
governmental immunity as their governmental employer with one exception: the
action alleged is that the employees acted ultra vires. Franka v. Velasquez, 332
S.W.3d 367, 382–83 (Tex. 2011). An ultra-vires claimant must allege, and ultimately
prove, that each official acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely
ministerial act. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). The
State has not pleaded, and cannot as a matter of law, plead a valid ultra-vires claim
because it does not allege any act taken by any Defendant outside of their legal
authority.
2. The State has not established a valid waiver of or exception to immunity.
Nor has the State invoked an applicable legislative waiver of the City’s
immunity. Even though Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.006(b) requires
5 MR 0033 that the City be made a party when the validity of an ordinance is challenged, that
claim of invalidity must have some basis in law for that statute to waive the City’s
immunity.
The self-enacting Ordinance at issue here does not violate Local Government
Code Section 370.003 by the statute’s plain terms. Thus, there is no legal basis for
the State’s claim that it is invalid. See City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners,
794 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. 1990) (“When there is no conflict between a state law and a
city ordinance, the ordinance is not void.”).
C. The State has not established any ripe case or controversy, and seeks only an impermissible advisory opinion.
The State’s suit is also non-jurisdictional because it does not present a live case
or controversy, but instead seeks an impermissible advisory opinion. “For a court to
have subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, the plaintiff’s claims must be ripe.” Sw.
Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. 2020).
A case is not ripe—and hence seeks an advisory opinion—“when the
determination of whether a plaintiff has a concrete injury can be made only on
contingent or hypothetical facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass.”
Robinson v. Parker, 353 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. 2011) (cleaned up). As demonstrated
below, the citizens passed the Ordinance by their initiative and vote, but neither the
City nor any city official have taken any action to enforce it. Even if the Ordinance is
void, “the fact that an ordinance is void alone works no injury; only after acts are
impending or steps are already being taken to directly cause harm does the basis for
6 MR 0034 relief exist.” City of Cleveland v. Keep Cleveland Safe, 500 S.W.3d 438, 450 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2016, no pet.) (cleaned up).
The State seeks a declaration that amounts to “the Denton City Council or
Denton Police Department should not in the future adopt policies pursuant to the
Ordinance.” But such a declaration would be the kind of advisory opinion that courts
are constitutionally prohibited from issuing. See Price v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
397 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1965, no writ). In the absence of an actual
injury and a basis for relief, the Court has no jurisdiction to issue what would be an
advisory opinion. Id. (“While [the Uniform Declaratory Judgments] Act does
authorize Texas courts to render declaratory judgments, it does not authorize such
courts to render advisory opinions.”).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Denton’s citizens amend the City’s Code of Ordinances via ballot initiative.
As provided by the Denton City Charter, the City’s voters presented a petition
for a proposed ordinance on June 7, 2022. (Certified Records of the City of Denton,
attached hereto as Ex. A, Minutes of June 7, 2022 City Council Meeting, pp. 2–20; see
also, Excerpt of Denton City Charter, Denton, Tex., Code of Ordinances pt. 1, art. IV
(1959), attached for reference hereto as Ex. B.) At its July 19, 2022 meeting, the City
Council performed its ministerial duty by verifying that the petition met all of the
Charter’s requirements and placing Proposition B on the November 8, 2022 ballot.
(Ex. A, Minutes of July 19, 2022 City Council Meeting, pp. 21–31.)
7 MR 0035 The voters approved Proposition B, and again the City Council performed its
ministerial duty by canvassing and confirming the vote totals on November 22, 2022.
(Ex. A, Minutes of November 22, 2022 City Council Meeting, pp. 34–126.) Upon
confirmation of the fact that the voters had passed Proposition B, Proposition B
automatically became an ordinance by operation of the terms of the Charter. (Ex. B,
Excerpt of Denton City Charter, Denton, Tex., Code of Ordinances pt. 1, art. IV, § 4.10
(1959).)
Proposition B, now known as City of Denton Code of Ordinances Chapter 21 –
Offenses, Article V – Marijuana Enforcement, broadly provides that the City of
Denton and Denton police officers will not issue citations or make arrests for Class A
or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses except in certain limited
circumstance and other mechanisms aimed at limiting marijuana arrests and
prosecutions in the City of Denton. Denton, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 21, art. V,
§§ 21-80–21-86 (2022).
B. City Officials do not adopt or change any City policy relating to the enforcement of the State’s drug laws.
The City Council never adopted the Ordinance; on the one occasion that the
terms of the Ordinance were before the City Council for adoption, the measure failed.
(Ex. A, Minutes of November 22, 2022 City Council Meeting at 119.)
Shortly after the voters passed the Ordinance, City Manager Sara Hensley
stated in a memorandum to the City Council that “Denton City Police Officer[s] will
continue to have authority to enforce state laws relating to marijuana.” (Ex. 1 to Pl.’s
Orig. Pet., attached hereto as Ex. C at 1.) She further acknowledged that “the City
8 MR 0036 does not have the authority to implement some provisions of Proposition B
without changes to current drug laws by Congress and the Texas Legislature.” (Ex. C
at 1 (emphasis in original).)
The City then issued a public statement that acknowledged that
“Chapter 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code prohibits the City Council and
Police Department from adopting a policy that does not fully enforce state and federal
laws relating to drugs, including marijuana” and further stated that “[b]ecause
portions of Proposition B conflict with and may be superseded by existing state and
federal laws, some provisions of Proposition B may not be implemented.” Information
on the Passage of Proposition B, Relating to Marijuana Possession, CITY OF DENTON
(Nov. 9, 2022) https://www.cityofdenton.com/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=275&ARC=707
(last visited May 17, 2024). That is, the City stated that it would deliberate and
consider what portions, if any, of the Ordinance could be implemented in light of Local
Government Code Section 370.003.
As a result of that deliberation and consideration, and concluding that
adopting such a policy may be barred by law (specifically, that such policy would
violate Local Government Code Section 370.003), neither the City nor the Denton
Police Department have adopted any policies not to fully enforce the marijuana laws
of the State of Texas in furtherance of or in connection with the Ordinance. (Ex. D,
Declaration of City Manager Sara Hensley and Ex. E, Declaration of Interim Chief of
Police Jessica Robledo.)
9 MR 0037 ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
Applying the summary-judgment standard set forth in Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 166a(c) to this jurisdictional plea, the Court should dismiss the State’s
claims for lack of jurisdiction because there is no genuine issue of material fact, and
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A. Local Government Code Section 370.003 cannot be the basis for an ultra- vires claim under the facts of this case.
The State relies exclusively on Section 370.003 as the basis for its declaratory-
judgment claim, the foundational claim on which all of its requested relief rests. (Pl.’s
Orig. Pet. at ¶¶ 25–40.) The State argues that the individual Official defendants have
acted ultra-vires with respect to the Ordinance. (Id.) But the State identifies no act by
the Officials that actually violates Section 370.003, and accordingly the State’s suit does
not fall within the ultra-vires exception to the Officials’ immunity.
1. The State must plead and prove that the Officials acted without legal authority to invoke the ultra-vires exception to immunity.
To fall within the ultra-vires exception to the City’s governmental immunity, the
State’s suit “must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal
authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284
S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). An ultra-vires suit can only be brought against the
specific “official who allegedly acted without authority.” Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d
203, 225 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (dismissing ultra-vires
claim where plaintiff “failed to allege any statutory duty that [the named defendant]
violated or any specific unconstitutional act by [the official] in his official capacity
that, if taken as true, would entitle them to the relief they seek.”).
10 MR 0038 The ultra-vires exception is a “narrow” one. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v.
City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 164 (Tex. 2016). Where the facts demonstrate that
the governmental actor has not acted outside his authority, the ultra-vires exception
does not apply and the officer remains immune to suit. See Hall v. McRaven, 508
S.W.3d 232, 243 (Tex. 2017) (“[S]overeign immunity comes with a price; it often allows
the ‘improvident actions’ of the government to go unredressed. Only when these
improvident actions are unauthorized does an official shed the cloak of the sovereign
and act ultra vires.” (internal citations omitted)).
2. The State’s suit does not allege—and cannot prove—any action taken by the Officials outside their legal authority.
The State invokes a version of Section 370.003 that does not exist. (Pl.’s Orig.
Pet. at ¶ 44 (citing Section 370.003 for the proposition that “[t]he City of Denton has
no authority to pass the Ordinance” (emphasis added).) Section 370.003 does not say
that “a municipality may not enact an ordinance that provides that the municipality
will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs,” nor does it say that the authority of a
municipality to take such action “is expressly preempted.”3
3 A statute written that way likely would render the Ordinance facially invalid, as the Ordinance then would be “inconsistent with . . . the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.” That is because such language would satisfy the requirement that the Legislature act with unmistakable clarity if it wants to preempt a home-rule city’s constitutional power of self-government. Dallas Merch.’s & Concessionaire’s Ass’n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1993). An example of a statute that does just that is the law the Legislature passed in response to attempted municipal fracking bans in 2015 (Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 30 (H.B. 40), § 2, codified at Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 81.0523). That statute, in sharp contrast to Local Government Code Section 370.003, provides that “a municipality or other political subdivision may not enact or enforce an ordinance or other measure, or an amendment or revision of an ordinance or other measure, that bans, limits, or otherwise regulates an oil and gas operation within the boundaries or extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality or political subdivision,” and “The authority of
11 MR 0039 Instead, Section 370.003 speaks only to the acts of a city’s governing body, police
department, and certain specifically identified officials in adopting such an
ordinance/policy.4 That is, the existence of an ordinance that calls for policies that
would not “fully enforce laws relating to drugs” is not prohibited by Section 370.003, as
the State contends; instead, it only prohibits certain bodies or people “adopt[ing] a policy
under which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t
Code § 370.003 (emphasis added).
a municipality or other political subdivision to regulate an oil and gas operation is expressly preempted . . . .” Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 81.0523 (emphasis added). That is what a statute preempting a municipal action looks like—it bars the enactment of the ordinance by the entity, not by a particular body or person. That is not what Local Government Code Section 370.003 looks like or provides. 4 Importantly, two of the officials who are named as defendants in this suit, the Denton City Manager (Sara Hensley) and the (now former) Chief of Police, Doug Shoemaker, are not officials who are prohibited by Local Government Code Section 370.003 from taking the prohibited action of adopting a policy not to fully enforce drug laws. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003 (specifically listing, for example, “a sheriff,” a “municipal attorney, county attorney, district attorney, or criminal district attorney” as people prohibited from adopting such a policy, but not “a city manager” or “a chief of police”). Thus, because those two officials are not prohibited from taking such action (nevermind the additional fact that they have not taken any such action), they cannot be alleged to have acted ultra-vires in violation of Section 370.003, and thus all claims against each of them must be dismissed on that basis as well.
12 MR 0040 But, as shown by the undisputed facts above, that act—the act of the City Council
or Denton’s police department adopting such a policy—has not happened. There was
no act beyond the votes of the citizens required for the Ordinance to take effect:
Sec. 4.10. - Results of election, publication.
(a)If a majority of the electors voting on a proposed initiative ordinance shall vote in favor thereof, it shall thereupon be an ordinance of the city. A referred ordinance which is not approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon shall thereupon be deemed repealed.
(b)Initiative ordinances adopted and referendum ordinances approved by the electors shall be published, and may be amended or repealed by the council in the same manner as other ordinances.
(Ex. B, Excerpt of Denton City Charter, Denton, Tex., Code of Ordinances pt. 1, art.
IV, § 4.10 (1959) (emphasis added).)
Because Section 370.003 prohibits only the act of the “governing body” of the City
(i.e., its City Council) or the City’s “police department” “adopting a policy” not to fully
enforce a drug law, no law has been violated. Thus, no claim—including an ultra-vires
claim—predicated on a violation of the law can proceed.
The undisputed material facts demonstrate that the Officials have not
committed any ultra-vires act. With no ultra-vires act, the ultra-vires exception to the
Officials’ immunity cannot be invoked. The Officials therefore remain immune from
the State’s suit, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over the State’s claims against them.
13 MR 0041 B. The State’s suit seeks an advisory opinion that would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
In addition to the fact that there has been no ultra-vires act, the absence of any
act by Defendants renders any opinion the Court could render in this case advisory.
The State asserts “a cause of action against Defendants for ultra vires acts.” (Pl.’s
Orig. Pet. at ¶ 43.) A plaintiff in an ultra-vires suit “must allege, and ultimately
prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely
ministerial act.” City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009), cited
in Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶ 38.
The verb tense used by the Supreme Court in Heinrich matters. A plaintiff in
an ultra-vires suit must allege that the governmental official “acted” outside his legal
authority. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 (emphasis added). An allegation that the
governmental official “will act” or “may act” does not state a jurisdictional claim, but
instead seeks a non-jurisdictional advisory opinion as to what the official may (or may
not) do in the future. See Lazarides v. Farris, 367 S.W.3d 788, 803 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (applying ripeness analysis in an ultra-vires
case).5 Such an advisory opinion is not within the authority of the judiciary to offer.
5 To the extent that the State seeks a declaration that the Ordinance is void because it “is inconsistent with . . . the general laws enacted by the Legislature,” that claim likewise seeks an advisory opinion. That is because while some future act by the Officials might violate Section 370.003, 1) no such act by those bodies has occurred or is imminent, and 2) Section 370.003 does not prohibit the enactment of such an ordinance by a body or person not specifically named in that statute (such as the City’s voters, who adopted and enacted the Ordinance by their votes). The State seeks a declaration that amounts to “if you, Denton City Council or Denton Police Department, ever think about adopting policies pursuant to the Ordinance . . . don’t do it.” But such a declaration would be exactly the kind of advisory opinion that courts in this state are
14 MR 0042 1. A request for an advisory opinion violates the separation of powers doctrine.
The rule against advisory opinions is rooted in the separation-of-powers
doctrine. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993).
Separation of powers may be violated “when one branch of government assumes, or
is delegated, to whatever degree, a power that is more ‘properly attached’ to another
branch.” Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 663, 672 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2010, pet. denied). “And the issuance of advisory opinions is a function of the
executive branch, not the judicial.” Garcia v. City of Willis, 593 S.W.3d 201, 206
(Tex. 2019); accord Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22 (conferring exclusive authority to issue
advisory opinions on the attorney general).
A case is not ripe—and hence seeks an advisory opinion—“when the
determination of whether a plaintiff has a concrete injury can be made only on
contingent or hypothetical facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass.”
Robinson v. Parker, 353 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. 2011). When presented with a suit
that is based on contingent or hypothetical facts, the trial court is obligated to dismiss
the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Patterson v. Planned Parenthood,
971 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex. 1998) (“At the time a lawsuit is filed, ripeness asks whether
the facts have developed sufficiently so that an injury has occurred or is likely to
occur, rather than being contingent or remote.”).
constitutionally prohibited from issuing. Thus, the State’s claim for declaratory relief must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
15 MR 0043 2. No case or controversy exists in the absence of an act to enforce the Ordinance, and the State thus has no standing to assert claims arising from the Ordinance.
The Ordinance was self-enacting by function of the Denton City Charter and the
petition and vote of the people. But it has not been enforced, and no Defendant intends
to enforce it.
Under that set of facts, no valid claim for relief can be stated: “The proper practice
is to wait until the ordinance is passed and the city attempts to operate under it before
seeking relief against [the city].” City of Universal City v. City of Selma, 514 S.W.2d
64, 73 (Tex. App.—Waco 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). Even
if the Ordinance is void (which it is not), “[t]he fact that an ordinance is void alone
works no injury. Only after acts are impending or steps are already being taken to
directly cause harm does the basis for relief exist, and only then may the authority of
a court be invoked to restrain the injury.” City of Cleveland v. Keep Cleveland Safe,
500 S.W.3d 438,450 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, no pet.) (cleaned up). In the absence
of injury, which can only be caused by actual or imminent acts to enforce or operate
under an ordinance, the State has no standing. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369
S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012) (“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires a concrete
injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved
by the court.”).
3. The Officials have not yet taken any action contrary to Local Government Code Section 370.003.
Section 370.003, which is the sole basis for the State’s suit, bars “[t]he
governing body of a municipality [or] a municipal police department” from “adopt[ing]
16 MR 0044 a policy under which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs.” Tex.
Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003, relied upon by Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶ 39. The State’s suit is
not based on any act that the City’s governing body or police department has taken.
The voters have taken action. (Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶ 19.) But any action on the
part of the City’s governing body or its police department in furtherance of that voter
action is merely hypothetical—a fact the State’s Petition acknowledges. Because
there has been no action by the Officials, the State can only seek an injunction
mandating the modification of “city policies and internal operating procedures to the
extent that they have been updated in response to the Ordinance.” (Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at
¶ 49(e) (emphasis added).) The Petition’s use of such contingent language reflects
that no action—a necessary predicate for any violation, injury, and jurisdiction—has
occurred.
4. The self-enacting Ordinance is not being enforced, and there is consequently no live case or controversy for the Court to adjudicate.
The City and its Officials have followed the law and done everything they are
supposed to do, yet they are still being sued. That doesn’t make sense, doesn’t form the
basis for an ultra-vires claim, and doesn’t raise any actual case or controversy. The
entire case should therefore be dismissed.
By its plain language Section 370.003 does not prohibit the citizens of Denton or
any other city from exercising their right to enact ordinances via the initiative process.
Section 370.003 does not prohibit “the citizens acting under the power of initiative,” or
17 MR 0045 some similar designation, from taking action.6 In short, Section 370.003 binds the City
Council, not the City’s voters.
But regardless—when the voters passed the Ordinance, Denton city officials,
noting the terms of Section 370.003, declined to enact any policy in furtherance of or
enforcing the ordinance. (Ex. D, Declaration of City Manager Sara Hensley and Ex. E,
Declaration of Interim Chief of Police Jessica Robledo.) That sequence is exactly how
a City Council and city officials are supposed to handle a citizen initiative that may end
up being invalid. See Glass v. Smith, 244 S.W.2d 645, 653 (Tex. 1951) (“When the people
exercise their rights and powers under the initiative provisions of a city charter and
thereby become the legislative branch of the city government, the members of the City
Council, like other city officials and employees, become ministerial officers in the
legislative process, burdened with the mandatory obligations of performing the duties
imposed upon them incidental to carrying out the initiative procedure.”).
Whether any of the Officials believed at any time that the Ordinance might be
invalid, they were required to follow the process of placing the measure on the ballot
and counting the votes. Id. at 648 (when the citizens are “entitled to have the initiative
election called and held, [they] cannot be defeated in that right by the refusal of [city
6 Local Government Code Section 370.003 prohibits adoption of a non-enforcement policy by certain listed individuals (e.g., a “municipal attorney,” or “a sheriff,” among others, none of whom are at issue here), and by certain bodies, including the “governing body of a municipality.” However, the term “governing body of a municipality” does not mean the citizens; it means only the Denton City Council itself (the actual governing body of the City of Denton), which has not adopted any such policy. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 21.002 (“[a] reference in this code or another statute . . . (2) to the governing body of a municipality includes a municipal governing body regardless of the name, including a board of aldermen, city commission, or city council, used by a statute, municipal charter, or municipal ordinance to refer to the governing body.”).
18 MR 0046 officials] to perform purely ministerial duties on the ground that in their opinion the
ordinance would be invalid if adopted.”). That’s what the Officials did.
Indeed, every act committed by the City Council in this process was mandatory.
Had it refused to do so at any juncture, the citizens likely would have been entitled to
bring their own ultra-vires suit to compel the City Council to perform its ministerial
tasks. Id. at 653 (when the people exercise the initiative provisions of a city charter,
“the members of the City Council, like other city officials and employees, become
ministerial officers in the legislative process, burdened with the mandatory obligations
of performing the duties imposed upon them incidental to carrying out the initiative
procedure.”).
This case presents the bizarre scenario where a city and its officials did
everything right—they took every affirmative ministerial action they were required to
take, and they declined to take the one act (adopting a policy) that they were prohibited
from taking. And they’re getting sued for it. That scenario has never supported and
can never support an ultra-vires claim.
A valid ultra-vires claim must establish that the Officials acted in violation of the
law. The State’s claim here and the evidence presented establish that the City and its
Officials have complied with the law. To the letter. The State’s claim only seeks a
declaration about hypothetical action that could be taken, and hence presents no live
case or controversy to adjudicate.
19 MR 0047 C. The State’s overbroad interpretation of Section 370.003 would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
The State presumably wants Section 370.003 to bar local governmental
entities from having any ordinance or policy requiring anything less than full
enforcement of the state’s drug laws. Hence, the State seeks an injunction requiring
the City to “fully enforce the drug laws in Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety
Code.” (Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at Prayer.) The State’s interpretation of Section 370.003
would cause that section to violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, rendering it
unconstitutional. And because the Courts should avoid a statutory interpretation
that creates a constitutional infirmity, the State’s interpretation should be rejected.
The Texas Constitution prohibits laws that interfere with the separation of
powers. See Tex. Const. art. II, § 1; In re Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 660
S.W.3d 161, 167 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.); State v. Stephens, 663
S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The separation-of-powers doctrine provides
that “governmental authority vested in one department of government cannot be
exercised by another department unless expressly permitted by the constitution.”
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993).
The separation-of-powers doctrine is “foundational for federal and state
governments in this country” and is “firmly embedded in our nation’s history.” In re
Cnty. of Hidalgo, 655 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2022, no
pet.). This doctrine “reflects a belief on the part of those who drafted and adopted our
state constitution that one of the greatest threats to liberty is the accumulation of
20 MR 0048 excessive power in a single branch of government.” Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State,
802 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
“Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to
make laws, but not to enforce them.” Springer v. Gov’t of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189, 202 (1928). The Legislature thus has no role in deciding when and how the laws
it passes should be enforced. “The Executive Branch has exclusive authority and
absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.” United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). Hence, the initiation of criminal prosecutions is within the
“special province of the executive branch” and is at the heart of prosecutorial
discretion. Id.; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
Insofar as it would limit the police and prosecutorial discretion held by the
executive branch, Section 370.003 constitutes an unconstitutional usurpation of
executive power by the Legislature. The Court should not infer such a constitutional
infirmity, and should reject the State’s statutory interpretation. Cf., City of Fort
Worth v. Rylie, 602 S.W.3d 459, 468 (Tex. 2020) (“Courts must construe statutes to
avoid constitutional infirmities.”).
1. The investigation and prosecution of crimes is a “quintessential” executive function that is “exclusive” to the executive branch.
Prosecutors have “broad” latitude in making a range of investigatory and
prosecutorial determinations, including when, against whom, and whether to
prosecute particular criminal acts. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
That “exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
case” is vested in “the Executive Branch.” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693; accord Morrison v.
21 MR 0049 Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (characterizing the
“investigation and prosecution of crimes” as a “quintessentially executive function.”).
Part of prosecutorial discretion is the discretion exercised by the law
enforcement officer who encounters alleged criminal activity. See Antu v. Eddy, 914
S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ). The doctrine of “police
discretion” is “well established” and “has long coexisted with apparently mandatory
arrest statutes.” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005). As the
United States Supreme Court has observed, it is simply “common sense that all police
officers must use some discretion in deciding when and where to enforce city
ordinances.” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 62, n. 32 (1999).
2. Restriction on prosecutorial discretion generally violates the separation of powers doctrine.
American courts have long characterized prosecutorial discretion as a function
of the separation-of-powers doctrine.7 See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171
(5th Cir. 1965). “[I]t is well settled that the question of whether and when prosecution
is to be instituted is within the discretion of the Attorney General. Mandamus will
not lie to control the exercise of this discretion.” Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234,
234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
7 While the federal Constitution contains no explicit separation-of-powers provision, the Texas Constitution explicitly prohibits one branch from exercising power inherently belonging to another branch. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs. v. Dickensheets, 274 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.); State v. Stephens, 663 S.W.3d 45, 49–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). This “textual difference between the United States and Texas constitutions suggests that Texas would ‘more aggressively enforce separation of powers between its governmental branches than would the federal government.’” Stephens, 663 S.W.3d at 50 (citing State v. Rhine, 297 S.W.3d 301, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
22 MR 0050 a. Judicial deference to prosecutorial decisions is practical.
As part of the separation of powers, the judicial branch has declined to
interfere in police or prosecutorial decision-making. The United States Supreme
Court has itself observed that the “decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to
judicial review.” See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. That decision of whether to prosecute
involves a consideration of factors—such as the strength of the evidence, the
deterrence value, the prosecutor’s available resources, and the office’s existing
enforcement priorities—that are “not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the
courts are competent to undertake.” Id. Indeed, “[f]ew subjects are less adapted to
judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when
and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made,
or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought.” Newman v. United States, 382
F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
The injunction the State seeks in this case illustrates the impracticality of
judicial review of police and prosecutorial decision-making. The State asks the Court
to issue an “injunction ordering Defendants to fully enforce the drug laws in Chapter
481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.” (Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at Prayer.) Leaving aside
the vagueness of how drug laws would be “fully enforced,” the injunction the State
proposes asks the Court to undertake a ride-along during every police shift, arbitrate
every police encounter, and evaluate every ounce of suspicion a police officer may
develop to determine whether the drug laws are being “fully enforced.” The
injunction the State seeks therefore not only violates the constitutional separation-
of-powers doctrine, it would produce an impractical and absurd result.
23 MR 0051 b. Prevention of the accumulation of power underpins the restriction on legislative infringement on prosecutorial discretion.
Separation of powers bars the legislative branch from passing laws that would
infringe on police and prosecutorial discretion. Under Article II of the United States
Constitution, the executive branch—and not the legislature—“possesses authority to
decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against
defendants who violate the law.’” United States v. Tex., 599 U.S. 670, 678–79 (2023)
(citing TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2207 (2021)). The executive branch must
be granted discretion both because it “lacks the resources to arrest and prosecute
every violator of every law” and because it “must constantly react and adjust to the
ever-shifting public-safety and public-welfare needs of the American people.” Id. at
680.
Were the Legislature to have written the statute the State would like to
enforce, such a statute would constitute a usurpation by the Legislature of the
executive’s prosecutorial power. If Section 370.003 required the police and
prosecutors to “fully enforce” the drug laws, such a requirement would prevent the
executive branch from effectively exercising its constitutionally assigned powers. See
Greeley v. State, No. 03-98-00007-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3535, at *36 (Tex. App.—
Austin May 31, 2000, pet. ref’d) (“The executive branch is charged with enforcing the
laws as adopted by the legislature. In enforcing these laws and deciding what crime
to charge, the State has prosecutorial discretion.”).
24 MR 0052 3. To avoid a constitutional infirmity, courts generally do not interpret statutes to require enforcement in every instance.
As set forth above, the statute does not require the City (or anyone) to “fully
enforce” the state’s drug laws. It merely restricts the City’s governing body and its
police department from adopting a policy under which the City will not enforce such
laws. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003. Because the statute, by its plain language,
does not support the overbroad and unconstitutional interpretation the State ascribes
to it, the Court need not pass on the constitutionality of the statute.
It is simply enough in this case to observe that the City has not violated the
statute by adopting any prohibited policy, and neither the City Council nor its police
department intends to do so.
Because of both the practical impossibility of enforcing against every statutory
violation and because of the legislative usurpation of executive authority such a
mandate would entail, courts do not interpret statutes that purport to require full
enforcement to impose an affirmative obligation. Accordingly, the United States
Supreme Court has held that a statutory requirement that an agency “shall enforce”
a statutory scheme is insufficient to permit review of a nonenforcement decision.
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834 (1984); accord Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller,
477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the provision that the U.S. Attorney is
“authorized and required to institute prosecutions against all persons violating”
certain provisions of the Civil Rights Act does not “strip” federal prosecutors of their
“normal prosecutorial discretion.”).
25 MR 0053 Illustrating this point, a Florida federal court recently interpreted provisions
of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), commanding that “the provisions of this Act
and any regulations or permits issued pursuant thereto shall be enforced by the
Secretary.” Atl. Green Sea Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty. Fla., No. 6:04-cv-
1576-Orl-31KRS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38841, at 43 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2005),
vacated as moot, No. 05-13683-HH (11th Cir. Jan. 18, 2006) (interpreting 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(e)). Rejecting a conservation group’s petition for mandamus against the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service to compel an enforcement action, the court concluded that
the ESA “plainly does not mandate an impossibility—i.e., the Service to pursue to the
fullest each and every possible violation of the ESA or permits thereunder.” Id. at
*49.
Section 370.003—even if it were a different version that the State seems to be
basing its claims on here—likewise does not mandate an impossibility. And, in fact,
the Code Construction Act provides that in interpreting the statute, the Court should
“presume that a result feasible of execution is intended.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.021(4)
(cleaned up).
The contrary interpretation proposed by the State, by which the City would be
mandated to perform “an impossibility” of “pursu[ing] to the fullest each and every
possible violation of the” state’s drug laws, cf., Atl. Green Sea Turtle, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38841, at *49, is contrary to the plain language of the statute, the Code
Construction Act, the Constitution’s Separation of Powers Clause, and the limitations
of police manpower, budgeting, and energy. That interpretation should be rejected.
26 MR 0054 D. Even if the Ordinance were preempted, Section 370.003 does not waive the City’s immunity to the relief the State seeks.
The ultra-vires exception to governmental immunity is limited not only as to
scope but also as to available relief. A successful claimant in an ultra-vires case “is
entitled only to prospective injunctive relief.” City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d
366, 376 (Tex. 2009).
In this suit, the State alleges that the City and the named officials acted
without legal authority when they adopted the Ordinance and “any corresponding
police department directives” (even though no Defendant adopted the Ordinance or
issued any police department directives). (Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶ 39.) Even if
Section 370.003 were given the broad meaning the State ascribes to it, the ultra-vires
exception only allows suits requiring officials “to comply with statutory or
constitutional provisions.” Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 (emphasis added).
Thus, even if the City Council and police department had adopted such a policy,
the only relief available to the State in an ultra-vires suit brought to enforce
Section 370.003 would be an injunction barring the Officials from following those
policies. The fact that there is no such policy in this case is but the first problem with
the injunction the State seeks.
The State’s requested declaratory and injunctive relief go far beyond that one
act of compliance that the State could seek (if there had actually been any act of
noncompliance). (Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶¶ 41 & 48.) For example, the State requests a
declaratory judgment that “the Ordinance” is void. (Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶ 41.) But
Section 370.003 does not state or provide that any ordinance to the effect of not fully
27 MR 0055 enforcing the state’s drug laws is illegal or void; as noted above and by its plain text,
the statute simply prohibits certain bodies and persons from adopting such a policy.
The State further seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to repeal the
Ordinance (that they did not pass) and to “fully enforce the drug laws in Chapter 481”
of the Texas Health and Safety Code. (Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶ 48.) But Section 370.003
does not require any official to “fully enforce” Chapter 481 of the Health and Safety
Code. Because the requested relief of a declaration that the Ordinance is void and a
request for an injunction requiring Defendants 1) to repeal an ordinance that they
did not pass and 2) to fully enforce drug laws would reach beyond any conduct
prohibited by Section 370.003 (meaning that no ultra-vires act in violation of that
statute is implicated), the City and named Officials retain immunity as to that relief
the State seeks. The State’s claims seeking that relief therefore should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
If Section 370.003 mandated full enforcement of the state’s drug laws, it would
be an unconstitutional infringement on the separation of powers. Fortunately, it
doesn’t do that. It only bars governmental officials from promulgating non-
enforcement policies.
The Officials have not promulgated any such policy. For reasons that can only
be speculated about, the State nonetheless attempts to create a dispute where there
is none. Neither the City nor the Officials have taken any action in contravention of
Section 370.003, and they do not have any present intention of doing so. The State’s
28 MR 0056 suit presents no case or controversy for the Court to adjudicate. Likewise, the City
and the Officials retain their immunity from suit.
Accordingly, Defendants City of Denton and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of
Denton, Brian Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe
Holland, Brandon Chase McGee and Chris Watts, Members of the City Council of
Denton and Doug Shoemaker, (former) Chief of Police of Denton all ask the Court to
dismiss all claims against them with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Defendants further ask the Court, pursuant to Section 37.009 of the Civil Practice &
Remedies Code to award them costs and reasonable and necessary attorney fees as
are just and equitable and to grant them such other and further relief to which they
may be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
29 MR 0057 LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
30 MR 0058 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 20th day of May, 2024:
Ken Paxton Richard Gladden Attorney General Richscot1@hotmail.com Law Office of Richard Gladden Brent Webster 1204 W. University Dr., Suite 307 First Assistant Attorney General Denton, Texas 76201 ATTORNEYS FOR Grant Dorfman INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS Deputy First Assistant Attorney DEB ARMINTOR AND General DECRIMINALIZE DENTON
Ralph Molina Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Jacob Przada Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Johnathan Stone Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE
31 MR 0059 EXHIBIT A
MR 0060 STATE OF TEXAS CERTIFIED COPY OF PUBLIC RECORD COUNTY OF DENTON
I Lauren Thoden, hereby certify in the performance of the functions of my office that the attached instrument is a full, true and correct copy of the 125 pages consisting of City of Denton City Council Minutes and City of Denton Ordinance 22-2447, a public record of the City of Denton, Texas. The same appears of record in my office and said documents are the official public record from the public office of the City of Denton, Denton County, Texas, and is kept in said office.
I further certify that I am the City Secretary for the City of Denton, Texas, that I have legal custody of said instrument, and that I am the official designated keeper of records in said office.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set and affixed the official seal of the City of Denton, Texas, on this 15th day of May 2024.
CLA.AA.lirt Lauren Thoden, 'City Secretary City of Denton, Texas Denton County State of Texas
[SEAL]
1 MR 0061 CITY OF DENTON CITY COUNCIL MINUTES June 7, 2022
After determiningthat a quorum was present, the City Council of the City of Denton, Texas convenedin a Work Sessionon Monday, June 7, 2022, at 2:01 p.m. in the Council Work Session Room at City Hall, 215 E. McKinney Street,Denton, Texas.
PRESENT IN PERSON: Mayor Gerard Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Brian Beck and Council MembersVicki Byrd, Jesse Davis, Alison Maguire, Brandon Chase McGee, and Chris Watts
ABSENT: None
Also presentwere City Manager Sara Hensley and City Attorney Mack Reinwand.
The posted agenda noted the registration process for both in-person, call-in, and virtual public participationat this meeting.While citizencommentaryreceivedvia the online registration process was not read, each member for the City Council received each online commentary as it was submitted. In-person, call-in, and/or online comments received will be reflected in the exhibit to the minutes of this meeting, if/as applicable.
WORK SESSION
1. Citizen Comments on Consent Agenda Items
None
2. Requests for clarification of agenda items listed on this agenda.
• Clarification was requested on the following items: o Council Member Beck: Items 4.E (22-978), 4.1 (22-1029), and 4.Q (22-1163) o Mayor Hudspeth: Items 4.E (22-978), 4.J (22-1032), 4.AB (22-1151), and 4.AH (22- 1141)
• The following item was pulled for Individual Consideration: o Council Members Davis and Maguire: Item 4.D (22-953)
3. Work Session Reports
A. ID 22-701 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction regarding Audit Project 018 - Health Insurance Operations: Follow-Up Review. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 30 minutes]
Followingdiscussion, therewas no directionprovidedas the item was for presentation/discussionpurposes.
2 MR 0062 City of Denton City Council Minutes June 7, 2022 Page2
B. ID 22-801 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction regarding proposals from the Board of Ethics to amendthe Ethics Ordinanceand Board of Ethics Rules of Procedure. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 60 minutes]
Following discussion, City Council consensus was to present an ordinance for consideration at a future date for the following components. Staff will revisit requested items for additional review by theBoard of Ethics.
•
1: Update to Panel Composition Requirements •
3: Alignment with Updated Ethics Complaint Form •
4: Clarification of Panel’s Ability to Recommend Frivolity Hearing •
5: Adjustment to Preliminary Assessment Panel Assignment Criteria •
6: Clarification of Advisory Opinion Request Timelines & Reporting Process •
Additional Minor Verbiage Changes
C. ID 22-815 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction regarding the role of City Council Committees, membership to subcommittees and other internal/external groups, and their associated nomination and appointment processes. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 45 minutes]
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, City Council consensus was to schedule formal appointment as presented at the June 28, 2022 City Council meeting with the only change being to reach out to the Denton County Behavioral Health Leadership Team for the addition of a second seat providing for the appointmentof Council Member Alison Maguire.
D. ID 22-828 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction regarding funding recommendations from the Community ServicesAdvisory Committee(CS AC) for the proposed activities to be included in the 2022 Action Plan. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 30 minutes]
The item was presentedand discussion followed.
Following discussion, staff was directed to proceed with the proposed recommendations as presented for inclusion in the 2022 Action Plan.
Council Member Jesse Davis arrived at 3:25 p.m.; advance notice was provided.
The work session was recessedfor a shortbreak at 3:30 p.m. and reconvenedat 3:45 p.m.
3 MR 0063 City of DentonCity Council Minutes June 7. 2022 Page3
E. ID 22-419 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction on pending City Council requestsfor: (1) A Council vote to increase the allottedtime for public comment from four to five minutes. (2) A work session to discuss incentives and or requirements for EV charging electrical circuitry and infrastructure for single-family homes with garages and multifamily developmentsof certain sizes. (3) A Council vote on a resolutionthat directs the Denton Police Departmentto make investigationsand criminal enforcementrelated to reproductive healthcare its lowest priority, and recommends against using City funds for such purposes. (4) Authorizing staff resources to be spent in developing a policy related to panhandlingand public health policy. [Estimated Presentation/DiscussionTime: 30 minutes]
Following discussion, City Council consensus was as follows:
• ID 22-419(1) A Council vote to increase the allottedtime for public commentfrom four to five minutes. o No consensus for a work session.
• ID 22-419(2) A work session to discuss incentives and or requirementsfor EV charging electrical circuitry and infrastructure for single family homes with garages and multifamily developments of certain sizes. o Consensus for a flrture work session.
• ID 22-419 (3) A Council vote on a resolution that directs the Denton Police Department to make investigations and criminal enforcement related to reproductive healthcare its lowest priority, and recommends against using City funds for such purposes. o Consensus for a future work session.
• ID 22-419 (4) Authorizing staff resources to be spent in developing a policy related to panhandling and public health policy. o Consensusfor a futurework session.
The work session ended at 4:10 p.m.
CLOSED MEETING
1. The City Council convenedinto a Closed Meeting at 4:10 p.m. consistentwith Chapter 551 of the Texas Government Code, as amended, or as otherwise allowed by law, as follows.
A ID 22-832 DeliberationsRegarding Certain Public Power Utilities: Competitive Matters Under Texas Government Code Section 551.086; Consultation with Attorneys - Under Texas Government Code, Section 551.071. Receive a presentationfrom staff regarding public power competitive and financial matters about the risks of wholesale energy supply and risk management plans, hedge plans, and strategies as each relates to the DME electric power and gas portfolio; discuss, deliberate,and provide direction to staff regarding the same. Consultationwith the City’s attorneysregarding legal issues associatedwith the above
4 MR 0064 City of Denton City Council Minutes June 7. 2022 Page4
matters where a public discussion of these legal matters would conflict with the duty of the City’s attorneysto the City of Dentonand the DentonCity Councilunderthe Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Texas, or would jeopardize the City’s legal position in any administrative proceeding or potential litigation. NOT DELIBERATED
B. ID 22-1031 Consultation with Attorneys under Texas Government Code Section 551.071 and Deliberations Involving Medical or Psychiatric Records of Individuals under Texas Government Code Chapter 551.0785. Receive information from staff, discuss, and provide staff with direction related to a police officer’s plan benefits related to an injury in the line of duty. Consultation with the City’s attorney regarding legal issues associated with benefits where a public discussion of theselegal matters would conflict with the duty of the City’s attorneys to the City of Denton and the Denton City Council under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Texas; to consider information in the medical or psychiatric records relatedto a police officer’s injury in the line of duty. DELIBERATED
The closed meeting startedat 4:15 p.m. and ended at 5:00 p.m. No votes or actionswere taken duringthe closedmeeting.
REGULAR MEETING
After determining thata quorumwas present,the City Councilof the City of Denton,Texas convenedin a Regular Meeting on Tuesday, June 7, 2022, at 6:32 p.m. in the Council Chambers at City Hall, 215 E. McKinney Street, Denton, Texas.
PRESENT IN PERSON: Mayor Gerard Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Brian Beck and Council Members Vicki Byrd, Jesse Davis, Alison Maguire, Brandon Chase McGee, and Chris Watts
ABSENT: None
Also present were City Manager Sara Hensley and City Attorney Mack Reinwand.
The posted agenda noted the registration process for both in-person, call-in, and virtual public participation at this meeting. While citizen commentary received via the online registration process was not read, each member for the City Council received each online commentary as it was submitted. Both in-person, call-in, and online comments received are reflected in the exhibit to the minutes of this meeting, if/as applicable 1. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE A. U.S. Flag andB. Texas Flag
5 MR 0065 City of DentonCity CouncilMinutes June 7. 2022 Page5
2. PROCLAMATIONS/PRESENTATIONS
A. ID 22-1181Proclamation:DentonLGBTQ Pride Month PRESENTED
B. ID 22-1182Proclamation: JuneteenthDay PRESENTED
3. PRESENTATIONS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC
A. Review of procedures for addressing the City Council.
B. Reports from members of the public
1) Receive Scheduled Citizen Reports from Members of the Public
a. ID 22-1127 Ms. Debbie Sims, 1801 N. Elm Street, regarding continual issues with water line breaks/leaks at her hair business, Debi Do & Company Salon (1801 N. Elm Street). PRESENTED
b. ID 22-1128 Ms. Kathy Woods, 504 Retama Street, regarding the financial impact of water main issues at Debi Do & Company Salon (1801 N. Elm Street). PRESENTED
c. ID 22-1143 Mr. Max Folmar, 1412 Fox Hollow, regarding transportation services and Go Zone. PRESENTED
d. ID 22-1210 Ms. Elisabeth Gould, 1103 Bernard Street, representing Speaking At Her Best, LLC, regardingwhat to look out for when loving yourself wholeheartedly. PRESENTED
e. ID 22-1212 Mr. Stephen Dillenburg, 1001 Abbots Lane, regarding follow-up to comments made on Emergency Resolution of Public Corruption. PRESENTED
f. ID 22-1213 Dr. David Zoltner, 2501 Timber Trail, regarding abuse of the Open Microphone by citizens who sign up for the opportunity to speak, and by membersof Council and Staff who fail to enforce decorum. PRESENTED
6 MR 0066 City of Denton City Council Minutes June 7. 2022 Page6
g. ID 22-1238 Mr. Glad(len, 1822 W. Oak Street, regarding Invalid Certificationof Recall Petitionby the Denton City Secretary. PRESENTED
2) Additional Citizen Reports (Open Microphone)
None
4. CONSENT AGENDA
The Consent Agenda consistedof Items 4.A-H. During the Work Sessionheld earlier in the day, Item 4.D was pulled for Individual Consideration by Council Members Davis and Maguire, and Items 4.AF and 4.AG were Removed From Consideration and rescheduled to a future date by Mayor Hudspeth at the request of Staff.
Mayor Pro Tem Beck moved to adopt the Consent Agenda, now consisting of Items 4.A-C. E-AE and AH. Motion secondedby Council Member McGee. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0):None A. ID 22-811 Consider approval of the minutes of May 17, 2022 (Canvassing and Regular) Meetings. APPROVED
B. ID 22-1133 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton providing the May 9, 2022 meeting absence of a Public Utilities Board Member be excused; and declaring an effective date. APPROVED
C ID 22-834 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton repealing Ordinance No. 21-765;approving the 2022 Denton Municipal Electric - Energy Risk ManagementPolicy; (the "2022 EMRP"); delegatingauthority as provided in the 2022 ERMP; authorizing and approving the subsequent execution of such other ancillary and related documents, including, without limitation, contracts, nominations, certificates, assignments, licenses, directions, instruments,confirmations, orders, and statementsas are authorized by the 2022 ERMP, which are incident to or relatedthereto; confirming that the City of Denton, its Mayor, its City Councilmembers,its City Manager,its City Attorney,and its City Secretaryare authorized to perform such acts and obligations as are reasonably required to consummate those future transactions which are provided for and authorized by the 2022 ERMP; finding that the purchase of electricity, natural gas, and related commodities and instrumentsare
7 MR 0067 City of DentonCity Council Minutes June 7. 2022 Page7
exempt from the requirements of competitive bidding; finding that the purchase of electric energy, natural gas, and related commodities and instruments made by the city under the terms of the 2022 ERMP are in the public welfare of the citizens and electric ratepayers of the city; authorizing the expenditure of funds therefor; and, providing an effective date. The Public Utilities Board recommends approval [7-0]. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-834 E. ID 22-978 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton approving a City co- sponsorship to the Denton Juneteenth Celebration Committee in an amount not to exceed $20,365.89 of in-kind services and resources for the Denton Juneteenth Celebration, which will be held on Friday, June 17, 2022 through Saturday, June 18, 2022, at the Fred Moore Park; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-978
F. ID 22-1081 Consider adoptionof an ordinance of the City of Denton granting the Denton Juneteenth Celebration Committee a three-year noise exception for the Denton Juneteenth Celebration, to be held on June 17-19,2022, June 16-18, 2023, and June 14-16, 2024 at Fred Moore Park; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1081
G. ID 22-1024 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton authorizing the City Manager to execute an agreementallowing Denton County Brewing Company to sell alcoholic beverages at the Yappy Hour event, on Friday, June 10, 2022, and Friday, August 5, 2022, at North Lakes Dog Park upon satisfying certain conditions; and providing for an effectivedate. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1024
H. ID 22-1028 Consider adoptionof an ordinance of the City of Denton granting the North Texas State Fair Association a three-yearnoise exception for the North Texas Fair and Rodeo which will be held August 18-28, 2022, August 17-27, 2023, and August 15-25, 2024, at 2217 N. Carroll Boulevard; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1028
1. ID 22-1029 Consider adoptionof an ordinance of the City of Denton approving a City co- sponsorship to the North Texas State Fair Association in an amount not to exceed $8,502.80 of in-kind services and resourcesfor the Annual North Texas Fair and Rodeo Parade which will be held on Saturday, August 20, 2022, at 10:00 a.m., at the Downtown Square; and providingan effectivedate. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1029
J. ID 22-1032 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton authorizing the City Manager to execute on behalf of the City the disc golf course rental agreement for disc golf tournaments and events in the parks; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1032
8 MR 0068 City of Denton City Council Minutes June 7. 2022 Page 8
K. ID 22-1053 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton authorizing the Original Denton District to provide a letter of support to the Texas Commission on the Arts for an application by the Denton Festival Foundation for the Arts Respond Project - Economic Development grant in the amount of $15,000 for musician salaries related to the 2023 Arts and Jazz Festival: and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1053
L. ID 22-1054 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton authorizing the Original Denton District to provide a letter of supportto the Texas Commission on the Arts for an application by the Greater Denton Arts Council for the Arts Respond - Cultural District Project grant in the amount of $10,000 for the implementation of the "63 & 93 : Generations in Conversation" art exhibition, an exhibition hosting works by artists thirty-years and younger alongside artists sixty-years and older; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1054
M. ID 22-1055 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton authorizing the Original Denton District to provide a letter of support to the Texas Commission on the Arts for an application by Tejas Storytelling Association for the Arts Respond - Cultural District Project grant in the amount of $7,000 for aid in 2023 Texas Storytelling Festival expenses; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1055
N. ID 22-1056 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton authorizing the Original Denton District to provide a letter of support to the Texas Commission on the Arts for an application by Theatre Denton for the Arts Respond - Cultural District project grant in the amount of $5,000 for renovation of the neon campus theatre sign; and providing an effective date ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1056
0. ID 22-1082 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton in support of the Original Denton District’s application for the Arts Respond - Cultural District Project grant from the Texas Commission on the Arts in the amount of $12,000 for traffic utility box art program; authorizing the Original Denton District to execute a letter of support; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1082
P ID 22-1161 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton authorizing the City Manager to execute an agreement allowing Denton County Brewing Company to sell alcoholic beverages at the Glow in the Park event, on Saturday, June 18, 2022, at the North Lakes Disc Golf Course upon satisfying certain conditions; and providing for an effective date ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1161
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Q. ID 22-1163 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton approving a City co- sponsorship in an amount not to exceed $2,545.70 of in-kind services and resources for the Glow in the Park eventhostedby the Denton Parks Foundation,which will be held on Saturday, June 18, 2022, from 6:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m., at the North Lakes Disc Golf Course, 2201 N Bonnie Brae St; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1163
R. ID 22-1103 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the approval of Change Order No. 5 to the contract betweenthe City of Dentonand Quality Excavation,LTD, for the constructionof the McKinney Street sidewalk segment for the Downtown Storm Sewer Trunk Line PH I Project; providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date (IFB 7086 - Change Order No. 5, in the not-to-exceed amount of $65,757.40 for a total contract award aggregatedto $1,289,375.65). The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (7 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1103
S. ID 22-1104 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Biggs and Mathews Environmental, Inc., for the scale facility and roadway improvements at the City of Denton Landfill for the Solid Waste and Recycling Department; providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFQ 7109- 025 - Professional Services Agreement for design services awarded to Biggs and Mathews Environmental, Inc., in the not-to-exceed amount of $ 160,000.00). The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (7 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1104
T. ID 22-1105 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Allegro DevelopmentCorporation, for the Energy Trading and Risk ManagementApplication for Denton Municipal Electric, which is the sole provider of this software, in accordance with Texas Local Government Code 252.022, which provides thatprocurementof commodities and services that are available from one source are exempt from competitive bidding, and if over $50,000, shall be awarded by the governing body; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (File 7916 - awarded to Allegro Development Corporation, in the eight (8) year not-to-exceedamount of $1,658,561.00). The Public Utilities Board recommendsapproval(7 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1105
U. ID 22-1106 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the approval of a first amendment to a Professional Services Agreement between the City of Denton and Freese and Nichols, Inc., amending the contract approved by the City Manager on January 18, 2021, in the not-to-exceed amount of
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$96,963.00,said first amendmentto provide collaborativeproject delivery consulting services for the Capital Improvement Projects division; providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date (File 7620 - providing for an additional first amendment expenditure amount not-to-exceed $110,725.00 with the total contract amount not-to-exceed$207,688.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1106
V. ID 22-1107 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Techline, Inc., for the purchase of roll duct, PVC conduit, fittings, and accessories for the Denton Municipal Electric Department to be stocked in the City of Denton Warehouse; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (IFB 7973 - awarded to Techline, Inc., for one (1) year, with the option for four (4) additional one (1) year extensions, in the total five (5) year not-to-exceed amount of $10,000,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1107
W. ID 22-1108 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the approval of a first amendment to a contract between the City of Denton and SHI Government Solutions, Inc., amending the contract approved by City Council on May 3, 2022, to add Technology Solutions Products & Services through The Interlocal Purchasing System (TIPS) Cooperative Program Contract # 200105; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (File 7983 - providing for an amendment to the ordinance to add the TIPS Cooperative Program Contract #200105). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1108
X. ID 22-1110 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Kimley-Horn and Associates, Inc., to provide regulatory permitting/approval support, process evaluation, design services, bidding assistance, and constructionphase services for the Pecan Creek Water ReclamationPlant (PCWRP) Headworks Project for the Water Utilities Department; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFQ 7574-013 - Professional Services Agreement for design services awarded to Kimley-Horn and Associates, Inc., in the not-to-exceed amount of $3,828,700.00). The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (7 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1110
Y ID 22-1131 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Freese and Nichols, Inc., for the development of a Storm Water Master Plan assessmentfor the DrainageDepartmentas set forth in the contract;providingfor the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFQ 7599-006 - Professional Services Agreement for assessment services awarded to Freese and Nichols, Inc., in the not- to-exceed amount of $500,000.00). The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (7 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1131
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Z. ID 22-1145 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, for the approval of a pre-qualified list for utility relocation and construction services for various Capital Investment Projects within the City of Denton; providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFQ 7968 - for a three (3) year term). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1145
AA. ID 22-1146 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, rejecting any and all competitive proposals under RFP 7982 for Voluntary Products,to include accident,critical illness with cancer, and hospital indemnity coverage; and providing an effective date (RFP 7982). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1146
AB. ID 22-1151 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Ray McCain Services, Inc., for repairs, replacement, maintenance, and installation of automatic gates and overhead doors for the Facilities Management Department; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFP 7951 - awarded to Ray McCain Services, Inc., for one (1 ) year, with the option for four (4) additional one (1) year extensions, in the total five (5) year in the not-to-exceedamount of $750,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1151
AC. ID 22-1154 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with 2L Construction,L.L.C., for the constructionof the North Texas Boulevard Widening and Improvementsat Apogee Stadium Project; providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date (IFB 7966 - awarded to 2L Construction, L.L.C., in the not- to-exceed amount of $802,815.83). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1154
AD. ID 22-1160 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Artistic Painting Company, Inc., for interior and exterior painting services for the Facilities Management Department; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFP 7952 - awarded to Artistic Painting Company, Inc., for one (1) year, with the optionfor four (4) additionalone (1) year extensions,in the totalfive (5) year not-to- exceed amount of $600,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1160
AE. ID 22-1197 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, rejecting any and all competitive proposals under RFP 7975 for the Channel Grinder Provision and Install for the Solid Waste Department; and providing an effective date (RFP 7975). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1197
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AH. ID 22-1141 Consider approval of a resolutionby the City of Denton. a Texas home-rule municipal corporation,suspendingOncor Electric Delivery Company LLC’s proposed effective date of June 17, 2022, for ninety days in connectionwith Oncor’s statementof intent to increase rates filed on or about May 13, 2022; requiring the reimbursement of municipal rate case expenses; authorizing participation in the coalition of similarly situated cities; authorizing intervention and participation in related rate proceedings; authorizing the retention of special counsel; finding that the meeting complies with the open meetings act; making other findings and provisions related to the subject; and declaring an effective date ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1141
ITEM PULLED FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION
D. ID 22-953 Consider adoptionof an ordinanceof the City of Denton authorizingthe City Manager to execute an Interlocal Agreement between the City of Denton and Denton Independent School District (DISD) for the widening ofRiney Road as an addendum to the Bonnie Brae Phase 6 Project, for which funds will provided for by DISD. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-953
Pulledfor Individual Considerationby Council Members Davis and Maguire.
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
Council Members Davis and Maguire had a conflict of interestand left the Council Chambers.
The item was not presented and no discussion followed.
Mayor Pro Tem Beck moved to adopt the item as presented.Motion secondedby Council Member Byrd. Motion carried.
AYES (5): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None ABSTENTIONS (2): Council Members Davis and Maguire
ITEMS PULLED FROM CONSIDERATION
AF. ID 22-1170 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton ratifying and authorizing the city manager, to execute an advance funding agreement with the Texas Department of Transportation for a project using fUnds held in the State Highway 121 subaccount-roadway improvements (off state system) providing for the extension ofMayhill
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Road from as a four-lane divided urban arterial roadway from IH 35 east to US 380 in the City of Denton; authorizingthe expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date PULLED FROM CONSIDERATION; RESCHEDULED TO A FUTURE DATE The item was pulled from considerationby Mayor Hudspeth at Staffs request and rescheduled to a future date.
AG. ID 22-1172Consideradoptionof an ordinance of the City of Dentonratifyingand authorizing the City Manager, to execute and deliver an Advance Funding Agreement with theTexas Departmentof Transportationfor a project using funds held in the State Highway 121 subaccountprovidingfor an expansionof Hickory Creek Road from a two-lanerural roadway to a four-lane divided urban roadway and intersection improvements on Hickory Creek Road from FM 1830to RiverpassDrive in the City of Denton; authorizingthe expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date. PULLED FROM CONSIDERATION; RESCHEDULED TO A FUTURE DATE The item was pulled from considerationby Mayor Hudspethat Staffs request and rescheduledto a futuredate.
5. PUBLIC HEARINGS
A. ID 22-829Hold a public hearinginviting citizens to commenton the 2022 Action Plan for Housing and Community Development.
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and no discussion followed. The public hearing was opened and citizen comments received are noted in Exhibit A.
With no other callers on queue, the public hearing was closed.
NOTE: There was no action taken as the item was only a public hearing.
B S22-OO02bHold a public hearingand consider making a recommendationto City Council regardinga requestby Tenano Realty, Inc. for a Specific Use Permit to allow for a Multifamily Dwelling Use on approximately 11.891 acres of land, generally located on the east side of Woodrow Lane, approximately 1,365 feet south of East McKinney Street, in the City of Denton,DentonCounty,Texas.THE ITEM HAS BEEN POSTPONEDTO THE JUNE 28, 2022 CITY COUNCIL MEETING (S22-0002b, Pathway Woodrow Lane Multifamily, Julie Wyatt) CONTINUED TO JUNE 28,2022WITH THE PUBLIC HEARING OPEN
Mayor Hudspeth announced the public hearing remained open and continued to June 28, 2022
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C 221-0017b Hold a public hearing and consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, Texas, regarding a change in the zoning district and use classification from Residential Rural (RR) District to Planned Development (PD) District with a Light Industrial (LI) base zone on approximately 3 11.5 acres of land generally located on the northeast corner of Hampton Road and Masch Branch Road in the City of Denton, Denton County, Texas; adopting an amendment to the City’s Official Zoning Map; providing for a penalty in the maximum amount of $2,000.00 for violations thereof; providing a severability clause and an effective date. The Planning and Zoning Commission voted [4-2] to recommend denial of the initial request to rezone to Light Industrial (LI) (221-0017b, RM Squared Denton Tract, Tina Firgens). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 221-O017b
All membersof the City Councilreceivedthe comments as submitted and had the opportunityto review all submissions prior to the start of the meeting and consider such commentswhen voting on the item. The summary of public commentary/registrationsare notedin ExhibitA.
The item was presentedand discussion followed.
The public hearing was opened and citizen comments received are noted in Exhibit A.
With no other callers on queue, the public hearing was closed.
Following discussion, Council Member Davis moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member Maguire. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0):None The council meeting was recessed for a short break at 8:57 p.m. and reconvened at 9:16 p.m.
6. ITEMS FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION- CONSIDERATIONOF THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO CONDEMN REAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
A ID 22-657 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton determining the public use, need, and necessity for the acquisition of a (i) permanent water line easement and a (ii) temporary construction easement, generally located along Loop 288 and US 77 between InterstateHighway 35E to Nicosia Street, situatedin the Nathan Wade Survey Abstract No. 1407, in the City and County of Denton, Texas, and more particularlydescribedin the attachedExhibit "A" (collectively the "Property Interests"); authorizingthe City Manager and City Attorney, to acquire the Property Interests by agreement,if possible, including
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making all offers required by law; authorizing the use of the power of eminent domain to condemn the property interests if agreements cannot be reached; authorizing the City Attorney, to file eminent domain proceedings if necessary; authorizing the expenditure of funding; making findings; providing a savings clause; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-657
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The itemwas presentedandno discussionfollowed.
Council Member Maguire moved that the City of Denton, after having made the offers required by State Law, use the power of eminent domain, if needed, to acquire various permanent waterline easements, permanent sanitary sewer easements, and temporary construction easements, located generally along Loop 288 and US 77 between Interstate Highway 35E to Nicosia Street, situated in the Nathan Wade Survey Abstract No. 1407, BBB&CRR Co. Survey Abstract No. 141, all in the City and County of Denton, Texas, and more particularly described in the attached Exhibit “A“ to the ordinance now under consideration and on the screen to be displayed to the audience, all of which are for a valid public use necessaryto install a transmissionmain and pump station as part of the Water Distribution Master Plan to move water to the elevated storage tank located at Loop 288 and IH35, to serve the public and citizens of the City of Denton.
Each page of Exhibit A of the proposed ordinance was shown on-screen prior to a second to the motion being called.
Motion secondedby Council Member McGee. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0):None B ID 22-777Consider adoptionof an ordinanceof the City of Denton determiningthe public use, need, and necessity for the acquisition of various (i) permanent sanitary sewer easements and (ii) temporary constructioneasements,generally located betweenInterstate Highway 35E and WestgateDr., situatedin the Nathan Wade Survey Abstract No. 1407, F. Baston Survey Abstract No. 43, all in the City and County of Denton, Texas, and more particularly described in the attached Exhibit " A’' (collectively, the "Property Interests"); authorizing the City Manager and City Attorney to acquire the Property Interestsby agreement, if possible, includingmaking all offers required by law; authorizing the use of the power of eminent domain to condemn the property interests if agreements cannot be reached; authorizing the City Attorney, to file eminentdomain proceedingsif necessary;authorizingthe expenditure of funding;making findings; providing a savings clause; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-777
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
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The item was presentedand discussion followed.
Following discussion, Council Member Davis moved that the City of Denton, after having made the offers required by State Law, use the power of eminent domain, if needed, to acquire a permanent waterline easement and temporary construction easement, located be between Interstate Highway 35E and Westgate Dr., situated in the Nathan Wade Survey Abstract No. 1407, F. Baston Survey Abstract No. 43, all in the City and County of Denton, Texas, and more particularly described in the attached Exhibit “A“ to the ordinance now under consideration and on the screen to be displayed to the audience, all of which are for a valid public use necessary to install to abandon the existing Barrow wastewater lift station, to serve the public and citizens of the City of Denton.
Each page of Exhibit A of the proposed ordinance was shown on-screen prior to a second to the motion being called.
Motion seconded by Council Member Maguire.
Council Member Davis amended his motion to clarify the last portion, “ ...to install a new sanitary sewer line and abandon the existing Barrow wastewater lift station, to serve the public and citizens of the City of Denton.” Council Member Maguire, who seconded the original motion, accepted the amendment. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council MembersByrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0):None 7. ITEMS FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION
A ID 22-862Consider approvalof a resolutionof the City of Denton statingno objectionto a 4% housing tax credit application to the Texas Departmentof Housing and Community Affairs for the proposed new development of the Pathways on Woodrow to provide affordable rental housing; authorizing the Texas Housing Foundation to exercise its powers within the territorial boundaries of the City of Denton; authorizing a cooperation agreement; andprovidingan effectivedate. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-862
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presentedand discussion followed.
Citizen comments received are noted in Exhibit A.
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Following discussion, Council Member Watts moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion secondedby Council Member Byrd. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire,McGee, andWatts NAYS (0): None
B. ID 22-921 Consider adoption of an ordinance considering all matters incident and related to the issuance, sale and delivery of up to $89,000,000 in principal amount of "City of Denton General Obligation Refunding and Improvement Bonds, Series 2022"; authorizing the issuanceof the bonds; delegatingthe authority to certain City officials to execute certain documentsrelatingto the sale of the bonds; approving and authorizinginstrumentsand procedures relating to said bonds; enacting other provisions relating to the subject; and providingan effectivedate. The Public Utilities Board recommendsapproval(7-0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-921
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
Items 7.B (22-921) and 7.C (22-922) were collectively read into the record, presented, and discussed, but voted on individually.
Following discussion, Council Member Watts moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion secondedby Council Member McGee. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council MembersByrd, Davis, Maguire,McGee, andWatts NAYS (0): None
C ID 22-922 Consider adoptionof an ordinance considering all matters incident and related to the issuance, sale and delivery of up to $121,000,000 in principal amount of "City of Denton Certificates of Obligation, Series 2022"; authorizing the issuance of the certificates; delegating the authority to certain city officials to execute certain documents relating to the sale of the certificates; approving and authorizing instruments and procedures relating to said certificates; enacting other provisions relating to the subject; and providing an effective date. The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (7-0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-922
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
Items 7.B (22-921) and 7.C (22-922) were collectively read into the record, presented, and discussed,but voted on individually.
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Following discussion, Council Member Watts moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion secondedby Council Member Davis. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None
D. ID 22-1027 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton approving a co- sponsorship to the Denton Noon Kiwanis Club in an amount not to exceed $24,095.00 of in- kind services and resources for the 4th of July fireworks show, which will be held on Sunday, July 3, 2022, at North Lakes Park; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1027
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, Council Member McGee moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion secondedby Council Member Maguire. Motion carried.
AYES (6): Mayor Hudspethand Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (1): Mayor Pro Tem Beck
E. ID 22-1030 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton granting the Denton Noon Kiwanis Club a noise exception with respect to sound levels and hours of operation for the 4th of July Fireworks show to be held on Sunday, July 3, 2022, from 9:30 p.m. to 10 p.m. at North Lakes Park; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1030
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item. The item was presentedand discussion followed.
Following discussion, Council Member Davis moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion secondedby Council Member Watts. Motion carried.
AYES (6): Mayor Hudspethand Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (1): Mayor Pro Tem Beck
F. ID 22-1224 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton expressing its support of the City of Uvalde regarding the tragic events that occurred at Robb Elementary School; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1224
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
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The item was not presented; however, an overview of the item was detailed. The resolution was read in its entiretyby Council Member Watts.
Following commentary, Council Member Watts moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion secondedby Council Member Byrd. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council MembersByrd, Davis, Maguire,McGee, andWatts NAYS (0): None G. ID 22-1149 Receive the certification from the City Secretary regardingthe petition for the recall of District 4 Council Member Alison Maguire.
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presentedand discussion followed.
Citizen commentsreceived are noted in Exhibit A
No City Council action was required.
H. ID 22-1150 Receive the certification from the City Secretary regarding the petition for the decriminalization of marijuana.
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presentedand discussion followed.
Citizen commentsreceived are noted in Exhibit A
No City Council action was required.
8. CONCLUDING ITEMS
Council Members expressed items of interest
With no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 10:55 p.m.
6sEn MAYOR DEPUTY CITY SECRETARY CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS
MINUTES APPROVED ON:. JUne 28/ 2021
20 MR 0080 CITY OF DENTON CITY COUNCIL MINUTES July 19, 2022
After determining that a quorum was present, the City Council of the City of Denton, Texas convened in a Work Session on Tuesday, July 19, 2022, at 2:00 p.m. in the Council Work Session Room at City Hall, 215 E. McKinney Street, Denton, Texas.
PRESENT IN PERSON: Mayor Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Brian Beck (virtual) and Council Members Vicki Byrd, Jesse Davis, Alison Maguire, Brandon Chase McGee, and Chris Watts
ABSENT: None
Also present were City Manager Sara Hensley and City Attorney Mack Reinwand.
The posted agenda noted the registration process for in-person, call-in, and virtual public participation at this meeting. While citizen commentary received via the online registration process was not read, each member for the City Council received each online commentary as it was submitted. In-person, call-in, and online comments received are reflected in the exhibit to the minutes of this meeting.
WORK SESSION
1. Citizen Comments on Consent Agenda Items
None
2. Requests for clarification of agenda items listed on this agenda.
• Clarification was requested on the following items: o Council Member Byrd: Item 4.H (22-830) o Council Member Watts: Item 4.11 (22-830)
• The following item was Pulled for Individual Consideration: o Council Member Maguire: Item 4.F (22-1398)
3. Work Session Reports
A. ID 22-247 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction regarding FY 2022- 23 departmental budget presentations for Customer Service, Water & Wastewater, Environmental Services & Sustainability, Electric, and Solid Waste. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 3 hours]
The item was presented and discussion followed.
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Following discussion, there was no direction provided. Additional budget presentations to be made at upcoming meetings until final adoption of the FY 2022-23 Budget, scheduled for the September 27, 2022 Meeting.
The work session was recessed for a short break at 4:40 p.m. and reconvened at 4:56 p.m.
B. ID 22-1433 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction regarding the procedure for call-in comments at public meetings. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 30 minutes]
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, City Council consensus was to shift to a pre-registration-only format for call-in comments for City Council and Planning and Zoning Commission meetings. As much time as possible is to be provided for the pre-registration process. Staff will determine the best time to end the pre-registration process once the technology vendor for the Tele- Townhall system is consulted while also working to give the public sufficient notice.
C. ID 21-2805 Receive an update regarding the Denton County Transit Authority (DCTA) from the City of Denton DCTA Board representative. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 30 minutes]
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, there was no direction provided, with additional information to be being requested of the DCTA in the following areas:
• Opportunity for reduced fee vouchers for social service agencies; • Dynamics on the accidents being reported; and • Their position on establishing connectivity up to the multifamily areas that are more in need of a fixed route.
D. ID 22-682 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction on pending City Council requests for: 1. A Work Session to discuss an amendment to the Mobility Plan to reflect a direct connection between Windsor Road and Masch Branch Road, north of but separate from Hampton Road. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 30 minutes]
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, City Council consensus was as follows:
• ID 22-682 (1) A Work Session to discuss an amendment to the Mobility Plan to reflect a direct connection between Windsor Road and Masch Branch Road, north of but separate from Hampton Road. o Consensus for a future work session.
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E. ID 22-558 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction regarding Audit Project 027 - Network Management: Security Controls. [Estimated Presentation/ Discussion Time: 30 minutes]
The item was presented and discussion followed.
The item related to Closed Meeting Item 1.B (22-1407) scheduled for deliberation at the Closed Meeting to follow.
Following discussion, there was no direction provided as the item was for presentation/discussion purposes.
The work session ended at 5:55 p.m.
CLOSED MEETING
1. The City Council convened into a Closed Meeting at 5:55 p.m. consistent with Chapter 551 of the Texas Government Code, as amended, or as otherwise allowed by law, as follows.
A. ID 22-1299 Consultation with Attorneys - Under Texas Government Code Section 551.071. Consult with the City's attorneys, if needed, regarding the Texas Municipal Power Agency (TMPA) budget process where public discussion of these legal matters would conflict with the duty of the City's attorneys to the City of Denton and the Denton City Council under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Texas, or otherwise compromise the City's legal position. NOT DELIBERATED
B. ID 22-1407 Deliberations Regarding Security Devices or Security Audits - Under Texas Government Code Section 551.089. Receive a presentation from staff regarding network security information and to Audit Project 027 - Network Management: Security Controls; discuss, deliberate, and provide direction to staff regarding the same. DELIBERATED
The item related to Work Session Item 3.E (22-558) discussed earlier in the day.
C. ID 22-1476 Consultation with Attorneys - Under Texas Government Code Section 551.071. Consult with the City's attorneys regarding the "Decriminalize Marijuana" petition where public discussion of these legal matters would conflict with the duty of the City's attorneys to the City of Denton and the Denton City Council under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Texas, or otherwise compromise the City's legal position. DELIBERATED
The item related, in part, to Public Hearing Item 5.B (22-1196) scheduled for consideration at the Regular Meeting to follow.
23 MR 0083 City of Denton City Council Minutes July 19, 2022 Page 4
D. ID 22-1459 Deliberations Regarding Certain Public Power Utilities: Competitive Matters - Under Texas Government Code Section 551.086; Consultation with Attorneys - Under Texas Government Code Section 551.071. Receive information from staff regarding financial matters that include data stemming from public power utility competitive data; discuss, deliberate, and provide direction to staff regarding same; consult with the City's attorneys regarding legal issues associated with the above matter and associated with the "Application of Denton Municipal Electric to Change Rates for Wholesale Transmission Service" pending before the Public Utility Commission of Texas under Docket No. 52715; where public discussion of these legal matters would conflict with the duty of the City's attorneys to the City of Denton and Denton Municipal Electric (DME) under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Texas, or otherwise compromise the City's legal position. DELIBER ATED
The closed meeting started at 5:57 p.m. and ended at 6:27 p.m. No votes or actions were taken during the closed meeting.
REGULAR MEETING
After determining that a quorum was present, the City Council of the City of Denton, Texas convened in a Regular Meeting on Tuesday, July 19, 2022, at 6:33 p.m. in the Council Chambers at City Hall, 215 E. McKinney Street, Denton, Texas.
PRESENT IN PERSON: Mayor Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Brian Beck (virtual) and Council Members Vicki Byrd, Jesse Davis, Alison Maguire, Brandon Chase McGee, and Chris Watts
ABSENT: None
Also present were City Manager Sara Hensley and City Attorney Mack Reinwand.
The posted agenda noted the registration process for in-person, call-in, and virtual public participation at this meeting. While citizen commentary received via the online registration process was not read, each member for the City Council received each online commentary as it was submitted. In-person, call-in, and online comments received are reflected in the exhibit to the minutes of this meeting.
1. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
A. U.S. Flag and B. Texas Flag
2. PROCLAMATIONS/PRESENTATIONS
A. ID 22-1360 Proclamation: Parks and Recreation Month PRESENTED
24 MR 0084 City of Denton City Council Minutes July 19, 2022 Page 5
3. PRESENTATIONS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC
A. Review of procedures for addressing the City Council.
B. Reports from members of the public
1) Receive Scheduled Citizen Reports from Members of the Public
a. ID 22-1382 Mr. Stephen Dillenburg regarding betrayal of public trust, conscious disregard for life, fraudulent inducement of dangerous behavior from fiduciary positions (of trust.) NOT PRESENTED
b. ID 22-1467 Mr. Steven Leach, 900 Willowwood St., #32, regarding Improving Turnout for City Elections. PRESENTED
c. ID 22-1468 Mr. Eunice Husband, 316 Fry St., #259, regarding proposed policy changes for potential employees/job seekers who have criminal records. PRESENTED
2) Additional Citizen Reports (Open Microphone)
Citizen comments received are noted in Exhibit A.
4. CONSENT AGENDA
The Consent Agenda consisted of Items 4.A- U. During the Work Session held earlier in the day, Item 4.F (22-1398) was pulled for Individual Consideration by Council Member Maguire.
Council Member Maguire moved to adopt the Consent Agenda, now consisting of Items 4.A-E and G-U. Motion seconded by Council Member Davis. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None
A. ID 22-816 Consider approval of the minutes of June 24, June 25, and June 28, 2022 Meetings. APPROVED
B. ID 22-1331 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton excusing the June 6, 2022 meeting absence of a Board of Ethics Member; and declaring an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1331
25 MR 0085 City of Denton City Council Minutes July 19, 2022 Page 6
C. ID 22-1332 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton excusing the June 10, 2022 meeting absence of a Community Services Advisory Committee Member; and declaring an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1332
D. ID 22-1330 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton excusing the June 13, 2022 meeting absence of a Public Utilities Board Member; and declaring an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1330
E. ID 22-1289 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton providing the June 27, 2022 meeting absence of a Zoning Board of Adjustment Member be excused; and declaring an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1289
G. ID 22-694 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton authorizing the City Manager to execute a funding agreement between the City of Denton and the Denton Affordable Housing Corporation to provide HOME Investment Partnership Program funds for the rehabilitation of five rental units located at 400 Coronado Drive, Denton, Texas; authorizing the expenditure of funds in an amount not to exceed $100,000.00; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-694
H. ID 22-830 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton authorizing the City Manager to sign and submit to the Department of Housing and Urban Development a 2022 Action Plan for Housing and Community Development with appropriate certifications, as authorized and required by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, as amended, and the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, as amended; authorizing the Director of Community Services, or designee, to sign releases of liens and subordination agreements upon certain conditions; and providing for an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-830
I. ID 22-1326 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the execution of the first amendment to a funding agreement between the City and Our Daily Bread, Inc., approved by City Council on October 26, 2021; said first amendment to extend the term of the contract, authorize the expenditure of State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF) and expand the scope of services; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1326
26 MR 0086 City of Denton City Council Minutes July 19, 2022 Page 7
J. ID 22-1265 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton, Texas, adopting the City of Denton's Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Strategy ("CSWMS") to guide the City's future solid waste/materials management system and to develop infrastructure, programs, and policies necessary to manage materials in alignment with the guiding principles of the CSWMS; and providing an effective date. The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (6 - 0). ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1265
K. ID 22-1295 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute approval documents under the Joint Operating Agreement by and between the Texas Municipal Power Agency, City of Bryan, Texas, the City of Denton, Texas, the City of Garland, Texas, and the City of Greenville, Texas regarding the TMPA budget for the fiscal year 2023; providing for the expenditure of funds therefore; and providing an effective date. The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (6-0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1295
L. ID 22-1302 Consider adoption of an ordinance authorizing the City Manager to execute Amendment No. 3 between the City of Denton, a Texas municipal home-rule corporation, and the Texas Municipal Power Agency, a Texas Joint Powers Agency, that extends the term of the existing agreement to September 1, 2024; authorizing the expenditure of funds; and providing an effective date. The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (6-0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1302
M. ID 22-1373 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the approval of a first amendment to a contract between the City of Denton and JRD, LLC dba Maslonka Powerline Services, LLC, amending the contract approved by the City Council on February 23, 2021, in the not-to-exceed amount of $15,880,000.00; said first amendment to provide transmission line emergency services and a cost adjustment due to rising fuel, material, and labor costs for Denton Municipal Electric; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFP 7483 - providing for an additional first amendment expenditure amount not-to-exceed $3,776,000.00, with the total contract amount not-to-exceed $19,656,000.00). The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (6 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1373
N. ID 22-1374 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Parkhill, Smith & Cooper, Inc., for engineering services related to the Southwest Booster Pump Station (SWBPS) Ground Storage Tank (GST) Coating project for the Water Production Department as set forth in the contract; providing for the expenditure
27 MR 0087 City of Denton City Council Minutes July 19, 2022 Page 8
of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFQ 7574-015 - Professional Services Agreement for engineering services awarded to Parkhill, Smith & Cooper, Inc., in the not- to-exceed amount of $116,500.00). The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (6 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1374
O. ID 22-1375 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Power Monitors, Inc., for the purchase of pole mounted, ethernet-based three-phase PMI End-of- Line voltage and current recording, monitoring, metering, software, integration, accessories, and devices for Denton Municipal Electric, which is the sole provider of these items, in accordance with Texas Local Government Code 252.022, which provides that procurement of commodities and services that are available from one source are exempt from competitive bidding, and if over $50,000, shall be awarded by the governing body; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (File 8008 - awarded to Power Monitors, Inc., in the three (3) year not-to-exceed amount of $204,643.74). The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (6 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1375
P. ID 22-1377 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with NewGen Strategies and Solutions, LLC, for the Solid Waste Cost of Service and Rate Design Study for the Solid Waste Department as set forth in the contract; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFQ 7997 - Professional Services Agreement for professional services awarded to NewGen Strategies and Solutions, LLC, in the not-to-exceed amount of $89,890.00). The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (6 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1377
Q. ID 22-1378 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Vulcan, Inc., for traffic signs and accessories for the Warehouse; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (IFB 8001 - awarded to Vulcan, Inc., for one (1) year, with the option for four (4) additional one (1) year extensions, in the total five (5) year not-to-exceed amount of $1,500,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1378
R. ID 22-1379 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Technology Assets, LLC, dba Global Asset, through the Buy Board Cooperative Purchasing Network Contract # 661-22, for the service of asset recovery and recycling for retired technology assets for the City of Denton; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (File 8017 - awarded to Technology Assets, LLC, dba Global Asset, in the three (3) year term). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1379
28 MR 0088 City of Denton City Council Minutes July 19, 2022 Page 9
S. ID 22-1380 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Bibliotheca, LLC, for the purchase of CloudLibrary digital services for downloadable ebooks and audiobooks as a companion to CloudLink services for the Denton Public Library, which is the sole provider of this software, in accordance with Texas Local Government Code 252.022, which provides that procurement of commodities and services that are available from one source are exempt from competitive bidding, and if over $50,000, shall be awarded by the governing body; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (File 8021 - awarded to Bibliotheca, LLC, in the seven (7) year not-to-exceed amount of $1,635,318.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1380
T. ID 22-1381 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Solid Border, Inc., through the Department of Information Resources (DIR) Cooperative Purchasing Network Contract No. DIR-CPO-4850, for the purchase of Cybersecurity Software Products and Services; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (File 8044 - awarded to Solid Border, Inc., in the five (5) year not-to-exceed amount of $1,300,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1381
U. ID 22-1400 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Sustainability Solutions Group USA, Inc., for the development of a Climate Action Adaptation Plan; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFP 7996 - awarded to Sustainability Solutions Group USA, Inc., in the not- to-exceed amount of $132,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1400
ITEM PULLED FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION
F. ID 22-1398 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton authorizing the City Manager to execute an Interlocal Agreement in the Form of a Memorandum of Understanding between the City of Denton and the Denton Independent School District (DISD), for reimbursement to the City in the estimated amount of $811,154 for compensation and benefits of Student Resource Officers (SROs) assigned at DISD for the period of July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023, and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1398
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was Pulled for Individual Consideration by Council Member Maguire.
29 MR 0089 City of Denton City Council Minutes July 19, 2022 Page 10
Council Members Davis and Maguire had a conflict of interest and left the Council Chambers.
The item was not presented and no discussion followed.
Mayor Hudspeth moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member Byrd. Motion carried.
AYES (5): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tern Beck and Council Members Byrd, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None ABSTAINED (2): Council Members Davis and Maguire
5. PUBLIC HEARINGS
A. DCA22-0002d Hold a public hearing and consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton amending the Denton Development Code, specifically amendments to Subchapter 2 - Administration and Procedures; providing for a penalty in the maximum amount of $2,000.00 for violations thereof; providing a severability clause and an effective date. The Planning and Zoning Commission voted [6-0] to recommend approval of the amendments. (DCA22-0002d, Subchapter 2 Code amendments, Ron Menguita) ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. DCA22-0002d
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and no discussion followed.
The public hearing was opened and with no callers in the queue, the public hearing was closed.
Council Member Watts moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member Davis. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tern Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None
B. ID 22-1196 Hold a public hearing pursuant to Article IV, Section 4.07 of the Denton City Charter, have deliberation, and give staff direction regarding the certified initiative petition to adopt an ordinance to eliminate low-level marijuana enforcement by creating Chapter 21, Article V of the Denton City Code to be titled "Marijuana Enforcement".
30 MR 0090 City of Denton City Council Minutes July 19, 2022 Page 11
All members of the City Council received the comments as submitted and had the opportunity to review all submissions prior to the start of the meeting and consider such comments when voting on the item. The summary of public commentary/registrations are noted in Exhibit A.
The item related, in part, to Closed Meeting 1.C (22-1476) deliberated earlier in the day.
The item was presented and discussion followed.
The public hearing was opened and citizen comments received are noted in Exhibit A.
With no other callers on queue, the public hearing was closed.
Following further discussion, City Council directed staff to schedule the ordering of the special election for vote on the initiative petition (Code Amendment) at the November 8, 2022 Uniform Election Date, with the item to be presented for consideration at the July 26, 2022 Meeting.
6. ITEMS FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION
A. ID 22-1245 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton amending the Code of Ordinances, related to Chapter 2, titled "Administration," Article XI, titled "Ethics," to update the composition requirements of a Panel, clarify what is included in the contents of an accepted Ethics Complaint, and clarify the process for recommending a frivolity hearing; providing for findings of fact; providing severability; providing a repealer clause, providing codification; confirming proper notice and meeting; and providing for an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1245
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, Council Member Byrd moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member Watts. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None
B. ID 22-1246 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton confirming the proposed amendments to the Board of Ethics' Rules of Procedure as required by the Code of Ordinances, Chapter 2, Article XI, Section 2-227(k) to update the composition requirements of a Panel, clarify what is included in the contents of an accepted Ethics Complaint, clarify the process for recommending a frivolity hearing, and provide guidelines for processing Advisory Opinion requests; providing for severability; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-1246
31 MR 0091 City of Denton City Council Minutes July 19, 2022 Page 12
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, Council Member Watts moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member McGee. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tern Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None
C. ID 22-1416 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton adopting the 2022-2023 City Council Priorities and Key Focus Areas for the city of Denton; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 22-1416
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, Council Member Byrd moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member McGee. Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, Maguire, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None
7. CONCLUDING ITEMS
Council Members expressed items of interest.
With no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 8:32 p.m.
GERARD HUDSPETH ROSA RIOS MAYOR CITY SECRETARY CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS
MINUTES APPROVED ON: Vg..G(/),,,,<7/
32 MR 0092 July 19, 2022 City Council Regular Meeting - EXHIBIT A
Speaker Commentaries/Registrations Online, Email, Phone
Name Last Address City Agenda Item Position Method Comments Deb Armintor 2003 Mistywood Ln. Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Stanton Brasher 13 Finley Cir. Krum 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Kristine Bray 1204 Cordell St. Denton Open Mic N/A In-Person Stated DCTA does not operate the Go Zone bus system the way it should be run. Industry standards are buses that come every 10 minutes, but in Denton it is closer to 45 minutes or more. Ridership is falling due to low standards and routes that don't make sense. Bus stops, especially in downtown have no benches or covers, nothing to accommodate riders. GoZone is low quality and is failing. Not sustainable. Kristine Bray 1204 Cordell St. Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. James Can 1526 Willowwood St. Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Javier Cavazos Weems 500 Inman St. Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Brett Davis 1014 Mack Place Denton 22-1196 Support Caller Called to express support for the item but did not speak. Alejandro Galindo-Juarez 2325 Northway Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Eva Grecco 802 W Oak St., #5 Denton Open Mic N/A In-Person Gave comments on the City's bus system she believes has gone completely downhill with Go Zone and the elimination of fixed routes and of buses on Sunday. Eva Grecco 802 W Oak St., #5 Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Everett Grey None Given Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Alexandria Hayden 7509 Inwood Rd. Dallas Open Mic N/A In-Person Gave comments in opposition to the overturning of Roe vs Wade. Robert Head 2061 Le Mans Carrollton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Jennifer Lane 1526 Willowwood St. Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Grace Martin-Young 401 S Locust St. Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Jared Panico 2411 W Hickory St. Denton 22-1196 Support Caller Gave comments in support of the item. Morgan Rawlinson 2411 W Hickory St. Denton 22-1196 Support Caller Gave comments in support of the item. Priya Singh 5201 Par Dr. Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. David Souders 22-1196 Oppose eComment Please do not accept this ordinance. This petition represents the views of activists and not our community as a whole. Let the 60 days lapse and put this to the citizens. You will hear from the silent majority and see that this ordinance is a bad idea and bad for our community. Passing of this ordinance will lead to increased drugs within our community and drug-use by youth and the most vulnerable among our community Nicholas Stevens 417 Amarillo St. Denton 22-1196 Support In-Person Gave comments in support of the item. Phillip Young 2041 Scripture St. Denton Open Mic N/A In-Person Gave comments on the City's structure and public communications. No longer opposed to the new Chief of Police reporting to an Asst. City Manger vs. the City Manager, and, City Council should make as few changes as possible in the administration of the City as he has a high level of confidence in the staff. he expressed concern about the local newspaper being used as a means of intimidation, rather than just information. Gave a hand-out supporting his topics and closed his remarks with a prayer for Council.
NOTES: Information contained within this exhibit includes only commentary for Open Microphone, Consent, Individual Consideration and Public Hearing Items. eComments are included in their entirety, as submitted. Comments for those citizens addressing the City Council are an abbreviated summary. Full agenda, meeting video, and system transcript are available by visiting the City of Denton Public Meetings Page at www.cityofdenton.com/242/Public-Meetings-Agendas, going to the Archived Meetings Section, and selecting the applicable meeting date.
33 MR 0093 CITY OF DENTON CITY COUNCIL MINUTES November22, 2022
After determiningthat a quorum was present,the City Council of the City of Denton, Texas convened in a Special Called Meeting on Tuesday, November 22, 2022, at 9:00 a.m. in the Council Chambers at City Hall, 215 E. McKinney Street, Denton, Texas.
PRESENT: Mayor Gerard Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Brian Beck and Council Members Vicki Byrd, Jesse Davis, Alison Maguire, Brandon Chase McGee, and Chris Watts
ABSENT: None
Also present were City Manager Sara Hensley and City Attorney Mack Reinwand.
The posted agenda noted the registration process for in-person, call-in, and virtual public participation at this meeting. While citizen commentary received via the online registration process was not read, each member for the City Council received each online commentary as it was submitted. In-person, call-in, and online comments received are reflected in the exhibit to the minutes of this meeting.
1. ITEMS FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION
A. ID 22-2447 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton canvassing election returns and declaringresults of the Special Elections held on November 8, 2022; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 22-2447
Council Member Maguire had a conflict of interest with Proposition A and left the Council Chambers. Becausethe item incorporatedboth propositionson the ballot,the conflict encompassed the entire item.
All members of the City Council received the comments as submitted and had the opportunity to review all submissionsprior to the start of the meeting and consider such commentswhen voting on the item. The summary of public commentary/registrationsare noted on Exhibit A.
City Secretary Rios read the final vote totals into the record. The election results reported the following propositions received a favorable majority vote with the result being as indicated:
•
PropositionA - Shall Alison Maguire be removed from the City Council by Recall? o CARRIED •
Proposition B - Shall an initiative ordinance be approved to eliminate low-level marijuanaenforcement? o CARRIED
Citizen comments received are noted on Exhibit A
34 MR 0094 City of Denton City Council Minutes November 22. 2022 Page2
During citizen comments, Mayor Pro Tem Beck called a Point of Order that speakersbe allowed to only speak on items listed on the agenda. Mayor Hudspeth ruled that since others had spoken on more than one issue, he would allow the current speaker to continue. With no objection forthcoming from any member of the City Council, the speaker continued the cornrnentary.
Discussion followed.
During Mayor Pro Tem Beck’s commentaryregardingPropositionA, Council Member Watts called a Point of Order posing a question to the City Attorney regarding the City’s current litigation and how such comments might affect the City’s position. City Attorney Reinwand opined Mayor Pro Tem Beck was speaking for himself and his comments were not representative of the City’s position in the litigation.
Following discussion, Mayor Hudspeth moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion secondedby Council Member Davis. Motion carried.
AYES (6): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Davis, McGee, andWatts NAYS (0): None ABSTENTIONS (1): Council MemberMaguire
B. ID 22-2456 Proclamation in appreciation of service to the City of Denton as a City Council Member to Alison Maguire. PRESENTED
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
Citizen comments received are noted on Exhibit A.
[This area of Page 2 has been intentionally left blank.]
35 MR 0095 City of Denton City Council Minutes November 22, 2022 Page 3
]prodaautfon bd ALISON MAGUIRE go all IB tolnm that preSents gbaU tome,
6te£tlngg
WHEREAS, Alisonb@tire has nwai as CoucH &4emtx:r – Distria 4 of theCity oflktt&Jn fran 2021to 2022: uH
\+}{ER£AS, IIte City of Dc:IRonhas uga)ul the tkdicacd and wt5twxJing wntIibtaia8 of Alison M#uirc and her efforts to make ChIROn a ban city; altd
WHEREAS. AHsul MBsite, 8rtntB her many cmbtxaias tn th coarmwlity, has also served on dIe (awnmhy Panncnhip (:onvnittce.\lot>aig ComInince, IXnton Cotnty BetuviaII Health l+aktship THru IhraonCaaty llanpoaationAldb(xiV. DiscoverDeMonAdt-IswHy Bcwd, aH the Regioaai TtutspoMtion Cotr€il; aId
WHEREAS, Alison Maguire tw always served dbafull} aId beyoad ttw efTnient dintwBe of in dudes in Funding dx: welfare &xI HUIHdV of the Cit) . ard hn canu=d the rnfwt ofhu fellow CaIne it Mcmkn, coIlmews, and citians of[knton, ala dw loss of her pneue waI tn keenly felti NO\V, THEREFORE.
tHE CITY Cot;NCil OF THE bY R£SOI'VIS,
TInt tIe sincere and warm 8ppncblkn of AliwI Maguire felt by ttys citiaw utd $tafTof dw City of IbM, tN fwm8liy con+t)ai to her in a panama nwuur by Kaiin8 thi, Prwtamadon into the officid minutesof th City of than& ma forward to her a mIC copy thereof; and
BErr }lIRTHER RFSOLVFJ):
1}at theCityof DenttndIm haeb} ofBcia} ly ud sbH€nb'extenditsdwas to Alisonbtquin for tur suansful cvnr u Cu:nil Hank:r of the City of Dental.
PASSED this th UNi cby of No\'emba 2022
ArrEST: ROSA RIOS, crrY SECRFrARY
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2. CONCLUDING ITEMS
Council Members expressed items of interest.
With no further business, the meetingwas adjourned at 10:26 A.M.
L& .1732}42 GERARD HUDSPETH MAYOR CITY SECRETARY CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS
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37 MR 0097 ORDINANCE NO. 22-2447
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF DENTON CANVASSING ELECTION RETURNS AND DECLARING RESULTS OF THE SPECIAL ELECTIONS HELD ON NOVEMBER 8, 2022; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Denton, Texas ("City") ordered a special election to be held in the City on November 8, 2022 for the for the propositions of (A) determining whether City Council Member Alison Maguire shall be removed from District 4 Seat of the City Council by Recall and (B) amendment to the Denton Code of Ordinances, creating Chapter 21, Article V to be titled "Marijuana Enforcement"; and
WHEREAS, the election officers who held the election have duly made the returns of the result thereof, and these returns have been duly delivered to the City Council; and
WHEREAS, the meeting at which this ordinance was passed was open to the public, and public notice of the time, place, and purpose of said meeting was given, all as required by the Texas Government Code, Chapter 551; NOW THEREFORE;
THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF DENTON HEREBY ORDAINS:
SECTION 1. The City Council officially fmds and determines the election held on November 8, 2022 was duly ordered, proper notice of this election was duly given, proper election officers were duly appointed prior to this election, this election was duly held, the City has complied with the Federal Voting Rights Act and the Texas Election Code, the returns of the result of this election have been made and delivered to the Council, and the City Council has duly canvassed these returns, all in accordance with the law and the ordinance calling this election.
SECTION 2. The official returns of the election officials having been opened, examined, and canvassed and the City Council officially finds and determines 16,270 votes were cast at this election on the submitted PROPOSITION A, and 46,677 votes were cast at this election on the submitted PROPOSITION B by the residents, qualified electors of the City, who voted at the election and that the votes cast for such propositions on the ballot for the election were as follows:
EARLY/ABSENTEE VOTING:
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A
Shall Alison Maguire be removed from the City Council by Recall?
FOR 6,836 AGAINST 3,782
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B
Shall an initiative ordinance be approved to eliminate low-level marijuana enforcement?
FOR 24,099 AGAINST 10,213
38 MR 0098 ELECTION DAY VOTING:
CITYOF DENTON PROPOSITION A
Shall Alison Maguire be removed from the City Council by Recall?
FOR 1,847 AGAINST 1,116
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B
Shall an initiative ordinance be approved to eliminate low-level marijuana enforcement?
FOR 8,574 AGAINST 2,915
TOTAL VOTES CAST:
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A
Shall Alison Maguire be removed from the City Council by Recall?
FOR 8.683 AGAINST 4.898
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B
Shall an initiative ordinance be approved to eliminate low-level marijuana enforcement?
FOR 32,673 AGAINST 13,128
SECTION 3. The City Council officially declares the result of said special elections to be that PROPOSITIONS A and B so submitted HAVE received a favorable majority vote in all respects and have CARRIED. The City Council finds and declares that Councilmember Alison Maguire is removed from office by Recall. In accordance with Section 2 of Ordinance No. 22-1198, which is incorporated herein by reference and made a part of this ordinance for all purposes, Chapter 21, Article V of the City Code, to be titled "Marijuana Enforcement" has been approved and adopted by a majority of the qualified voters of the City of Denton, and the City Secretary is hereby directed to enter a full copy of Ordinance No. 22-1198 in the official minutes of this meeting and to codify Section 2 of Ordinance No. 22-1198 in the Denton Code of Ordinance.
SECTION 4. The City Council has found and determined the meeting at which this ordinance is considered is open to the public and that notice thereof was given in accordance with provisions of the Texas open meetings law, Texas Government Code Chapter 551, as amended, and a quorum of the City Council was present.
SECTION 5. This ordinance shall become effective immediately upon its passage and approval.
Page 2 of 3 39 MR 0099 The motion to approve this ordipance was made by (maca-ck --(1,a5SIRAk, and seconded by e Q1,tyt ; the ordinance was passe and approved by the following vote F - D 1: Aye Nay Abstain Absent
Mayor Gerard Hudspeth: Vicki Byrd, District 1: Brian Beck, District 2: V Jesse Davis, District 3: V
Alison Maguire, District 4: V Brandon Chase McGee, At Large Place 5: Chris Watts, At Large Place 6:
PASSED AND APPROVED this the day of No-, E'h' , 2022.
GERARD HUDSPETH, MAYOR
ATTEST: ROSA RIOS, CITY SECRETARY
VS BY:
APPROVED AS TO LEGAL FORM: MACK REINWAND, CITY ATTORNEY
BY:
Page 3 of 3 40 MR 0100 ORDENANZA N.° 22-2447
UNA ORDENANZA DE LA CIUDAD DE DENTON PARA ESCRUTAR RESULTADOS ELECTORALES Y DECLARAR LOS RESULTADOS DE LA ELECCION ESPECIAL CELEBRADA EL 8 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2022; Y QUE DISPONE UNA FECHA DE ENTRADA EN VIGOR.
POR CUANTO, el Concejo Municipal de la Ciudad de Denton, Texas ("Ciudad"), ordeno la celebracion de una eleccion especial en la Ciudad el dia 8 de noviembre de 2022 para las siguientes propuestas: (A) determinar si la concejala Alison Maguire sera destituida del escalio del Distrito 4 del Concejo Municipal mediante revocacion, y (B) modificar el C6digo de Ordenanzas de Denton creando el Capitulo 21, articulo V, que se denominard "Imposicion respecto a la marihuana"; y
POR CUANTO, los funcionarios electorales que celebraron la eleccion han formulado debidamente las declaraciones de los resultados de las mismas, y dichas declaraciones han sido debidamente entregadas al Concejo Municipal; y
POR CUANTO, la reunion en la que se aprobo esta ordenanza estuvo abierta al publico, y se dio aviso public() de la hora, el lugar y el proposito de dicha reunion, todo como lo exige el Capitulo 551 del Codigo de Gobierno de Texas; EN VIRTUD DE LO CUAL;
EL CONCEJO MUNICIPAL DE LA CIUDAD DE DENTON ORDENA LO SIGUIENTE:
SECCION 1. El Concejo Municipal constata y determina de manera oficial que la eleccion celebrada el dia 8 de noviembre de 2022 se ordeno debidamente, se dio aviso oportuno de esta eleccion, se nombraron adecuadamente funcionarios electorales idoneos antes de esta eleccion, esta eleccion se celebro como corresponde, la Ciudad ha acatado tanto la Ley Federal de Derecho al Voto como el Codigo Electoral de Texas, se formularon y entregaron las declaraciones del resultado de esta eleccion al Concejo, y el Concejo Municipal ha escrutado debidamente estas declaraciones, todo de conformidad con la ley y la ordenanza que convoca a esta eleccion.
SECCION 2. Habiendose abierto, examinado y escrutado las declaraciones oficiales de los funcionarios electorales, y el Concejo Municipal constata y determina de manera oficial que se emitieron 16,270 votos en esta eleccion sobre la PROPUESTA A presentada, y que se emitieron 46,677 votos en esta eleccion sobre la PROPUESTA B presentada por parte de los residentes, electores calificados de la Ciudad, que votaron en la eleccion y que los votos emitidos para dichas propuestas en la boleta electoral para la eleccion fueron los siguientes:
VOTACION ANTICIPADA/A DISTANCIA:
CIUDAD DE DENTON PROPUESTA A
c,Debe destituirse a Alison Maguire del Concejo Municipal mediante revocacion?
A FAVOR 6.836 EN CON I RA 3.782
41 MR 0101 CIUDAD DE DENTON PROPUESTA B
1,Se debe aprobar una ordenanza de iniciativa para eliminar la imposicion de delitos de bajo nivel relacionados con la marihuana?
A FAVOR 24,099 EN CONTRA 10,213
VOTACION EN EL DiA DE LA ELECCION:
CIUDAD DE DENTON PROPUESTA A
1,Debe destituirse a Alison Maguire del Concejo Municipal mediante revocacion?
A FAVOR 1,847 EN CONTRA 1,116
CIUDAD DE DENTON PROPUESTA B
1,Se debe aprobar una ordenanza de iniciativa para eliminar la imposicion de delitos de bajo nivel relacionados con la marihuana?
A FAVOR 8,574 EN CONTRA 2,915
TOTAL DE VOTOS EMITIDOS:
CIUDAD DE DENTON PROPUESTA A
1,Debe destituirse a Alison Maguire del Concejo Municipal mediante revocacion?
A FAVOR 8,683 EN CONTRA 4,898
CIUDAD DE DENTON PROPUESTA B
1,Se debe aprobar una ordenanza de iniciativa para eliminar la imposicion de delitos de bajo nivel relacionados con la marihuana?
A FAVOR 32,673 EN CONTRA 13,128
SECCION 3. El Concejo Municipal declara de manera oficial que el resultado de dichas elecciones especiales es que LAS PROPUESTAS A y B asi presentadas HAN recibido un voto mayoritario favorable en todos los aspectos y han GANADO. El Concejo Municipal constata y declara que la concejala Alison Maguire es destituida de su cargo mediante revocacion. De conformidad con la Seccion 2 de la Ordenanza N.° 22-1198, que se incorpora al presente documento por referencia y forma parte de esta ordenanza para todos los propositos, se ha aprobado el Capitulo 21, Articulo V del Codigo de la Ciudad, que se denominard "Imposicion respecto a la marihuana", y adoptado por una mayoria de los votantes calificados de la Ciudad de Denton, y por la presente se ordena a la Secretaria Municipal que ingrese una copia completa de la Ordenanza N.° 22-1198 en las actas oficiales de esta reunion y que codifique la Secci6n 2 de la Ordenanza N.° 22-1198 en el COdigo de Ordenanzas de Denton.
42 Pagina 2 de 3 MR 0102 SECCION 4. El Concejo Municipal constata y determina que la reunion en la que se considera esta ordenanza esta abierta al paha), y que se notifico de la misma de conformidad con las disposiciones de la Ley de Reuniones Publicas de Texas (Capitulo 551 del Codigo de Gobierno de Texas), con sus modificaciones, y que bubo quorum del Concejo Municipal.
SECCION 5. Esta ordenanza entrard en vigencia inmediatamente despues de su promulgacion y aprobacion.
La mocion para aprobar esta ordenanza fue formulada por (-4". x 0,w ( 14/ (.1,6-:c,Q ii y secundada por :Tess a Dcuit S ; la ordenanza fue promulgada y aprobada por el siguiente voto [ L, - 0 1:
Si No Abstencion Ausente
Gerard Hudspeth, alcalde: ✓ Vicki Byrd, Distrito 1: Brian Beck, Distrito 2: ✓ Jesse Davis, Distrito 3: Alison Maguire, Distrito 4: Brandon Chase McGee, posicion en general 5: ✓ Chris Watts, posicion en general 6: V
PROMULGADA Y APROBADA el dia Q 0 de YlOVie,li bre de 2022.
GERARD H SPETH, ALCALDE
DOY FE: ROSA BIOS, SECRETARIA MUNICIPAL . o ttilltif fii , S r, f DEN / to„, 1., ..k .w.................O4,•„, ,, 4
POR: _ :7 ft, t.) .. 4 ,-• :. % E 1 * Z Z* •I : co z• t•• % ) : 40 • 0.9 Ir 4 . APROBADO EN CUANTO A LA FORMA JURIDICA: O 0 ••••• 1 • • 0. 6... ek .. 0. °oili e Ile 'S- •• lt iO MACK REINWAND, ABOGADO DE LA CIUDAD 'w TON ‘• fil ti
43 Pagina 3 de 3 MR 0103 POR:
44 Pagina 4 de 3 MR 0104 PROPOSITION A NOVEMBER 8, 2022 SPECIAL ELECTION
45 MR 0105 City of Denton Dist 4 Canvass Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:50 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 1
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A
YES NO Cast Votes Undervotes Overvotes Absentee Voting Ballots Cast Early Voting Ballots Cast Election Day Voting Ballots Cast Total Ballots Cast Registered Voters Turnout Percentage
Precinct 4161 680 509 1,189 255 2 61 981 404 1,446 3,122 46.32% 4162 247 166 413 73 0 14 329 143 486 908 53.52% 4164 1,090 795 1,885 457 0 128 1,683 532 2,343 4,433 52.85% 4179 1,046 750 1,796 340 4 84 1,482 575 2,141 3,706 57.77% 4180 447 286 733 156 1 55 653 182 890 1,394 63.85% 4181 1,090 809 1,899 427 2 131 1,546 652 2,329 4,380 53.17% 4182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.00% 4183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 4184 1,232 693 1,925 519 2 98 1,628 720 2,446 4,196 58.29% 4185 1,130 328 1,458 167 1 129 1,333 164 1,626 1,990 81.71% 4186 1,721 562 2,283 283 0 174 2,163 233 2,570 3,033 84.73% Totals 8,683 4,898 13,581 2,677 12 874 11,798 3,605 16,277 27,166 59.92%
MR 0106 46 City of Denton Dist 4 Canvass Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:50 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 2
*** End of report ***
MR 0107 47 City of Denton Dist 4 Denton County Unofficial Results Cumulative Registered Voters
General & Special Elections 16277 of 27166 = 59.92%
Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:45 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 1
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 459 60.63% 6,377 64.67% 1,847 62.34% 8,683 63.93% NO 298 39.37% 3,484 35.33% 1,116 37.66% 4,898 36.07% Cast Votes: 757 100.00% 9,861 100.00% 2,963 100.00% 13,581 100.00%
Undervotes: 113 1,925 639 2,677 Overvotes: 0 10 2 12
*** End of report ***
48 MR 0108 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 1
4161 1,446 of 3,122 registered voters = 46.32%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 35 66.04% 459 57.74% 186 54.55% 680 57.19% NO 18 33.96% 336 42.26% 155 45.45% 509 42.81%
Cast Votes: 53 100.00% 795 100.00% 341 100.00% 1,189 100.00%
Undervotes: 8 184 63 255 Overvotes: 0 2 0 2
49 MR 0109 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 2
4162 486 of 908 registered voters = 53.52%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 7 63.64% 156 55.71% 84 68.85% 247 59.81% NO 4 36.36% 124 44.29% 38 31.15% 166 40.19%
Cast Votes: 11 100.00% 280 100.00% 122 100.00% 413 100.00%
Undervotes: 3 49 21 73 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
50 MR 0110 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 3
4164 2,343 of 4,433 registered voters = 52.85%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 50 45.87% 778 57.16% 262 63.13% 1,090 57.82% NO 59 54.13% 583 42.84% 153 36.87% 795 42.18%
Cast Votes: 109 100.00% 1,361 100.00% 415 100.00% 1,885 100.00%
Undervotes: 18 322 117 457 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
51 MR 0111 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 4
4179 2,141 of 3,706 registered voters = 57.77%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 45 58.44% 726 58.50% 275 57.53% 1,046 58.24% NO 32 41.56% 515 41.50% 203 42.47% 750 41.76%
Cast Votes: 77 100.00% 1,241 100.00% 478 100.00% 1,796 100.00%
Undervotes: 7 238 95 340 Overvotes: 0 3 1 4
52 MR 0112 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 5
4180 890 of 1,394 registered voters = 63.85%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 27 52.94% 327 61.01% 93 63.70% 447 60.98% NO 24 47.06% 209 38.99% 53 36.30% 286 39.02%
Cast Votes: 51 100.00% 536 100.00% 146 100.00% 733 100.00%
Undervotes: 4 116 36 156 Overvotes: 0 1 0 1
53 MR 0113 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 6
4181 2,329 of 4,380 registered voters = 53.17%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 62 56.88% 697 56.26% 331 60.07% 1,090 57.40% NO 47 43.12% 542 43.74% 220 39.93% 809 42.60%
Cast Votes: 109 100.00% 1,239 100.00% 551 100.00% 1,899 100.00%
Undervotes: 21 305 101 427 Overvotes: 0 2 0 2
54 MR 0114 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 7
4182 0 of 4 registered voters = 0.00%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% NO 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Cast Votes: 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 0 0 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
55 MR 0115 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 8
4183 0 of 0 registered voters = 0.00%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% NO 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Cast Votes: 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 0 0 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
56 MR 0116 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 9
4184 2,446 of 4,196 registered voters = 58.29%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 54 65.85% 819 63.74% 359 64.34% 1,232 64.00% NO 28 34.15% 466 36.26% 199 35.66% 693 36.00%
Cast Votes: 82 100.00% 1,285 100.00% 558 100.00% 1,925 100.00%
Undervotes: 16 342 161 519 Overvotes: 0 1 1 2
57 MR 0117 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 10
4185 1,626 of 1,990 registered voters = 81.71%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 75 65.22% 948 79.33% 107 72.30% 1,130 77.50% NO 40 34.78% 247 20.67% 41 27.70% 328 22.50%
Cast Votes: 115 100.00% 1,195 100.00% 148 100.00% 1,458 100.00%
Undervotes: 14 137 16 167 Overvotes: 0 1 0 1
58 MR 0118 City of Denton Dist 4 Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 16277 of 27166 = 59.92% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 11 of 11 = 100.00% Run Time 10:46 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 11
4186 2,570 of 3,033 registered voters = 84.73%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION A Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total YES 104 69.33% 1,467 76.05% 150 73.53% 1,721 75.38% NO 46 30.67% 462 23.95% 54 26.47% 562 24.62%
Cast Votes: 150 100.00% 1,929 100.00% 204 100.00% 2,283 100.00%
Undervotes: 22 232 29 283 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
*** End of report ***
59 MR 0119 PROPOSITION B NOVEMBER 8, 2022 SPECIAL ELECTION
60 MR 0120 City of Denton Canvass Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:45 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 1
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B
FOR THE ORDINANCE AGAINST THE ORDINANCE Cast Votes Undervotes Overvotes Absentee Voting Ballots Cast Early Voting Ballots Cast Election Day Voting Ballots Cast Total Ballots Cast Registered Voters Turnout Percentage
Precinct 1007 26 14 40 1 0 1 25 15 41 76 53.95% 1056 116 68 184 7 0 6 154 31 191 328 58.23% 1057 184 70 254 5 0 3 162 94 259 574 45.12% 1058 880 297 1,177 12 1 44 817 331 1,192 2,670 44.64% 1059 1,415 477 1,892 23 3 95 1,314 512 1,921 3,311 58.02% 1060 553 245 798 14 0 147 520 147 814 1,354 60.12% 1061 1,249 424 1,673 26 4 68 1,207 428 1,703 3,545 48.04% 1062 1,084 292 1,376 20 0 81 985 330 1,396 2,540 54.96% 1063 711 350 1,061 18 1 48 805 228 1,081 1,938 55.78% 1064 1,357 521 1,878 15 0 129 1,386 378 1,893 2,889 65.52% 1065 417 128 545 8 1 23 363 168 554 1,294 42.81% 1066 69 33 102 1 1 5 75 24 104 251 41.43% 2067 377 253 630 14 0 21 482 141 644 1,564 41.18% 2069 874 419 1,293 15 0 44 895 371 1,310 2,517 52.05% 2070 94 65 159 2 0 3 119 39 161 272 59.19% 4161 955 444 1,399 41 6 61 981 404 1,446 3,122 46.32% 4162 308 162 470 15 1 14 329 143 486 908 53.52% 4163 997 448 1,445 25 3 28 1,009 436 1,473 3,201 46.02%
MR 0121 61 4164 1,477 791 2,268 68 6 128 1,683 532 2,343 4,433 52.85% 4165 1,815 500 2,315 36 1 126 1,577 653 2,356 6,387 36.89% City of Denton Canvass Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:45 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 2
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B
FOR THE ORDINANCE AGAINST THE ORDINANCE Cast Votes Undervotes Overvotes Absentee Voting Ballots Cast Early Voting Ballots Cast Election Day Voting Ballots Cast Total Ballots Cast Registered Voters Turnout Percentage
Precinct 4166 698 247 945 8 0 38 648 267 953 2,203 43.26% 4167 1,492 321 1,813 14 1 62 1,272 497 1,831 4,498 40.71% 4168 830 119 949 1 0 26 666 259 951 1,902 50.00% 4169 1,340 228 1,568 22 1 67 1,125 399 1,591 3,012 52.82% 4170 1,855 164 2,019 22 1 11 1,372 660 2,043 5,048 40.47% 4171 153 20 173 2 0 2 120 53 175 396 44.19% 4172 732 68 800 9 0 5 527 277 809 2,176 37.18% 4173 4 1 5 0 0 0 5 0 5 20 25.00% 4174 699 55 754 10 0 5 488 271 764 2,091 36.54% 4175 106 14 120 1 0 1 77 43 121 386 31.35% 4176 1,072 598 1,670 23 4 135 1,246 318 1,699 2,841 59.80% 4177 268 48 316 1 0 4 217 96 317 906 34.99% 4178 783 194 977 14 2 37 670 286 993 2,093 47.44% 4179 1,339 754 2,093 43 4 84 1,482 575 2,141 3,706 57.77% 4180 538 320 858 30 2 55 653 182 890 1,394 63.85% 4181 1,495 765 2,260 64 4 131 1,546 652 2,329 4,380 53.17% 4182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.00% 4183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
MR 0122 62 4184 1,362 995 2,357 87 2 98 1,628 720 2,446 4,196 58.29% 4185 786 804 1,590 33 3 129 1,333 164 1,626 1,990 81.71% City of Denton Canvass Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:45 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 3
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B
FOR THE ORDINANCE AGAINST THE ORDINANCE Cast Votes Undervotes Overvotes Absentee Voting Ballots Cast Early Voting Ballots Cast Election Day Voting Ballots Cast Total Ballots Cast Registered Voters Turnout Percentage
Precinct 4186 1,300 1,207 2,507 56 3 174 2,163 233 2,570 3,033 84.73% 4187 747 117 864 10 0 13 554 307 874 2,377 36.77% 4189 110 80 190 5 0 9 124 62 195 390 50.00% 4193 6 2 8 0 0 0 7 1 8 15 53.33% 4197 0 6 6 0 0 1 5 0 6 9 66.67% Totals 32,673 13,128 45,801 821 55 2,162 32,816 11,727 46,705 92,240 50.63%
MR 0123 63 City of Denton Canvass Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:45 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 4
*** End of report ***
MR 0124 64 City of Denton Cumulative Denton County Unofficial Results Registered Voters
General & Special Elections 46705 of 92240 = 50.63%
Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 1
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 1,343 64.51% 22,756 70.61% 8,574 74.63% 32,673 71.34% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 739 35.49% 9,474 29.39% 2,915 25.37% 13,128 28.66% Cast Votes: 2,082 100.00% 32,230 100.00% 11,489 100.00% 45,801 100.00%
Undervotes: 57 544 220 821 Overvotes: 0 39 16 55
*** End of report ***
65 MR 0125 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 1
1007 41 of 76 registered voters = 53.95%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 1 100.00% 14 56.00% 11 78.57% 26 65.00% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 11 44.00% 3 21.43% 14 35.00%
Cast Votes: 1 100.00% 25 100.00% 14 100.00% 40 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 1 1 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
66 MR 0126 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 2
1056 191 of 328 registered voters = 58.23%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 4 66.67% 92 62.59% 20 64.52% 116 63.04% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 2 33.33% 55 37.41% 11 35.48% 68 36.96%
Cast Votes: 6 100.00% 147 100.00% 31 100.00% 184 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 7 0 7 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
67 MR 0127 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 3
1057 259 of 574 registered voters = 45.12%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 1 33.33% 117 74.05% 66 70.97% 184 72.44% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 2 66.67% 41 25.95% 27 29.03% 70 27.56%
Cast Votes: 3 100.00% 158 100.00% 93 100.00% 254 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 4 1 5 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
68 MR 0128 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 4
1058 1,192 of 2,670 registered voters = 44.64%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 27 62.79% 607 75.12% 246 75.46% 880 74.77% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 16 37.21% 201 24.88% 80 24.54% 297 25.23%
Cast Votes: 43 100.00% 808 100.00% 326 100.00% 1,177 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 8 4 12 Overvotes: 0 1 0 1
69 MR 0129 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 5
1059 1,921 of 3,311 registered voters = 58.02%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 56 62.92% 968 74.58% 391 77.43% 1,415 74.79% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 33 37.08% 330 25.42% 114 22.57% 477 25.21%
Cast Votes: 89 100.00% 1,298 100.00% 505 100.00% 1,892 100.00%
Undervotes: 3 14 6 23 Overvotes: 0 2 1 3
70 MR 0130 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 6
1060 814 of 1,354 registered voters = 60.12%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 95 67.86% 352 68.62% 106 73.10% 553 69.30% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 45 32.14% 161 31.38% 39 26.90% 245 30.70%
Cast Votes: 140 100.00% 513 100.00% 145 100.00% 798 100.00%
Undervotes: 5 7 2 14 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
71 MR 0131 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 7
1061 1,703 of 3,545 registered voters = 48.04%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 47 71.21% 875 73.72% 327 77.86% 1,249 74.66% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 19 28.79% 312 26.28% 93 22.14% 424 25.34%
Cast Votes: 66 100.00% 1,187 100.00% 420 100.00% 1,673 100.00%
Undervotes: 2 18 6 26 Overvotes: 0 2 2 4
72 MR 0132 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 8
1062 1,396 of 2,540 registered voters = 54.96%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 55 71.43% 771 79.00% 258 79.88% 1,084 78.78% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 22 28.57% 205 21.00% 65 20.12% 292 21.22%
Cast Votes: 77 100.00% 976 100.00% 323 100.00% 1,376 100.00%
Undervotes: 4 9 7 20 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
73 MR 0133 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 9
1063 1,081 of 1,938 registered voters = 55.78%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 24 52.17% 529 66.54% 158 71.82% 711 67.01% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 22 47.83% 266 33.46% 62 28.18% 350 32.99%
Cast Votes: 46 100.00% 795 100.00% 220 100.00% 1,061 100.00%
Undervotes: 1 10 7 18 Overvotes: 0 0 1 1
74 MR 0134 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 10
1064 1,893 of 2,889 registered voters = 65.52%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 85 66.41% 998 72.58% 274 73.07% 1,357 72.26% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 43 33.59% 377 27.42% 101 26.93% 521 27.74%
Cast Votes: 128 100.00% 1,375 100.00% 375 100.00% 1,878 100.00%
Undervotes: 1 11 3 15 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
75 MR 0135 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 11
1065 554 of 1,294 registered voters = 42.81%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 15 68.18% 274 76.54% 128 77.58% 417 76.51% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 7 31.82% 84 23.46% 37 22.42% 128 23.49%
Cast Votes: 22 100.00% 358 100.00% 165 100.00% 545 100.00%
Undervotes: 1 4 3 8 Overvotes: 0 1 0 1
76 MR 0136 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 12
1066 104 of 251 registered voters = 41.43%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 3 60.00% 52 69.33% 14 63.64% 69 67.65% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 2 40.00% 23 30.67% 8 36.36% 33 32.35%
Cast Votes: 5 100.00% 75 100.00% 22 100.00% 102 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 1 1 Overvotes: 0 0 1 1
77 MR 0137 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 13
2067 644 of 1,564 registered voters = 41.18%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 9 42.86% 275 57.89% 93 69.40% 377 59.84% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 12 57.14% 200 42.11% 41 30.60% 253 40.16%
Cast Votes: 21 100.00% 475 100.00% 134 100.00% 630 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 7 7 14 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
78 MR 0138 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 14
2069 1,310 of 2,517 registered voters = 52.05%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 29 69.05% 602 67.87% 243 66.76% 874 67.59% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 13 30.95% 285 32.13% 121 33.24% 419 32.41%
Cast Votes: 42 100.00% 887 100.00% 364 100.00% 1,293 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 8 7 15 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
79 MR 0139 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 15
2070 161 of 272 registered voters = 59.19%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 1 33.33% 72 61.02% 21 55.26% 94 59.12% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 2 66.67% 46 38.98% 17 44.74% 65 40.88%
Cast Votes: 3 100.00% 118 100.00% 38 100.00% 159 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 1 1 2 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
80 MR 0140 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 16
4161 1,446 of 3,122 registered voters = 46.32%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 35 60.34% 646 67.86% 274 70.44% 955 68.26% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 23 39.66% 306 32.14% 115 29.56% 444 31.74%
Cast Votes: 58 100.00% 952 100.00% 389 100.00% 1,399 100.00%
Undervotes: 3 27 11 41 Overvotes: 0 2 4 6
81 MR 0141 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 17
4162 486 of 908 registered voters = 53.52%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 9 64.29% 205 64.87% 94 67.14% 308 65.53% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 5 35.71% 111 35.13% 46 32.86% 162 34.47%
Cast Votes: 14 100.00% 316 100.00% 140 100.00% 470 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 12 3 15 Overvotes: 0 1 0 1
82 MR 0142 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 18
4163 1,473 of 3,201 registered voters = 46.02%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 23 82.14% 687 69.46% 287 67.06% 997 69.00% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 5 17.86% 302 30.54% 141 32.94% 448 31.00%
Cast Votes: 28 100.00% 989 100.00% 428 100.00% 1,445 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 18 7 25 Overvotes: 0 2 1 3
83 MR 0143 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 19
4164 2,343 of 4,433 registered voters = 52.85%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 76 62.81% 1,044 63.97% 357 69.32% 1,477 65.12% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 45 37.19% 588 36.03% 158 30.68% 791 34.88%
Cast Votes: 121 100.00% 1,632 100.00% 515 100.00% 2,268 100.00%
Undervotes: 6 47 15 68 Overvotes: 0 4 2 6
84 MR 0144 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 20
4165 2,356 of 6,387 registered voters = 36.89%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 83 68.60% 1,219 78.65% 513 79.66% 1,815 78.40% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 38 31.40% 331 21.35% 131 20.34% 500 21.60%
Cast Votes: 121 100.00% 1,550 100.00% 644 100.00% 2,315 100.00%
Undervotes: 1 26 9 36 Overvotes: 0 1 0 1
85 MR 0145 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 21
4166 953 of 2,203 registered voters = 43.26%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 23 62.16% 486 75.58% 189 71.32% 698 73.86% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 14 37.84% 157 24.42% 76 28.68% 247 26.14%
Cast Votes: 37 100.00% 643 100.00% 265 100.00% 945 100.00%
Undervotes: 1 5 2 8 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
86 MR 0146 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 22
4167 1,831 of 4,498 registered voters = 40.71%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 37 64.91% 1,041 82.55% 414 83.64% 1,492 82.29% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 20 35.09% 220 17.45% 81 16.36% 321 17.71%
Cast Votes: 57 100.00% 1,261 100.00% 495 100.00% 1,813 100.00%
Undervotes: 2 10 2 14 Overvotes: 0 1 0 1
87 MR 0147 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 23
4168 951 of 1,902 registered voters = 50.00%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 23 92.00% 583 87.54% 224 86.82% 830 87.46% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 2 8.00% 83 12.46% 34 13.18% 119 12.54%
Cast Votes: 25 100.00% 666 100.00% 258 100.00% 949 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 1 1 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
88 MR 0148 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 24
4169 1,591 of 3,012 registered voters = 52.82%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 57 86.36% 954 85.56% 329 85.01% 1,340 85.46% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 9 13.64% 161 14.44% 58 14.99% 228 14.54%
Cast Votes: 66 100.00% 1,115 100.00% 387 100.00% 1,568 100.00%
Undervotes: 1 9 12 22 Overvotes: 0 1 0 1
89 MR 0149 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 25
4170 2,043 of 5,048 registered voters = 40.47%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 8 80.00% 1,249 92.18% 598 91.44% 1,855 91.88% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 2 20.00% 106 7.82% 56 8.56% 164 8.12%
Cast Votes: 10 100.00% 1,355 100.00% 654 100.00% 2,019 100.00%
Undervotes: 1 16 5 22 Overvotes: 0 0 1 1
90 MR 0150 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 26
4171 175 of 396 registered voters = 44.19%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 2 100.00% 104 87.39% 47 90.38% 153 88.44% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 15 12.61% 5 9.62% 20 11.56%
Cast Votes: 2 100.00% 119 100.00% 52 100.00% 173 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 1 1 2 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
91 MR 0151 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 27
4172 809 of 2,176 registered voters = 37.18%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 4 100.00% 481 92.15% 247 90.15% 732 91.50% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 41 7.85% 27 9.85% 68 8.50%
Cast Votes: 4 100.00% 522 100.00% 274 100.00% 800 100.00%
Undervotes: 1 5 3 9 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
92 MR 0152 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 28
4173 5 of 20 registered voters = 25.00%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 4 80.00% 0 0.00% 4 80.00% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 1 20.00% 0 0.00% 1 20.00%
Cast Votes: 0 0.00% 5 100.00% 0 0.00% 5 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 0 0 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
93 MR 0153 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 29
4174 764 of 2,091 registered voters = 36.54%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 4 80.00% 449 93.54% 246 91.45% 699 92.71% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 1 20.00% 31 6.46% 23 8.55% 55 7.29%
Cast Votes: 5 100.00% 480 100.00% 269 100.00% 754 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 8 2 10 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
94 MR 0154 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 30
4175 121 of 386 registered voters = 31.35%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 71 92.21% 35 83.33% 106 88.33% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 1 100.00% 6 7.79% 7 16.67% 14 11.67%
Cast Votes: 1 100.00% 77 100.00% 42 100.00% 120 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 1 1 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
95 MR 0155 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 31
4176 1,699 of 2,841 registered voters = 59.80%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 77 59.23% 753 61.42% 242 77.07% 1,072 64.19% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 53 40.77% 473 38.58% 72 22.93% 598 35.81%
Cast Votes: 130 100.00% 1,226 100.00% 314 100.00% 1,670 100.00%
Undervotes: 3 16 4 23 Overvotes: 0 4 0 4
96 MR 0156 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 32
4177 317 of 906 registered voters = 34.99%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 3 75.00% 181 83.41% 84 88.42% 268 84.81% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 1 25.00% 36 16.59% 11 11.58% 48 15.19%
Cast Votes: 4 100.00% 217 100.00% 95 100.00% 316 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 1 1 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
97 MR 0157 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 33
4178 993 of 2,093 registered voters = 47.44%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 26 70.27% 540 81.45% 217 78.34% 783 80.14% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 11 29.73% 123 18.55% 60 21.66% 194 19.86%
Cast Votes: 37 100.00% 663 100.00% 277 100.00% 977 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 5 9 14 Overvotes: 0 2 0 2
98 MR 0158 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 34
4179 2,141 of 3,706 registered voters = 57.77%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 47 56.63% 923 63.66% 369 65.89% 1,339 63.98% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 36 43.37% 527 36.34% 191 34.11% 754 36.02%
Cast Votes: 83 100.00% 1,450 100.00% 560 100.00% 2,093 100.00%
Undervotes: 1 29 13 43 Overvotes: 0 3 1 4
99 MR 0159 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 35
4180 890 of 1,394 registered voters = 63.85%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 29 52.73% 390 61.90% 119 68.79% 538 62.70% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 26 47.27% 240 38.10% 54 31.21% 320 37.30%
Cast Votes: 55 100.00% 630 100.00% 173 100.00% 858 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 21 9 30 Overvotes: 0 2 0 2
100 MR 0160 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 36
4181 2,329 of 4,380 registered voters = 53.17%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 83 68.03% 983 65.23% 429 67.99% 1,495 66.15% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 39 31.97% 524 34.77% 202 32.01% 765 33.85%
Cast Votes: 122 100.00% 1,507 100.00% 631 100.00% 2,260 100.00%
Undervotes: 8 36 20 64 Overvotes: 0 3 1 4
101 MR 0161 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 37
4182 0 of 4 registered voters = 0.00%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Cast Votes: 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 0 0 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
102 MR 0162 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 38
4183 0 of 0 registered voters = 0.00%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Cast Votes: 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 0 0 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
103 MR 0163 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 39
4184 2,446 of 4,196 registered voters = 58.29%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 49 52.13% 894 57.16% 419 59.94% 1,362 57.79% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 45 47.87% 670 42.84% 280 40.06% 995 42.21%
Cast Votes: 94 100.00% 1,564 100.00% 699 100.00% 2,357 100.00%
Undervotes: 4 62 21 87 Overvotes: 0 2 0 2
104 MR 0164 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 40
4185 1,626 of 1,990 registered voters = 81.71%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 83 65.35% 633 48.58% 70 43.75% 786 49.43% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 44 34.65% 670 51.42% 90 56.25% 804 50.57%
Cast Votes: 127 100.00% 1,303 100.00% 160 100.00% 1,590 100.00%
Undervotes: 2 27 4 33 Overvotes: 0 3 0 3
105 MR 0165 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 41
4186 2,570 of 3,033 registered voters = 84.73%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 96 57.83% 1,088 51.47% 116 51.10% 1,300 51.85% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 70 42.17% 1,026 48.53% 111 48.90% 1,207 48.15%
Cast Votes: 166 100.00% 2,114 100.00% 227 100.00% 2,507 100.00%
Undervotes: 6 45 5 56 Overvotes: 0 2 1 3
106 MR 0166 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 42
4187 874 of 2,377 registered voters = 36.77%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 8 61.54% 478 87.23% 261 86.14% 747 86.46% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 5 38.46% 70 12.77% 42 13.86% 117 13.54%
Cast Votes: 13 100.00% 548 100.00% 303 100.00% 864 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 6 4 10 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
107 MR 0167 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 43
4189 195 of 390 registered voters = 50.00%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 6 66.67% 67 56.30% 37 59.68% 110 57.89% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 3 33.33% 52 43.70% 25 40.32% 80 42.11%
Cast Votes: 9 100.00% 119 100.00% 62 100.00% 190 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 5 0 5 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
108 MR 0168 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 44
4193 8 of 15 registered voters = 53.33%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 5 71.43% 1 100.00% 6 75.00% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 2 28.57% 0 0.00% 2 25.00%
Cast Votes: 0 0.00% 7 100.00% 1 100.00% 8 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 0 0 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
109 MR 0169 City of Denton Precinct Unofficial Results Denton County Registered Voters 46705 of 92240 = 50.63% General & Special Elections Precincts Reporting 45 of 45 = 100.00% Run Time 10:36 AM 11/8/2022 Run Date 11/21/2022 Page 45
4197 6 of 9 registered voters = 66.67%
CITY OF DENTON PROPOSITION B Choice Party Absentee Voting Early Voting Election Day Voting Total FOR THE ORDINANCE 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% AGAINST THE ORDINANCE 1 100.00% 5 100.00% 0 0.00% 6 100.00%
Cast Votes: 1 100.00% 5 100.00% 0 0.00% 6 100.00%
Undervotes: 0 0 0 0 Overvotes: 0 0 0 0
*** End of report ***
110 MR 0170 CITY OF DENTON CITY COUNCIL MINUTES June 6, 2023
After determiningthat a quorum was present, the City Council of the City of Denton, Texas convenedin a Work Sessionon Tuesday, June 6, 2023, at 2:00 p.m. in the Council Work Session Room at City Hall, 215 E. McKinney Street, Denton, Texas.
PRESENT: Mayor Gerard Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Brian Beck and Council Members Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Brandon Chase McGee, Joe Holland, and Chris Watts
ABSENT: None
Also presentwere City Manager Sara Hensley and City Attorney Mack Reinwand.
The posted agenda noted the registration process for in-person, call-in, and public participation at this meeting. While citizen commentary received via the online registration process was not read, each member for the City Council received each online commentary as it was submitted. In-person, call-in, and online comments received are reflected in the exhibit to the minutes of this meeting
WORK SESSION
1. Citizen Comments on Consent Agenda Items
None
2. Requests for clarification of agenda items listed on this agenda.
•
Clarification was requestedon the following item: o Mayor Pro Tem Beck: Consent Items 4.D (23-1030) and 4.E (23-1142) o Council Member Byrd: Consent Items 4.G (23-1109) o Council Member Byrd: Individual Consent Item 5.A (23-1121) o Council Member McGee: Individual Consent Item 5.A (23-1121)
• The following items were pulled for Individual Consideration: o Mayor Pro Tem Beck: Consent Items 4.F (23-93 1) o Council MemberMcGee: ConsentItem 4.G (23-1109)
3. Work Session Reports
A. ID 23-424 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction regarding Audit Project 032 - Fleet Services Operations: Fuel Card Administration. [Estimated Presentation/ Discussion Time: 30 minutes1
The item was presentedand discussion followed.
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Following discussion, there was no direction provided as the item was for presentation/discussionpurposes.
B. ID 23-375 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction regarding an update on the Wastewater Master Plan. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 45 minutes]
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, there was no direction provided as the item was for presentation/discussionpurposes.
C. ID 23-421 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction regarding the introductionof the Denton County TransportationAuthority (DCTA) staffing updates. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 30 minutes]
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, there was no direction provided as the item was for presentation/discussionpurposes.
D. ID 23-919 Receive a report, hold a discussion and give staff direction regarding the City of Denton and Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) collaboration including efforts relating to safety and planning measures. [Estimated Presentation/DiscussionTime: 30 minutes]
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Followingdiscussion, therewas no directionprovidedas the item was for presentation/discussionpurposes.
E ID 23-216 Receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction on pending City Council requests for: 1). Request for staff to research and prepare an Informal Staff Report (ISR) on Community Benefits Ordinances. 2). Request to bring the implementation of a Fair Chance Hiring Ordinance forward for Council consideration during the June 27 City Council meeting.3). Request for a work session on the creationof a Public Health Official position. [Estimated Presentation/Discussion Time: 30 minutes]
The item was presentedand discussion followed.
Following discussion, results were as follows: • ID 23-216 (1) Request for staff to research and prepare an Informal Staff Report (ISR) on Community Benefits Ordinances. o Consensus for an Informal Staff Report (ISR).
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• ID 23-216(2) Requestto bringthe implementationof a Fair Chance Hiring Ordinance forwardfor Council considerationduring the June 27 City Council meeting. o Consensus to bring forward a Fair Chance Hiring Ordinance for Council consideration duringtheJune 27 City Council meeting.
• ID 23-216 (3) Request for a work session on the creation of a Public Health Official posrtron. o Consensusfor a futurework session.
CLOSED MEETING
1. The City Council convenedinto a Closed Meeting at 5:05 p.m. consistentwith Chapter 551 of the Texas Government Code, as amended, or as otherwise allowed by law, as follows:
A. ID 23-1074Consultation with Attorneys - Under Texas Government Code Section 551.071. Consult with the City’s attorneys on the legal status, expenses, strategy and options for resolution of litigationin Cause No. 22-10794-393, styled " Alison Maguire, Keri Caruthers, and Olivia Jeffers v. Gerard Hudspeth, in his Official Capacities as Mayor of the City of Denton, Texas as Presiding Officer of the Final Canvassing Authority for the City of Denton, and as Presiding Officer of Authority Ordering Election" pending in the 393rd District Court, Denton County, Texas and litigation in Cause No. 22-4543-431, styled "Alison Maguire, Keri Caruthers,Tracy Runnels, and Emily Meisner v. Rosa Rios, in her Official Capacity as City Secretary of the City of Denton, Texas, the City of Denton, Texas, Donald Duff, in his Official Capacity as Representative of a Committee of Electors in the City of Denton, Texas; and, Frank Phillips, in his Official Capacity as Denton County ElectionsAdministrator" pending in the 431st District Court, Denton County, Texas; where public discussion of these legal matters would conflict with the duty of the City’s attorneys to the City of Denton and the Denton City Council under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Texas, or otherwise compromise the City’s legal position in pending litigation. DELIBERATED
The closed meetingstartedat 5:23 p.m. and ended at 6:08 p.m. No votes or actions were taken during the closed meeting.
The work sessionendedat 6:08 p.m.
REGULAR MEETING
After determiningthat a quorum was present, the City Council of the City of Denton, Texas convened in a Regular Meeting on Tuesday, June 6, 2023, at 6:34 p.m. in the Council Chambers at City Hall, 215 E. McKinney Street, Denton, Texas.
PRESENT: Mayor Gerard Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Brian Beck and Council Members Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Brandon Chase McGee, Joe Holland and Chris Watts
ABSENT: None
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Also present were City Manager Sara Hensley and City Attorney Mack Reinwand.
The posted agenda noted the registration process for in-person, call-in, and public participation at this meeting. While citizen commentary received via the online registration process was not read, each member for the City Council received each online commentary as it was submitted. In-person, call-in, and online comments received are reflected in the exhibit to the minutes of this meeting
1. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE A. U.S. Flag and B. Texas Flag
2. PROCLAMATIONS/PRESENTATIONS
A. ID 23-881 Proclamation: Elder Abuse Awareness Month PRESENTED
B. ID 23-961 Proclamation: Waste and Recycling Workers Week PRESENTED
C. ID 23-1145Proclamation: Diann Rozell Huber Day PRESENTED 3. PRESENTATIONS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC
1) Scheduled Citizen Reports from Members of the Public
a. ID 23-1158 Mr. Stephen Dillenberg regarding the practical interpretation of the US Human Capital Index Ranking: #36 overall with the most powerful armed forces and largest economy. CANCELLED 2) Additional Citizen Reports (Open Microphone) Citizen comments received are noted in Exhibit A.
4. CONSENT AGENDA
The Consent Agenda consisted of Items 4.A-W. During the Work Session held earlier in the day, Item 4.F (23-931) was pulled for Individual Consideration by Mayor Pro Tem Beck, and Item 4.G (23-1109) was pulled for Individual Consideration by Council Member Chase McGee.
Mayor Pro Tem Beck moved to adopt theConsent Agenda, now consistingof Items 4.A-E and H- W. Motion secondedby Council Member McGee.
Motion carried
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AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Meltzer, Holland, McGee, andWatts NAYS (0): None
A. ID 23-031 Consider approval of the minutes of the May 2, 2023 Regular, May 16, 2023 Special Called, and May 16, 2023 Regular meetings. APPROVED
B. ID 23-061 Consider nominations/appointments to the City’s Boards, Commissions, and Committees: Special Citizens Bond Advisory Committee. APPROVED
APPOINTMENTS LISTED ON EXHIBIT B (or A if no Citizen Commentsexhibit)
C. ID 23-774 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton, Texas adopting the City of Denton’s Vegetation Management Program (’'VMP") to provide rules and policies necessary to manage transmission system and distribution providers’ vegetation management standardsto provide a safe system environment for customers and the general public to minimize tree related outages caused during high wind, snow, and ice storms, and trees losing their branchesfrom diseaseor old age; and providing an effective date. The Public Utility Board recommends approval (6-0). ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 23-774
D. ID 23-1030 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, ratifying a contract and an extension thereto between the City of Denton and Akimeka, LLC, through March 31, 2024, to provide data related to Denton Municipal Electric’s EV chargers in connection with a USDOE Project; and declaring an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1030
E. ID 23-1142 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing payment in an amount not to exceed Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) pursuantto an engagementbetweenthe City of Denton and Carolyn Ahrens, Attorney at Law approved by the City Attorney on March 11, 2022, to provide legal servicesto the City of Denton for negotiatingwater rights, supply contracts, and submittingpermit applications;providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providingan effectivedate. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1142
H ID 23-1029 Consider adoption of an ordinance by the City of Denton ratifying and authorizing the City Manager, or designee, to execute and deliver an Advanced Funding Agreement with the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) for bridge replacement or rehabilitationof the statesystem project located at Trinity Road at Cooper Creek in the City of Denton; Providing for the use of federal hInds for a project of 100% fUnding with no local match required, in the amount of nine hundred seventy-three thousand and eighty-one
115 MR 0175 City of Denton City Council Minutes June 6, 2023 Page 6
dollars ($973,081.00) for CSJ #0918-46-300;authorizing the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1029
1. SED23-0002 Consider approval of a resolution amending the Southeast Denton Area Plan Steering Committee to add members. The Southeast Denton Area Plan is generally bounded by East McKinney Street to the north, South Bell Avenue to the west, Dallas Drive and Shady Oaks Drive to the south, and South Woodrow Lane to the east; and providing an effective date ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. SED23-0002
J. ID 23-998Consider approval of a resolutionof the City of Denton ratifying the submission of an applicationto the State of Texas, Office of the Governor, 2023 Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program ftmdedthrough the US Departmentof Homeland Security in the amount of $73,087.86 for hazardous material detection equipment; and providing an effectivedate. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 23-998
K. ID 23-999 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton ratifying the submission of an application to the State of Texas, Office of the Governor, 2023 Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Activities (LETPA) grantprogram funded through the US Department of Homeland Security in the Amount of $66,115 for tactical communication equipment and personal protective equipment; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 23-999
L. ID 23-1028 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton ratifying the submission of an application to the U.S. Department of Agriculture - Forest Service Urban and Community Forestry Program in the amount not to exceed $2,000,000 for planting of trees, removal of invasive Chinese Privet, restoring native habitat, and education to the public of these activities; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 23-1028
M. ID 23-1031 Consider adoption of an ordinanceby the City of Denton authorizingthe City Manager to execute nine (9) agreements for funding under the Denton County Transportation Reinvestment Program (TRiP), providing financial assistance to member cities for transit- supportive projects, through the Denton County TransportationAuthority (DCTA) in the amountof $3,980,578for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 funding period. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1031
N ID 23-1055 Consider approval of a resolution of the City of Denton ratifying the submission of an applicationto theNorth Central Texas Council of Governments(NCTCOG) FY 2024 to 2025 Solid Waste ImplementationGrant Program in the amount of $70,850 for a Styrofoam densifier; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 23-1055
116 MR 0176 City of DentonCity CouncilMinutes June 6, 2023 Page7
0. ID 23-1008Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Kimley-Horn and Associates, Inc., to provide permitting assistance for two (2) new WastewaterReclamationFacilities for the Water Utilities Department;providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFQ 7574-028 - Professional Services Agreement for design services awarded to Kimley-Horn and Associates, Inc., in the not-to-exceedamount of $240,000.00). The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (6 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1008
P. ID 23-1010Consider adoptionof an ordinanceof the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, rejecting any and all competitive proposals under RFP 8154 for the Emily Fowler Library Remodel for the Facilities Department; and providing an effective date (RFP 8154). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1010
Q. ID 23-1011 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Texas Series ofLockton Companies, LLC, for property and casualty insurance brokerage services for Risk Management;providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFP 8203 - awarded to Texas Series ofLockton Companies, LLC, for three (3) years, with the option for two (2) additional one (1) year extensions, in the total five (5) year not- to-exceed amount of $980,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1011
R. ID 23-1048 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Guidehouse Inc., through the Department of Information Resources (DIR) Cooperative Purchasing Network Contract No. DIR-CPO-4947, for the JD Edwards system upgrade for the Technology Services Department; providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date (File 8236 - awarded to Guidehouse Inc., in the not-to-exceed amount of $200,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1048
S ID 23-1049Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Direct Packet, Inc. DBA OneVision Solutions, through the Department of Information Resources (DIR) CooperativePurchasingNetwork Contract Number DIR-CPO-5088 for Technology- Based Recording and Conferencing Product and Related Services; through the Buy Board Cooperative Purchasing Network Contract 661-22 for Technology Equipment, Products, Services and Software& Contract and 644-21 for Audio Visual Equipment and Supplies; through The Interlocal Purchasing System (TIPS) Cooperative Program Contract #200105 Technology Solutions,Products and Services & Contract and #21050301for Networking Equipment, Software, and Services; providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date (File 8237 - awarded to Direct Packet, Inc. DBA OneVision
117 MR 0177 City of Denton City Council Minutes June 6. 2023 Page8
Solutions, for one (1) year, with the option for four (4) additional one (1) year extensions, in the total five (5) year not-to-exceed amount of $1,750,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1049
T. ID 23-1090 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Kroll, LLC, for propertyappraisalservices for insurancepurposesfor Risk Management as set forth in the contract; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFQ 8197 - Professional Services Agreement for appraisal services awarded to Kroll, LLC, for three (3) years, with the option for two (2) additional one (1) year extensions, in the total five (5) year not-to-exceed amount of $114,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1090
U. ID 23-1092 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to authorize the spend for an insurance binder to Archer Contingent Energy Risk, LLC, for forced outage insurance for the Denton Energy Center for the Summer of 2023; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFP 8254 - authorizing the spend for Power Plant Forced Outage Insurance Coverage for the Summer of 2023, and awarding such insurance binder to Archer Contingent Energy Risk, LLC, in the not-to-exceed amount of $1,050,000.00). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1092
V. ID 23-1107 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute an Interlocal Cooperative Purchasing Agreement with the Town of Flower Mound, under the Texas Government Code Section 791.001, to authorize the Town of Flower Mound and the City of Denton to utilize each entities’ solicited contracts for the purchasing of various goods and services; authorizing the expenditureof funds therefor; and declaring an effective date (File 8278 - award an Interlocal Cooperative Purchasing Agreement with the Town of Flower Mound). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1107
W ID 23-1161 Consider adoptionof an ordinanceof the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager, or designee, to execute and deliver an Advance Funding Agreement ('’AFA'’) for Highway Safety ImprovementProject ("HSIP") off-system between the City of Denton and the Texas Department of Transportation ("TxDOT") providing for the furnishing of traffic signal equipmentfor the intersectionsof traffic signals and pedestrian facilities at the intersections of Hickory Street and Fry Street and West Oak Street and Thomas Street in the City of Denton; providing for the expenditure of funds for a total not to exceed $120,199.00 ($34,235.30 for the direct state costs and $85,964.00 for furnishing traffic signal equipment); and providing for an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1161
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5. ITEM(S) FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION
A. ID 23-1121Consider adoptionof an ordinanceof the City of Denton adoptingChapter 21, Article V, of the City of Denton code of ordinances, titled "Marijuana Enforcement"; providing repealer, cumulative, and severability clauses; and declaring an effective date. DENIED
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Citizen comments received are noted on Exhibit A.
Following discussion, Council Member Holland moved to deny the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member Watts.
Motion carried.
AYES (4): Mayor Hudspeth, Council Members Byrd, Holland, and Watts NAYS (3): Mayor Pro Tem Beck, Council Members Meltzer, and McGee
The meeting was recessed for a short break at 9:12 p.m. and reconvened at 9:32 p.m.
CONSENT ITEMS PULLED FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION
F ID 23-931 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton amending the provisions of Ch. 21 Art. 1 Sec 21.6 of the code of ordinances "Prohibited Acts" to include an offense titled "aggressive solicitation" outlining prohibited acts; providing for a severability clause; providing for a savings clause; providing for a penalty; providing for codification; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-931
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
Pulledfor Individual Considerationby Mayor Pro Tem Beck.
Items 4.F (23-931) and 4.G (23-1109) were collectively read into the record, presented, and discussed, but voted on individually.
Following discussion, Mayor Hudspeth moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member Watts.
Motion carried.
AYES (4): Mayor Hudspeth,Council Members Byrd, McGee, and Watts NAYS (3): Mayor Pro Tem Beck, Council Member Holland and Meltzer.
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G. ID 23-1109 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton amending the provisions of Ch. 16, Art. III, Sec. 16-72 to remove panhandling from the definition of soliciting; providing for a severability clause; providing for a savings clause; providing for codification; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1109
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
Pulled for Individual Consideration by Council Member Chase-McGee.
Items 4.F (23-93 1) and 4.G (23-1109) were collectively read into the record, presented, and discussed, but voted on individually.
Following discussion, Mayor Pro Tem Beck moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member McGee.
Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and CouncilMembersByrd, Meltzer, Holland, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0):None
6. PUBLIC HEARING(S)
A. ID 23-287 Hold a public hearing inviting citizens to comment on the 2023-2027 Consolidated Plan for Housing and Community Development and 2023 Action Plan.
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and discussion followed.
The public hearing was opened and citizen comments received are noted on Exhibit A.
With no other callers on queue, the public hearing was closed.
Note: There was no action taken as the item was only a public hearing.
Z ITEM(S) FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION - CONTINUED
B. ID 23-1026 Consider approval of a resolutionof the City Council of the City of Denton to appoint a director to the Board of Directors of Hunter Ranch Improvement District No. 1 of Denton County, Texas; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 23-1026
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
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Items 7.B (23-1026) and 7.C (23-1027) were collectively read into the record, presented, and discussed, but voted on individually.
Mayor Pro Tem Beck moved to adopt the item as presented.Motion secondedby Council Member Chris Watts.
Motion carried
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Meltzer, Holland,McGee, andWatts NAYS (0): None
C. ID 23-1027Consider approvalof a resolution of the City Council of the City of Denton to appointa director to the Board of Directors of Cole Ranch Improvement District No. 1 of Denton County, Texas; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED RESOLUTION NO. 23-1027
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
Items 7.B (23-1026) and 7.C (23-1027) were collectively read into the record, presented, and discussed, but voted on individually.
Mayor Pro Tem Beck moved to adopt the item as presented.Motion seconded by Council Member Meltzer.
Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council MembersByrd, Meltzer, Holland,McGee, andWatts NAYS (0):None D ID 23-929 Consider adoption of an ordinance considering all matters incident and related to the issuance, sale and delivery of up to $80,500,000 in principal amount of "City of Denton General Obligation Refunding and Improvement Bonds, Series 2023"; authorizing the issuanceof the bonds; delegatingthe authority to certain City officials to execute certain documentsrelating to the sale of the bonds; approving and authorizing instruments and proceduresrelating to said bonds; enacting other provisions relating to the subject; and providingan effective date.The Public Utilities Board recommendsapproval(6-0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-929
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presentedand discussion followed.
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Following discussion, Council Member Meltzer moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion secondedby Council Member Watts.
Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council MembersByrd, Meltzer, Holland, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None
E. ID 23-930 Consider adoption of an ordinance considering all matters incident and related to the issuance, sale and delivery of up to $158,500,000 in principal amount of "City of Denton Certificates of Obligation, Series 2023"; authorizing the issuance of the certificates; delegating the authority to certain city officials to execute certain documents relating to the sale of the certificates; approving and authorizing instruments and procedures relating to said certificates; enacting other provisions relating to the subject; and providing an effective date. The Public Utilities Board recommendsapproval(6-0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-930
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presentedand no discussion followed.
Council Member Watts moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member Byrd.
Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Meltzer, Holland, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0):None F ID 23-1007 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Kimley-Horn and Associates, Inc., to provide regulatory permitting/approvalsupport, process evaluation, design services, bidding assistance,and constructionphase services for the Pecan Creek Water ReclamationPlant (PCWRP) Expansion to 26MGD Project for the Wastewater Department; providing for the expenditure of funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFQ 7574-027 - Professional Services Agreement for design services awarded to Kimley-Horn and Associates, Inc., in the not-to- exceed amount of $14,952,000.00). The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (6 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1007
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and discussion followed.
122 MR 0182 City of DentonCity Council Minutes June6. 2023 Page13
Following discussion, Council Member Watts moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion secondedby Mayor Pro Tem Beck.
Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Meltzer, Holland, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0):None G. ID 23-1009 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Alamo Transformer Supply Company, for the purchase of refurbished, rebuilt, and salvaged transformersand transformerdisposalfor DentonMunicipal Electric as set forth in the contract;providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFQ 8192 - contract for transformers awarded to Alamo Transformer Supply Company, in the three (3) year not-to-exceedamount of $10,000,000.00).The Public Utilities Board recommends approval (6 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1009
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and discussion followed.
Following discussion, Mayor Pro Tem Beck moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member Watts.
Motion carried
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Meltzer, Holland, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None
H ID 23-1043 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home-rule municipal corporation, authorizing the City Manager to execute a contract with Pure TechnologiesUS Inc., for the TransmissionMains Condition Assessmentfor the Water Utilities Department;providing for the expenditureof funds therefor; and providing an effective date (RFP 8181 - awarded to Pure Technologies US Inc., for three (3) years, with the option for two (2) additionalone (1) year extensions,in the total five (5) year not-to- exceedamountof $10,000,000.00).The Public Utilities Board recommendsapproval (6 - 0). ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-1043
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and discussion followed.
123 MR 0183 City of Denton City Council Minutes June6. 2023 Page14
Following discussion, Council Member Watts moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion secondedby Mayor Pro Tem Beck.
Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth, Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Meltzer, Holland, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0):None 1. ID 23-489 Consider adoption of an ordinance of the City of Denton, a Texas home rule municipal corporation,amending Chapter 18, Article V, "Motor Vehicles and Traffic," of the City of Denton Code of Ordinances, to permit the operation of golf carts and off-highway vehicles on University Campus Streets adjacent to the University of North Texas (UNT) and Texas Woman’s University (TWU) campus; providing a repealer clause; providing a severability clause; providing a penalty clause; providing for publication; providing codification; and providing an effective date. ASSIGNED ORDINANCE NO. 23-489
There were no online registrations or call-ins on the item.
The item was presented and discussion followed. I Following discussion, Mayor Hudspeth moved to adopt the item as presented. Motion seconded by Council Member Watts.
Motion carried.
AYES (7): Mayor Hudspeth,Mayor Pro Tem Beck and Council Members Byrd, Meltzer, Holland, McGee, and Watts NAYS (0): None
8. CONCLUDING ITEMS
Council Members expressed items of interest.
With no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 10:41 p.m.
MAYOR INTERIM CITY SECRETARY CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS
MINUTES APPROVED ON: !o£3
124 MR 0184 June 6, 2023 City Council Regular Meeting - EXHIBIT A
Citizen Registrations Online, Email, Phone
NAME LAST ADDRESS CITY AGENDA POSITION METHOD ITEM Joseph Adamo 1710 Linden Dr. Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Max Anderson 1708 Linden Dr. Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Deb Armintor Not Provided N/A 23-1121 Supports In-Person Eric Beckwith 4205 Aqueduct Dr. Denton 23-1121 Opposed In-Person Kristine Bray 1204 Cordell St. Denton Open Mic N/A In-Person Daryn Briggs 7160 Barthold Rd. Denton 23-1121 Opposed In-Person Travis Eaves 1310 Scripture St. Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Bret Flores Not Provided N/A 23-1121 Supports In-Person Richard Gladden 1822 W. Oak St. Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Eva Grecco Not Provided N/A 23-1121 Supports In-Person Richard Hayner 3071 Olympia Dr. Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Robert Head 2061 Le Mans Dr. Carrolton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Willie Hudspeth Not Provided Denton Open Mic N/A In-Person Canan Johnson 919 Eagle Dr., Apt 1012 Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Mary Kuhfeldt 409 Magnolia St. Denton 23-1121 Opposed Submitted White Card indicating position on the issue. Logan Larson Not Provided Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Jeff Laughlin Not Provided N/A 23-1121 Opposed In-Person Dillon Luna 3330 Eastpark Denton 23-1030 Supports eComment Marshall Lundsberg 915 S. Welch St. Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Aura Masters Not Provided N/A 23-1121 Supports In-Person Walter Mcelhinney 517 Roberts Denton 23-1121 Supports Submitted White Card indicating position on the issue. Jeannette McKenzie Not Provided Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Rawley McKinney Not Provided N/A 23-1121 Opposed In-Person Julie Oliver 3500 Werner Ave. Austin 23-1121 Supports In-Person Jared Panico 2413 W Hickory St., #13-108A Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Carson Parker 915 S. Welch St. Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Louis Pizana Not Provided Denton 23-1121 Opposed In-Person Madison Powers Not Provided Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Rob Rayner 607 S. Locust St., #101 Denton 23-1121 Opposed Submitted White Card indicating position on the issue. Kenny Severson 3330 Eastpark Blvd. Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Keith Shugart 1326 Princton Ct. Denton 23-1121 Opposed Submitted White Card indicating position on the issue. Donna Smith 3924 Yellowstone Denton 23-1121 Opposed In-Person Nick Stevens 417 Amarillo St. Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Chris Summitt 7160 Barthold Denton 23-1121 Opposed In-Person Donald Thornton 8717 Swan Park Dr. Denton 23-1121 Opposed In-Person Liam Gaume-Wakefield 411 Ponder Ave. Denton 23-1121 Supports In-Person Liam Gaume-Wakefield 411 Ponder Ave. Denton 23-287 N/A In-Person Liam Gaume-Wakefield 411 Ponder Ave. Denton Open Mic N/A In-Person Kirby Wallace 100 N. Forest Prk Blvd. Fort Worth 23-1121 Opposed In-Person Phillip Young 2041 Scripture St. Denton Open Mic N/A In-Person Austin Zamhariri Not Provided N/A 23-1121 Supports In-Person Sage Not Provided Not Provided N/A 23-1121 Supports In-Person NOTES: - Information contained within this exhibit includes information regarding citizens who participated in the meeting by giving commentary during Open Microphone, Consent, Individual Consideration and Public Hearing Items, or by submitting eComments in advance.
- Full agenda, meeting video, and system transcript are available by visiting the City of Denton Public Meetings Page at www.cityofdenton.com/242/Public-Meetings-Agendas, going to the Archived Meetings Section, and selecting the applicable meeting date.
- eComments, if submitted, can be found here: https://denton-tx.granicusideas.com/meetings?scope=past
125 MR 0185 EXHIBIT B June 6, 2023 Agenda Item 4.B (ID 23-061) COUNCIL NOMINATING MEMBER STATUS & QUALIFICATION BOARD/COMMITTEE/COMMISSION NEW TERM PLACE AUTHORITY NAME OR PREFERENCE, IF ANY Special Citizens Bond Appointment through 3 Meltzer - City Council Cynthia Hill New Advisory Committee August 21, 2023 Special Citizens Bond Appointment through BOC-4 Bond Oversight Committee Jeff Bowerman New Advisory Committee August 21, 2023 Special Citizens Bond Appointment through BOC-11 Bond Oversight Committee Aaron Newquist New Advisory Committee August 21, 2023
126 MR 0186 EXHIBIT B
MR 0187 PART I - CHARTER ARTICLE IV. INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL
ARTICLE IV. INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL
Sec. 4.01. Power of initiative. The electors shall have power to propose any ordinance, except an ordinance appropriating money or authorizing the levy of taxes, and to adopt or reject the proposed ordinance at the polls, such power being known as the initiative. Any initiative ordinance may be submitted to the council by a petition signed by qualified voters of the city equal in number to at least twenty-five percent of the number of votes cast at the last regular municipal election.
Sec. 4.02. Power of referendum. The electors shall have power to approve or reject at the polls any ordinance passed by the council or submitted by the council to a vote of the electors, except an ordinance appropriating money, issuing bonds or authorizing the levying of taxes, such power being known as the referendum. Within twenty (20) days after the enactment by the council of any ordinance which is subject to a referendum, a petition signed by qualified voters of the city equal in number to at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the number of votes cast at the last preceding regular municipal election may be filed with the city secretary requesting that any such ordinance be either repealed or submitted to a vote of the electors.
Sec. 4.03. Form of petition, committee of petitioners. Initiative petition papers shall contain the full text of the proposed ordinance. Referendum petition papers shall contain the full text of the ordinance which they propose to repeal. The signatures to initiative or referendum petitions need not all be appended to one paper, but to each separate petition there shall be attached a statement of the circulator thereof as provided by this section. Each signer shall sign his name in ink or indelible pencil and shall give after his name his place of residence by street and number, or other description sufficient to identify the place. There shall appear on each petition the names and addresses of the same five (5) electors, who, as a committee of the petitioners, shall be regarded as responsible for the circulation and filing of the petition. Attached to each separate petition paper there shall be an affidavit of the circulator thereof that he, and he only, personally circulated the foregoing paper, that it bears a stated number of signatures, that all the signatures were appended thereto in his presence and that he believes them to be the genuine signatures of the persons whose names they purport to be.
Sec. 4.04. Filing, examination and certification of petitions. All papers comprising an initiative or referendum petition shall be assembled and filed with the city secretary as one instrument. Within twenty (20) days after a petition is filed, the city secretary shall determine whether each paper of the petition bears the required affidavit of the circulator and whether the petition is signed by a sufficient number of qualified voters. After completing his examination of the petition, the city secretary shall certify the result thereof to the council at its next regular meeting. If he shall certify that the petition is insufficient he shall set forth in his certificate the particulars in which it is defective and shall at once notify the committee of the petitioners of his findings.
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MR 0188 Sec. 4.05. Amendment of petitions. An initiative or referendum petition may be amended at any time within ten (10) days after the notification of insufficiency has been sent by the city secretary, by filing a supplementary petition upon additional papers signed and filed as provided in the case of an original petition. The city secretary shall within five (5) days after such an amendment is filed, examine the amended petition and, if the petition is still insufficient, he shall file his certificate to that effect in his office and notify the committee of the petitioners of his findings and no further action shall be had on such insufficient petition. The findings of the insufficiency of a petition shall not prejudice the filing of a new petition for the same purpose.
Sec. 4.06. Effect of certification of referendum petition. When a referendum petition, or amended petition as defined in section 4.05 of this article, has been certified as sufficient by the city secretary, the ordinance specified in the petition shall not go into effect, or further action thereunder shall be suspended if it shall have gone into effect, until and unless approved by the electors as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 4.07. Consideration by council. Whenever the council receives a certified initiative or referendum petition from the city secretary, it shall proceed at once to consider such petition. A proposed initiative ordinance shall be read and provision shall be made for a public hearing upon the proposed ordinance. The council shall take final action on the ordinance within sixty (60) days after the date on which such ordinance was certified to the council by the city secretary. A referred ordinance shall be reconsidered by the council and its final vote upon such reconsideration shall be upon the question, "Shall the ordinance specified in the referendum petition be repealed?"
Sec. 4.08. Submission of electors. If the council shall fail to pass an ordinance proposed by initiative petition, or shall pass it in a form different from that set forth in the petition therefor, or if the council shall fail to repeal a referred ordinance, the proposed or referred ordinance shall be submitted to the electors not less than thirty (30) days nor more than sixty (60) days from the date the council takes its final vote thereon. If no regular election is to be held within such period the council shall provide for a special election.
Sec. 4.09. Form of ballot for initiated and referred ordinances. Ordinances submitted to a vote of the electors in accordance with the initiative and referendum provisions of this charter shall be submitted by ballot title, which shall be prepared in all cases by the city attorney. The ballot title may be different from the legal title of any such initiated or referred ordinance and shall be a clear, concise statement, without argument or prejudice, descriptive of the substance of such ordinance. If a paper ballot is used it shall have below the ballot title the following propositions, one above the other, in the order indicated: "FOR THE ORDINANCE" and "AGAINST THE ORDINANCE." Any number of ordinances may be voted on at the same election and may be submitted on the same ballot, but any paper ballot used for voting thereon shall be for that purpose only. If voting machines are used, the ballot title shall have below it the same two (2) propositions, one above the other or one preceding the other in the order indicated, and the elector shall be given an opportunity to vote for or against the ordinance.
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MR 0189 Sec. 4.10. Results of election, publication. (a) If a majority of the electors voting on a proposed initiative ordinance shall vote in favor thereof, it shall thereupon be an ordinance of the city. A referred ordinance which is not approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon shall thereupon be deemed repealed. (b) Initiative ordinances adopted and referendum ordinances approved by the electors shall be published, and may be amended or repealed by the council in the same manner as other ordinances.
Sec. 4.11. Recall of councilmen. Any member of the city council may be removed from office by a recall election.
Sec. 4.12. Recall petition, committee of petitioners. Recall petition papers shall contain the name of the councilman (or names of the councilmen) whose removal is sought, and a clear and concise statement of the grounds for his (or their) removal. There shall appear at the head of each petition the names and addresses of five electors, who, as a committee of the petitioners shall be regarded as responsible for the circulation and filing of the petition. Each signer of any petition paper shall sign his name in ink or indelible pencil and give after his name his place of residence by street and number, or other description sufficient to identify the place, and the date his signature was affixed. No signature to such petition shall remain effective or be counted which was placed thereon more than forty-five (45) days prior to the filing of such petition with the city secretary. The signatures to a recall petition need not all be appended to one paper, but to each separate petition there shall be attached an affidavit of the circulator thereof that he, and he only, personally circulated the foregoing paper, that it bears a stated number of signatures, that all signatures were appended thereto in his presence and that he believes them to be the genuine signatures of the persons whose names they purport to be.
Sec. 4.13. Filing and certification of petitions, recall election. (a) All papers comprising a recall petition shall be assembled and filed with the city secretary as one instrument. Within seven (7) days after a petition is filed, the city secretary shall determine whether each paper bears the names of five (5) electors who constitute a committee of the petitioners, and the required affidavit of the circulator thereof, and whether the petition is signed by qualified voters of the constituency of the councilmember whose removal is sought equal in number to at least twenty-five (25) percent of the number of the votes cast for that councilmember and all of his opponents in the last preceding general municipal election in which he was a candidate. As used herein "constituency" shall mean the qualified voters eligible to vote for the councilmember whose removal is sought, either by geographical district or at large, as the case may be. (b) If the city secretary finds the petition insufficient he shall return it to the committee of the petitioners, without prejudice, however, to the filing of a new petition based upon new and different grounds, but not upon the same grounds. If the city secretary finds the petition sufficient and in compliance with the provisions of this Article of the Charter he shall submit the petition and his certificate of its sufficiency to the council at its next regular meeting and immediately notify the councilman whose removal is sought of such action. (c) If the councilman whose removal is sought does not resign within seven (7) days after such notice the city council shall thereupon order and fix a date for holding a recall election not less than thirty (30) nor more than sixty (60) days after the petition has been presented to the council. If no general election is to be held within this time the council shall provide for a special election.
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MR 0190 (Ord. No. 79-86, § 2, 12-11-79, ratified 1-19-80)
Sec. 4.14. Recall election ballots. Ballots used at recall elections shall conform to the following requirements: (a) With respect to each person whose removal is sought the question shall be submitted: "SHALL (name of person) BE REMOVED FROM THE CITY COUNCIL BY RECALL?" (b) Immediately below each such question shall be printed the two following propositions, one above the other, in the order indicated: "YES" "NO"
Sec. 4.15. Results of recall election. If a majority of the votes cast at a recall election shall be against the recall of the councilman named on the ballot, he shall continue in office. If a majority of the votes cast at a recall election be for the recall of the councilman named on the ballot, he shall be deemed removed from office and the vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed in Article II, section 2.04 of this charter.
Sec. 4.16. Limitations on recalls. No petition shall be filed against a councilmember within six (6) months after he takes office nor against a councilmember who has been subjected to a recall election and not removed thereby until at least six (6) months after such election. Should a regular election occur during the time when a recall petition is current and should the person(s) being recalled be reelected, the recall petition shall be null and void. (Ord. No. 79-86, § 2, 12-11-79, ratified 1-19-80)
Sec. 4.17. District judge may order election. Should the city council fail or refuse to order any recall election when all of the requirements for such election have been complied with by the petitioning electors in conformity with this Article of the charter, then it shall be the duty of the District Judge of Denton County, upon proper application therefor, to order such election and effectuate the provisions of this Article of the charter.
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MR 0191 EXHIBIT C
MR 0192 City Manager’s Office DENTON 215 E. McKinney St., Denton, TX 76201 • (940) 349-8307
TO: City Council
FROM: Sara Hensley, City Manager
RE1 : Proposition B Implementation
DATE: Nov. 9, 2022
In yesterday’s election, an ordinance relating to marijuana enforcement, Proposition B, was approvedby voters. This ordinancewill become effective after the election is canvassed by the City Council, currently scheduledto be considered during a Special Meeting on Friday, Nov. 18.
ImplementationConsiderations for Proposition B While we continue to be dedicated to serving the community by making marijuana possession a low priority and recognize the statement expressed by voters regarding marijuana enforcement, the passage of Proposition B presents a challenge to the City regarding our ability to implement its provisions. These issues have previously been described in briefings to the City Council but can essentially be reduced to the issue of certain provisions of Proposition B being in direct conflict with statelaw. Chapter 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code prohibits the City Council and Police Department from adopting a policy that does not fully enforce state and federal laws relating to drugs, including marijuana. While Proposition B imposes explicit prohibitions on the Denton Police Department’s ability to enforce laws related to low-level marijuana possession, those prohibitions are in direct conflict with, and are superseded by, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which vests police officers with the authority and duty to enforce state law, including the ability to use the smell of marijuana as probable cause to conduct a search or seizure, the right to make an arrest, and where appropriate, the right to issue a citation for the possession of marijuana or drug paraphernalia, regardless of the quantity of marijuana. In short, the City does not have the authority to implement some provisions of Proposition B without changes to current drug laws by Congress and the Texas Legislature.
In practice, a Denton Police Officer will continue to have the authority to enforce state laws relating to marijuana. Neither the City, the City Manager, nor the Chief of Police has the authority to direct officers to do otherwise or to discipline an officer when they are acting in accordance with statelaw.
Proposition B further prescribes obligations on the part of the City Manager. In Section 21-84(b) of the ordinance, the City Manager is directed, along with the Chief of Police, to “update city policies and internal operating procedures in accordance with this ordinance” including updates to the Denton Police Department General Orders. The Chief of Police cannot adopt a General Order thatis in conflict with statelaw and I, as the City Manager to whom the Chief of Police reports, do not have the authority to direct him to act in violation of state law.
EXHIBIT 1 MR 0193 Copy from re:SearchTX In addition,PropositionB prohibitsthe City from using City funds or personnelto request, conduct, or obtain THC testing of any cannabis-related substance. While Council has budgetary authority, this provision of Proposition B is in direct conflict with the City Charter, which expressly excludes the appropriation of money from an initiative ordinance, though the Council may choose to amend the budget at its discretion. The passage of Proposition B will also not impact the city’s existing employee drug testing policies.
Public StatementRegarding Proposition B Given the above challenges in implementation, the recognition that other law enforcement agenciesare not subject to Proposition B, and the legal distinctions between marijuana and other THC derivatives, the City has drafted and released the attached public statement.
I am and City staff are concerned with the potential for incorrect information regarding the applicability and enforceability of Proposition B to quickly spread in the community, which could leadto a confrontationbetweenthe police and a member of the community should an officer act in accordancewith State law, while the community member mistakenly believes that action violates Proposition B. Therefore, staff have shared this statementwith the media and community stakeholders in order to mitigate the negative effects stemming from incorrect information.
Ongoing Approach to Marijuana Enforcement Prior to the passing of Proposition B, the City of Denton Police Department already significantly revised its marijuana enforcement policy and practices which are enumerated in its General Orders. Between June 2021 and July 2022, of the 65 arrests that the Denton Police Department made for marijuana possession under 4 ounces, 15 of these charges accompanied other controlled substances unrelatedto marijuana, and weapons were involved in 31 of these cases.
Going forward, Chief Shoemaker has affirmed that enforcementof marijuana possession will continueto be a low priority for the Denton Police Department. However, public safety requires the Police Department’s ability to use the smell and possession of marijuana, regardless of the amount, as well as the possession of drug paraphernalia, as probable cause to conduct further investigation,which as noted above, may lead to more serious crimes being charged, including the possession of a firearm and crimes of violence against members of our community.
Next Steps In accordance with Section 21-86 of the ordinance, I will report to Council within three months’ time regarding its implementation.
Attachment
CC: Mack Reinwand, City Attorney Frank Dixon, Assistant City Manager Doug Shoemaker,Chief of Police City Manager’s Office
MR 0194 Copy from re:SearchTX FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Stuart Birdseye (940) 349-8009 Stuart.Birdseye@cityofdenton.com
Information on the Passing of Proposition B, Relating to Marijuana Possession
DENTON, TX, Nov. 9, 2022 – Following the passage of Proposition B, which outlines actions to be taken regarding marijuana possession in the City of Denton, there is important information to share to help understand what this means for the Denton community. This ordinance, which was approved by voters, will become effective after the election is canvassed by the City Council, currently scheduled to be considered during a Special Meeting on Friday, Nov. 18.
Current Practices Prior to the passage of Proposition B, the City of Denton Police Department already significantly revised its marijuana enforcement policy and practices which are enumerated in its general orders. Between June 2021 and July 2022, of the 65 arrests that the Denton Police Department made for marijuana possession under 4 ounces, 15 of these charges accompanied other controlled substances unrelated to marijuana, and weapons were involved in 31.
The existing policy leaves officers with the discretion to continue an investigation after the discovery of marijuana if other crimes are suspected, such as driving while impaired, unlawful carrying of a weapon, or possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone (such as a school, park, or daycare).
“As a forward-thinking agency, marijuana possession alone has not been a priority for the Denton Police Department for several years,” said Police Chief Doug Shoemaker. “This will continue to be the case. With that said, officers must maintain discretion to be able to keep our community safe from harm. When marijuana possession pairs with other crimes that affect public safety, including offenses such as driving while intoxicated or firearms violations, such acts cannot and will not be ignored.”
Implementation With the voter approval of Proposition B, City staff has been working to determine which portions of the ordinance will be incorporated into the Police Department’s General Orders, also known as department policies. This review is necessary since Chapter 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code prohibits the City Council and Police Department from adopting a policy that does not fully enforce state and federal laws relating to drugs, including marijuana, as well as the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure which vests police officers with the authority and duty to enforce state law, including the possession of marijuana. Because portions of Proposition B conflict with and may be superseded by existing state and federal laws, some provisions of Proposition B may not be implemented without changes to those laws by the United States Congress and Texas Legislature.
OUR CORE VALUES Inclusion Collaboration Quality Service Strategic Focus Fiscal Responsibility
ADA/EOE/ADEA www.cityofdenton.com TDD (800) 735-2989
MR 0195 Copy from re:SearchTX It is also important to note, especially for students and visitors, that City policies and the Denton Police Department’s General Orders do not apply to the other law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction to enforce state law within the City of Denton. These agencies include, but are not limited to, the University of North Texas Police Department, Texas Woman’s University Department of Public Safety, the Denton County Sheriff’s Office, and the Texas Department of Public Safety, which all have their own policies and practices when it comes to marijuana investigations and arrests and are not subject to Proposition B.
Another important distinction is that the possession of marijuana and the possession of THC products are entirely different offenses. Per Texas state law, possessing any amount of THC, which is often the substance in edibles or vape cartridges, is a felony offense and this is not covered by Proposition B. As a result, possessing a single vape cartridge or a single edible would be classified as a felony. Also, when THC is added to any other substance, such as brownies or cookies, state law takes the total weight of the combined substances into consideration rather than the pure weight of the added THC. Meaning, per state law, if you bake a small amount of THC into a pound of brownies, you could be charged with possessing a pound of THC, a first- degree felony.
The Denton Police Department is dedicated to serving the community in a fair and safe manner. The department understands that, with the voter approval of Proposition B, voters wish to reduce punishments for low-level marijuana possession. The department is committed to continuing the innovative policies that are in place, which have resulted in a significant reduction in arrests since implemented in 2019 and updated in 2022, but must do so within the parameters of state and federal law. The Police Department will continue to assess all aspects of this ordinance, as passed by voters, to determine what may be implemented in accordance with both the current law as well as the voices of the population we serve.
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Visit www.cityofdenton.com for more news and to stay updated.
MR 0196 Copy from re:SearchTX EXHIBIT D
MR 0197 (
CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF DENTON; GERARD HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tern of Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and CHRIS WATTS, Members of the City Council of Denton; SARA 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, Chief of Police of Denton, in their official capacities, Defendants.
DECLARATION OF CITY MANAGER SARA HENSLEY
1. "My name is Sara Hensley, and I am the current City Manager for the City of Denton, Texas. I am over the age of eighteen years, am of sound mind, am competent in all respects to make this declaration, and the following facts are true and correct and within my personal knowledge as the City Manager for the City of Denton.
2. I have more than 20 years of public service and leadership experience. Before joining the City o£,Denton, I served as the Parks and Recreation Director for the City of Austin and also served as Interim Assistant City Manager for two years. I led large-scale teams in multiple program and service areas and operations, served as the executive lead for several citywide cross-departmental efforts, and had frequent interaction with elected officials, community stakeholders, and residents.
3. I joined the City of Denton in May 2019 as the Assistant City Manager, was promoted to Deputy City Manager in July 2020, then to Interim City Manager in February 2021, and was then appointed City Manager in March 2022.
4. As City Manager, I am responsible for the implementation of Council policies and priorities. Together with my team, I provide leadership and direction to all departments of the City, coordinate the official business of the City Council, submit and administer the annual budget and capital improvement programs, and act as liaisons among the City Council, citizens, and the City organization. My
MR 0198 authority as City Manager is described in Article V, Section 5.03 of the City of Denton's Charter.
5. In the State's petition, the State cites the memo I sent to the Denton City Council on November 9, 2022, discussing the potential implementation of Proposition B. Orig. Pet.¶ 20-21. In this memo, I explained that the voters of the City of Denton had approved and passed Proposition B in the November 8, 2022 election. Exh. 1, City Manager Memo, at 1. I also state, not that the City is adopting or shall adopt a specific policy, but that the City would "not have the authority to implement some of the provisions of Proposition B." Id. Ultimately, I stated my conclusion that the Denton City Police Officers will continue to have authority enforce state laws relating to marijuana.
6. This memo does not establish and is not a "policy" by which the City of Denton "will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs," as discussed in Texas Local Government Code § 370.003. As explained above, this memo discusses the issues regarding any potential implementation of Proposition B, which was approved and passed by the voters of the City of Denton on November 8, 2022, but does not set or adopt any policy for the City.
7. Article II, Section 2-28(c) of the City of Denton Code of Ordinances does authorize me to issue policies, including any policy for how city personnel should handle marijuana related offenses. Specifically, Section 2-28(c) provides that:
The city manager is hereby authorized to issue such administrative procedures and directives as 11A. deems necessary to implement approved policies relating to personnel and internal operational matters. Such procedures and directives shall be contained in a manual available for inspection by city employees.
8. I have not, as City Manager or otherwise, promulgated a policy not to fully enforce laws relating to drugs in response to or in connection with the Ordinance, and I do not plan to do so."
My name is Sara Lynn Hensley (First) (Middle) (Last)
and I am an employee of the following governmental agency: the City of Denton.
I am executing this declaration as part of my assigned duties and responsibilities.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
2 MR 0199 Executed in Denton County, State of Texas, on the _16_ day of May 2024.
Declarant
3 [ MR 0200 EXHIBIT E
MR 0201 CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF DENTON; GERARD HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tern of Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and CHRIS WATTS, Members of the City Council of Denton; SARA 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, Chief of Police of Denton, in their official capacities, Defendants.
DECLARATION OF INTERIM CHIEF OF POLICE JESSICA ROBLEDO
1. "My name is Jessica Robledo, and I am the Interim Chief of Police for the City of Denton, Texas.
2. I am over the age of eighteen years, am of sound mind, am competent in all respects to make this declaration, and the following facts are true and correct and within my personal knowledge as the Interim Chief of Police for the City of Denton.
3. I was appointed Interim Chief of Police for the City of Denton in April 2024, replacing Acting Chief Bryan Cose, who served as Acting Chief of Police following the resignation of Chief Doug Shoemaker.
4. I have 34 years of public safety experience and last served as chief of the Pflugerville Police Department until 2021. Before that, I served as an assistant chief for the Austin Police Department until 2016.
5. As the Interim Chief of Police for the City of Denton, I have the powers, rights, duties, and jurisdiction granted to and imposed on me by the laws of the State of Texas. As Interim Chief of Police, all general orders and policies for the City of Denton Police Department must be approved by me. Furthermore, I have both the authority to publish directives and an obligation to follow the laws of the State of Texas. The City Manager, therefore, cannot abrogate my obligations to
MR 0202 comply with the law, and has not done so. So, to the extent that I have the authority to publish directives, I have not issued and will not issue a policy inconsistent with Section 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code. Additionally, neither the Denton Police Department nor either of my immediate predecessors, Chief Shoemaker and Acting Chief Cose, adopted any policy or issued any directive by which the Denton Police Department would not fully enforce federal or state laws relating to drugs.
6. As the Interim Chief of Police, I also report directly to the City of Denton City Manager, Sara Hensley. Under the supervision of the Denton City Manager, I likewise have not adopted and do not intend to adopt any policy under which the police department will not fully enforce federal or state laws relating to drugs.
7. Thus, no policy of the City of Denton or of the Denton Police Department has been adopted that would change the pre-existing discretion of Denton police officers to enforce drug laws, as that pre-existing discretion was summarized by then-Chief Shoemaker in his public statement on November 9, 2022 found at Exhibit 1 of Plaintiffs Original Petition."
My name is r\L-s.s-ic..,4 g- Aele 06 (First) (Middle) (Last)
and I am an employee of the following governmental agency: the City of Denton.
I am executing this declaration as part of my assigned duties and responsibilities.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed in Denton County, State of Texas, on the ?° day of fil7 , 2024.
Declarant
2 MR 0203 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Cathy Daniels on behalf of Jose de la Fuente Bar No. 00793605 cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Envelope ID: 87929221 Filing Code Description: Plea to Jurisdiction Filing Description: Defendants' Plea to the Jurisdiction Status as of 5/21/2024 8:37 AM CST
Associated Case Party: The State Of Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Johnathan Stone 24071779 Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Jacob Przada 24125371 jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Tamera Martinez tamera.martinez@oag.texas.gov 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Decriminalize Denton
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Deb Armintor
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: The City Of Denton, Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Amy Hoffee amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Mack Reinwand mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Jose E.de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
James F.Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Gabrielle C.Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Sydney P.Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Case Contacts MR 0204 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Cathy Daniels on behalf of Jose de la Fuente Bar No. 00793605 cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Envelope ID: 87929221 Filing Code Description: Plea to Jurisdiction Filing Description: Defendants' Plea to the Jurisdiction Status as of 5/21/2024 8:37 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Sharon Murray sharon.murray@oag.texas.gov 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Doug Shoemaker
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 5/20/2024 3:18:49 PM SENT
MR 0205 Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § In the District Court of Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § Denton County, Texas BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and CHRIS WATTS, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § DOUG SHOEMAKER, Chief of Police of § Denton; in their official capacities, § 481st Judicial District Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF THE STATE OF TEXAS’S RESPONSE TO CITY DEFENDANTS’ PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
Plaintiff the State of Texas (“Texas”), by and through the Office of the Attorney General
of Texas, files its Response City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction. In support thereof, Texas
respectfully states as follows:
City Defendants challenge this Court’s jurisdiction on four bases. First, Defendants argue
that Texas “has not pleaded, and cannot as a matter of law, plead a valid ultra-vires claim because
it does not allege any act taken by any Defendant outside of their legal authority.” City Defendants’
Plea to the Jurisdiction at 2. 1 Second, City Defendants argue that “neither the City Council nor any
1 Defendants seem to argue that the City did not “adopt” the unconstitutional ordinance
in violation of Section 370.003. But as discussed in more detail below, Texas disagrees because Defendants’ characterizations contravene the facts included in their own response—facts that show the City Council “passed and approved” the ordinance after voters “adopted” the ordinance. See Ex. A, City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction, at 34–33, 39–40. Thus, throughout this response, Texas uses the word “adopt” to comport with Section 370.003 and to refer to what
MR 0206 Official has adopted a policy,” even though the ordinance is “on the books” in “the City’s official
Code of Ordinances,” and “the absence of any act by Defendants renders any opinion the Court
could render in this case advisory;” hence, Texas lacks Article III standing. Id. at 2, 14. Third, City
Defendants argue that Texas’s interpretation of Section 370.003 of the Texas Local Government
Code would violates the separation of powers doctrine and should thus be rejected because Texas’s
ultimate relief would purportedly hinder prosecutorial discretion afforded to law enforcement. Id.
at 20-22. Fourth, and finally, City Defendants claim that Texas is not entitled to relief for City
Defendants’ ultra vires actions. Id. at 27–28.
City Defendants’ arguments fail as a matter of law. First, codification of an
unconstitutional ordinance decriminalizing marijuana in conflict with state law—constitute ultra
vires actions. Defendants’ ultra vires actions—codifying an unconstitutional ordinance
decriminalizing marijuana in conflict with state law—have injured Texas. Houston Belt & Terminal
Railway Co. v. City of Houston, 487, S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. 2016) (noting that government officers
act without legal authority if they exceed the bounds of their granted authority); Creedmoor-Maha
Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Comm'n on Env't Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505, 515–16 (Tex. App.—Austin
2010, no pet.) (noting that “if the claimant is attempting to restrain a state officer’s conduct on the
grounds that it is unconstitutional,” the plaintiff must plead a “constitutional violation” to fall
within the ultra vires exception). Texas has pled a violation.
Second, Defendants’ ultra vires actions confer standing upon Texas because Texas has an
interest in ensuring State law has not been undermined by conflicting local law. See State v. El Paso
the City Council actually accomplished through its approval and passage of an unconstitutional ordinance. 2
MR 0207 Cnty., 618 S.W.3d 812, 826 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2020), overruled on other grounds 2by Abbott v.
City of El Paso, 668 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023) (citations omitted) (observing that a
state has interests in “safeguarding [even] theoretical interests in the hierarchy of a governmental
structure.”).
Third, City Defendants’ separation-of-powers arguments fail as a matter of law. Since
Texas pled ultra vires action in the form of codifying an unconstitutional ordinance, for which it
seeks prospective relief, conferring Article III standing, an advisory opinion would not result.
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987) (emphasis in original) (“[t]he real value of the judicial
pronouncement—what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a case or controversy rather than an
advisory opinion—is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards
the plaintiff.”). And while Defendants argue that Section 370.003 of the Local Government Code
(“Section 370.003”) should be read to violate the constitution, see City Defendants’ Plea to the
Jurisdiction at 20, Defendants ignore the fact that Texas’s use of that provision does not violate
constitution. What’s more, Defendants’ interpretation cannot be reconciled with the presumption
of validity doctrine, which requires the parties read Section 370.003 narrowly and not to infringe
on other branches of government. Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex.1968); Tex. Local
Gov’t Code § 370.003.
Moreover, City Defendants prosecutorial discretion argument fails as a blanket prohibition
on the enforcement of the Texas Penal Code pertaining to marijuana conflicts with a law
2 Although Texas has included the above subsequent history, the opinion overruling State v.
El Paso Cnty on other grounds was vacated by the Supreme Court of Texas. See Abbott v. City of El Paso, 677 S.W.3d 914, 915 (Tex. 2023).
MR 0208 enforcement officer’s “duty to stop crime whenever it occurs.” Pardo v. Iglesias, 672 S.W.3d 428,
433 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. den’d). That is, the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, Section 2.13 indicates that “[i]t is the duty of every peace officer to preserve the peace
within the officer's jurisdiction.” Moore v. Barker, No. 14-17-00065-CV, 2017 WL 4017747, at *4
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.13(a)).
Fourth, Texas is entitled to relief for City Defendants’ ultra vires actions. City of Beaumont
v. Boullion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 149 (Tex. 1995); City of Elsa v. MAL, 226 S.W.3d 390, 381 (Tex. 2007)
(“In this case we reaffirm . . . governmental entities may be sued for injunctive relief under the
Texas Constitution.”).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 31, 2024, following the City of Denton’s codification of an unconstitutional
ordinance decriminalizing marijuana, Texas sued the City of Denton and applicable city officials,
alleging Defendants’ codification of the ordinance violated Article XI, Section 5 of the Texas
Constitution, and Section 370.003 of the Local Government Code. Plaintiff’s Original Verified
Petition, Application for Temporary Injunction and Permanent Injunction (“Petition”) at 1-3, 5. Texas
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, including a temporary injunction and a permanent
injunction. See id.
Shortly thereafter, on February 5, 2024, Intervenor-Defendants’ Deb Armintor, in her
personal capacity, and in her official capacity as Chairperson on behalf of Decriminalize Denton,
and Decriminalize Denton, a Nonprofit, Unincorporated Political Action Committee, filed their
Petition in Intervention. Petition in Intervention. Texas then filed its Motion to Strike Intervenor-
Defendants’ Petition in Intervention, to which Intervenor-Defendants responded. Motion to Strike
MR 0209 Intervenor-Defendants’ Petition in Intervention; Response to Motion to Strike Intervenor-Defendants’
Petition in Intervention. After City Defendants filed their Plea to the Jurisdiction on May 20, 2024,
Texas now responds. See City Defendants Plea to the Jurisdiction.
RESPONSE TO PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
I. Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the court’s authority to determine the subject matter
of the controversy. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). “Subject-
matter jurisdiction is a multiple choice question with only two answers: yes or no.” City of Anson
v. Harper, 216 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.). “When a plea to the
jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, [the court] determine[s] if the pleader has alleged facts that
affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Tex. Dep’t. of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
II. City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is facially flawed.
City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction fails as a matter of law for four reasons: (1)
adoption of an unconstitutional ordinance decriminalizing marijuana in conflict with state law
constitute ultra vires actions; (2) Defendants’ ultra vires actions confer standing upon Texas, as
Texas has an interest in ensuring State law has not been undermined by conflicting local law; (3)
Texas seeks proper relief in response to City Defendants’ ongoing, unlawful actions that do not
implicate separation-of-powers concerns; and (4) Texas is entitled to relief for City Defendants’
ultra vires actions.
A. Defendants’ adoption of an unlawful ordinance constitutes ultra vires actions, thus removing any claim to sovereign immunity.
City Defendants ask this Court to shield them with sovereign immunity for activity by 5
MR 0210 government officials that directly conflict with the Texas Constitution and Local Government
Code. See City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction at 10. Specifically, City Defendants argue that
“the State identifies no act by the Officials that actually violates Section 370.003, and accordingly,
the State’s suit does not fall within the ultra-vires exception to the Officials’ immunity,” id.
Defendants are wrong. Defendants’ ultra vires actions of adopting an unconstitutional
ordinance decriminalizing marijuana in conflict with state law confers a waiver of immunity.
Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co., 487, S.W.3d at 158 (Tex. 2016) (noting that government
officers act without legal authority if they exceed the bounds of their granted authority); Creedmoor-
Maha Water Supply Corp., 307 S.W.3d at 515–16 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that
“if the claimant is attempting to restrain a state officer’s conduct on the grounds that it is
unconstitutional,” the plaintiff must plead a “constitutional violation” to fall within the ultra vires
exception).
And despite Defendants’ assertions to the contrary, see City Defendants’ Plea to the
Jurisdiction at 5 (citing City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009)), sovereign
immunity does not bar an ultra vires suit seeking prospective injunctive relief against a state official
in their official capacity for acting unlawfully. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372–73
(Tex. 2009). “To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit . . . must allege, and ultimately prove,
that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” Id. at
372; Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 240–41 (Tex. 2017) (holding that the official capacity
defendant acted within his legal authority and was therefore still entitled to sovereign immunity).
“[A]ctions taken ‘without legal authority’ has two fundamental components: (1) authority giving
the official some (but not absolute) discretion to act and (2) conduct outside of that authority.”
MR 0211 Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Tex. 2017). A government officers acts without legal
authority if he exceeds the bounds of his granted authority or if his acts conflict with the law itself.
Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. v. City of Houston, 487, S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. 2016).
“Although only exercises of absolute discretion are absolutely protected, whether a suit attacking
an exercise of limited discretion will be barred is dependent upon the grant of authority at issue in
any particular case.” Id. at 164.
Ultimately, here, City Defendants were not provided discretion as to how to act. First,
Texas has alleged that Chapter 481 of the Penal Code prohibits possession of marijuana and related
paraphernalia and that Section 370.003 of the Local Government Code forbids “[t]he governing
body of a municipality [or a] municipal police department” to “adopt a policy under which the
entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs, including Chapters 481 and 483, Health and
Safety Code, and federal law.” Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 370.003; Tex. Health and Safety Code
§§ 481.121, 481.125.
City Defendants were not permitted to adopt the unlawful ordinance. See Texas Ass’n of
Bus. v. City of Austin, Texas, 565 S.W.3d 425, 441 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2018, reh’g denied) (citing
Tex. Const. art. XI § 5) (citing Abbott v. Perez, 138 S.Ct. 2305, 2324 n.17 (2018)). City Defendants
admit that it has an Ordinance in its City Code of Ordinances, which Texas contends violates
Section 370.003, but City Defendants claimed that the City Council’s approval and passage of the
ordinance—and hence, the act of the Ordinance being placed in the City Code of Ordinances—is
not an action for the purposes of ultra vires actions, citing to the Denton City Charter. Denton,
Tex., Code of Ordinances pt. 1, art. IV, § 4.10 (1959) (emphasis added); see also City Defendants
Plea to the Jurisdiction at 13. Yet, City Defendants don’t explain how the Ordinance ended up in
MR 0212 its Code of Ordinance, while seemingly raising the defense that it had to be placed in the Code
pursuant to Code of Ordinances pt. 1, art. IV, § 4.10.
City Defendants here, in relevant part, ignore the preemption language of the Texas
Constitution. The Texas Constitution requires that “no…ordinance passed under [Denton’s]
charter shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the general
laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.” Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5. Courts have found that
when a “provision [is] inconsistent with the . . . general laws enacted by the Legislature of this
State. . . . [t]he ‘inability [of a state] to enforce its duly enacted [laws] clearly inflicts irreparable
harm on the State.’” Texas Ass’n of Bus., 565 S.W.3d at 441 (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, citing to their City Code of Ordinances, City Defendants claim that they
have not committed any act. City Defendants cannot claim it correctly chose to follow its Code of
Ordinances and disclaim Texas Constitutional preemption or the Texas Government Code,
particularly in light of its own charter language stating its rules and regulations are “subject [] to
the limitations imposed by the state Constitution.” Charter of the City of Denton art. I, § 1.04
Nor would the City Police Defendant be permitted to decline to follow the state’s drug
laws, thus providing an ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity. That is, a blanket prohibition
on the enforcement of the Texas Penal Code pertaining to marijuana conflicts with a law
enforcement officer’s duty under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code “to stop crime
whenever it occurs.” Pardo, 672 S.W.3d at 433. What’s more , the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, Section 2.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that “[i]t is the duty of
every peace officer to preserve the peace within the officer’s jurisdiction.” Moore v. Barker, No.
14-17-00065-CV, 2017 WL 4017747, at *4 (Tex. App. Sept. 12, 2017) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
MR 0213 art. 2.13(a)).
Furthermore, ultra vires actions can be maintained against entities for violation of
constitutional rights against an entity. Texas A&M Univ. v. Carapia, 494 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied) (noting that “‘suits for injunctive relief’ may be maintained
against governmental entities to remedy violations of the Texas Constitution.”). Here, Texas has
also sued the City of Denton, to which it is entitled to sue.
Ultimately, Texas has pled a waiver of sovereign immunity for ultra vires actions and its
claims must proceed.
B. Defendants’ ultra vires confer standing.
City Defendants proceed to contest every element of the standing inquiry. First, City
Defendants argue that Texas suffers no harm because “[t]he Ordinance was self-enacting by
function of the Denton City Charter and the petition and vote of the people . . . has not been
enforced, and no Defendant intends to enforce it.” City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction at 16.
Second, to the extent they concede injury, City Defendants challenge, causation, arguing that “as
shown by the undisputed facts above, that act—the act of the City Council or Denton’s police
department adopting such a policy—has not happened,” thus challenging causation. Id. at 13.
Third, and finally, City Defendants’ assert State’s suit is also non-jurisdictional because it does
not present a live case or controversy, but instead seeks an impermissible advisory opinion.” Id. at
6. City Defendants’ flagrant contravention of state law, as discussed infra I.A., provides a clear
pathway to the conclusion that Texas in fact has standing.
Because “Texas’s test for constitutional standing parallels the federal test for Article III
standing,” Texas courts may “look to federal standing jurisprudence for guidance” unless
MR 0214 specifically contradicted by state law. Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 776
(Tex. 2020).
To establish standing, a plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove (1) an actual or imminent
injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct and (3) likely to be
redressed by the plaintiff’s requested remedy. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154–
55 (Tex. 2012) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
i. Injury-in-Fact
Defendants’ ultra vires actions—adopting an unconstitutional ordinance decriminalizing
marijuana in conflict with state law—have caused Texas an injury. See State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d
400, 410 (Tex. 2020) (holding that the State in injured by local ultra vires actions “as a matter of
law”). Actions taken by local officials that facially contravene State law are ultra vires. See Houston
Belt & Terminal Railway Co., 487, S.W.3d at 158 (noting that government officers act without legal
authority if they exceed the bounds of their granted authority or if their acts conflict with the law
itself); Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp., 307 S.W.3d 505, 515–16 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no
pet.) (noting that “if the claimant is attempting to restrain a state officer’s conduct on the grounds
that it is unconstitutional, it must allege facts that actually constitute a constitutional violation” to
fall within the ultra vires exception);
The act of adopting a preempted ordinance injures Texas. See Texas Ass’n of Bus, 565
S.W.3d at 441 (citing Tex. Const. art. XI § 5) (citing Perez, 138 S.Ct. at 2324 n.17). Courts have
applied the Constitutional principles set out in Article XI, Section 5 to claims brought by Texas for
the purposes of the standing inquiry. In Texas Association of Business, Texas challenged a city’s
decision to adopt an ordinance that directly conflicted with State law. See generally id. The Court
MR 0215 found that when a “provision [is] inconsistent with the . . . general laws enacted by the Legislature
of this State. . . . [t]he ‘inability [of a state] to enforce its duly enacted [laws] clearly inflicts
irreparable harm on the State.’” Id. at 441 (citations omitted). In mounting a facial challenge
against the Ordinance, Texas need only prove “that the [ordinance], by its terms, always operates
unconstitutionally.” Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 (Tex. 1995)
(emphasis added).
In El Paso Cnty., the Court noted that when Texas sues local officials for acting contrary to
State law, Texas “is safeguarding its theoretical interests in the hierarchy of a governmental
structure.” 618 S.W.3d at 826 (citations omitted). The Constitution clearly subordinates
municipal law to the State’s “general statutes.” Tex. Const. art. XI sec. 5; see also Yett v. Cook, 115
Tex. 205, 281 S.W. 837, 842 (1926) (municipalities are “agencies of the state, and subject to state
control”). In this instance, adopting the ordinance has caused injury because the ordinance facially
conflicts with State law. See Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400, 410 (Tex. 2020) (noting that “[w]e have
explained that where those laws are being defied or misapplied by a local official, an ultra vires suit
is a tool ‘to reassert the control of the state,’” that would “be useless—and our language null—if
the State were required to demonstrate additional, particularized harm arising from a local
official’s specific unauthorized actions.”).
Here, as in El Paso Cnty., the Ordinance undeniably conflicts with State law and would
deprive the State of its ability “to enforce its duly enacted laws” Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 565 S.W.3d at
441 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied). By adopting a conflicting ordinance, the City has
upended the constitutional “hierarchy of [] governmental structure” between the State and
municipalities. Because the Ordinance as written so clearly injures Texas’s sovereignty, the State
MR 0216 has standing to challenge it prior to enforcement. Put another way, the State suffers an injury
because the City has attempted to create two sets of rules: (1) one for the City of Denton and (2)
one for the rest of Texas. “[T]he public cannot have two sets of rules to live by.” El Paso Cnty.,
618 S.W.3d at 826.
The Ordinance undeniably conflicts with state law and would deprive the State of its ability
“to enforce its duly enacted laws” Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 565 S.W.3d at 441 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018,
pet. denied). Texas has pled that Chapter 481 of the Penal Code prohibits possession of marijuana
and related paraphernalia and that Section 370.003 of the Local Government Code forbids “[t]he
governing body of a municipality [or a] municipal police department” to “adopt a policy under
which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs, including Chapters 481 and 483,
Health and Safety Code, and federal law.” Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 370.003; Tex. Health and
Safety Code §§ 481.121, 481.125. See Petition at 7-9. State law not only criminalizes conduct the
Ordinance condones, it expressly preempts local discretion by prohibiting any municipal regulation
that loosens drug enforcement. See id. The Legislature could hardly have made its intent any
clearer: local government has no authority to create its own lax marijuana policy. Because the
Ordinance as written so clearly injures Texas’s sovereignty, the State has standing to challenge it
prior to enforcement.
Ultimately, Intervenor-Defendants’ standing arguments fail for two key reasons: (1) the
controversy is ripe, and (2) Hollins and its progeny clearly establish that local ordinances violating
State law injure Texas.
First, Texas’s injury is ripe—an unconstitutional ordinance adopted by the City
Defendants is still on the City’s books. “Under the ripeness doctrine, [the court] consider[s]
MR 0217 whether, at the time a lawsuit is filed, the facts are sufficiently developed so that an injury has
occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote.” Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851–52 (Tex. 2000) (emphasis in original, internal quotations omitted).
“A case is not ripe when determining whether the plaintiff has a concrete injury depends on
contingent or hypothetical facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass.” Id. at 852. Like
standing, ripeness is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 850.
Here, Chapter 481 makes possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia an offense. Thus,
the ordinance and any corresponding Denton Police Department general order or directive violate
and are preempted by section 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code: “The governing body
of a municipality [or a] municipal police department . . . may not adopt a policy under which the
entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs, including Chapters 481 and 483, Health and
Safety Code, and federal law.” The ordinance is also unconstitutional. “[N]o . . . ordinance passed
under [Denton’s] charter shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the
State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.” Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5.
Moreover, generally, an ordinance that conflicts with provisions of the Constitution or state
statutes and code provisions is void, not voidable. Because the Ordinance conflicts with Section
370.003, the Ordinance would be void and of no legal effect. See Hotze v. Turner, 672 S.W.3d 380,
388 (Tex. 2023), reh'g denied (Sept. 1, 2023) (holding an ordinance’s primacy clause would be
“void because it conflicts with state law.”); see also Ex parte Farley, 65 Tex.Cr.R. 405, 144 S.W.
530 (1912) (“If the ordinance is in conflict with the state law, it will be held invalid.”) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); Honeycutt v. State, 627 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981);
Abrams v. State, 563 S.W.2d 610 (1978) (declaring a speeding ordinance of the City of Arlington
MR 0218 null and void because it was contrary to the state statute regulating the permissible speed of motor
vehicles). Overall, the case is ripe in light of City Defendants’ adoption of an unlawful ordinance—
an ordinance that remains on the books and that continues to upend the hierarchy of government.
Second, Hollins and its progeny clearly establish that even proposed ultra vires actions that
conflict with State law injure Texas. In Hollins, the Court held that in a challenge brought by the
State of Texas against local government for its ultra vires proposed mailing of unsolicited ballots to
all registered voters under 65 years of age, when the election code did not authorize the county
clerk’s proposal, constituted an ultra vires action. El Paso Cnty, 618 S.W.3d at 826 (citing Hollins,
620 S.W.3d at 410) (finding that Hollins also applies to ultra vires matters unrelated to election
law).
The Court reasoned that Texas holds a “justiciable interest in its sovereign capacity in the
maintenance and operation of its municipal corporation in accordance with law.” Hollins, 620
S.W.3d at 410 (internal quotation marks omitted). Texas has been injured.
ii. Causation
Texas has pled causation. See Petition at 1, 3–5, 6–9. City Defendants’ actions have resulted
in the adoption of an ordinance that conflicts with State law and the Texas Constitution, which
expressly states that home rule cities are not authorized to enact ordinances that contravene state
statute. See Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5 (“no charter or any ordinance passed under said charter shall
contain any provision inconsistent with . . . the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this
State.”). Cities that flout this constitutional limit exceed their home-rule powers; they adopt
ordinances that, per the Constitution, they have no authority to enact. See Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5;
see also Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 370.003; Tex. Health and Safety Code §§ 481.121, 481.125.
MR 0219 Defendants, not any third parties, have adopted the ordinance, and their actions have caused injury.
iii. Redressability
When the Texas legislature passes laws that are subsequently enacted, a city official’s ultra
vires actions in adopting an unconstitutional ordinance can be remedied by the relief requested by
Texas—enjoining and removing the unconstitutional ordinance from “the books.” See Petition at
11. On the issue of redressability, Texas’s’ injuries are ripe and can be redressed by the relief
requested. Compare, City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction at 6, with, Petition at 7-9. Texas’ injury
is ongoing and can be redressed by the injunction, and declaratory relief. Texas has standing.
C. Texas’s suit does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
City Defendants’ separation-of-powers arguments fail for three reasons: (1) a ruling from
this Court would not result in advisory opinion, as City Defendants’ unconstitutional actions have
created a live controversy from which this Court may provide relief; (2) City Defendants’ reading
of Section 370.003 is implausible, particularly in light of presumption of validity doctrine, which
requires the parties read Section 370.003 narrowly and with a presumption of validity; and (3)
blanket bans on law enforcement’s ability to apply Texas Penal Code provisions relating to
marijuana laws infringe on prosecutorial discretion, whereas Texas’s suit would empower Denton
law enforcement to enforce the law.
“The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct
departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which
are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to
another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise
any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly
MR 0220 permitted.” Tex. Const. art. II, § 1. The Texas Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, divides
the powers of government into legislative, executive, and judicial departments, “and no person, or
collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached
to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.” Tex. Const. art. II, §
1. “The separation of powers doctrine prohibits one branch of state government from exercising
power inherently belonging to another branch of state government.” Hotze v. City of Houston, 339
S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. App.— Austin 2011, no pet.).
“The Separation of Powers Clause is violated (1) when one branch of government assumes
power more properly attached to another branch or (2) when one branch unduly interferes with
another branch so that the other cannot effectively exercise its constitutionally assigned powers.”
In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied); see also Black v. Dallas
Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 882 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ) (same); Tex. Dep’t of
Family & Protec. Servs. v. Dickensheets, 274 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008,
no pet.) (same). “To determine whether a separation of powers violation involving ‘undue
interference’ has occurred, [courts] engage in a two-part inquiry.” Tex. Comm’n on Env’l Quality
v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 663, 672 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied). Courts first look to the
scope of the powers constitutionally assigned to the first governmental actor and then to the impact
on those powers imposed by the second. See id.
And generally, “[c]ourts [] traditionally take a ‘flexible approach’ in determining whether
a separation of powers violation has occurred, and will uphold ‘statutory provisions that to some
degree commingle the functions of the Branches, but that pose no danger of either aggrandizement
or encroachment.’” Martinez v. State, 503 S.W.3d 728, 734 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. ref’d)
MR 0221 (quoting Tex. Com’n on Env’tl. Quality v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 663, 671–72 (Tex. App.—Austin pet.
denied)).
First, this Court’s ruling would not result in an advisory opinion because City Defendants’
unconstitutional actions have created a live controversy from which this Court may provide relief.
City Defendants argue that Texas’s relief would violate the “separation-of-powers doctrine”
since “there has been no ultra-vires act” and “the absence of any act by Defendants renders any
opinion the Court could render in this case advisory.” Petition at 14.
Texas has identified the ultra vires act: City Defendants’ codification of an unlawful statute.
See Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co., 487, S.W.3d at 158 (Tex. 2016). Notably, this State’s
standing doctrine “derives from the Texas Constitution’s provision for separation of powers
among the branches of government.” In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Tex. 2020) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam). The separation of powers “prohibit[s] courts from issuing advisory
opinions because such is the function of the executive rather than judicial department.” Tex. Ass’n
of Bus. v. Tex. Air Traffic Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). “The distinctive feature
of an advisory opinion is that it decides an abstract question of law without binding the parties.”
Id. A district court can issue opinions when there is a case or controversy. See id.; TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 402.042.
Here, adoption of an unlawful ordinance presents a live case or controversy, to be resolved
by the relief requested in this suit. Petition at 9-11. City Defendants cite to City of El Paso v. Heinrich,
for the assertion that “[a] plaintiff in an ultra-vires suit ‘must allege, and ultimately prove, that the
officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.’” City Defendants’
Plea to the Jurisdiction at 14 (citing 284 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. 2009)). However, at this stage
MR 0222 “[w]hen a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged
facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. We construe the
pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the pleaders’ intent.” Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t
of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004). Texas has pled the ultra vires
action, as stated supra, which is ongoing. Thus, this Court’s ruling would provide Texas
meaningful relief and would not constitute an advisory opinion.
Second, City Defendants’ reading of Section 370.003 cannot be reconciled with the
presumption of validity doctrine, which requires the parties read Section 370.003 narrowly and not
to infringe on other branches of government. City Defendants contend that “The State’s
overbroad interpretation of Section 370.003 would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine”
because “[t]he State presumably wants Section 370.003 to bar local governmental entities from
having any ordinance or policy requiring anything less than full enforcement of the state’s drug
laws.” Petition at 20. While City Defendants seek to have this Court broadly interpret Section
370.003 to extend into the province of another branch of government, such a reading does not
comport with the state’s presumption of validity doctrine. That is, a duly enacted state statute is
entitled to a “strong presumption of validity.” See, e.g., Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597
U.S. 215, 301 (2022). Take Smith v. Davis for example:
Courts in Texas recognized that [i]n passing upon the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with a presumption of validity. It is to be presumed that the Legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily; and a mere difference of opinion, where reasonable minds could differ, is not a sufficient basis for striking down legislation as arbitrary or unreasonable.
Smith, 426 S.W.2d at 831 (citing Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex.1983)) (internal citations omitted); see also Ex parte Benavides, 801 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ dismissed w.o.j.) (“All laws carry a presumption of validity.”). 18
MR 0223 City Defendants’ intended reading cannot be reconciled with Texas’s interpretation of
Section 370.003, which requires cities permit law enforcement to fully enforce the Texas Penal
Code provisions, pertaining to marijuana, not to require that law enforcement always ticket or
arrest individuals in violation of the provisions. Thus, City Defendants interpretation should be
rejected.
Third, City Defendants cannot plausibly raise prosecutorial discretion in defense of their
unlawful ordinance, when the Ordinance itself provides a blanket ban on enforcement of the Texas
Penal Code provisions relating to marijuana usage. Here, City Defendants argue that Section
370.003 constitutes “legislative infringement on prosecutorial discretion,” and the “[s]eparation
of powers bars the legislative branch from passing laws that would infringe on police and
prosecutorial discretion.” City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction at 24.
“Prosecutorial discretion” refers to the “prosecutor’s power to choose from the options
available in a criminal case, such as filing charges, prosecuting, not prosecuting, plea-bargaining,
and recommending a sentence to the court.” Prosecutorial Discretion, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014). Notably, “[i]n our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that
the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and
what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Neal v. State, 150 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“Thus, if the prosecutor has probable
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether to
prosecute and what charge to file generally rests entirely within his or her discretion.”).
MR 0224 However, City Defendants have usurped prosecutorial discretion. To the extent that the
City Defendants now claim that the ordinance comports with the principle of prosecutorial
discretion, it does the exact opposite. That is, the ordinance, after a “motion to approve . . . was
made by [Defendant Mayor] Gerard Hudspeth and seconded by [Defendant] Jesse Davis; the
ordinance was passed and approved by the following vote [6-0],” by the City Council,” which
requires that:
Denton Police Officers shall not issue citations or make arrests for class A or class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, except in the limited circumstances described in subsection (b) : The only circumstances in which Denton Police Officers are permitted to issue citations or make arrests for class A or class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana are when such citations or arrests are part of (1) the investigation of a felony level narcotics case that has been designated as a high priority investigation by a Denton Police Commander, assistant chief of police, or chief of police; and/or (2) the investigation of a violent felony.
Petition at 19; City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction at 72.
For over one-hundred years, Texas Courts have held that an ordinance in “direct conflict
with the Penal Code,” cannot be valid. McClain v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 558, 561, 21 S.W. 365, 365
(1893).
The same holds with the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Austin Police Ass'n v. City
of Austin, 71 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that “no city ordinance or charter
provision “shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the
general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.”); Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5. That is, the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedures provides law enforcement the ability to arrest individuals without a
warrant for offenses committed within their presence. Because the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure requires that individuals who have committed a Class A or Class B Misdemeanor be
MR 0225 arrested and taken before a Magistrate Judge, if the individual does not live in the County where
the offense has occurred, the Ordinance conflicts with the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Compare Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. art. 14.06 (stating that “[i]f the person resides in the county
where the offense occurred, a peace officer who is charging a person with committing an offense
that is a Class A or B misdemeanor may, instead of taking the person before a magistrate, issue a
citation to the person.”) (emphasis added) with Chapter 21 – Offenses, Article V - Marijuana
Enforcement, Section 21-80 (requiring that police do not make arrest for crimes specified under
Article 14.06, when the individual does not live in the county); compare, Chapter 21 – Offenses,
Article V - Marijuana Enforcement, Section 21-81 ( “[a]class C misdemeanor citation for
possession of drug residue or drug paraphernalia shall not be issued in lieu of a possession of
marijuana charge.”) with, Neal, 150 S.W.3d at 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Chapter 21 –
Offenses, Article V - Marijuana Enforcement, Section 21-82-21-86).
Nor may “Denton Police shall not consider the odor of marijuana or hemp to constitute
probable cause for any search or seizure, except in the limited circumstances of a police
investigation pursuant to subsection 21-80” Compare with, Matter of X.H., No. 14-23-00187-CV,
2023 WL 4196557, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 27, 2023, no pet.) (Courts have
held that while not statutorily defined probable cause exists when there exists “sufficient facts and
circumstances to warrant a prudent man to believe that the suspect had committed or was
committing an offense.”); State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars & No Cents in
U.S. Currency ($90,235), 390 S.W.3d 289, 293 (Tex. 2013) (citing $14,832.00 United States
Currency v. State, No. 04-21-00044-CV, 2022 WL 1230294, at *2 (Tex. App. Apr. 27, 2022)
MR 0226 ((finding that probably cause would be “a reasonable belief that ‘a substantial connection exists
between the property to be forfeited and the criminal activity defined by the statute.’”).
And the City then subjects its officers to disciplinary action, should they follow the Texas
Penal Code. Section 21-85 indicates that “[a]ny violation of this chapter may subject a Denton
Police Officer to discipline as provided by the Texas Local Government Code or as provided in city
policy.” This would open up law enforcement to discipline where they choose to follow the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, the Texas Penal Code, or State common law, which thus squarely
conflicts with state law and state code provisions.
The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion does not mean that the State of Texas cannot
create criminal laws or code provisions that provide duties to law enforcement officers. Such a
reading would be impractical, and it would provide local governments the provenance to generate
their own criminal law system, outside the purview of the state—stripping district and county
attorneys of their power as an executive office, creating a patchwork of judicial enforcement, and
ultimately stripping judges of their ability to rely on the Texas Penal Code and Government Code
provisions.
Rather than Texas affecting prosecutorial discretion, City Defendants’ Ordinance would
provide law enforcement no discretion to enforce the law. Because this reading fails as a matter of
law, City Defendants’ attempt to usurp law enforcement discretion through a blanket ban on
enforcing Texas Penal Code provisions relating to marijuana should fail. Cf. Bordenkircher, 434
U.S. at 364 (1978); Neal, 150 S.W.3d at 173.
Ultimately, the Texas Penal Code, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and Texas Local
Government Code proscribe different duties for either city officials or law enforcement. For the
MR 0227 ordinance to abrogate those duties or to force law enforcement to choose between adhering to state
law or unlawful local ordinances itself undermines prosecutorial discretion and even violates the
separation of powers doctrine to the extent that it allows a home-rule city to regulate the executive
branch through its legislative function of law-making. Texas, through its suit and interpretation of
Section 370.003, based on its plain language poses no separation of powers concerns.
D. Texas is entitled to relief for City Defendants’ ultra vires actions.
Finally, Texas is entitled to relief for City Defendants’ ultra vires actions. City Defendants
nevertheless contend that: (1) Texas has not identified any prospective relief; (2) Texas may only
seek an injunction barring City Defendants from following those policies that violate Section
370.003; (3) Section 370.003—though it requires that City Defendants’ not adopt policies that
decline to fully enforce state drug laws—an Ordinance declining to fully enforce state drug laws is
not void or illegal; and (4) Section 370.003 does not require that City Defendants fully enforce
state drug laws. See City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction at 27-28.
Despite City Defendants’ assertions to the contrary, every claim for relief brought by Texas
would be prospective. See Petition at 9-11. In support of the contention that Texas’s requested relief
would not be prospective, City Defendants cite Heinrich, for the assertion that the ultra vires
exception only allows suits requiring officials to “to comply with statutory or constitutional
provisions.” 284 S.W.3d at 372 (emphasis added). Leaving an ordinance in place that declines to
fully enforce state drug laws, when 370.003 of the Local Government Code forbids “[t]he
governing body of a municipality [or a] municipal police department” to “adopt a policy under
which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs, including Chapters 481 and 483,
Health and Safety Code, and federal law,” provides for prospective relief requested by Texas. Tex.
MR 0228 Local Gov’t Code § 370.003. Texas seeks prospective relief, including injunctive relief afforded to
bar City Defendants from continuing to leave the Ordinance in place that violates Section 370.003.
Moreover, the Texas Constitution, “suits for equitable remedies for violation of
constitutional rights are not prohibited” because a law contrary to a constitutional provision is
void. City of Beaumont, 896 S.W.2d at 149; City of Elsa v. MAL, 226 S.W.3d at 381 (“In this case
we reaffirm . . . governmental entities may be sued for injunctive relief under the Texas
Constitution.”). The Ordinance, which declines to fully enforce state drug laws, is void as it
directly conflicts with Section 370.003, which requires that a City not adopt an ordinance that
declines to fully enforce state drug laws.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff, the State of Texas, by and through the Office of the Attorney General, asks that
this Court deny City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.
MR 0229 Date: May 30, 2024 Respectfully submitted.
KEN PAXTON /S/ JACOB PRZADA Attorney General JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 First Assistant Attorney General JOHNATHAN STONE RALPH MOLINA Special Counsel Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy Tex. State Bar No. 24071779
RYAN D. WALTERS OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Chief, Special Litigation Division Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 463-2100 Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
MR 0230 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing has been served has been
served on all counsel of record in accordance with File and Serve Texas System of Denton County,
Texas.
/s/ Jacob E. Przada Jacob E. Przada
MR 0231 FILED: 5/31/2024 8:02 AM David Trantham Denton County District Clerk By: Jade Kenemore, Deputy
CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of the § City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
The City of Denton (the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian
Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon
Chase McGee and Chris Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley,
City Manager of Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton1 (the
“Officials” and together with the City, the “Defendants”), file this their Reply in
Support of Their Plea to the Jurisdiction as follows:
Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton, and thus is not a proper 1
defendant. The current Interim Chief of Police of Denton is Jessica Robledo.
MR 0232 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The State’s position is predicated on a statute that does not actually exist. In
the pleaded case, Local Government Code Section 370.003 can be violated in only two
possible ways:
1. “The governing body of a municipality” (i.e., the City Council) “adopt[s] a policy under which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs,” or
2. A “municipal police department . . . adopt[s] a policy under which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs . . .”
Neither thing has happened here. Per the City Charter, the Ordinance was adopted
by the people, and was enacted the moment their votes in favor were confirmed. No
further ministerial action (like publishing the results of the vote in the minutes of
council meetings, or posting the Ordinance in the City’s Code of Ordinances) had any
legal effect or consequence. There is no violation of the law by any Defendant. And
absent a violation of the law, there is no dispute, and no jurisdictional claim before
the Court.
ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES
The Court should grant the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction because the City’s
immunity from suit has not been waived nor has the State established the requisite
elements of standing. Without both a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity
and standing, the court “does not have jurisdiction to proceed at all.” Abbott v.
Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681, 693 (Tex. 2022); Wichita Falls State
Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. 2003).
2 MR 0233 A. The State has not established a valid waiver of or exception to the Defendants’ immunity.
To maintain a suit against Defendants for an ultra-vires act, the State must
allege, and ultimately prove, that (1) the Defendants committed an act (2) without
legal authority. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). The
State has not pleaded such an act, and the undisputed evidence before this Court
demonstrates that there is no such act. (See Pl.’s Orig. Pet.; see also Defs.’ Plea to the
Jurisdiction Exs. D and E.)
Instead, the State claims—for the very first time in its Response—
“codification . . . constitute[s] ultra vires actions.” (See Pl.’s Resp. at 2.) But
“codification” of an ordinance that has already been enacted and adopted by a vote of
the people is not an adoption, and neither of the cases cited by the State support the
claim that merely codifying the Ordinance was an ultra-vires act. See Creedmoor-
Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505, 517-18
(Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (holding that TCEQ did not act ultra-vires by
granting the petition and issuing an order); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City
of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 169 (Tex. 2016) (holding that the Director of Public
Works and Engineering acted without legal authority when making “his ‘benefitted
property’ and ‘impervious surface’ determinations”).
Rather, the law consistently supports the opposite conclusion: publishing—i.e.,
codifying—an ordinance is not an ultra-vires act. In Glass v. Smith, the Texas
Supreme Court stated that “[o]nce the people have properly invoked their right to act
legislatively under valid initiative provisions of a city charter . . . the City Council
3 MR 0234 and other municipal officers should be compelled by the courts to perform their
ministerial duties . . . though that product may later prove to be unwise or even
invalid.” 244 S.W.2d 645, 654 (1951). There, the city’s charter required the
publication of ordinances by the City Clerk. Id. In concluding that publishing was
not just permitted but mandatory, the Court stated: “If the City Council should pass
a penal ordinance, can it be thought that the courts would stand idly [sic] by and
permit the City Clerk to interrupt the legislative process by refusing to publish the
ordinance because he thought it invalid? We think not.”). Id. In other words, the
mere act of codifying or publishing an ordinance is a mandatory or nondiscretionary
duty that cannot be deemed an ultra-vires act. See In re Rogers, No. 23-0595, 2024
LEXIS 386, at *10 (Tex. May 24, 2024) (“[T]he Board has a ministerial,
nondiscretionary duty to call an election based on a petition with the statutorily
required number of signatures.”).
The same ministerial, nondiscretionary duty is present here. Section 4.10(b)
of the Denton City Charter provides that: “Initiative ordinances adopted and
referendum ordinances approved by the electors shall be published.” Denton, Tex.,
Charter art. IV, § 4.10(b) (emphasis added). Consequently, the Ordinance ended up
in the Code of Ordinances because Denton’s Charter provides that once “a majority
of the electors voting on a proposed initiative ordinance . . .vote in favor thereof, it
shall thereupon be an ordinance of the city,” and it “shall be published”—i.e., codified.
Denton, Tex., Charter art. IV, § 4.10. Thus, the City is being sued—not for an ultra-
vires act—but for performing a ministerial, nondiscretionary duty.
4 MR 0235 What is more is that Section 370.003 does not forbid “publishing” or “codifying”
an ordinance that was passed by someone not subject to Section 370.003—e.g., voters.
See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003. Instead, the Legislature made it clear that only
“[t]he governing body of a municipality, the commissioners court of a county, or a
sheriff, municipal police department, municipal attorney, county attorney, district
attorney, or criminal district attorney” are prohibited from adopting a policy. Id.
And importantly, the sole act covered by Section 370.003—the act of “adopting a
policy,” to the extent that passing/enacting the Ordinance is deemed to be such an
act—had already happened when the City published the result of that
enactment/adoption. Whether or not the City published the Ordinance passed by the
people had no additional legal effect or consequence; by the plain terms of the
Charter, once the citizens voted in favor, Proposition B was “an ordinance of the City.”
If the City had not published the Ordinance, it would remain “an ordinance of the
City.” If the City somehow “unpublished” the Ordinance, it would remain “an
ordinance of the City.” The City Council did not “adopt” anything. It simply sent the
results of the people’s adoption to the printer’s office.
Because the State has alleged that “codification” was the only ultra-vires act,
and codification is a ministerial, nondiscretionary duty as a matter of law, and was a
duty which had no further legal effect or consequence, the State’s ultra-vires suit fails
to overcome Defendants’ immunity. Because the State cannot amend its pleadings to
clearly and unambiguously waive the Defendants’ immunity, the Court should grant
the Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.
5 MR 0236 B. The State also does not have standing to assert claims arising from the Ordinance because the State cannot establish an “injury in fact” or the “redressability” requirement.
To establish standing, the State acknowledges that it must plead and
ultimately prove that an actual or imminent injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s
challenged conduct is likely to be redressed by the plaintiff’s requested remedy. (Pl.’s
Resp. at 10.) The State, however, cannot meet its burden to establish standing.
To establish the first element of standing—referred to as “injury-in-fact—the
State must have suffered an injury that is “concrete and particularized,” and “actual
or imminent,” not conjectural or hypothetical. In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 808 (Tex.
2020); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. City of Austin, 565 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Tex. App.—Austin
2018, pet. denied) (“[A] plaintiff ‘must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a
direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement’”) (citing Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (emphasis added). The State cannot
demonstrate any realistic danger of any injury arising from the Ordinance’s operation
or enforcement because it has not and is not being enforced.
The State instead claims an injury-in-fact by claiming that the “act of adopting
a preempted ordinance injures Texas.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 10.) That alleged “act” (simply
passing an ordinance, in this case by direct vote of the people) does not support a
claim of injury. Courts have made clear that “[t]he fact that an ordinance is void
alone works no injury.” In re Spiritas Ranch Enters., L.L.P., 218 S.W.3d 887, 900
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); City of Cleveland v. Keep Cleveland Safe, 500
S.W.3d 438, 450 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, no pet.). Instead, Courts have held
that the basis for relief exists “only after acts are impending or steps are already
6 MR 0237 being taken to directly cause harm.” City of Cleveland, 500 S.W.3d at 450. In this
case, the City of Denton has not adopted a policy in violation of Section 370.003. The
City has no plans to adopt a policy in violation of Section 370.003. Consequently, the
State cannot allege that the City has (or will) adopt a policy in violation of
Section 370.003 because the evidence completely refutes this. (See Defs.’ Plea to the
Jurisdiction Exs. D and E.)
Contrary to the State’s assertion that merely adopting a preempted ordinance
injures Texas, the law consistently requires an actual or imminent enforcement or
violation to give rise to the “actual injury” element of standing. Indeed, every case
cited by the State in its Response dealt with an actual or imminent injury where the
law was either already being violated or enforced or was likely to be violated or
enforced. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 565 S.W.3d at 432 (“[T]he City does not dispute . . .
[that] the City would likely enforce the Ordinance against the Private Parties.”)
(emphasis added); State v. El Paso Cnty., 618 S.W.3d 812, 843–44 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2020, no pet.) (Rodriguez, J., dissenting) (“[T]he county sheriff’s department enforced
the County’s [stay-at-home] order based on the County’s determination that it still
retained emergency authority” during the COVID-19 pandemic.) (emphasis added);
State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. 2020) (noting that the State sued Hollins
only after Hollins refused to sign a retraction as ordered to by the Director of Elections
for the Secretary of State and said he would still send the ballots) (emphasis added).
Unlike the actors in each of these cases, the City has explicitly stated it will not adopt
or enforce any policy in violation of Section 370.003. In short, the State has not
7 MR 0238 established an “injury-in-fact” because the Ordinance is not being enforced nor is it
likely to be enforced. Rather, any injury is entirely conjectural or hypothetical.
The State also cannot establish the third requirement of standing—often
referred to as “redressability”—because the State cannot show that “there is a
substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury.”
Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 485 (Tex. 2018). Here, the State
claims that “a city official’s ultra vires actions in adopting an unconstitutional
ordinance can be remedied by . . . enjoining and removing the unconstitutional
ordinance from ‘the books.’” (Pl.’s Resp. at 15 (emphasis added).)
But neither of the State’s requests for relief will remedy the alleged injury.
The State’s request for an injunction will not remedy any alleged injury because there
are no ultra-vires “acts” of officials to enjoin. Likewise, the State’s request that the
ordinance be removed from “the books” cannot remedy any alleged injury because
removing a law from “the books” is not (and never has been) an available remedy.
Consequently, the State cannot meet its burden of establishing the redressability
requirement of standing.
1. The State cannot seek injunctive relief because there are no ultra- vires acts of the officials to enjoin.
As briefed in the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, no Official acted ultra-vires.
(See Defs.’ Plea to the Jurisdiction at 7–9.) Rather, the self-enacting Ordinance was
proposed via a petition signed by the voters of Denton, which was passed and
approved by the voters of Denton and became law automatically by operation of the
terms of the Charter. The Defendants’ only act at issue—i.e., codifying and
8 MR 0239 publishing the Ordinance—was actually a “ministerial, nondiscretionary duty,” as
fully briefed by the City in its Plea to the Jurisdiction and as was reiterated by the
Texas Supreme Court just last week. See In re Rogers, 2024 LEXIS 386, at *9
(agreeing that the governing body’s decision to reject the voters’ petition was
improper because it had a ministerial, nondiscretionary duty to call an election).
In fact, had the Defendants not performed these ministerial, nondiscretionary
duties, the voters could have sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Defendants
to comply with the City Charter by codifying and publishing the Ordinance. See In
re Rogers, 2024 LEXIS 386, at *1, *14 (granting mandamus to compel the governing
body to perform its ministerial duty of determining whether the petition satisfied the
requirements to be placed on the ballot and directing the governing body to call an
election if so).
Here, the State failed to allege a valid ultra-vires claim constituting an
exception to the City’s immunity because the State has not alleged, and cannot
ultimately prove, any act of any Defendant that violated Section 370.003. See
Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 (holding that an ultra-vires claimant must allege, and
ultimately prove, that each official acted without legal authority or failed to perform
a purely ministerial act).
2. The State cannot seek removal of the Ordinance because even when a law is declared unconstitutional, the remedy has never been removing the law from “the books.”
“Written laws do not simply vanish from existence . . .”2
2 Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 494 n. 10 (Tex. 2020).
9 MR 0240 The State contends that the adoption of an unconstitutional ordinance can be
remedied by “removing the unconstitutional ordinance from ‘the books.’” (Pl.’s Resp.
at 15.) The State, however, does not cite support for this proposition. (Id.) And there
is no such support to cite because Courts have consistently ruled that
unconstitutional laws remain on the books. See Pool v. City of Houston, 978 F.3d 307,
309 (5th Cir. 2020) (“It is often said that courts ‘strike down’ laws when ruling them
unconstitutional. That’s not quite right. Courts hold laws unenforceable; they do not
erase them.”); Pidgeon v. Turner, 538 S.W.3d 73, 88 n. 20 (Tex. 2017) (“When a court
declares a law unconstitutional, the law remains in place unless and until the body
that enacted it repeals it, even though the government may no longer constitutionally
enforce it.”).
In fact, multiple unconstitutional provisions remain on “the books” in Texas
despite the courts holding them unconstitutional. Take, for example, the anti-sodomy
statute codified in Texas Penal Code Section 21.06, which was declared
unconstitutional by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). That statute—passed by
the State of Texas, the plaintiff in the present case—has remained on the books
despite bipartisan efforts to repeal it.3
3 Alex Nguyen, Texas Sodomy Ban Repeal Bill, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (May 11, 2023), https://www.texastribune.org/2023/05/11/texas-sodomy-ban-repeal-bill/.
10 MR 0241 Or consider the anti-flag-burning statute codified in Texas Penal Code Section
42.11, which remains on the books despite being declared unconstitutional in State v.
Johnson, 475 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
And only a few years ago, the Third Court of Appeals held that City of Austin
Ordinance No. 20180215-049 requiring private employers in the City of Austin to
provide paid sick leave to employees was unconstitutional. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v.
City of Austin, 565 S.W.3d 425, 440 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied) (“We hold
that . . . the Ordinance [is] unconstitutional.). Yet the ordinance discussed in City of
Austin—a case repeatedly cited by the State—remains in the City of Austin’s Code of
Ordinances, codified in Title 4, Chapter 4-19 without any notation of
unconstitutionality.4 The list of unconstitutional provisions remaining on “the books”
goes on.5
So, even if the Ordinance enacted by the citizens of Denton is void—which it is
not—the State’s remedy would never be the “removal of the unconstitutional
4 Austin, Tex., Code of Ordinances, ch. 4-19 (2018), https://library.municode.com/tx/au stin/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT4BUREPERE_CH4-19EASITI. 5 The most well-known are the statutes criminalizing abortion, which have remained on the books despite once being held unconstitutional. And in the case of the Texas “Heartbeat Bill” (S.B. 8), this unconstitutional statute was passed and placed on the books by the State (codified in Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.204), so that it would be triggered if the United States Supreme Court ever overruled Roe v. Wade. Consequently, when the Court issued its opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022), reversing Roe, those previously “unconstitutional” statutes became constitutional and enforceable.
11 MR 0242 ordinance” as it requests. (Pl.’s Resp. at 15.) Instead, when an ordinance is found to
be unconstitutional, the remedy is to bar enforcement, not to strike the text from the
books. This legal truth reveals the absurdity of the State’s position; merely
publishing or maintaining the text of a prior legislative action (in this case, a
legislative action of the people themselves acting as sovereign) is not an illegal act; if
that were the case, the State of Texas would be acting illegally in contempt of the
Supreme Court of the United States by keeping its (unconstitutional) anti-sodomy
statute on the books. The State is not acting illegally in that instance. It is not acting
at all. “Publishing” is not an act of legal effect or consequence.
But again, the remedy of “barring enforcement” is not available here because
neither the Denton City Council nor the Denton Police Department is enforcing the
Ordinance nor is there any imminent threat of its enforcement. Rather, the facts of
this case establish just the opposite. Ultimately, the redressability element is not
satisfied because (1) there is no unlawful act to enjoin and (2) even if there was an
unlawful act, removing the Ordinance from the books is not an available remedy.
Thus, the Court should find that the State’s injury is not redressable because
the State seeks relief that courts cannot grant.
CONCLUSION
Because the State has failed both to waive the Defendants’ immunity and plead
facts sufficient to meet its burden of establishing the elements of standing, the
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss all claims against them with prejudice for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendants further ask the Court, pursuant to
Section 37.009 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code to award them costs and
12 MR 0243 reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees as are just and equitable and to grant them
such other and further relief to which they may be justly entitled.
13 MR 0244 Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
MR 0245 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 31st day of May, 2024:
Ken Paxton Richard Gladden Attorney General Richscot1@hotmail.com Law Office of Richard Gladden Brent Webster 1204 W. University Dr., Suite 307 First Assistant Attorney General Denton, Texas 76201 ATTORNEYS FOR Grant Dorfman INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS Deputy First Assistant Attorney DEB ARMINTOR AND General DECRIMINALIZE DENTON Ralph Molina Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Jacob Przada Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Kyle Tebo Kyle.tebo@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Johnathan Stone Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Ethan Szumanski Ethan.Szumanski@oag.texas.gov
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE
15 MR 0246 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Cathy Daniels on behalf of Jose de la Fuente Bar No. 00793605 cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Envelope ID: 88293336 Filing Code Description: Reply Filing Description: Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Plea to the Jurisdiction Status as of 5/31/2024 8:27 AM CST
Associated Case Party: The State Of Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Johnathan Stone 24071779 Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Amaireny Rodriguez amaireny.rodriguez@oag.texas.gov 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Jacob Przada 24125371 jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Tamera Martinez tamera.martinez@oag.texas.gov 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Ethan Szumanski ethan.szumanski@oag.texas.gov 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Kyle Tebo Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Decriminalize Denton
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Deb Armintor
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: The City Of Denton, Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Amy Hoffee amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Mack Reinwand mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Jose E.de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
MR 0247 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Cathy Daniels on behalf of Jose de la Fuente Bar No. 00793605 cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Envelope ID: 88293336 Filing Code Description: Reply Filing Description: Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Plea to the Jurisdiction Status as of 5/31/2024 8:27 AM CST
Associated Case Party: The City Of Denton, Texas
Jose E.de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
James F.Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Gabrielle C.Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Sydney P.Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Sharon Murray sharon.murray@oag.texas.gov 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Doug Shoemaker
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 5/31/2024 8:02:04 AM SENT
MR 0248 FILED: 9/27/2024 2:40 PM David Trantham Denton County District Clerk By: Jacquelyn Kubach, Deputy
CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of the § City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
The City of Denton (the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian
Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon
Chase McGee and Chris Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley,
City Manager of Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton1 (the
“Officials” and together with the City, the “Defendants”) file this Motion for Protective
Order (“Motion”) pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.6 and would
respectfully show the Court as follows:
1 Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton.
MR 0249 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The State served written discovery on Defendants months after the original
setting for the hearing on Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction. Claiming the need for
“jurisdictional discovery,” the written requests served were not narrowly tailored or
targeted to any jurisdictional facts at issue to resolve the case. That defect in the
State’s discovery requests is understandable because there are no disputed facts
needed to resolve this case. This is a case that is a matter of public record—public
record that was provided to the State four months ago attached to Defendants’ Plea
to the Jurisdiction and easily accessible on the City’s website.2 The State’s claim is
clearly pleaded, and likewise the State’s claim clearly fails for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Because the claims against Defendants are not viable, and in the interest of
avoiding undue litigation burden and expense, Defendants ask the Court to grant
protection from responding to discovery, staying discovery by Plaintiff unless the
Court denies Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.3
2 A copy of the City Council meeting agendas, minutes, and video can be found at https://www.cityofdenton.com/242/Public-Meetings-Agendas.
3 Defendants submit this Motion in addition to asserting certain stated objections to Plaintiff’s written discovery requests. While Defendants believe their objections to written discovery to be sufficient to preserve their rights consistent with the provisions of Rule 192.6, in light of the broad dispute as to whether any discovery is appropriate prior to the Court’s decision on Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction, Defendants submit this Motion to the extent necessary to preserve their rights. Defendants further note that pursuant to Rule 192.6, the filing of this motion does not waive any objection asserted by Defendants, and Defendants affirmatively represent to the court do not waive any of their written objections, which they hereby incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein. 2
MR 0250 II. BACKGROUND
The State of Texas sued the City of Denton, the Mayor, the City Council, the
City Manager, and the Chief of Police on January 31, 2024 for temporary and
permanent injunctive relief. The basis of the State’s claims was the passage of
Chapter 21 – Offenses, Article V – Marijuana Enforcement of the City’s Code of
Ordinances (“Ordinance”) by Denton voters during the November 8, 2022 Special
Election. The State sued the City of Denton and each of the Officials in their official
capacity for allegedly acting in violation of Section 370.003 of the Texas Local
Government Code.
Because none of the acts alleged by the State constitute a violation of
Section 370.003, the City and the Officials are immune from suit, and accordingly,
they filed a plea to the jurisdiction on May 20, 2024. Defendants’ Plea to the
Jurisdiction and the State’s Request for Temporary Injunction were set to be heard
on May 31, 2024.4 No party requested discovery prior to setting that hearing.
Plaintiff served written discovery on Defendants on August 30, 2024. Plaintiff’s
Requests for Admission, Requests for Production, and Interrogatories are attached
as Exhibits A, B, and C to this Motion.
4 Intervenors in this matter, Deb Armintor and Decriminalize Denton, have been struck from this case. The State’s Motion to Strike Intervenor’s Plea in Intervention and Intervenors’ Plea to the Jurisdiction were also set for hearing on May 31, 2024. The Court only heard and decided the Motion to Strike due to time constraints. 3
MR 0251 III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
This motion is timely pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.6, as
written responses are due by the end of the day on September 30, 2024, and this
motion is filed in advance of the deadline to respond.
Defendants move for a protective order from discovery sought by the State
pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.6. The State’s request for discovery
would subject the Defendants to “undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment,
annoyance” and protecting Defendants from compliance is “in the interest of justice.”
Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6. Defendants are seeking protection from responding to discovery
while their Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending. In the interest of avoiding
unnecessary litigation burden and expense, or potential discovery disputes on claims
which should be dismissed, Defendants are seeking protection from responding to
Plaintiff’s requests in their entirety, and are asking for a stay of discovery from
Plaintiff accordingly pending a ruling on the Plea.
1. The discovery sought is not relevant to the issues in this case.
“Targeted discovery cannot be allowed unless—and only to the extent that—
it is essential to the resolution of a jurisdictional question.” Tex. S. Univ. v. Young,
682 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Tex. 2023) (Young, J. concurring) (emphasis added). The State
of Texas filed suit claiming the Ordinance violated and was preempted by Section
370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code, and specifically brought a claim against
each of the Defendants asserting that Defendants acted ultra vires by “adopting” the
MR 0252 Ordinance. The relevant statutory provision that the State alleges was violated by
each Defendant states:
The governing body of a municipality, the commissioners court of a county, or a sheriff, municipal police department, municipal attorney, county attorney, district attorney, or criminal district attorney may not adopt a policy under which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs, including Chapters 481 and 483, Health and Safety Code, and federal law.
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003. The dispositive questions in determining Defendants’
jurisdictional challenge and the State’s claims are addressed by “yes or no” answers
concerning formal acts of government officials and public employees; no
“jurisdictional facts” (or any other facts) are at issue other than the acts that the State
alleges the Defendants committed.
The only actionable act pleaded in this case is the act of alleged adoption of a
policy by either the Denton City Council or the Denton Police Department under
which the State’s laws relating to drugs will not be fully enforced. Tex. Loc. Gov’t
Code § 370.003 (“The governing body of a municipality . . . [or] municipal police
department . . . may not adopt a policy under which the entity will not fully enforce
laws relating to drugs . . .”) “Implementation,” “enforcement,” and other verbs that
are not stated in the plain language of the sole statute upon which the State bases its
claim are not at issue. The questions for this Court to consider in deciding the Parties’
pleadings can only consider official acts by government officials or employees. In the
State’s written discovery requests, it acknowledges that formal action is required as
it defines “adoption” as “passage of a measure into law.” Exhibit A, Pl.’s First Reqs.
MR 0253 for Admis. to Defs. at 5.5 Discovery about inaction, the wisdom of the citizen-initiative
Marijuana Ordinance, or the discretion exercised by officers in the normal course of
police work are of no consequence to the sole legal issue (did the city council or police
department commit the act of adopting a policy not to fully enforce drug laws?) and
thus are of no use to this Court in determining whether it has jurisdiction.
2. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permit the Court to limit the discovery sought here.
“The discovery methods permitted by these rules should be limited by the court
if . . . the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
form some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”
Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4(a). As outlined above, the facts relevant to the sole dispositive
jurisdictional question (did the city council or police department adopt a policy not to
fully enforce drug laws?) are undisputed, and all evidence of such facts has long been
available to the State.
The City’s Council’s votes in connection with the Ordinance passed by the
voters are a matter of public record.
Defs.’ Plea to the Jurisd. at Ex. A at 34.
5 Defendants do not necessarily agree with this definition as a whole, but do agree that the only “acts” that could be actionable as ultra-vires acts contrary to Section 370.003 are 1) official acts of the city council and/or municipal police department 2) to adopt a policy not to fully enforce drug laws. 6
MR 0254 On November 22, 2022, Council only voted on adoption of an ordinance
“canvassing the election returns and declaring results of the Special Elections.” And
when presented with the opportunity to actually adopt the Ordinance by City Council
vote, that action was voted down.
Defs.’ Plea to the Jurisd. at Ex. A at 119.
The discovery sought is best obtained not from overbroad and overreaching
written discovery requests, but from the relevant public records (which the State
already has). The discovery sought here should be limited in its entirety as the
burden and expense of substantive responses and potential for additional discovery
requests and discovery disputes regarding same outweighs the likely benefit given
the needs of the case and the limited scope of the questions before this Court. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4(b).
Defendants filed an evidentiary plea to the jurisdiction. The State has the
burden to plead a claim for which the City’s and Officials’ immunity is waived. Here,
the State must plead a specific act by a person or entity identified in the statute that
would violate Section 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code. The State hasn’t
pleaded any acts by a person or entity identified in Section 370.003 or facts to support
any alleged acts, only legal conclusions. Legal conclusions (especially when they are
wrong) do not support a claim; factual allegations do.
MR 0255 Here, the relevant facts regarding any action, or inaction, by the Defendants
are already fully before the Court. The State did not previously seek a continuance
or serve discovery with respect to the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction—it filed a
response and asked the Court to rule. See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Plea to the Jurisd. at
24 (“Plaintiff, the State of Texas, by and through the Office of the Attorney General,
asks that this Court deny City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.”). The only
reason that the question of jurisdiction has not already been fully presented to and
decided by the Court is because the proceedings ran long on May 31, 2024, leaving
the hearing on City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction to be continued to a later date. There
is no material or relevant discovery needed to determine the pending jurisdictional
question.
3. The State’s request for discovery is intended to harass Defendants and drive up litigation expense.
The Ordinance was passed on November 8, 2022. The hearing on Defendants’
jurisdictional plea and the State’s Request for Temporary Injunction were originally
set to be heard on May 31, 2024. All facts relating to the passage of the Ordinance
by the voters and the City’s official actions subsequent thereto have been known for
well over a year, and are pleaded in the State’s Petition. While the Parties
communicated often in the weeks and months leading up to the May 31 hearing date,
no written discovery was served by either party. Not only did the parties not seek
written discovery prior to that hearing, the parties entered into a written agreement
via e-mail not to exchange even initial disclosures until after those hearings were set
to have occurred. Exhibit D, Scheduling Email Correspondence. Due to time
MR 0256 constraints created by a lengthy hearing on the State’s Motion to Strike Plea in
Intervention on May 31, the State requested that the Court continue the hearing on
Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction and State’s Request for Temporary Injunction.
Defendants’ evidentiary Plea to the Jurisdiction included witness statements and
certified public records, but the State did not identify the need to conduct discovery
to address the Plea to the Jurisdiction. No pleadings have changed, and no facts have
changed in the intervening four months. The facts regarding the passage of the
Ordinance and all official acts of the City and any of its officials in connection with
same are a matter of public record, and Defendants affirmatively supplied those
records to the State as part of their jurisdictional challenge. In fact, the only change
that has occurred since the original May 31 hearing date is that district court judges
in Hays and Travis Counties granted pleas to the jurisdiction filed by other cities and
officials dismissing nearly identical claims brought by the State against cities in those
jurisdictions whose citizens passed similar initiatives. See Exhibit E, Order
Granting the City of Austin’s Plea to the Jurisdiction; see also Exhibit F, Order
Granting the City of San Marcos’s Plea to the Jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional discovery is not needed in this case. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun.
Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d,
458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
request for continuance to seek jurisdictional discovery where “[n]one of the discovery
mentioned by Plaintiffs could have raised a fact issue material to the determination
of the jurisdictional plea.”); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283
MR 0257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (trial court did not abuse discretion
in denying discovery “based on purported need for jurisdictional discovery” where
party could not show discovery sought “would be material to the trial court’s
assessment of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction”). The State has not articulated a
reason it now needs this discovery, because there is no good reason for delaying a
decision on the issue of immunity implicated by the pending pleadings. The goal of a
plea to the jurisdiction “is to defeat a cause of action for which the state has not
waived sovereign immunity (usually before the state has incurred the full costs of
litigation).” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex.
2004). Immunity serves “to shield the public from the costs and consequences of
improvident actions of their governments.” Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325,
332 (Tex. 2006).
Reviewing the written discovery requests, it is clear there is no need for the
supposedly “jurisdictional discovery” the State seeks. The legal question is “did any
of the Defendants adopt a policy in violation of Section 370.003 of the Texas Local
Government Code?” The only “policy” the State identifies in its pleading is the
Marijuana Ordinance. So, then the question is “did any of the Defendants adopt the
Marijuana Ordinance?” The answer to that based on public records attached to
Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is “no.” Defs.’ Plea to the Jurisd. at Ex. A. The
Marijuana Ordinance was adopted by the voters of the City of Denton. The written
requests served by the State are not aimed at answering that question; relevant
examples of these improper requests are provided below:
MR 0258 TO DEFENDANT: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck,
Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester,
Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 7: Identify any documented changes in Marijuana
use since the Marijuana Ordinance took effect, including but not limited to
any documented changes occurring at the Denton Independent School
District, or in connection to City of Denton Police citations and arrests or
traffic and pedestrian stops.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 8: Identify how many times the Marijuana
Ordinance has been enforced and identify the individuals whom the
Marijuana Ordinance has been enforced against.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: Sara Hensley and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 9: Identify all jobs to which you have applied from
August 30, 2022 to Present, including the name of the employer, its location,
and the ultimate outcome of your application for that job.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Ex. B, Pl.’s Interrogatories to Defs.
MR 0259 None of these requests speak to adoption of a policy not to fully enforce drug
laws of this State. Implementation and methods and means of enforcement are not
the subject of Section 370.003. What any of the Defendants did in other cities or their
individual thoughts about the Ordinance has no bearings on what official action was
taken. The discovery sought isn’t to establish jurisdiction, it’s a fishing expedition
and an attempt to distract from the straightforward question before this Court.
As stated above and out of an abundance of caution, Defendants are also
providing Plaintiff with written objections and responses to Plaintiff’s requests.
Where Defendants could respond to questions as worded by pointing to relevant
documents or providing short and direct answers, they have done so. Defendants
have no intent to hide the obvious (after all, the City Council’s actions are a matter
of public record, to which the Plaintiff has had access at all times), but ask this Court
to protect them from unnecessary expenditure of taxpayer dollars trying to prove a
negative when the City and Officials do not have the burden of proof in this case.
Thus, Defendants ask the Court to protect them from compliance with written
discovery while the Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending.
IV. CONCLUSION & PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant prays the Court
protect Defendants from discovery propounded, that discovery by Plaintiff be abated
pending the ruling on the Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction, and grant such other
and further relief to which Defendants may be justly entitled.
MR 0260 Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E/. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
MR 0261 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 27th day of September, 2024:
Ken Paxton Attorney General
Brent Webster First Assistant Attorney General
Grant Dorfman Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
Ralph Molina Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Jacob Przada Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Johnathan Stone Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE
MR 0262 EXHIBIT A
MR 0263 Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO DEFENDANTS
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
Plaintiff, the State of Texas, serves these Requests for Admission on Defendants, as allowed
by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 198. Defendants must respond to the following Requests for
Admission within thirty (30) days after service and supplement all responses in accordance with
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
.
MR 0264 Date: August 30, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON /S/ Jacob Przada Attorney General of Texas JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 First Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RALPH MOLINA TEXAS Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station AUSTIN KINGHORN Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy Telephone: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 30, 2024, a true and correct copy of this document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Jose ( Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel
2 MR 0265 INSTRUCTIONS
1. Unless otherwise specified, the time period covered by any Request for Admission (“admission” or “admissions,” as applicable) is from November 2, 2021, through the present.
2. Pursuant to Rule 198 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (TRCP) you are required to serve a separate response to each of the following Requests for Admission. Each matter is admitted without the necessity of a court order, unless, on or before thirty (30) days after service of these requests, you serve upon attorneys for Plaintiff a written answer or objection addressed to each request, signed by you or your attorney.
3. If you deny a matter on which an admission is requested, your denial must fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires you to qualify your answer or deny only the part of the matter on which the admission is requested, you must specify so much of the matter as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. You may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failing to admit or deny a matter unless you state that you have made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or easily obtainable by you is insufficient to enable you to admit or deny the matter.
4. The singular shall be construed to include the plural, and the plural shall be construed to include the singular, as necessary to bring within the scope of each Request all responses that might otherwise be construed outside its scope.
5. The connectives “and” and “or” and the phrase “and/or” shall be construed disjunctively or conjunctively as necessary to bring within the scope of each Request all responses that might otherwise be construed outside its scope.
6. The use of any past, present, or future tense of any verb shall not be construed to limit or otherwise modify the time period covered by these Requests. Each Request should be read to include the past, present, or future tense of any verb as necessary to bring within the scope of each Request all responses that might otherwise be construed outside its scope.
3 MR 0266 DEFINITIONS
1. “Plaintiff” or “defendant,” as well as a party’s full or abbreviated name or a pronoun referring to a party, means the party, and when applicable, the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
2. “You” or “your” means: (1) The City of Denton, (2) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (3) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (4) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (5) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (6) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (7) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At- Large, (8) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, (9) Defendant Sara Hensley, City Manager of Denton, and (10) Defendant Jessica Robledo, Interim-Chief of Police of Denton as well as, successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
3. “Communication” means any exchange or transmission of words or ideas to another person or an entity, including without limitation, conversations, discussions, letters, memoranda, interoffice communication platforms, social media platforms, instant messaging programs, meetings, notes, speeches, or other transfers of information, whether written, oral, or by any other means, whether direct or indirect, formal or informal, and includes any document which abstracts, digests, transcribes, or records any such communication.
4. “And/or,” “and,” and “or” refer to all listed categories inclusively, not exclusively (i.e., not the option of producing one group of documents, or another, nor of producing documents for one group of the listed persons or entities, but not others).
5. “Document” and “documents” mean all documents and tangible things, in the broadest sense allowed by Rule 192.3(b) and comment 2 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
6. “Possession” means actual care, custody, control, or management.
7. “Marijuana” means the plant Cannabis sativa L., and any preparation thereof, excluding Hemp.
8. “Paraphernalia” means equipment, a product, or material that is used or intended for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, or concealing a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, or in injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
4 MR 0267 9. “Memorandum” means a brief written message or report from one person or department in an organization to another.
10. “Codification” means the process of collecting, organizing, and consolidating local government ordinances and regulations into a comprehensive document.
11. “Adoption” means passage of a measure into law.
12. “Implementation” means placing an ordinance into effect.
13. “City Council” means: (1) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (2) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (3) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (4) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (5) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (6) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At-Large, (7) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
14. “City of Denton Police Department” means the City of Denton Police Department, located at 601 E Hickory St, Denton, TX 76205.
15. “The Marijuana Ordinance” means Chapter 21 – Offenses, Article V - Marijuana Enforcement of the City of Denton Code of Ordinance, Proposition B to the November 8, 2022, City of Denton Election, and the Voter Initiative Petition preceding the Proposition.
16. All undefined terms and phrases have not only the meaning ascribed to them by ordinary custom and usage, but also the meaning ascribed to them by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.
5 MR 0268 PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 1. Admit that the Marijuana Ordinance was adopted on November 22, 2022, following a vote by the City of Denton City Council.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 2. Admit that following a vote on November 22, 2022, the Marijuana Ordinance became operational by law.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 3. Admit that the June 6, 2023 vote on the Marijuana Ordinance only related to budgetary authorization for the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 4. Admit that during the June 6, 2023 vote on the Marijuana Ordinance, the City of Denton City Council considered a duplicate of the Marijuana Ordinance, already adopted on November 22, 2022.
ADMIT OR DENY
6 MR 0269 If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 5. Admit that following a vote on the Marijuana Ordinance on June 6, 2023, the Marijuana Ordinance remained in the Code of Ordinances.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 6. Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have been directed not to cite or arrest individuals for misdemeanor levels of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 7. Admit that the Marijuana Ordinance conflicts with Texas Local Government Code 370.003.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 8. Admit that City of Denton Police Department citations and arrests for misdemeanor levels of marijuana have decreased by over 50 percent since November 22, 2022.
7 MR 0270 ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 9. Admit that City of Denton Police Department citations and arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia have decreased by over 50 percent since November 22, 2022.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 10. Admit that you did not send out a document or communication to employees of the City of Denton Police Department that the Marijuana Ordinance has not been implemented.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 11. Admit that you received a document or communication from the City of Denton Police Department that the Marijuana Ordinance has been implemented.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 12. Admit that you directed the City of Denton Police Department not to use the smell of marijuana for probable cause.
8 MR 0271 ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 13. Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have received training on the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 14. Admit that the City of Denton City Council could change a City of Denton policy relating to the implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 15. Admit that a new City Manager could change a City of Denton policy relating to the implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
9 MR 0272 EXHIBIT B
MR 0273 Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANTS
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
Plaintiff, the State of Texas, serves these Requests for Production on Defendants, as allowed
by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196. Defendants must produce all requested documents (as they
are kept in the ordinary course of business or organized and labeled to correspond with categories
in each request) for inspection and copying, not more than 30 days after service, at P.O. Box 12548,
Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711-2548.
.
MR 0274 Date: August 30, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON /S/ Jacob Przada Attorney General of Texas JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 First Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RALPH MOLINA TEXAS Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station AUSTIN KINGHORN Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy Telephone.: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 30, 2024, a true and correct copy of this document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Jose ( Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel
2 MR 0275 INSTRUCTIONS
1. Answer each request for documents separately by listing the documents and by describing them as defined below. If documents produced in response to this request are numbered for production, in each response provide both the information that identifies the document and the document’s number.
2. For a document that no longer exists or that cannot be located, identify the document, state how and when it passed out of existence or could no longer be located, and the reasons for the disappearance. Also, identify each person having knowledge about the disposition or loss of the document, and identify any other document evidencing the lost document’s existence or any facts about the lost document.
a. When identifying the document, you must state the following:
(1) The nature of the document (e.g., letter, handwritten note).
(2) The title or heading that appears on the document.
(3) The date of the document and the date of each addendum, supplement, or other addition or change.
(4) The identities of the author, signer of the document, and person on whose behalf or at whose request or direction the document was prepared or delivered.
b. When identifying the person, you must state the following:
(1) The full name.
(2) The present or last known address and telephone number.
3. These requests for Production are deemed to be continuing and you have a duty under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to amend your responses to these requests if you obtain information upon the basis of which: (1) you know that an answer was incorrect when made, or (2) you know that any answer, though correct when made, is no longer correct, true or complete, and circumstances are such that a failure to amend the answer is in substance a knowing concealment.
4. If you believe that any written discovery is requesting privileged information, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193, the party must state: (1) that the information or material responsive to request has been withheld, (2) the request to which the information or material relates, (3) the privilege or privileges asserted, and (4) a description of the documents, communications, or tangible things not being disclosed.
5. These Requests for Production are directed to all Defendants named in this lawsuit.
3 MR 0276 DEFINITIONS
1. “Plaintiff” or “Defendant,” as well as a party’s full or abbreviated name or a pronoun referring to a party, means the party, and when applicable, the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
2. “You” or “your” means: (1) The City of Denton, (2) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (3) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (4) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (5) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (6) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (7) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At- Large, (8) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, (9) Defendant Sara Hensley, City Manager of Denton, and (10) Defendant Jessica Robledo, Interim-Chief of Police of Denton, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
3. “Document” means all written, typed, or printed matter and all magnetic, electronic, or other records or documentation of any kind or description in your actual possession, custody, or control, including those in the possession, custody, or control of any and all present or former directors, officers, employees, consultants, accountants, attorneys, or other agents, whether or not prepared by you, that constitute or contain matters relevant to the subject matter of the action. “Document” includes, but is not limited to, the following: letters, reports, charts, diagrams, correspondence, telegrams, memoranda, notes, records, minutes, contracts, agreements, records or notations of telephone or personal conversations or conferences, interoffice communications, e-mail, microfilm, bulletins, circulars, pamphlets, photographs, faxes, invoices, tape recordings, computer printouts, drafts, résumés, logs, and worksheets.
4. “Communication” means any oral or written communication of which Defendants have knowledge, information, or belief.
5. “Electronic or magnetic data” means electronic information that is stored in a medium from which it can be retrieved and examined. The term refers to the original (or identical duplicate when the original is not available) and any other copies of the data that may have attached comments, notes, marks, or highlighting of any kind. Electronic or magnetic data includes, but is not limited to, the following: computer programs; operating systems; computer activity logs; programming notes or instructions; e-mail receipts, messages, or transmissions; output resulting from the use of any software program, including word-processing documents, spreadsheets, database files, charts, graphs, and outlines; metadata; PIF and PDF files; batch files; deleted files; temporary files; Internet- or web-browser-generated information stored in textual, graphical, or audio format, including history files, caches, and cookies; and any miscellaneous files or file fragments. Electronic or magnetic data includes any items stored on magnetic, optical, digital, or other electronic-storage media, such as hard drives, floppy disks,
4 MR 0277 CD-ROMs, DVDs, tapes, smart cards, integrated-circuit cards (e.g., SIM cards), removable media (e.g., Zip drives, Jaz cartridges), microfiche, punched cards. Electronic or magnetic data also includes the file, folder, tabs, containers, and labels attached to or associated with any physical storage device with each original or copy.
6. “Possession, custody, or control” of an item means that the person either has physical possession of the item or has a right to possession equal or superior to that of the person who has physical possession of the item.
7. “Person” means any natural person, corporation, firm, association, partnership, joint venture, proprietorship, governmental body, or any other organization, business, or legal entity, and all predecessors or successors.
8. “Mobile device” means any cellular telephone, satellite telephone, pager, personal digital assistant, handheld computer, walkie-talkie, or any combination of these devices.
9. “The Cities” means, when applicable, a municipality, including agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
10. “Law Enforcement” means a public agency charged with policing functions, including any of its component bureaus, and when applicable, the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
11. “City Council” means: (1) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (2) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (3) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (4) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (5) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (6) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At-Large, (7) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
12. “Marijuana” means the plant Cannabis sativa L., and any preparation thereof, excluding Hemp.
13. “The Marijuana Ordinance” means Chapter 21 – Offenses, Article V - Marijuana Enforcement of the City of Denton Code of Ordinance, Proposition B to the November 8, 2022 City of Denton Election, and the Voter Initiative Petition preceding the Proposition.
14. “Public Health Statistics” mean numbers that summarize information related to health.
5 MR 0278 15. “Disciplinary Statistics” mean numbers that summarize information related to officer discipline.
16. “Enforcement” means ensuring that individuals obey a law.
17. “Policy” means a law, regulation, procedure, administrative action, incentive, or voluntary practice of governments and other institutions.
18. “Memorandum” means a brief written message or report from one person or department in an organization to another.
19. “Public” means individuals within the City of Denton.
20. “Police Directive” or “General Order” means an official written order or instruction by the City of Denton Police Department, its Chief, or Police Administration.
21. “Social Media Posts” refer to a short-form message or content that is published on social media platforms on the official or personal account of any Defendant, including but not limited to Instagram, Facebook, Meta, Twitter, X, TikTok, YouTube, LinkedIn and Reddit.
22. “Demonstrative” means a visual, graphic, or sound aid used to explain or illustrate a witness’s testimony or presentation.
23. “Violation” means an action that breaks or goes against a law, regulation, ordinance, policy, or memorandum, including the Marijuana Ordinance or any related policy or memorandum.
24. “Ground Game Texas” refers to the dismissed Intervenor-Defendant in State of Texas v. City of Austin, et. al., D-1-GN-24-000586 (419th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Jun. 12, 2024), and the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the parties or under the parties’ control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
25. “Decriminalize Denton” refers to the dismissed Intervenor-Defendants in this suit and the parties’ agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the parties or under the parties’ control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
26. “Supporting” means seek to influence a politician or government official on an issue.
27. “Paraphernalia” means equipment, a product, or material that is used or intended for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, or concealing a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health
6 MR 0279 and Safety Code, or in injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
28. “Marijuana use” means the smoking, eating, drinking, or inhaling of marijuana.
29. “Tetrahydrocannabinol” (hereinafter, “THC”), means the primary psychoactive component in marijuana, hashish, and other preparations derived from cannabis plants, especially Cannabis sativa, or produced synthetically.
30. “Codification” means the process of collecting, organizing, and consolidating local government ordinances and regulations into a comprehensive document.
31. “Adoption” means passage of a measure into law.
32. “Implementation” means placing an ordinance into effect.
33. “Media” means members of the media and press, associated with broadcast and narrowcast mediums, including radio, television, newspapers, magazines, journals, and the internet.
34. “Reprioritization” means the process of rearranging priorities based on their importance and urgency.
35. All undefined terms and phrases have not only the meaning ascribed to them by ordinary custom and usage, but also the meaning ascribed to them by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.
7 MR 0280 REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST 1: Produce all communications and documents sent or received by you, from November 2, 2021 to Present, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance, including communications in which you were copied.
REQUEST 2: Produce all policies or memoranda created by you, from November 2, 2021 to Present, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
REQUEST 3: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and citizens groups, including Ground Game Texas, Decriminalize Denton, any parties supporting the Marijuana Ordinance, or their agents, employees, or representatives, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 4: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the public relating to enforcement of the Marijuana Ordinance and the Marijuana laws of the State of Texas.
REQUEST 5: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and law enforcement or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 6: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killen, Austin, and San Marcos or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 7: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killen, Austin, and San Marcos or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of a Marijuana Ordinance by the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killen, Austin, and San Marcos from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 8: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Denton Independent School District, or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 9: Produce all disciplinary statistics relating to violations of the Marijuana Ordinance or any related policy or memorandum by employees of the City of Denton Police Department from November 22, 2022 to Present.
8 MR 0281 REQUEST 10: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and employees of the City of Denton Police Department or their agents, and representatives regarding reprioritization of Marijuana enforcement, including misdemeanor marijuana possession or misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia offenses from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 11: Produce all copies of communications or documents within your possession relating to the City of Denton Police Administration’s demonstrative of marijuana at a City Council meeting from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 12: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Denton County Public Health District or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding marijuana use in the City of Denton from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 13: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to funding by the City of Denton or the City of Denton Police Department for THC testing from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
REQUEST 14: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to funding by the City of Denton or the City of Denton Police Department for THC testing from November 22, 2022 to Present.
REQUEST 15: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
REQUEST 16: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia from November 22, 2022 to Present.
REQUEST 17: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
REQUEST 18: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance from November 22, 2022 to Present.
REQUEST 19: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
REQUEST 20: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause from November 22, 2022 to Present.
9 MR 0282 REQUEST 21: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
REQUEST 22: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses from November 22, 2022 to Present.
REQUEST 23: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia, where the subject expressed that they thought it was lawful to possess marijuana or marijuana paraphernalia, from November 22, 2022 to Present.
REQUEST 24: Produce all communications and documents sent by you, your attorneys, or agents, employees, or representatives to the media regarding the Marijuana Ordinance or this lawsuit from November 2, 2021 to Present.
10 MR 0283 EXHIBIT C
MR 0284 Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANTS
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
Plaintiff, the State of Texas, serves these Interrogatories on Defendants, as allowed by Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 197. Defendants must answer each interrogatory separately, fully, in
writing, and under oath, within 30 days after service.
MR 0285 Date: August 30, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON /S/ Jacob Przada Attorney General of Texas JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 First Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RALPH MOLINA TEXAS Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station AUSTIN KINGHORN Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy Telephone: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 30, 2024, a true and correct copy of this document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Jose ( Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel
2 MR 0286 INSTRUCTIONS
For any requested information about a document that no longer exists or cannot be located, identify the document, state how and when it passed out of existence or when it could no longer be located, and give the reasons for the disappearance. Also, identify each person having knowledge about the disposition or loss, and identify each document evidencing the existence or nonexistence of each document that cannot be located.
DEFINITIONS 1. “Plaintiff,” or “Defendant,” as well as a party’s full or abbreviated name or a pronoun referring to a party, means the party, and when applicable, the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney. 2. “You” or “your” means: (1) The City of Denton, (2) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (3) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (4) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (5) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (6) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (7) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At-Large, (8) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, (9) Defendant Sara Hensley, City Manager of Denton, and (10) Defendant Jessica Robledo, Interim-Chief of Police of Denton, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
3 MR 0287 3. “Document” means any writing of any kind, source, or authorship, regardless of how it may be recorded, stored, or reproduced. The term includes both originals and all non- identical copies thereof, as well as all drafts, revisions, and amendments, regardless of whether adopted. The term also includes but is not limited to handwritten, typewritten, printed, photocopied, photographic, and electronically recorded matter. For purposes of illustration and not limitation, the term includes: contracts, agreements, communications, reports, charges, complaints, correspondence, letters, emails, social media postings, telegrams, memoranda, applications, summaries or records of telephone conversations, summaries or records of personal conversations or interviews, journals, diaries, schedules, charts, graphs, worksheets, spreadsheets, reports, notebooks, note charts, handwritten notes, plans, drawings, sketches, maps, brochures, pamphlets, advertisements, circulars, press releases, summaries or records of meetings or conferences, summaries or reports or records of investigations or negotiations, opinions or reports of consultants, bills, statements, invoices, affidavits, schedules, audio recordings, video recordings, transcriptions, and photographs. 4. “Statement” means any written or graphic assertion or representation signed, adopted, or approved by the person making it, or any stenographic, mechanical, electronic, or other record or transcription that is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded. 5. “Communication” means any conveyance or transfer of any information from one person to another by any means or in any form, including but not limited to all types of documents, oral communications, and online resources such as social media. 6. “Electronic or magnetic data” means electronic information that is stored in a medium from which it can be retrieved and examined. The term refers to the original (or identical duplicate when the original is not available) and any other copies of the data that may have attached comments, notes, marks, or highlighting of any kind. Electronic or magnetic data includes, but is not limited to, the following: computer programs; operating systems; computer activity logs; programming notes or instructions; e-mail receipts, messages, or transmissions; output resulting from the use of any software program, including word-processing documents, spreadsheets, database files, charts, graphs, and outlines; metadata; PIF and PDF files; batch files; deleted files; temporary files; Internet- or web-browser-generated information stored in textual, graphical, or
4 MR 0288 audio format, including history files, caches, and cookies, and any miscellaneous files or file fragments. Electronic or magnetic data includes any items stored on magnetic, optical, digital, or other electronic-storage media, such as hard drives, floppy disks, CD-ROMs, DVDs, tapes, smart cards, integrated-circuit cards (e.g., SIM cards), removable media (e.g., Zip drives, Jaz cartridges), microfiche, punched cards. Electronic or magnetic data also includes the file, folder, tabs, containers, and labels attached to or associated with any physical storage device with each original or copy. 7. “Possession, custody, or control” of an item means that the person either has physical possession of the item or has a right to possession equal or superior to that of the person who has physical possession of the item. 8. “Person” means any natural person, corporation, firm, association, partnership, joint venture, proprietorship, governmental body, or any other organization, business, or legal entity, and all predecessors or successors in interest. 9. “Mobile device” means any cellular telephone, satellite telephone, pager, personal digital assistant, handheld computer, walkie-talkie, or any combination of these devices. 10. “Police Directive” or “General Order” means an official written order or instruction by the City of Denton Police Department, its Chief, or Police Administration. 11. “Identify” or “describe,” when referring to a person, means you must state the following: 1. The full name. 2. The present or last known office address and office telephone number. 3. The occupation, job title, employer, and employer’s address at the time of the event or period referred to in each particular interrogatory.
4. In the case of any entity, the identity of the officer, employee, or agent most closely connected with the subject matter of the interrogatory and the officer who is responsible for supervising that officer or employee. 12. “Identify” “describe,” or “explain” when referring to document or policy, means you must state the following: 1. The nature of the document (e.g., letter, handwritten note).
5 MR 0289 2. The title or heading that appears on the document. 3. The date of the document and the date of each addendum, supplement, or other addition or change. 4. The identities of the author, signer of the document, and person on whose behalf or at whose request or direction the document was prepared or delivered. 5. The present location of the document and the name, address, position or title, and telephone number of the person or persons having custody of the document. 6. A summary of the contents of the document. 13. “Tetrahydrocannabinol” (hereinafter, “THC”), means the primary psychoactive component in marijuana, hashish, and other preparations derived from cannabis plants, especially Cannabis sativa, or produced synthetically. 14. “Marijuana” means the plant Cannabis sativa L., and any preparation thereof, excluding Hemp. 15. “Codification” means the process of collecting, organizing, and consolidating local government ordinances and regulations into a comprehensive document. 16. “Adoption” means passage of a measure into law. 17. “Implementation” means placing an ordinance into effect. 18. “Policy” means a law, regulation, procedure, administrative action, incentive, or voluntary practice of governments and other institutions, written or unwritten. 19. “City Staff” means all employees of the City. 20. “City of Denton” means the City of Denton, located at 601 East Hickory Street, Denton, Texas 76205, and all agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under its control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney 21. “Enforce” means compel observance of or compliance with a law, rule, or obligation. 22. “Media Personnel” means members of the media and press, associated with broadcast and narrowcast mediums, including radio, television, newspapers, magazines, journals, and the internet.
6 MR 0290 23. “The Cities” means, when applicable, a municipality, including agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney. 24. “City Council” means: (1) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (2) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (3) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (4) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (5) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (6) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At-Large, (7) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries. 25. All undefined terms and phrases have not only the meaning ascribed to them by ordinary custom and usage, but also the meaning ascribed to them by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.
7 MR 0291 INTERROGATORIES
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 1: Identify all documents utilized to assist in any way with the preparation of the answers to each of the interrogatories.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 2: Explain the process to change, adopt, or implement a different policy or ordinance than a policy or ordinance currently codified, adopted, or implemented by the City of Denton.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 3: Identify every person who has firsthand factual information about this case, rebuttal or impeachment evidence in this case, or who is expected testify in this case, including your experts or rebuttal witnesses, and provide a brief statement of each individual’s connection with the case. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 4: State the legal theories and describe in general the factual bases for your defenses. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(j), 197.1.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul
8 MR 0292 Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 5: Identify any City of Denton employees and third-parties, including the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killen, Austin, and San Marcos, and media personnel with whom you discussed codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 6: If you contend that the Marijuana Ordinance can, or cannot be changed to comply with the City Charter, Ordinance, or a policy, state the factual basis for your claim and identify all documents relied on for your response.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 7: Identify any documented changes in Marijuana use since the Marijuana Ordinance took effect, including but not limited to any documented changes occurring at the Denton Independent School District, or in connection to City of Denton Police citations and arrests or traffic and pedestrian stops.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 8: Identify how many times the Marijuana Ordinance has been enforced and identify the individuals whom the Marijuana Ordinance has been enforced against.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: Sara Hensley and Jessica Robledo
9 MR 0293 INTERROGATORY 9: Identify all jobs to which you have applied from August 30, 2022 to Present, including the name of the employer, its location, and the ultimate outcome of your application for that job.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 10: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to funding for THC testing that was in effect during the period spanning February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 11: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to funding for THC testing that has been in effect during the period spanning November 22, 2022, to Present.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 12: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to the use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause that was in effect during the period spanning February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 13: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to the use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause that has been in effect during the period spanning November 22, 2022, to Present.
10 MR 0294 Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 14: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 15: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 16: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 17: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
11 MR 0295 TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 18: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 19: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 20: Identify all inquiries by the public about confusion relating to codification, implementation, or adoption of the City of Denton’s Marijuana Ordinance.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Sara Hensley and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 21: Identify all documents relied upon in developing the current City of Denton Police Department Policy and Police Directive or General Orders relating to misdemeanor-level marijuana offenses.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 22: If you have ever been convicted of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, state the nature of the charge and the date and place of arrest and conviction. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(B), 609(a).
12 MR 0296 Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
13 MR 0297 EXHIBIT D
MR 0298 From: Richard Gladden
Jacob and Jose,
My clients agree to this proposal.
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob,
The City agrees to this proposal.
Joe de la Fuente
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 ---------------------------------- Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 Your text here!
****ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT ****
A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email (and all attachments) is confidential, legally privileged, and covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Unauthorized use or dissemination is prohibited. If you have received this message in error please delete it immediately. For more detailed information click http://www.lglawfirm.com/email-disclaimer/ .
MR 0299 NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e-mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ . From: Jacob Przada
Hi all,
I hope you are well. Would counsel be willing to stipulate to service of disclosures on June 21, 2024? Finally, would counsel agree to exchanging Exhibit and Witness lists for the hearing by Tuesday, May 28, 2024?
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jacob Przada Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2024 10:30 AM To: Jose de la Fuente
Hi Joe,
We will do that. Thanks for reaching out.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob and Richard,
Per the court’s email this morning, we will be serving a notice of hearing for the two matters Denton wants heard (our PTJ and Special Exceptions); y’all should do the same for the matters you want heard on your behalf.
MR 0300 Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 Your text here!
****ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT ****
A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
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NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e-mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ . From: Jacob Przada
Thanks, Joe. It sounds like May 31st works for the Pleas to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Strike, and Temporary Injunction to be heard at the same time, with the Court to likely carry rulings until all argument has been heard. Although Mr. Gladden referenced Denton’s Special Exceptions, we are unopposed to that being heard on the 31 st as well.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Richard Gladden
Exactly Jose. This is all good with my clients.
MR 0301 Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 12, 2024, at 4:58 PM, Jose de la Fuente
Richard,
With that clarification (I was going to remind you of it in any case, as the AG is entitled to have their TI hearing go into the queue – I’m sure the court will carry any rulings until all of the various motions have been presented), Denton is fine with that. Bottom line – everything set for hearing, jurisdiction goes first (as it does), and then the remaining items are stacked for the court to take up in due order.
If we can nail down this agreement, we’ll let the court know ASAP to hold that date, and we’ll list the items to be heard. The notices of hearing can then issue once the court makes the setting.
Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 Your text here!
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A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
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NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e-mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ . From: Richard Gladden
I neglected to mention Mr. Paxton's application for a temporary injunction. Assuming we agree that it will be heard after the please to jurisdiction are first heard by the Court, my agreement sent in my last email stands as stated. 4
MR 0302 From: Richard Gladden
Gentlemen,
The Defendant-Intervenors agree to setting the hearing for May 31, 2024, provided the pleas to jurisdiction of the Defendant-Intervenors and the City of Denton are heard first, and the City's special exceptions and Mr. Paxton's motion to strike being heard on the same date and at the same time thereafter.
If all parties are in agreement, Defendant-Intervenors authorize either of you (Mr. Przada or Mr. De La Fuente) to inform the Court's coordinator of this agreement via email, provided counsel for all parties, including me, are included on the said email communication to the Court.
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob and Richard,
Taking this offline so we just confer among counsel . . . May 31st works for me. So long as we make it clear to the court that it’s a half day for 1) our two PTJs, 2) the AG’s TI, and 3) the AG’s Motion to Strike (all of which can be heard in a half-day window), then can we agree on that date? Otherwise, we’re looking at June 25th.
Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct ---------------------------------- 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800
Your text here!
****ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT ****
MR 0303 A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email (and all attachments) is confidential, legally privileged, and covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Unauthorized use or dissemination is prohibited. If you have received this message in error please delete it immediately. For more detailed information click http://www.lglawfirm.com/email-disclaimer/ .
NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e-mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ . From: Tina Lopez
Good afternoon,
The hearing set on May 10th has been removed. Here are dates available for ½ day for your motion to strike: 5/2 at 9:30am 5/31 at 9:30am 6/25 at 1:30pm Please confer with all parties and submit agreed date and time.
Sincerely,
Tina Lopez 481st District Court Administrator 1450 E. McKinney, 4th Floor Denton, TX 76209 Tina.Lopez@DentonCounty.gov 481st Website: https://www.dentoncounty.gov/1574/481st-District-Court You may review case records or court dockets here. All hearings in the 481st District Court are held in person.
From: Jacob Przada
MR 0304 Cc: Heather Dyer
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Ms. Lopez,
Thank you so much for your responsiveness and for working with us on these dates. As you and I discussed, the May 10, 2024 date was placed on hold, not set, and was subsequently determined to not work for all parties. At that point, we notified Court Administration of the same.
Despite Mr. Gladden’s misunderstanding of this situation, and my previous email this week to him and all counsel, where we indicated that Court staff would be notified that the May 10, 2024 date did not work, we look forward to working with him to identify a hearing date. Thank you again for your time.
Best regards,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Richard Gladden
Ms. Lopez,
I represent the Defendant-Intervenors in the above-referenced case.
MR 0305 Earlier this week I discovered one of the other attorneys in this case apparently caused the pending matters to be scheduled for a half-day hearing on May 10, 2024. I then expressed my objection to that date to all opposing counsel. However, I now see that Mr. Prazda, without further conference with me, has apparently scheduled his client's motion to strike for the same date, May 10, 20024.
I realize Mr. Przada is a relatively inexperienced attorney and that he may not be familiar with the local Uniform Rules of Denton County, particularly those that require him to confer with opposing counsel before causing a hearing to be set, and that require him to include opposing counsel on all email communications he has with you or the Court. Regardless of these circumstances, at this juncture I would appreciate it if you would remove from the Court's calendar any hearing on any pending pleadings filed by any party currently scheduled for any hearing May 10, 20024. No hearing for that date has ever been agreed to by any attorney in this case, other than Mr. Przada, and all other counsel informed Mr. Przada of this fact last week.
All attorneys for the parties agreed last week that the May 10, 2024, hearing date would be canceled, and we further mutually agreed we would all attempt to agree on a new date for all pending pleadings in the next few days. I expect we will be able to do so.
Thank you.
From: Jose de la Fuente
Dear Ms. Lopez,
Thank you so much for your responsiveness to our recent scheduling inquiries. And, as you requested, we are including counsel for all parties in this email and any other similar communications going forward.
All parties appreciate the demands on the court’s calendar, as well as your notification to us last week that the first available date for a ½ day hearing slot in this matter would be July 3rd. In discussing that option among the parties, the Office of the Attorney General would like to see if there are any earlier options available, and we of course would like to do what we can to accommodate their scheduling preferences; perhaps an earlier slot has opened up since our prior communication?
MR 0306 Again, we appreciate the demands on the court’s calendar, and we appreciate your efforts thus far to accommodate the parties’ request for a ½ day hearing. We likewise appreciate any other information you can provide and any alternate/additional dates, should any now be available.
Thank you for your attention to this matter,
Jose de la Fuente Counsel for the City of Denton
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 ---------------------------------- www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800
Your text here!
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A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
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NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e -mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ .
Jacob and
MR 0307 EXHIBIT E
MR 0308 06/12/2024 09:01:30AM Velva L. Price District Clerk Travis County D-1-GN-24-000586 CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-000586
THE STATE OF TEXAS, IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff,
Vv.
CITY OF AUSTIN; KIRK PRESTON WATSON, Mayor of Austin; PAIGE ELLIS, Mayor Pro Tem of Austin; NATASHA HARPER-MADISON, VANESSA FUENTES, JOSE VELASQUEZ, JOSE "CHITO" VELA, RYAN ALTER, MACKENZIE KELLY, OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS LESLIE POOL, ZOHAIB "ZO" QADRI, and ALISON ALTER, Members of the City Council of Austin; JESUS GARZA, Interim City Manager of Austin; and ROBIN HENDERSON, Interim Chief of Police of Austin, in their official capacities, Defendants,
GROUND GAME TEXAS, Intervenor-Defendant. 419T JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION CAME TO BE HEARD on June 10, 2024, Defendants' Plea to the Jurisdiction. Having
considered the pleadings, responses, as well as the arguments of counsel and the applicable law,
the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Plea should be and accordingly is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs claims against Defendants asserted in this cause are hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE, without leave to amend.
SIGNED on June 11, 2024.
a? ram a oifer, Judge Presidir g >
MR 0309 EXHIBIT F
MR 0310 CAUSE NO. 24-0267 THE STATE OF TEXAS, § INTHE DISTRIGRCOURT Plaintiff, HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS § at 0.5% o'clock_?_M. v. § Cm JUL 22 2024 CITY OF SAN MARCOS, JANE HUGHSON, Mayor of San Marcos, § , DISTRICT CLERK MATTHEW MENDOZA, SAUL GONZALES, ALYSSA GARZA, § HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS SHANE SCOTT, MARK GLEASON, § and JUDE PRATHER, Members of § the City Council of San Marcos; § STEPHANIE REYES, City § Manager of San Marcos; and STAN § STANDRIDGE, Chief of Police of § San Marcos, in their official § capacities, § Defendants. § 207th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER GRANTING PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
On June 27, 2024, came on to be heard the City of San Marcos (the "City") and
Jane Hughson, Mayor of San Marcos, Matthew Mendoza, Saul Gonzales, Alyssa
Garza, Shane Scott, Mark Gleason, and Jude Prather, Members of the City Council
of San Marcos; Stephanie Reyes, City Manager of San Marcos; and Stan Standridge,
Chief of Police of San Marcos; in their official capacities (the "Officials" and together
with the City, the "Defendants") (the "Officials" and together with the City, the
"Defendants") Plea to the Jurisdiction ("Plea"). The Court, having reviewed the Plea
and the argument of counsel, is of the opinion that Defendants' Plea should be, and
therefore is, GRANTED.
It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED with
prejudice to refiling.
MR 0311 SIGNED this of 2024.
t
JUDGE PRESTDING
MR 0312 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Cathy Daniels on behalf of Jose de la Fuente Bar No. 00793605 cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Envelope ID: 92547645 Filing Code Description: Motion/Application for Protective Order (quash subpoena) Filing Description: Defendants' Status as of 9/27/2024 3:14 PM CST
Associated Case Party: The State Of Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Johnathan Stone 24071779 Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Amaireny Rodriguez amaireny.rodriguez@oag.texas.gov 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Jacob Przada 24125371 jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Tamera Martinez tamera.martinez@oag.texas.gov 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Ethan Szumanski ethan.szumanski@oag.texas.gov 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM ERROR
Kyle Tebo Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Sharon Murray sharon.murray@oag.texas.gov 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Bonnie Freymuth bonnie.freymuth@oag.texas.gov 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: The City Of Denton, Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Amy Hoffee amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Mack Reinwand mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Jose E.de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
James F.Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Gabrielle C.Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
MR 0313 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Cathy Daniels on behalf of Jose de la Fuente Bar No. 00793605 cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Envelope ID: 92547645 Filing Code Description: Motion/Application for Protective Order (quash subpoena) Filing Description: Defendants' Status as of 9/27/2024 3:14 PM CST
Associated Case Party: The City Of Denton, Texas
Gabrielle C.Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Sydney P.Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Doug Shoemaker
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 9/27/2024 2:40:37 PM SENT
MR 0314 FILED: 10/17/2024 9:35 PM David Trantham Denton County District Clerk By: Alyssa Gongora, Deputy
CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § Plaintiff, § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE McGEE, § and CHRIS WATTS, Members of the City § Council of Denton; SARA HENSLEY, City § Manager of Denton; and DOUG § SHOEMAKER, Chief of Police of Denton; § in their official capacities, § § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants.
TEXAS’S MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS AND WRITTEN DISCOVERY AND RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.1, the State of Texas (Texas) files this Motion to Compel both
the oral depositions of Defendants: (1) Councilmember Brian Beck, (2) Councilmember Joe
Holland, (3) City Manager Sara Hensley, (4) Police Chief Jessica Robledo, (5) City of Denton
Police Sgt. Daryn Briggs, and (6) City of Denton Police Lt. Chris Summitt, and Defendants’
written discovery responses to Texas’s discovery requests. Texas also responds to Defendants’
Motion to Quash and Motion for Protection from Deposition Notices and Defendants’ Motion for
Protective Order as to Texas’s written discovery. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6, 199.4.
MR 0315 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... ii
Background ................................................................................................................................... 1
Standard of Review ....................................................................................................................... 3
Summary of the Argument ............................................................................................................ 5
Argument ...................................................................................................................................... 6
A. Texas’s discovery is relevant and will resolve the jurisdictional question. ......................... 6
Discovery will clarify an ambiguous public record ..................................................... 7
B. Courts cannot grant a Plea to the Jurisdiction that is based on uncertain jurisdictional facts. ............................................................................................................ 9
C. This Court should compel Defendants to produce the noticed deponents. ..................... 10
D. This Court should compel Defendants to respond to Texas’s written discovery. ........... 12
E. Defendants have refused to meaningfully confer regarding their opposition to written discovery. ............................................................................................................ 19
F. Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash is defective because Defendants did not propose alternative dates. ................................................................. 20
G. Defendants’ protective motions fail to show undue burden. ........................................... 21
Prayer .......................................................................................................................................... 27
Certificate of Conference ............................................................................................................ 28
Certificate of Service ................................................................................................................... 28
Index of Exhibits ......................................................................................................................... 29
ii MR 0316 BACKGROUND On January 31, 2024, following the City of Denton’s adoption of an unconstitutional
ordinance decriminalizing marijuana, Texas sued the City of Denton and relevant city officials,
alleging the Ordinance conflicts with Texas’s statutory prohibition of marijuana possession. See
Pl.’s Orig. Pet., Appl. for Temp. Inj. and Perm. Inj. (Orig. Pet.) at 1–5. Texas further alleged that
by adopting the Ordinance, Defendants violated Article XI, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution
and § 370.003 of the Local Government Code, which respectively prohibit home rule cities from
enacting any local ordinance “inconsistent with...the general laws enacted by the Legislature of
this State” and forbid “[t]he governing body of a municipality,...municipal police department,
[from] adopt[ing] a policy under which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs.” Id.;
Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5(a); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 370.003. To put an end to Defendants’
ultra vires conduct, adopting and implementing marijuana decriminalization, Texas seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief, including temporary and permanent injunction. Orig. Pet. at 10–
11.
On May 20, 2024, Defendants filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction with an extensive factual
record and asked this Court to determine its subject matter jurisdiction in light of the facts they
presented. See City of Denton’s Plea to the Jurisdiction (PTJ). Included in the more than 140 pages
of detailed exhibits were statements by the City Manager and other city officials claiming that
Defendants would refrain from implementing the Ordinance. See PTJ Exs. D, E. In light of these
disavowals, Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction argued that no city official had “yet taken any
action” to “adopt[] a policy under which the [City] will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs,”
PTJ at 16–17 (quoting Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003), and that therefore city officials could not
possibly have acted ultra vires. See id. Defendants dodged the awkward fact that Denton’s city
1 MR 0317 council voted the Ordinance into law on November 22, 2022, by describing that vote as a “purely
ministerial dut[y]” that Denton’s City Charter left them no choice but to take. PTJ at 18–19. On
Defendants’ creative description, the Ordinance was “self-enacting” and issued into the City’s
law books without action by any city official who can be enjoined pursuant to § 370.003. Id. at 18.
This convenient story, if accepted at face value, obscures the clear-cut case of local law
preempted by state statute that Texas originally pleaded by introducing fact issues as to whether
city officials have truly taken no action over the Ordinance. Orig. Pet. at 1, 4–11. Defendants’ Plea
to the Jurisdiction is based on evidence claiming to show the inaction of local officials. See PTJ at 2–
3. Accordingly, to get to the bottom of the City’s conduct vis a vis the Ordinance, Texas
conferenced serving written and oral discovery with counsel for Defendants on August 22. See
Exs. M, O, P.
Although Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction relies on statements by Denton officials to
argue that the Ordinance is not enforced, Defendants refuse to allow Texas to question any relevant
city officials. On September 13, 2024, Texas served depositions notices upon the following Denton
officials and employees: (1) Councilmember Brian Beck, (2) Councilmember Joe Holland, (3) City
Manager Sara Hensley, (4) Police Chief Jessica Robledo, (5) City of Denton Police Sgt. Daryn
Briggs, and (6) City of Denton Police Lt. Chris Summitt. See Exs. G, H, I, J, K, and L. But on
September 18, 2024, Defendants filed their Motion to Quash and Motion for Protection from
Deposition Notices. See Mot. to Quash and Mot. for Protection from Dep. Notices.
Doubling down on their obstructionism, on September 27, 2024, Defendants filed their
Motion for Protective Order, as to Texas’s written discovery. See Mot. for Protective Order. The
following business day, Defendants served responses to Texas’s written discovery refusing to
2 MR 0318 answer any of Texas’s discovery questions or to produce new information in response to Texas’s
requests for production. See Exs. A, B, and C.
Thus, at this point, the Court has only the factual record that Defendants attached to their
Plea to the Jurisdiction before it. Because Texas thinks that is unfair, it now asks the Court to allow
development of the facts to elucidate: 1) whether any City of Denton officials are currently
implementing the Ordinance, and 2) whether the city council members exercised discretion when
they voted in the Ordinance.
STANDARD OF REVIEW Three different standards apply here: (1) the Motion to Compel standard, (2) the Motion
to Quash standard, and (3) the Motion for Protective Order standard.
The Motion to Compel standard. “Generally, requested information is discoverable absent a
valid objection. Thus, the party seeking to exclude documents from discovery must specifically
plead the particular privilege or immunity claimed and provide evidence to support the claim.”
Texaco, Inc. v. Dominguez, 812 S.W.2d 451, 456 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ) (citation
omitted). The party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling discovery. Tex.
R. Civ. P. 215.1(b).
Moreover, “[t]he party seeking discovery has several potential remedies under the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure when a deponent” fails to provide a complete deposition. In re White, 227
S.W.3d 234, 236 (Tex. App. 2007—San Antonio, no pet.). “[T]he discovering party may move for
an order compelling an answer.” Here, the movant may seek to compel oral discovery when a party
fails “to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 215(1)(2)(a)–(1)(2)(d).
3 MR 0319 Though Texas does not seek sanctions, “[r]ule 215.1(b) [even] permits the discovering
party to apply for sanctions when a party fails ‘to appear before the officer who is to take his
deposition, after being served with a proper notice....’” Stromberger v. Turley L. Firm, 315 S.W.3d
921, 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.1(b)(2)(A)).
The Motion for Protective Order Standard. “A party seeking to avoid discovery must show
particular, specific, and demonstrable injury by facts sufficient to justify protection from
discovery.” Martinez v. Martinez, 52 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, subsequent
history omitted) (citations omitted); Masinga v. Whittington, 792 S.W.2d 940, 940–41 (Tex.1990).
A party or non-party resisting discovery may file a motion for protective order in response to a
discovery request. Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.6(e), 192.6(a). A court has discretion to issue a protective
order to protect a party from undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment, or annoyance. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6(b). A court may issue a protective order to prevent or limit testimony because
of a privilege. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6, 199.4. A court has the authority to limit the scope of
discovery based on the needs and circumstances of the case. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192 cmt. 7.
The Motion to Quash Standard. A motion to quash is a type of motion for protective order
that seeks to cancel completely the relevant pleading, order, or notice. See In re Berrenberg, 605
S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.). “The party seeking to avoid a deposition is
required to show particular, specific, and demonstrable injury by facts sufficient to justify a
protective order . . . . Thus, to prevail on its motion to quash, [movant] was required to show that the
deposition would cause [noticed deponent] to suffer undue burden, unnecessary expense,
harassment, or an invasion of protected rights.”). In re Titus Cnty., 412 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2013, no pet.).
4 MR 0320 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Defendants have filed an evidence-based Plea to the Jurisdiction. To fully respond to this
Plea, Texas needs to inquire into the facts surrounding Denton officials’ adoption and
implementation of the Ordinance as these issues are essential to the Court’s jurisdiction.
First, this Court should grant Texas’s Motion to Compel, because Texas’s requests for the
depositions of six Denton officials as well as its written discovery requests are reasonably calculated
to reveal whether the City and any of its officials adopted or implemented the Ordinance and
therefore are appropriately limited to the jurisdictional issue the Court should decide as soon as
practicable.
Defendants’ discovery responses rely on boilerplate objections and do not engage with
Texas’s discovery requests. Under the Rules, “when responding to written discovery, a party must
make a complete response, based on all information reasonably available to the responding party,”
Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.1, and caselaw does not tolerate generic objections. In re Shipmon, 68 S.W.3d
815, 821 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.). To deprive Texas of jurisdictional discovery, while
simultaneously taking up Defendants’ evidence-based Plea to the Jurisdiction would provide
Defendants an unfair advantage and ignore precedent. Accordingly, this Court should compel
Defendants to comply with Texas’s written discovery.
Second, Defendants’ Motion to Quash and Motions for Protective Order should be denied.
Defendants argue that discovery is impermissible because this Court’s jurisdiction only involves
matters of law, not fact. But Defendants themselves have placed fact issues at the center of their
jurisdictional challenge by offering the Court (dubious) evidence that Defendants are treating the
Ordinance as if it were null and void. Texas’s discovery is calculated to investigate these claims
that the Ordinance sits idly in the municipal code unenforced and (somehow) unadopted.
5 MR 0321 Therefore, Texas respectfully requests that the Court issue an order: (1) compelling
Defendants to submit to the noticed depositions on a date to be set by the court, (2) overruling
Defendants’ objections, and (3) requiring Defendants to fully respond to Texas’s written discovery
requests. Texas also requests that Defendants’ Motion to Quash and Motions for Protective Order
be denied. Ultimately, Defendants’ dilatory and obstructionist behavior should not be rewarded by
providing Defendants relief from jurisdictional discovery.
ARGUMENT A. Texas’s discovery is relevant and will resolve the jurisdictional question.
Texas needs the limited discovery it has requested to resolve the fact-based question of this
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction that Defendants raised in their Plea to the Jurisdiction. “[A]
court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction . . . may consider evidence and must do so when necessary
to resolve the jurisdictional issues.” Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). “[T]rial courts considering a plea to the jurisdiction have
broad discretion to allow reasonable opportunity for targeted discovery.” Mission Consol. Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 642–43 (Tex. 2012).
Preliminary discovery is especially appropriate “[w]hen the consideration of a trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction requires the examination of evidence.” Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife
v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004). And if a jurisdictional plea attacks jurisdiction by
challenging “the existence of jurisdictional facts, we must move beyond the pleadings and consider
evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). Therefore, when development of the factual record would
help the court decide its jurisdiction, caselaw permits “targeted discovery...to illuminate
jurisdictional facts.” Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 491 (Tex. 2012).
6 MR 0322 Here, the parties dispute the existence of two key jurisdictional facts: 1) that any City of
Denton officials are currently implementing the Ordinance, and 2) that the city council members
exercised discretion when they voted on the Ordinance. Texas alleged both these facts in its
Original Petition. Orig. Pet. at 1-5.
However, Defendants contend that the City has taken no action to adopt or implement the
Ordinance, despite appearances to the contrary, and that City councilmembers had no discretion
over the vote they took on November 22. Def. PTJ at 16-19. To prove up these allegations,
Defendants attached the signed affidavits of the City Manager and Interim Police Chief, declaring
that they had not and would not implement the Ordinance or otherwise refrain from fully enforcing
the State’s drug laws. See Def. PTJ Ex. D, E. Defendants produced numerous other exhibits as
well. Instead of challenging this Court’s jurisdiction based on Texas’s pleadings, Defendants have
done so by alleging new facts designed to controvert Texas’s allegations of ultra vires conduct by
City officials. Defendants put these facts at issue, and Texas is entitled to test them with discovery.
Accordingly, Texas should be allowed to inquire into the facts surrounding the Ordinance.
Discovery will clarify an ambiguous public record
Texas has good reason to suspect that at least some City officials are carrying the Ordinance
into effect, and preliminary discovery will establish whether that suspicion is correct. Many city
officials have made public statements that belie Defendants’ claim that the Ordinance has not been
implemented. At a recent city council session, Mayor Hudspeth stated that the City is “not
enforcing marijuana laws,” referring to State and federal marijuana laws. City Council Sess. Sept.
24, 2024, Tr. at 01:00:03. He then—understandably—asked Denton’s City Attorney if “that
violate [sic] the law?” Id. In an earlier session, Councilman Beck announced that “the initiative is
effective today” as an operational ordinance and implied that police officers could be disciplined
7 MR 0323 under the Ordinance. City Council Sess. Jun. 6, 2023, Tr. at 05:18:20 (reassuring the public that
despite the Ordinance’s content the city council has no “taste” for disciplining officers). During
another session, a different Councilmember called the Ordinance a “policy” that might “be in
conflict with Texas Local Government Code 370.003.” City Council Sess. Feb. 21, 2023, Tr. at
2:51:11. And immediately following the November 22 council vote that adopted the Ordinance,
City Manager Hensley explained that the effect of the Ordinance is that “marijuana laws can still
be enforced by peace officers from various law enforcement agencies in Denton, not necessarily the
City of Denton police officers, but any other police officer in the City of Denton.” City Council Sess.
Nov. 22, 2022, Tr. at 55:43 (emphasis added).
At the same time these public statements were made, marijuana enforcement by the
Denton police department declined precipitously. In the period immediately following adoption of
the Ordinance, Denton police officers made 0 arrests for possession of marijuana or marijuana
paraphernalia as a standalone offense. See Orig. Pet. at 16. And over the entirety of 2023, only three
arrests were made in Denton solely for possession of marijuana, a steep decrease from nineteen
arrests during June 2021 to July 2022. Id.1 These statistics show effective possession enforcement
during 2022 before a steep decline following enactment of the Ordinance.
Likewise, publicly available information undermines Defendants’ claim that the November
22 city council vote was a purely ministerial act. For example, during the November 22, 2022, City
1 Denton Record-Chronicle Website is subject to judicial notice because this information is publicly available online and can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Tex. R. Evid. 201. Denton Police Report 2023 Had Lowest Violent Crime Rate In Five Years (Apr. 7, 2024), available at https://dentonrc.com/news/denton-police-report-2023-had-lowest-violent-crime-rate-in-five- years/article_402946d2-6378-5284-a445-7b3d225ab86b.html.
8 MR 0324 Council session, the City Council actively debated whether to adopt Proposition A, the other of
the two voter-initiated measures passed in 2022. See City Council Sess. Nov. 22, 2022, Tr. at 41:48.
That debate revealed a divide amongst councilmembers, one of whom regarded the vote to be
“purely ministerial” while others viewed it as an opportunity to deliberate the validity of the ballot
items. See id. The fact that some Councilmembers saw fit to debate the merits of one of the
initiatives shows that the November 22, 2022, Council vote was an opportunity to avoid adopting
an unlawful ordinance. See id.
Discovery into Denton’s local legislative practices will clarify whether the City Charter
truly imposes a ministerial duty for council members to adopt initiative proposals approved by a
majority of the voting public. Cf. City of Houston v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 1999 WL 681939
at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 1999) (stating that “local...custom and usage” is
relevant for deciding whether local officials have exercised “policymaking authority”). Discovery
into the City’s marijuana enforcement, internal and external discussions regarding the Ordinance,
and conduct regarding the Ordinance will clarify whether Defendants have taken any action
towards implementing the Ordinance in contravention of State law.
B. Courts cannot grant a Plea to the Jurisdiction that is based on uncertain jurisdictional facts.
Where a jurisdictional challenge turns on the existence of disputed facts, “a trial court’s
review of a plea to the jurisdiction mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment motion.”
Mission, 372 S.W.3d at 635. Only “if the relevant evidence is undisputed or the plaintiff fails to
raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue,” can the trial court “rule[] on the plea as a matter
of law.” Id. Otherwise, “[i]f a fact issue exists, the trial court should deny the plea.” Id. (citation
omitted). A “fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue” means that “the trial court cannot
9 MR 0325 grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder.” Miranda,
133 S.W.3d at 227-28.
There is no doubt that Defendants have based their Plea on assertions of fact—the crux of
their contention that the City has taken no action relies on signed affidavits—and similarly no
doubt that Texas disputes these factual assertions. Moreover, the public record complicates
Defendants’ simple story of “no action taken.” Accordingly, the facts that would be required to
grant Defendants’ Plea are in credible dispute. Because “fact question[s] regarding the
jurisdictional issue” persist, Defendants cannot have their Plea to the Jurisdiction granted at this
time. Consequently, the Court must either deny or carry Defendant’s Plea. Mission, 372 S.W.3d at
635, 643 (stating that “[i]f a fact issue exists, the trial court should deny the plea” or “allow
reasonable opportunity for targeted discovery”) (citation omitted).
Given these alternatives, Defendants principal basis for both their protective motions and
their discovery objections melts away. Defendants have nothing to gain from delaying discovery
until their Plea can be resolved, because a bona fide dispute over jurisdictional facts prevents the
Court from granting a jurisdictional plea. On the other hand, there is much to be gained from
allowing the State to take discovery. Doing so will reveal the full picture of the City’s conduct
adopting and implementing the Ordinance and thereby advance the litigation of this case.
C. This Court should compel Defendants to produce the noticed deponents.
“A party may take the testimony of any person or entity by deposition on oral examination
before any officer authorized by law to take depositions.” In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d
782, 790 (Tex. 2021) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 199.1(a)). Specifically, “the rules generally allow
‘discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the
pending action” and confirm that “[i]t is not a ground for objection that the information sought
10 MR 0326 will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.’” In re USAA, 624 S.W.3d at 790–91 (citing Tex. R. Civ.
P. 192.3(a)).
Here, the depositions that Texas noticed were reasonably calculated to discover facts about
the Ordinance’s adoption and implementation. Texas seeks to depose two city council members,
the City Manager, the Police Chief and two senior members of Denton’s Police Department. Each
of these six deponents likely has knowledge concerning the Ordinance's status and is therefore able
to aid this Court’s determination of its subject matter jurisdiction.
The city council members likely have knowledge about local legislative practices,
particularly whether council votes on ballot measures are discretionary under Denton’s charter.
They will also be able to testify concerning communications between council, the City Manager
and the police department regarding the Ordinance, amongst others.
Defendants argue that the councilmembers cannot be deposed because they are protected
by legislative privilege. However, when a governmental entity has made allegations about its
legislative practices that “place the actions of their representatives at the center of a lawsuit,”
courts do not allow it to “shield those same representatives from all inquiry by invoking legislative
privilege.” In Re TXU Elec. Co., 2001 WL 688128 at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 20, 2001, no pet.).
Here, Defendants are contesting the jurisdiction of this Court by making allegations about
the nature of the City Council’s November 22 vote and the City’s subsequent actions. Therefore,
to the extent legislative privilege applies, Defendant city councilmembers should not be allowed to
duck Texas’s depositions when their own statements to the Court have created a need for
jurisdictional discovery. The discovery Texas served does not inquire into communications or
11 MR 0327 events that predate enactment and instead delves into public statements and actions that the City
Council took in regard to the Ordinance. Finally, the legislative privilege extends to legislative
matters but no further, so Texas can question Councilmembers Beck and Holland about their
knowledge of post-enactment municipal conduct without nearing privileged territory.
The members of Denton’s police department are able to testify regarding whether their
department has discontinued enforcement of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
All three deponents know whether the steep drop off in marijuana possession arrests and citations
is due to the Ordinance. As the Police Chief, Chief Robledo can testify regarding current
departmental policy and whether the department has altered any of its policies because of the
Ordinance. Further, as chief, she is privy to information about the Ordinance’s impact that police
officers are not. Sgt. Briggs and Lt. Summitt are two long-serving officers on Denton’s police force.
Unlike Chief Robledo, whose tenure has lasted less than two years, they will be able to testify
whether the department’s approach to marijuana enforcement changed during the period
immediately after the Ordinance’s adoption.
Finally, Texas needs to depose Sara Hensley, the City Manager, because Defendants
heavily rely on her statements that the City has not and will not implement the Ordinance. See e.g.
PTJ at 1–2, 8–9, 18; Mot. to Quash and for Protective Order at 9. Additionally, because the
Ordinance directs the City Manager to monitor the police department’s compliance with the
Ordinance’s substantive provisions, the City Manager is in a position to know whether any steps
to effectuate the Ordinance have been taken.
D. This Court should compel Defendants to respond to Texas’s written discovery.
Defendants have impeded Texas’s ability to conduct meaningful discovery by refusing to
provide substantive responses to Texas’s Requests for Production, Interrogatories, and Requests
12 MR 0328 for Admissions. Defendants objected to every definition and discovery request with boilerplate
objections. Shipmon, 68 S.W.3d at 821 (stating that the Rules call for “reasonably tailored
responses to discovery requests” rather than “boiler plate discovery . . . responses.”).
The Parties conferred but were unable to resolve their disagreements. Defendants were
willing to let go of a single objection to only one of Texas’s requests. Texas therefore asks this
Court to overrule Defendants’ objections and compel adequate responses.
Defendants objections and responses are deficient in seven respects, as they are:
(1) boilerplate objections to the propriety of jurisdictional discovery, (2) overbroad, unduly
burdensome, vague, and ambiguous objections, made with zero explanation, (3) improper
definition objections, (4) misleading “subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections”
language, (5) improper assertions of the common interest privilege, (6) boilerplate criminal and
judicial records objections, and (7) objections to clear instructions as to what “Explain” means for
interrogatories. To assist with reviewing these objections, Texas provides the following table listing
each of the above categories of objections indexed to the request they respond to:
Jurisdictional Discovery Objection Interrogatories: 1–22 (all) Requests for Production: 1–24 (all) Requests for Admission: 1–15 (all) Overbroad Objection Interrogatories 7, 20, 21, and Requests for Production 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 Unduly Burdensome Objection Interrogatories 7, 20, 21, and Requests for Production 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. Vague Objection Interrogatories: 2, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 Requests for Production: 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Requests for Admission: 1, 4, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
13 MR 0329 Ambiguous Objection Interrogatories: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 Requests for Production: 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Definitions Objections Request for Production 17, 18 Request for Admissions 13 Subject to and Without Waiving the Foregoing Interrogatories: 3, 4 Objections Language Requests for Production: 1, 2, 4, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24 Requests for Admissions: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 The Common Interest Privilege Objections Interrogatories: 5, 7 Requests for Production: 6 Criminal and Judicial Records Objections Requests for Production: 15, 16, 21, 22, 23 Third Parties Objections Interrogatories: 72
First, Defendants raise the same general objection to every single discovery request
propounded by Texas, refusing to respond because they have a pending Plea to the Jurisdiction
that asserts sovereign immunity. See Table.
Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
See generally, Defs.’ Responses to Texas’s 1st Interrog., Req. for Produc., and Req. for Admis.
2 Defendants withdrew this objection following conference. It is the one agreement to withdraw an objection that Defendants have made at the time this Motion was filed.
14 MR 0330 Texas’s jurisdictional discovery is unobjectionable, as “[t]rial courts considering a plea to
the jurisdiction have broad discretion to allow “reasonable opportunity for targeted discovery”
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 642–43 (Tex. 2012). Defendants do not
have a protective order in place shielding it from Texas’s written discovery, and the mere fact it
has moved for one—twenty-eight days after being served—does not shield them from discovery.
Defendants must comply with their “duty to make a complete response” Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.1, to
Texas’s discovery, and should be compelled to fully answer the discovery requests with all of the
information requested so Texas can prepare its case.
Second, Defendants’ overbroad, unduly burdensome, vague, and ambiguous objections
fail, as a party asserting an objection on this basis must provide specific reasons in support of the
objection. Defendants objected to dozens of discovery requests in this manner. See Table.
Notably, “a responding party who objects to a request for production because is it
overbroad, unduly burdensome, vague, ambiguous, or unreasonably cumulative or duplicative
should explain why the discovery request suffers from each asserted deficiency.” In re Park Cities
Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 876–77 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, no pet.); see also In re K & L Auto Crushers,
LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239, 253 (Tex. 2021) (stating “a party resisting discovery must do more than
make conclusory allegations that the requested discovery is unduly burdensome”) (citation
omitted); In re Volt Power, LLC, No. 12-23-00047-CV, 2023 WL 2804430, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Tyler Apr. 5, 2023) (citation omitted)).
Because Defendants did no more than assert these objections without further explanation,
Texas has not received adequate discovery responses. Defendants however have not described the
burdens that compliance would create nor explained how the requests are disproportionate to the
15 MR 0331 needs of the case. See generally, Exs. D, E, and F. In fact, Defendants have provided no valid
explanation whatsoever to support these objections. Defendants should be compelled to respond
to the discovery requests.
Third, Defendants’ improper definition objections to terms which practically all use the
plain meaning of the word. See Table. Defendants objected to definitions pulled from online
dictionaries on the basis that they gave the terms “legal significance” and were “in conflict with
the plain meaning.” To the extent Defendants have refused to answer requests based on their
objections to definitions, Defendants have shirked their responsibility of a good faith response to
written discovery.
Additionally, Defendants objected to Request for Admissions 13, because it was “vague
and overbroad as to the term training.” Exhibit F at 11. As with Defendants’ other objections,
Defendants did not explain how “training” is objectionable. Exhibit D at 14–15; Exhibit E at 16–
17; Exhibit F at 10–11. The word is used in its ordinary sense in Request for Admissions 13, so it is
not vague. Tellingly, Defendants understood the meaning of “training” in Request for Production
17 and 18, where it appears in nearly identical contexts as Request for Admissions 13. Nor is the
term overbroad just because its plain meaning encompasses a wide range of responsive
information—assuming that is the missing explanation for Defendants’ missing answer. See In re
Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 180 n.1 (“the sheer volume of a discovery request does not
in itself render the request irrelevant or overbroad.”). Defendants should be compelled to
completely answer all the information Texas has requested.
Fourth, Defendants’ misleading use of the “subject to and without waiving the foregoing
objections” objections language prevents Texas from understanding the scope and completeness
16 MR 0332 of Defendants’ response. Defendants’ responses that are “subject to and without waiving the
foregoing objections” violate Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.2, as they do not “state . . . the
extent to which the party is refusing to comply with the request” and state the “factual basis for
the objection,” since they hide necessary context about what information or material is being
provided or withheld. Tex R. Civ. P. 193.2(a), (c). Defendants should be compelled to answer the
discovery requests with all of the information requested by Texas.
Fifth, Defendants’ assertions of the common interest privilege are improper, as public
records demonstrate that Defendants engaged in communications responsive to the discovery
requests that are not privileged, but Defendants declined to produce relevant discovery responses.
The common interest privilege only extends to communications between attorneys
concerning litigation. “[T]he rule, as one of its objectives, creates a privilege for a client to prevent
the disclosure of confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendering of
professional legal services, when such communications are made by the client's lawyer to a lawyer
representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest.” In re
Seigel, 198 S.W.3d 21, 27 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, mandamus, den’d); In re Skiles, 102 S.W.3d
323, 326–27 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 2003, orig. proceeding); In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d
46, 53 (Tex. 2012).
Texas does not seek attorney-to-attorney communications concerning legal representation.
Instead, Texas seeks party-to-party communications concerning relevant facts. That is, City
Manager Sara Hensley indicated that she had communicated with city officials regarding the
Ordinance. See City Council Meeting Transcript, Feb. 21, 2023, 2:56:25–2:58:00 (discussing
meetings between City Manager Hensley and City Managers of Harker Heights, Killeen, and
17 MR 0333 Austin, in addition to meetings between City of Denton Police Officials and San Marcos officials
relating to the Ordinance). These communications are not subject to the common interest
privilege. See id. Moreover, any other communications that are not between lawyers in a pending
action are not subject to the common interest privilege. See id. Defendants should be compelled to
respond to Texas’s discovery requests.
Sixth, Defendants improperly declined to respond to Texas’s written discovery requests,
based on objections to requests for criminal and judicial records, despite Texas notifying
Defendants that it does not seek such records.
After counsel for Texas expressed this clarification to Defendants via a letter of conferral
and video call, Defendants declined to respond to the discovery requests. See Exs. O, P.
Defendants should be compelled to respond.
Seventh, Defendants’ objections to Texas’s Interrogatories to Defendants on the basis that
it would be vague and ambiguous to require Defendants to “Explain” a policy or similar matter fail
as a matter of law, as Texas provided clear guidelines as to what “Explain” means, and attempted
to conference any issues regarding these instructions (Ex. E), but Defendants declined to respond.
See Ex. P.
Defendants’ failure to meaningfully respond to Texas’s discovery requests through
boilerplate objections should not be rewarded. Defendants produced no records, and failed to
meaningfully respond to a single Interrogatory, Request for Production, or Request for Admission.
This Motion to Compel should be granted.
18 MR 0334 E. Defendants have refused to meaningfully confer regarding their opposition to written discovery.
“[P]arties and their attorneys are expected to cooperate in discovery and to make any
agreements reasonably necessary for the efficient disposition of the case.’” In re BP Prod. N. Am.,
Inc., 244 S.W.3d 840, 847–48 (Tex. 2008) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 191.2); In re Scherer, 684 S.W.3d
875, 882 (Tex. App. 2024). “Toward that end, prior to filing a motion to compel or a similar
discovery motion, the parties to the underlying litigation should confer and engage in reasonable
efforts to resolve their disputes without the necessity of, and before seeking, trial court
intervention.” In re Scherer, 684 S.W.3d 875, 882 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). “This
requirement should not be ignored, nor should it be observed in a pro forma fashion.” Id. at 882
(emphasis added).
Notably, “[t]he Rule also provides that, when requesting a hearing relating to discovery or
when filing a discovery motion, a party must certify ‘that a reasonable effort has been made to
resolve the dispute without the necessity of court intervention and the effort failed.’” Id. (citations
omitted); see also Clark v. Clark, 546 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (ruling
that “all discovery motions must contain a certificate of conference stating that ‘reasonable efforts’
were used to resolve the pending dispute without the need for court intervention.”). Here,
Defendants declined to meaningfully confer in two respects.
First, Defendants did not attempt to meet and confer regarding Defendants’ Motion to
Quash and Motion for Protection from Deposition Notices. Instead, they broadly asserted that
jurisdictional discovery would not be appropriate, so “we do not see the need for further discussion
of schedule or logistics as to the depositions the plaintiff may seek.” See Ex. N. Failing to meet and
confer, Defendants asserted that no jurisdictional discovery would be appropriate. See id.
19 MR 0335 As to the depositions, Defendants failed to provide alternative dates. When a party seeks
protection from the time or place of discovery, “the person must state a reasonable time and place
for discovery with which the person will comply.” In re Mulacek, No. 09-22-00341-CV, 2023 WL
313218, at *6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 19, 2023, no pet.). Defendants did not do so. Instead,
they avoided this requirement to meet and confer, indicating that “Defendants are unavailable to
attend the Depositions at the times on which these Depositions have been set.” See Defs.’ Mot. to
Quash and Mot. for Protection from Dep. Notices at 14.
Second, Defendants did not conference any of their motions with Texas. Because they
never attempted to meet and confer, Defendants did not include a certificate of conference with
either motion, notifying the Court that it made “a reasonable effort . . . to resolve the dispute
without the necessity of court intervention.” In re BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d 840, 848
(Tex. 2008) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 191.2). This failure renders these motions defective and adds
another reason for this Court to grant the State’s Motion to Compel and deny Defendants’ Motion
to Quash and Motions for Protective Order.
F. Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash is defective because Defendants did not propose alternative dates.
In their Motion to Quash and Motion for Protection from Deposition Notices, Defendants rely
on Rule 199.4’s automatic stay provision to suspend Texas’s depositions without proposing
alternative dates for the depositions. Rule 199.4 automatically freezes depositions when the noticed
parties “object to the time and place designated for an oral deposition.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 199.4.
However, Defendants failed to identify “a reasonable time and place for discovery with
which the person will comply” as required by Rule 192.6 whenever “a person seeks protection
regarding the time or place of discovery”. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6(b). “A movant seeking protection
20 MR 0336 regarding the time or place of discovery must state a reasonable time and place for discovery with
which it will comply.” In re Berrenberg, 605 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020); Mulacek,
No. 09-22-00341-CV, 2023 WL 313218 at *6. And the Rule’s requirement to offer alternate dates
still applies when a party styles its protective motion a “motion to quash.” See e.g., Grass v. Golden,
153 S.W.3d 659, 662–63 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004); Medlin v. King, No. 08-24-00001-CV, 2024
WL 3845970 at *7 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2024, no pet.).
Defendants objected “to the date and time for the Depositions because counsel for the
Defendants are unavailable to attend the Depositions at the times on which these Depositions have
been set,” but did not provide substitute dates. Motion to Quash and for Protective Order at 14.
Consequently, their Motion fails Rule 192.6. Failure to propose replacement dates and times is an
independent reason to deny Defendants’ Motion. Cf. Grass v. Golden, 153 S.W.3d at 663; see also
Carswell v. Christus Health, No. 2005-36179 165th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Jan 19, 2006)
(ordering production of witnesses for deposition because “Defendant’s motions to Quash . . . fail
to comply with Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6(a) in that they fail to state a reasonable time or place for the
deposition with which the party will comply.”).
Defendants’ Motion has stymied Texas’s efforts to investigate the claims raised in their
Jurisdictional Plea without even complying with the Rules. The Court should deny Defendants’
defective Motion.
G. Defendants’ protective motions fail to show undue burden.
Generally, the party requesting a protective order holds the burden of demonstrating a
particularized or identifiable injury through specific facts in support thereof. Specifically, “a party
resisting discovery cannot prevail simply by making conclusory allegations that the requested
21 MR 0337 discovery is unduly burdensome or unnecessarily harassing.” In Matter of Issuance of Subpoenas
Depositions of Bennett, 502 S.W.3d 373, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016) (citing Garcia
v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex.1987)); Martinez, 52 S.W.3d at 432; Masinga, 792 S.W.2d at
940–41. A court has discretion to issue a protective order to protect a party from undue burden,
unnecessary expense, harassment, or annoyance. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6(b).
Here, Defendants filed an evidence-based plea to the jurisdiction, utilizing hand-selected
jurisdictional evidence to persuade this court that it does not have jurisdiction, but at the same time, asks
this court to prevent Texas from seeking its jurisdictional discovery. They provide no evidence-based
reasoning as to why jurisdictional discovery should not be permitted.
Defendants raise five arguments that all fail to satisfy the standard for a protective order:
(1) jurisdictional questions are undisputed, (2) “[t]he discovery sought is best obtained not from
the testimony of any individual councilmember, the City Manager, the Chief of Police, or the
individual police officers, but from the relevant public records,” (3) “[t]he burden and expense of
preparing witnesses for depositions and defending same outweighs the likely benefit given the
needs of the case and the limited scope of the questions before this court,” (4) because
“[d]efendants filed an evidentiary plea to the jurisdiction, [t]he State has the burden to plead a
claim for which the City’s and Officials’ immunity is waived,” and (5) that Defendants have not
pled ultra vires actions, so “there is no good reason for delaying a decision on the issue of immunity
implicated by the pending pleadings.”
First, despite Defendants’ contentions, jurisdictional facts are disputed. In fact,
Defendants have placed them in dispute by alleging that Denton and its officials have not taken any
action to decriminalize marijuana, despite having a decriminalization ordinance on the books.
22 MR 0338 Texas has served discovery, for example, concerning the: (1) sharp decline in marijuana
enforcement in the City of Denton in 2023, (2) public statements by city council that the City of
Denton Ordinance is effective, and (3) public statements from the City of Denton Mayor even as
recent as September, stating that the City of Denton has decriminalized marijuana through the
Ordinance. City Council Sess. Nov. 22, 2022, Tr. at 41:48, 55:43; Council Sess. Feb. 21, 2023, Tr.
at 2:51:11; City Council Sess. Jun. 6, 2023, Tr. at 05:18:20; City Council Sess. Sept. 24, 2024, Tr.
at 01:00:03.
Since jurisdictional facts are hotly contested, seeking discovery that inquires into
jurisdictional facts cannot by itself be objectionable, so Defendants’ first argument fails.
Second, Defendants’ argument that “the discovery sought is best obtained not from the
testimony of any individual councilmember, the City Manager, the Chief of Police, or the
individual police officers, but from the relevant public records,” fails for two key reasons. First,
Texas seeks discovery of jurisdictional facts beyond the municipal records and affidavits produced
by Defendants in this case. See Exs. A, B, C, G, H, I, J, K, and L. Texas seeks to determine, inter
alia, the factual basis behind Denton’s dramatic decline in post-ordinance marijuana possession,
and both the mayor and a council member’s statements indicating that the Ordinance has been
adopted and is currently being implemented. See Exs. A, B, and C. Second, Texas seeks depositions
to test the allegations in Defendants’ carefully curated declarations. The need for these depositions
is sharpened by the inconsistency in public statements made by Denton officials, including several
defendants, concerning the status of the Ordinance. Defendants should not be able to substitute an
incomplete factual record for Texas’s sought depositions.
23 MR 0339 Third, Defendants’ argument that the “burden and expense of preparing witnesses for
depositions and defending same outweighs the likely benefit given the needs of the case and the
limited scope of the questions before this court,” does not speak to the standard for seeking
discovery protection. Defendants must show that the discovery sought is “only for an improper
purpose,” because “unless [discovery] is an undue burden, the trial court cannot limit the
deposition on these bases.” Bennett, 502 S.W.3d at 380–81 (citing In re Amaya, 34 S.W.3d 354, 358
(Tex.App.--Waco 2001, orig. proceeding)). Nor are conclusory recitations of undue burden or
expense, annoyance, improper purpose, or harassment sufficient to obtain a protective order. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6(b). “The Supreme Court of Texas has made it clear that supporting evidence
is essential.” Bennett, 502 S.W.3d at 81.
However, Defendants base their requests for protection almost entirely on their objection
to the relevance of jurisdictional discovery without advancing separate reasons why Texas’s
discovery is improper. Defendants filed a jurisdiction motion based on evidence and now refuse to
provide responses to jurisdictional discovery requests. Any burden or expense of preparing for
depositions and defending them are greatly outweighed by the need for this discovery, particularly
in light of Defendants’ actions and statements regarding implementation.
Fourth, Defendants contend that because they “filed an evidentiary plea to the jurisdiction,
[t]he State has the burden to plead a claim for which the City’s and Officials’ immunity is waived
and Texas has not pled facts overcoming the Plea,” so jurisdictional discovery should not be
permitted.
Plaintiffs do have an initial burden to plead sufficient facts to overcome a governmental
defendant’s sovereign immunity. See Mission, 372 S.W.3d at 635. And Texas did so by alleging that
24 MR 0340 “[t]he City of Denton.. adopted an ordinance designed to eliminate marijuana enforcement,
knowing full well that ‘the City does not have the authority to implement’ the Ordinance,” and
that “[t]he Denton City Council codified and published the ordinance.” Orig. Pet. at 14. Texas
noted that “[b]ecause the Ordinance violates section 370.003 of the Local Government Code,
Defendants ‘may not adopt’ it.” Id. at 8. Texas also included statements from the City Manager,
indicating that “[t]he Police Department will continue to assess all aspects of this Ordinance, as
passed by voters, to determine what may be implemented,” as well as the City Manager, who
promised to “report to Council within three months’ time regarding its implementation. Orig. Pet.
at 16,18.
Then, Defendants contested Texas’s allegations by filing an evidence-based Plea to the
Jurisdiction. “[C]ourts should allow [a] reasonable opportunity for targeted discovery if necessary
to illuminate jurisdictional facts in a plea to the jurisdiction.” Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State,
381 S.W.3d 468, 491 (Tex. 2012). Defendants have ensured that such is the case here.
Fifth, because jurisdictional facts are in dispute, the Court should not heed Defendants’
suggestion that their sovereign immunity must be decided now. Defendants provide little reasoning
to support this argument.
Texas has brought claims against Defendants for ultra vires actions, which constitute an
exception to Defendants’ sovereign immunity, so both the ultra vires acts and the sovereign
immunity defense are subject to jurisdictional discovery. See e.g., Mission, 372 S.W.3d at 635-37,
643 (holding that discovery targeted to the question of sovereign immunity was proper).
The Rules place the burden on the party resisting discovery, here Defendants, to
demonstrate an undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment, or annoyance. See Tex. R. Civ.
25 MR 0341 P. 192.6(b). Defendants have failed to do so. As a result, Texas should be afforded its discovery,
and the Motions for Protective Order should be denied.
PRAYER Defendants have and continue to impede Texas’s ability to investigate jurisdictional facts
by refusing to submit to oral and written jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiff, the State of Texas, by
and through the Office of the Attorney General, asks that this Court compel the depositions of:
(1) Councilmember Brian Beck, (2) Councilmember Joe Holland, (3) City Manager Sara Hensley,
(4) Police Chief Jessica Robledo, (5) City of Denton Police Sgt. Daryn Briggs, and (6) City of
Denton Police Lt. Chris Summitt, and Defendants’ written discovery responses.
Texas also prays that (1) Defendants’ objections to Texas’s discovery requests be overruled,
(2) that Defendants’ Motion to Quash and Motions for Protective Order be denied, (3) and that
the Court order Defendants to fully respond to Texas’s discovery requests within seven days.
Date: October 17, 2024 Respectfully submitted, KEN PAXTON Attorney General BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General RALPH MOLINA Deputy First Assistant Attorney General AUSTIN KINGHORN Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division /s/ Jacob E. Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 KYLE S. TEBO
26 MR 0342 Special Counsel Texas State Bar No. 24137691 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
27 MR 0343 CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE I hereby certify that on October 17, 2024, the undersigned attorney conferred with Mr. Joe De La Fuente, counsel for defendants via electronic mail regarding the substance of this Motion. Defendants are opposed to Texas’s Motion. /s/ Jacob E. Przada JACOB E. PRZADA Special Counsel
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on October 17, 2024, a true and correct copy of the above and forgoing document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com Jose (Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com Mack Reinwand mackreinwand@cityofdenton.com Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
/s/ Jacob E. Przada JACOB E. PRZADA Special Counsel
28 MR 0344 INDEX OF EXHIBITS Exhibit A Texas’s Interrogatories to Defendants, August 30, 2024
Exhibit B Texas’s Requests for Production to Defendants, August 30, 2024
Exhibit C Texas’s Requests for Admissions to Defendants, August 30, 2024
Exhibit D Defendants’ Responses to Texas’s Interrogatories to Defendants, September 30, 2024
Exhibit E Defendants’ Responses to Texas’s Requests for Production to Defendants, September 30, 2024
Exhibit F Defendants’ Responses to Texas’s Requests for Admissions to Defendants, September 30, 2024
Exhibit G Deposition Notice – Brian Beck, September 13, 2024
Exhibit H Deposition Notice – Joe Holland, September 13, 2024
Exhibit I Deposition Notice – Sara Hensley, September 13, 2024
Exhibit J Deposition Notice – Jessica Robledo, September 13, 2024
Exhibit K Deposition Notice – Daryn Briggs, September 13, 2024
Exhibit L Deposition Notice – Chris Summit, September 13, 2024
Exhibit M Email from Defense Counsel, August 22, 2024
Exhibit N Email from Defense Counsel, September 13, 2024
Exhibit O Texas’s Discovery Deficiency Letter to Defendants, October 4, 2024
Exhibit P Email from Defense Counsel, October 14, 2024
29 MR 0345 Exhibit A
Texas’s Interrogatories to Defendants August 30, 2024
MR 0346 Exhibit A Page 1 of 13
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANTS
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
Plaintiff, the State of Texas, serves these Interrogatories on Defendants, as allowed by Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 197. Defendants must answer each interrogatory separately, fully, in
writing, and under oath, within 30 days after service.
MR 0347 Exhibit A Page 2 of 13
Date: August 30, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON /S/ Jacob Przada Attorney General of Texas JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 First Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RALPH MOLINA TEXAS Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station AUSTIN KINGHORN Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy Telephone: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 30, 2024, a true and correct copy of this document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Jose ( Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel
2 MR 0348 Exhibit A Page 3 of 13
INSTRUCTIONS
For any requested information about a document that no longer exists or cannot be located, identify the document, state how and when it passed out of existence or when it could no longer be located, and give the reasons for the disappearance. Also, identify each person having knowledge about the disposition or loss, and identify each document evidencing the existence or nonexistence of each document that cannot be located.
DEFINITIONS 1. “Plaintiff,” or “Defendant,” as well as a party’s full or abbreviated name or a pronoun referring to a party, means the party, and when applicable, the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney. 2. “You” or “your” means: (1) The City of Denton, (2) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (3) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (4) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (5) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (6) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (7) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At-Large, (8) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, (9) Defendant Sara Hensley, City Manager of Denton, and (10) Defendant Jessica Robledo, Interim-Chief of Police of Denton, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
3 MR 0349 Exhibit A Page 4 of 13
3. “Document” means any writing of any kind, source, or authorship, regardless of how it may be recorded, stored, or reproduced. The term includes both originals and all non- identical copies thereof, as well as all drafts, revisions, and amendments, regardless of whether adopted. The term also includes but is not limited to handwritten, typewritten, printed, photocopied, photographic, and electronically recorded matter. For purposes of illustration and not limitation, the term includes: contracts, agreements, communications, reports, charges, complaints, correspondence, letters, emails, social media postings, telegrams, memoranda, applications, summaries or records of telephone conversations, summaries or records of personal conversations or interviews, journals, diaries, schedules, charts, graphs, worksheets, spreadsheets, reports, notebooks, note charts, handwritten notes, plans, drawings, sketches, maps, brochures, pamphlets, advertisements, circulars, press releases, summaries or records of meetings or conferences, summaries or reports or records of investigations or negotiations, opinions or reports of consultants, bills, statements, invoices, affidavits, schedules, audio recordings, video recordings, transcriptions, and photographs. 4. “Statement” means any written or graphic assertion or representation signed, adopted, or approved by the person making it, or any stenographic, mechanical, electronic, or other record or transcription that is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded. 5. “Communication” means any conveyance or transfer of any information from one person to another by any means or in any form, including but not limited to all types of documents, oral communications, and online resources such as social media. 6. “Electronic or magnetic data” means electronic information that is stored in a medium from which it can be retrieved and examined. The term refers to the original (or identical duplicate when the original is not available) and any other copies of the data that may have attached comments, notes, marks, or highlighting of any kind. Electronic or magnetic data includes, but is not limited to, the following: computer programs; operating systems; computer activity logs; programming notes or instructions; e-mail receipts, messages, or transmissions; output resulting from the use of any software program, including word-processing documents, spreadsheets, database files, charts, graphs, and outlines; metadata; PIF and PDF files; batch files; deleted files; temporary files; Internet- or web-browser-generated information stored in textual, graphical, or
4 MR 0350 Exhibit A Page 5 of 13
audio format, including history files, caches, and cookies, and any miscellaneous files or file fragments. Electronic or magnetic data includes any items stored on magnetic, optical, digital, or other electronic-storage media, such as hard drives, floppy disks, CD-ROMs, DVDs, tapes, smart cards, integrated-circuit cards (e.g., SIM cards), removable media (e.g., Zip drives, Jaz cartridges), microfiche, punched cards. Electronic or magnetic data also includes the file, folder, tabs, containers, and labels attached to or associated with any physical storage device with each original or copy. 7. “Possession, custody, or control” of an item means that the person either has physical possession of the item or has a right to possession equal or superior to that of the person who has physical possession of the item. 8. “Person” means any natural person, corporation, firm, association, partnership, joint venture, proprietorship, governmental body, or any other organization, business, or legal entity, and all predecessors or successors in interest. 9. “Mobile device” means any cellular telephone, satellite telephone, pager, personal digital assistant, handheld computer, walkie-talkie, or any combination of these devices. 10. “Police Directive” or “General Order” means an official written order or instruction by the City of Denton Police Department, its Chief, or Police Administration. 11. “Identify” or “describe,” when referring to a person, means you must state the following: 1. The full name. 2. The present or last known office address and office telephone number. 3. The occupation, job title, employer, and employer’s address at the time of the event or period referred to in each particular interrogatory.
4. In the case of any entity, the identity of the officer, employee, or agent most closely connected with the subject matter of the interrogatory and the officer who is responsible for supervising that officer or employee. 12. “Identify” “describe,” or “explain” when referring to document or policy, means you must state the following: 1. The nature of the document (e.g., letter, handwritten note).
5 MR 0351 Exhibit A Page 6 of 13
2. The title or heading that appears on the document. 3. The date of the document and the date of each addendum, supplement, or other addition or change. 4. The identities of the author, signer of the document, and person on whose behalf or at whose request or direction the document was prepared or delivered. 5. The present location of the document and the name, address, position or title, and telephone number of the person or persons having custody of the document. 6. A summary of the contents of the document. 13. “Tetrahydrocannabinol” (hereinafter, “THC”), means the primary psychoactive component in marijuana, hashish, and other preparations derived from cannabis plants, especially Cannabis sativa, or produced synthetically. 14. “Marijuana” means the plant Cannabis sativa L., and any preparation thereof, excluding Hemp. 15. “Codification” means the process of collecting, organizing, and consolidating local government ordinances and regulations into a comprehensive document. 16. “Adoption” means passage of a measure into law. 17. “Implementation” means placing an ordinance into effect. 18. “Policy” means a law, regulation, procedure, administrative action, incentive, or voluntary practice of governments and other institutions, written or unwritten. 19. “City Staff” means all employees of the City. 20. “City of Denton” means the City of Denton, located at 601 East Hickory Street, Denton, Texas 76205, and all agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under its control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney 21. “Enforce” means compel observance of or compliance with a law, rule, or obligation. 22. “Media Personnel” means members of the media and press, associated with broadcast and narrowcast mediums, including radio, television, newspapers, magazines, journals, and the internet.
6 MR 0352 Exhibit A Page 7 of 13
23. “The Cities” means, when applicable, a municipality, including agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney. 24. “City Council” means: (1) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (2) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (3) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (4) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (5) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (6) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At-Large, (7) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries. 25. All undefined terms and phrases have not only the meaning ascribed to them by ordinary custom and usage, but also the meaning ascribed to them by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.
7 MR 0353 Exhibit A Page 8 of 13
INTERROGATORIES
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 1: Identify all documents utilized to assist in any way with the preparation of the answers to each of the interrogatories.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 2: Explain the process to change, adopt, or implement a different policy or ordinance than a policy or ordinance currently codified, adopted, or implemented by the City of Denton.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 3: Identify every person who has firsthand factual information about this case, rebuttal or impeachment evidence in this case, or who is expected testify in this case, including your experts or rebuttal witnesses, and provide a brief statement of each individual’s connection with the case. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 4: State the legal theories and describe in general the factual bases for your defenses. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(j), 197.1.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul
8 MR 0354 Exhibit A Page 9 of 13
Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 5: Identify any City of Denton employees and third-parties, including the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killen, Austin, and San Marcos, and media personnel with whom you discussed codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 6: If you contend that the Marijuana Ordinance can, or cannot be changed to comply with the City Charter, Ordinance, or a policy, state the factual basis for your claim and identify all documents relied on for your response.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 7: Identify any documented changes in Marijuana use since the Marijuana Ordinance took effect, including but not limited to any documented changes occurring at the Denton Independent School District, or in connection to City of Denton Police citations and arrests or traffic and pedestrian stops.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 8: Identify how many times the Marijuana Ordinance has been enforced and identify the individuals whom the Marijuana Ordinance has been enforced against.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: Sara Hensley and Jessica Robledo
9 MR 0355 Exhibit A Page 10 of 13
INTERROGATORY 9: Identify all jobs to which you have applied from August 30, 2022 to Present, including the name of the employer, its location, and the ultimate outcome of your application for that job.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 10: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to funding for THC testing that was in effect during the period spanning February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 11: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to funding for THC testing that has been in effect during the period spanning November 22, 2022, to Present.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 12: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to the use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause that was in effect during the period spanning February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 13: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to the use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause that has been in effect during the period spanning November 22, 2022, to Present.
10 MR 0356 Exhibit A Page 11 of 13
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 14: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 15: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 16: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 17: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
11 MR 0357 Exhibit A Page 12 of 13
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 18: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 19: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 20: Identify all inquiries by the public about confusion relating to codification, implementation, or adoption of the City of Denton’s Marijuana Ordinance.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANT: Sara Hensley and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 21: Identify all documents relied upon in developing the current City of Denton Police Department Policy and Police Directive or General Orders relating to misdemeanor-level marijuana offenses.
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 22: If you have ever been convicted of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, state the nature of the charge and the date and place of arrest and conviction. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(B), 609(a).
12 MR 0358 Exhibit A Page 13 of 13
Answer: ___________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
13 MR 0359 Exhibit B
Texas’s Requests for Production to Defendants August 30, 2024
MR 0360 Exhibit B Page 1 of 10
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANTS
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
Plaintiff, the State of Texas, serves these Requests for Production on Defendants, as allowed
by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196. Defendants must produce all requested documents (as they
are kept in the ordinary course of business or organized and labeled to correspond with categories
in each request) for inspection and copying, not more than 30 days after service, at P.O. Box 12548,
Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711-2548.
.
MR 0361 Exhibit B Page 2 of 10
Date: August 30, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON /S/ Jacob Przada Attorney General of Texas JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 First Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RALPH MOLINA TEXAS Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station AUSTIN KINGHORN Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy Telephone.: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 30, 2024, a true and correct copy of this document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Jose ( Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel
2 MR 0362 Exhibit B Page 3 of 10
INSTRUCTIONS
1. Answer each request for documents separately by listing the documents and by describing them as defined below. If documents produced in response to this request are numbered for production, in each response provide both the information that identifies the document and the document’s number.
2. For a document that no longer exists or that cannot be located, identify the document, state how and when it passed out of existence or could no longer be located, and the reasons for the disappearance. Also, identify each person having knowledge about the disposition or loss of the document, and identify any other document evidencing the lost document’s existence or any facts about the lost document.
a. When identifying the document, you must state the following:
(1) The nature of the document (e.g., letter, handwritten note).
(2) The title or heading that appears on the document.
(3) The date of the document and the date of each addendum, supplement, or other addition or change.
(4) The identities of the author, signer of the document, and person on whose behalf or at whose request or direction the document was prepared or delivered.
b. When identifying the person, you must state the following:
(1) The full name.
(2) The present or last known address and telephone number.
3. These requests for Production are deemed to be continuing and you have a duty under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to amend your responses to these requests if you obtain information upon the basis of which: (1) you know that an answer was incorrect when made, or (2) you know that any answer, though correct when made, is no longer correct, true or complete, and circumstances are such that a failure to amend the answer is in substance a knowing concealment.
4. If you believe that any written discovery is requesting privileged information, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193, the party must state: (1) that the information or material responsive to request has been withheld, (2) the request to which the information or material relates, (3) the privilege or privileges asserted, and (4) a description of the documents, communications, or tangible things not being disclosed.
5. These Requests for Production are directed to all Defendants named in this lawsuit.
3 MR 0363 Exhibit B Page 4 of 10
DEFINITIONS
1. “Plaintiff” or “Defendant,” as well as a party’s full or abbreviated name or a pronoun referring to a party, means the party, and when applicable, the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
2. “You” or “your” means: (1) The City of Denton, (2) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (3) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (4) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (5) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (6) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (7) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At- Large, (8) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, (9) Defendant Sara Hensley, City Manager of Denton, and (10) Defendant Jessica Robledo, Interim-Chief of Police of Denton, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
3. “Document” means all written, typed, or printed matter and all magnetic, electronic, or other records or documentation of any kind or description in your actual possession, custody, or control, including those in the possession, custody, or control of any and all present or former directors, officers, employees, consultants, accountants, attorneys, or other agents, whether or not prepared by you, that constitute or contain matters relevant to the subject matter of the action. “Document” includes, but is not limited to, the following: letters, reports, charts, diagrams, correspondence, telegrams, memoranda, notes, records, minutes, contracts, agreements, records or notations of telephone or personal conversations or conferences, interoffice communications, e-mail, microfilm, bulletins, circulars, pamphlets, photographs, faxes, invoices, tape recordings, computer printouts, drafts, résumés, logs, and worksheets.
4. “Communication” means any oral or written communication of which Defendants have knowledge, information, or belief.
5. “Electronic or magnetic data” means electronic information that is stored in a medium from which it can be retrieved and examined. The term refers to the original (or identical duplicate when the original is not available) and any other copies of the data that may have attached comments, notes, marks, or highlighting of any kind. Electronic or magnetic data includes, but is not limited to, the following: computer programs; operating systems; computer activity logs; programming notes or instructions; e-mail receipts, messages, or transmissions; output resulting from the use of any software program, including word-processing documents, spreadsheets, database files, charts, graphs, and outlines; metadata; PIF and PDF files; batch files; deleted files; temporary files; Internet- or web-browser-generated information stored in textual, graphical, or audio format, including history files, caches, and cookies; and any miscellaneous files or file fragments. Electronic or magnetic data includes any items stored on magnetic, optical, digital, or other electronic-storage media, such as hard drives, floppy disks,
4 MR 0364 Exhibit B Page 5 of 10
CD-ROMs, DVDs, tapes, smart cards, integrated-circuit cards (e.g., SIM cards), removable media (e.g., Zip drives, Jaz cartridges), microfiche, punched cards. Electronic or magnetic data also includes the file, folder, tabs, containers, and labels attached to or associated with any physical storage device with each original or copy.
6. “Possession, custody, or control” of an item means that the person either has physical possession of the item or has a right to possession equal or superior to that of the person who has physical possession of the item.
7. “Person” means any natural person, corporation, firm, association, partnership, joint venture, proprietorship, governmental body, or any other organization, business, or legal entity, and all predecessors or successors.
8. “Mobile device” means any cellular telephone, satellite telephone, pager, personal digital assistant, handheld computer, walkie-talkie, or any combination of these devices.
9. “The Cities” means, when applicable, a municipality, including agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
10. “Law Enforcement” means a public agency charged with policing functions, including any of its component bureaus, and when applicable, the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
11. “City Council” means: (1) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (2) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (3) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (4) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (5) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (6) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At-Large, (7) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
12. “Marijuana” means the plant Cannabis sativa L., and any preparation thereof, excluding Hemp.
13. “The Marijuana Ordinance” means Chapter 21 – Offenses, Article V - Marijuana Enforcement of the City of Denton Code of Ordinance, Proposition B to the November 8, 2022 City of Denton Election, and the Voter Initiative Petition preceding the Proposition.
14. “Public Health Statistics” mean numbers that summarize information related to health.
5 MR 0365 Exhibit B Page 6 of 10
15. “Disciplinary Statistics” mean numbers that summarize information related to officer discipline.
16. “Enforcement” means ensuring that individuals obey a law.
17. “Policy” means a law, regulation, procedure, administrative action, incentive, or voluntary practice of governments and other institutions.
18. “Memorandum” means a brief written message or report from one person or department in an organization to another.
19. “Public” means individuals within the City of Denton.
20. “Police Directive” or “General Order” means an official written order or instruction by the City of Denton Police Department, its Chief, or Police Administration.
21. “Social Media Posts” refer to a short-form message or content that is published on social media platforms on the official or personal account of any Defendant, including but not limited to Instagram, Facebook, Meta, Twitter, X, TikTok, YouTube, LinkedIn and Reddit.
22. “Demonstrative” means a visual, graphic, or sound aid used to explain or illustrate a witness’s testimony or presentation.
23. “Violation” means an action that breaks or goes against a law, regulation, ordinance, policy, or memorandum, including the Marijuana Ordinance or any related policy or memorandum.
24. “Ground Game Texas” refers to the dismissed Intervenor-Defendant in State of Texas v. City of Austin, et. al., D-1-GN-24-000586 (419th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Jun. 12, 2024), and the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the parties or under the parties’ control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
25. “Decriminalize Denton” refers to the dismissed Intervenor-Defendants in this suit and the parties’ agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the parties or under the parties’ control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
26. “Supporting” means seek to influence a politician or government official on an issue.
27. “Paraphernalia” means equipment, a product, or material that is used or intended for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, or concealing a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health
6 MR 0366 Exhibit B Page 7 of 10
and Safety Code, or in injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
28. “Marijuana use” means the smoking, eating, drinking, or inhaling of marijuana.
29. “Tetrahydrocannabinol” (hereinafter, “THC”), means the primary psychoactive component in marijuana, hashish, and other preparations derived from cannabis plants, especially Cannabis sativa, or produced synthetically.
30. “Codification” means the process of collecting, organizing, and consolidating local government ordinances and regulations into a comprehensive document.
31. “Adoption” means passage of a measure into law.
32. “Implementation” means placing an ordinance into effect.
33. “Media” means members of the media and press, associated with broadcast and narrowcast mediums, including radio, television, newspapers, magazines, journals, and the internet.
34. “Reprioritization” means the process of rearranging priorities based on their importance and urgency.
35. All undefined terms and phrases have not only the meaning ascribed to them by ordinary custom and usage, but also the meaning ascribed to them by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.
7 MR 0367 Exhibit B Page 8 of 10
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST 1: Produce all communications and documents sent or received by you, from November 2, 2021 to Present, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance, including communications in which you were copied.
REQUEST 2: Produce all policies or memoranda created by you, from November 2, 2021 to Present, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
REQUEST 3: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and citizens groups, including Ground Game Texas, Decriminalize Denton, any parties supporting the Marijuana Ordinance, or their agents, employees, or representatives, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 4: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the public relating to enforcement of the Marijuana Ordinance and the Marijuana laws of the State of Texas.
REQUEST 5: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and law enforcement or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 6: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killen, Austin, and San Marcos or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 7: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killen, Austin, and San Marcos or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of a Marijuana Ordinance by the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killen, Austin, and San Marcos from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 8: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Denton Independent School District, or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 9: Produce all disciplinary statistics relating to violations of the Marijuana Ordinance or any related policy or memorandum by employees of the City of Denton Police Department from November 22, 2022 to Present.
8 MR 0368 Exhibit B Page 9 of 10
REQUEST 10: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and employees of the City of Denton Police Department or their agents, and representatives regarding reprioritization of Marijuana enforcement, including misdemeanor marijuana possession or misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia offenses from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 11: Produce all copies of communications or documents within your possession relating to the City of Denton Police Administration’s demonstrative of marijuana at a City Council meeting from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 12: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Denton County Public Health District or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding marijuana use in the City of Denton from November 2, 2021 to Present.
REQUEST 13: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to funding by the City of Denton or the City of Denton Police Department for THC testing from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
REQUEST 14: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to funding by the City of Denton or the City of Denton Police Department for THC testing from November 22, 2022 to Present.
REQUEST 15: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
REQUEST 16: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia from November 22, 2022 to Present.
REQUEST 17: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
REQUEST 18: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance from November 22, 2022 to Present.
REQUEST 19: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
REQUEST 20: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause from November 22, 2022 to Present.
9 MR 0369 Exhibit B Page 10 of 10
REQUEST 21: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
REQUEST 22: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses from November 22, 2022 to Present.
REQUEST 23: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia, where the subject expressed that they thought it was lawful to possess marijuana or marijuana paraphernalia, from November 22, 2022 to Present.
REQUEST 24: Produce all communications and documents sent by you, your attorneys, or agents, employees, or representatives to the media regarding the Marijuana Ordinance or this lawsuit from November 2, 2021 to Present.
10 MR 0370 Exhibit C
Texas’s Requests for Admissions to Defendants August 30, 2024
MR 0371 Exhibit C Page 1 of 9
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO DEFENDANTS
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
Plaintiff, the State of Texas, serves these Requests for Admission on Defendants, as allowed
by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 198. Defendants must respond to the following Requests for
Admission within thirty (30) days after service and supplement all responses in accordance with
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
.
MR 0372 Exhibit C Page 2 of 9
Date: August 30, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON /S/ Jacob Przada Attorney General of Texas JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 First Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RALPH MOLINA TEXAS Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station AUSTIN KINGHORN Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy Telephone: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 30, 2024, a true and correct copy of this document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Jose ( Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel
2 MR 0373 Exhibit C Page 3 of 9
INSTRUCTIONS
1. Unless otherwise specified, the time period covered by any Request for Admission (“admission” or “admissions,” as applicable) is from November 2, 2021, through the present.
2. Pursuant to Rule 198 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (TRCP) you are required to serve a separate response to each of the following Requests for Admission. Each matter is admitted without the necessity of a court order, unless, on or before thirty (30) days after service of these requests, you serve upon attorneys for Plaintiff a written answer or objection addressed to each request, signed by you or your attorney.
3. If you deny a matter on which an admission is requested, your denial must fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires you to qualify your answer or deny only the part of the matter on which the admission is requested, you must specify so much of the matter as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. You may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failing to admit or deny a matter unless you state that you have made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or easily obtainable by you is insufficient to enable you to admit or deny the matter.
4. The singular shall be construed to include the plural, and the plural shall be construed to include the singular, as necessary to bring within the scope of each Request all responses that might otherwise be construed outside its scope.
5. The connectives “and” and “or” and the phrase “and/or” shall be construed disjunctively or conjunctively as necessary to bring within the scope of each Request all responses that might otherwise be construed outside its scope.
6. The use of any past, present, or future tense of any verb shall not be construed to limit or otherwise modify the time period covered by these Requests. Each Request should be read to include the past, present, or future tense of any verb as necessary to bring within the scope of each Request all responses that might otherwise be construed outside its scope.
3 MR 0374 Exhibit C Page 4 of 9
DEFINITIONS
1. “Plaintiff” or “defendant,” as well as a party’s full or abbreviated name or a pronoun referring to a party, means the party, and when applicable, the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
2. “You” or “your” means: (1) The City of Denton, (2) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (3) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (4) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (5) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (6) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (7) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At- Large, (8) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, (9) Defendant Sara Hensley, City Manager of Denton, and (10) Defendant Jessica Robledo, Interim-Chief of Police of Denton as well as, successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
3. “Communication” means any exchange or transmission of words or ideas to another person or an entity, including without limitation, conversations, discussions, letters, memoranda, interoffice communication platforms, social media platforms, instant messaging programs, meetings, notes, speeches, or other transfers of information, whether written, oral, or by any other means, whether direct or indirect, formal or informal, and includes any document which abstracts, digests, transcribes, or records any such communication.
4. “And/or,” “and,” and “or” refer to all listed categories inclusively, not exclusively (i.e., not the option of producing one group of documents, or another, nor of producing documents for one group of the listed persons or entities, but not others).
5. “Document” and “documents” mean all documents and tangible things, in the broadest sense allowed by Rule 192.3(b) and comment 2 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
6. “Possession” means actual care, custody, control, or management.
7. “Marijuana” means the plant Cannabis sativa L., and any preparation thereof, excluding Hemp.
8. “Paraphernalia” means equipment, a product, or material that is used or intended for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, or concealing a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, or in injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
4 MR 0375 Exhibit C Page 5 of 9
9. “Memorandum” means a brief written message or report from one person or department in an organization to another.
10. “Codification” means the process of collecting, organizing, and consolidating local government ordinances and regulations into a comprehensive document.
11. “Adoption” means passage of a measure into law.
12. “Implementation” means placing an ordinance into effect.
13. “City Council” means: (1) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (2) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (3) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (4) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (5) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (6) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At-Large, (7) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
14. “City of Denton Police Department” means the City of Denton Police Department, located at 601 E Hickory St, Denton, TX 76205.
15. “The Marijuana Ordinance” means Chapter 21 – Offenses, Article V - Marijuana Enforcement of the City of Denton Code of Ordinance, Proposition B to the November 8, 2022, City of Denton Election, and the Voter Initiative Petition preceding the Proposition.
16. All undefined terms and phrases have not only the meaning ascribed to them by ordinary custom and usage, but also the meaning ascribed to them by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.
5 MR 0376 Exhibit C Page 6 of 9
PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 1. Admit that the Marijuana Ordinance was adopted on November 22, 2022, following a vote by the City of Denton City Council.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 2. Admit that following a vote on November 22, 2022, the Marijuana Ordinance became operational by law.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 3. Admit that the June 6, 2023 vote on the Marijuana Ordinance only related to budgetary authorization for the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 4. Admit that during the June 6, 2023 vote on the Marijuana Ordinance, the City of Denton City Council considered a duplicate of the Marijuana Ordinance, already adopted on November 22, 2022.
ADMIT OR DENY
6 MR 0377 Exhibit C Page 7 of 9
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 5. Admit that following a vote on the Marijuana Ordinance on June 6, 2023, the Marijuana Ordinance remained in the Code of Ordinances.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 6. Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have been directed not to cite or arrest individuals for misdemeanor levels of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 7. Admit that the Marijuana Ordinance conflicts with Texas Local Government Code 370.003.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 8. Admit that City of Denton Police Department citations and arrests for misdemeanor levels of marijuana have decreased by over 50 percent since November 22, 2022.
7 MR 0378 Exhibit C Page 8 of 9
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 9. Admit that City of Denton Police Department citations and arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia have decreased by over 50 percent since November 22, 2022.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 10. Admit that you did not send out a document or communication to employees of the City of Denton Police Department that the Marijuana Ordinance has not been implemented.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 11. Admit that you received a document or communication from the City of Denton Police Department that the Marijuana Ordinance has been implemented.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 12. Admit that you directed the City of Denton Police Department not to use the smell of marijuana for probable cause.
8 MR 0379 Exhibit C Page 9 of 9
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 13. Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have received training on the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 14. Admit that the City of Denton City Council could change a City of Denton policy relating to the implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 15. Admit that a new City Manager could change a City of Denton policy relating to the implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
9 MR 0380 Exhibit D
Defendants Responses to Texas’s Interrogatories to Defendants September 30, 2024
MR 0381 Exhibit D Page 1 of 18
CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of the § City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
TO: Plaintiff, the State of Texas, by and through its attorneys of record, Jacob Przada and Johnathan Stone, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Special Litigation Division, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711-2548.
Pursuant to Rule 197 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the City of Denton
(the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of
Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee and Chris
Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley, City Manager of
Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton1 (the “Officials” and together
with the City, the “Defendants”) hereby serves their Responses and Objections to
Plaintiff the State of Texas’s (the “State” or “Plaintiff”) First Set of Interrogatories,
1 Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton.
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which responses are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference for all
purposes.
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Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 30th day of September, 2024:
Ken Paxton Attorney General
Brent Webster First Assistant Attorney General
Grant Dorfman Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
Ralph Molina Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Jacob Przada Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Johnathan Stone Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. DE LA FUENTE
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Objections to Definitions
1. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Enforce” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
2. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “The Cities” to the extent it defines municipalities “acting in concert” and implies collusion or some other coordinated effort with undefined entities and undefined acts.
3. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Codification” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
4. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Adoption” to the extent that it seeks to create a legal definition that is contrary to the relevant legal authority in this case. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
5. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Implementation” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
6. “Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Policy” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined to the extent it conflicts with the plain meaning of the term and seeks to redefine any documents identified as a “Policy” in City’s records. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
Defendants’ objection to each of these terms applies to each and every request below that uses such term, and is incorporated therein by this statement.
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify all documents utilized to assist in any way with the preparation of the answers to each of the interrogatories.
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RESPONSE: See documents attached to Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction filed in this case on May 20, 2024.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Explain the process to change, adopt, or implement a different policy or ordinance than a policy or ordinance currently codified, adopted, or implemented by the City of Denton.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this Interrogatory is overbroad and vague, and not tailored to the issues and claims involved in this case.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions. For facts supporting the Court’s lack of jurisdiction, see Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction filed in this case.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify every person who has firsthand factual information about this case, rebuttal or impeachment evidence in this case, or who is expected testify in this case, including your experts or rebuttal witnesses, and provide a brief statement of each individual’s connection with the case. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283
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(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Defendants’ Initial Disclosures and Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: State the legal theories and describe in general the factual bases for your defenses. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(j), 197.1.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Defendants’ Initial Disclosures and Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify any City of Denton employees and third- parties, including the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killeen, Austin, and San Marcos, and media personnel with whom you discussed codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458
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S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as overbroad to the extent that it would impermissibly seek information protected by the common interest privilege. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, Defendants will refrain from answering this Interrogatory.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: If you contend that the Marijuana Ordinance can, or cannot be changed to comply with the City Charter, Ordinance, or a policy, state the factual basis for your claim and identify all documents relied on for your response.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request because it incorporates and assumes an incorrect and impermissible predicate legal conclusion as to the Marijuana Ordinance’s legality. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify any documented changes in Marijuana use since the Marijuana Ordinance took effect, including but not limited to any documented changes occurring at the Denton Independent School District, or in
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connection to City of Denton Police citations and arrests or traffic and pedestrian stops.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the extent that it seeks information regarding third parties that are not within Defendants’ control. Defendants also object to this interrogatory as vague, overbroad, and unduly burdensome in its entirety. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions. For facts supporting the Court’s lack of jurisdiction, see Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction filed in this case.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify how many times the Marijuana Ordinance has been enforced and identify the individuals whom the Marijuana Ordinance has been enforced against.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
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RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify all jobs to which you have applied from August 30, 2022 to Present, including the name of the employer, its location, and the ultimate outcome of your application for that job.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, Defendants will refrain from answering this Interrogatory.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to funding for THC testing that was in effect during the period spanning February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to
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the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to funding for THC testing that has been in effect during the period spanning November 22, 2022, to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to the use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause that was in effect during the period spanning February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension
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Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to the use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause that has been in effect during the period spanning November 22, 2022, to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to
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the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458
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S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for felony- level marijuana offenses that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for felony- level marijuana offenses that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Identify all inquiries by the public about confusion relating to codification, implementation, or adoption of the City of Denton’s Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this interrogatory as vague, facially overbroad and unduly burdensome to the extent it would require Defendants to review all public inquiries and determine the state of mind of the inquirer. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not
16 MR 0397 Exhibit D Page 17 of 18
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Identify all documents relied upon in developing the current City of Denton Police Department Policy and Police Directive or General Orders relating to misdemeanor-level marijuana offenses.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this interrogatory as vague, facially overbroad, and unduly burdensome in its entirety. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: If you have ever been convicted of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, state the nature of the charge and the date and place of arrest and conviction. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(B), 609(a).
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors,
17 MR 0398 Exhibit D Page 18 of 18
which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, Defendants refrain from answering this Interrogatory.
18 MR 0399 Exhibit E
Defendants Responses to Texas’s Requests for Production to Defendants
September 30, 2024
MR 0400 Exhibit E Page 1 of 20
CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of the § City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
TO: Plaintiff, the State of Texas, by and through its attorneys of record, Jacob Przada and Johnathan Stone, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Special Litigation Division, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711-2548.
Pursuant to Rule 196 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the City of Denton
(the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of
Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee and Chris
Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley, City Manager of
Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton1 (the “Officials” and together
with the City, the “Defendants”) hereby serves their Responses and Objections to
Plaintiff the State of Texas’s (the “State” or “Plaintiff”) First Requests for Production,
1 Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton.
MR 0401 Exhibit E Page 2 of 20
which responses are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference for all
purposes.
MR 0402 Exhibit E Page 3 of 20
Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
MR 0403 Exhibit E Page 4 of 20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 30th day of September, 2024:
Ken Paxton Attorney General
Brent Webster First Assistant Attorney General
Grant Dorfman Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
Ralph Molina Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Jacob Przada Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Johnathan Stone Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. DE LA FUENTE
MR 0404 Exhibit E Page 5 of 20
OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
1. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Enforcement” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
2. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “The Cities” to the extent it defines municipalities “acting in concert” and implies collusion or some other coordinated effort with undefined entities and undefined acts.
3. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of Supporting” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
4. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Memorandum” to the extent it conflicts with the plain meaning of the term and seeks to redefine any documents identified as a “Memorandum” in the record. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
5. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Codification” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
6. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Adoption” to the extent that it seeks to create a legal definition that is contrary to the relevant legal authority in this case. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
7. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Implementation” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
8. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Reprioritization” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory
MR 0405 Exhibit E Page 6 of 20
authority. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
Defendants’ objection to each of these terms applies to each and every request below that uses such term, and is incorporated therein by this statement.
RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Produce all communications and documents sent or received by you, from November 2, 2021 to Present, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance, including communications in which you were copied.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Produce all policies or memoranda created by you, from November 2, 2021 to Present, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—
MR 0406 Exhibit E Page 7 of 20
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 124. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and citizens groups, including Ground Game Texas, Decriminalize Denton, any parties supporting the Marijuana Ordinance, or their agents, employees, or representatives, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the public
MR 0407 Exhibit E Page 8 of 20
relating to enforcement of the Marijuana Ordinance and the Marijuana laws of the State of Texas.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and law enforcement or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
MR 0408 Exhibit E Page 9 of 20
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killeen, Austin, and San Marcos or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Denton City Council did not adopt an ordinance affecting the enforcement of marijuana-related offenses, and actions taken or not taken by other cities are not a part of the claims in this lawsuit. Defendants further object to this request as overbroad to the extent that it seeks documents that would be subject to the common interest privilege. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killeen, Austin, and San Marcos or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of a Marijuana Ordinance by the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killeen, Austin, and San Marcos from November 2, 2021 to Present.
MR 0409 Exhibit E Page 10 of 20
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Denton City Council did not adopt an ordinance affecting the enforcement of marijuana-related offenses, and actions taken or not taken by other cities are not a part of the claims in this lawsuit. Defendants further object to this request as overbroad to the extent that it seeks documents that would be subject to the common interest privilege. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Denton Independent School District, or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not
MR 0410 Exhibit E Page 11 of 20
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Produce all disciplinary statistics relating to violations of the Marijuana Ordinance or any related policy or memorandum by employees of the City of Denton Police Department from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and employees of the City of Denton Police Department or their agents, and representatives regarding reprioritization of Marijuana enforcement, including misdemeanor
MR 0411 Exhibit E Page 12 of 20
marijuana possession or misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia offenses from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Produce all copies of communications or documents within your possession relating to the City of Denton Police Administration’s demonstrative of marijuana at a City Council meeting from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and fails to identify a document or
MR 0412 Exhibit E Page 13 of 20
category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Denton County Public Health District or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding marijuana use in the City of Denton from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to funding by the City of Denton or the City of Denton Police Department for THC testing from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the
MR 0413 Exhibit E Page 14 of 20
discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to funding by the City of Denton or the City of Denton Police Department for THC testing from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
MR 0414 Exhibit E Page 15 of 20
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants further object to the extent that this request seeks criminal records or judicial records.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see publicly available data at: https://data.cityofdenton.com/dataset/denton-crime- data.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not
MR 0415 Exhibit E Page 16 of 20
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants further object to the extent that this request seeks criminal records or judicial records.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see publicly available data at: https://data.cityofdenton.com/dataset/denton-crime- data.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the
MR 0416 Exhibit E Page 17 of 20
discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
MR 0417 Exhibit E Page 18 of 20
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R.
MR 0418 Exhibit E Page 19 of 20
Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants further object to the extent that this request seeks criminal records or judicial records.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see publicly available data at: https://data.cityofdenton.com/dataset/denton-crime- data.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants further object to the extent that this request seeks criminal records or judicial records.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see publicly available data at: https://data.cityofdenton.com/dataset/denton-crime- data.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia, where the subject expressed that they thought it was lawful to possess marijuana or marijuana paraphernalia, from November 22, 2022 to Present.
MR 0419 Exhibit E Page 20 of 20
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants further object to the extent that this request seeks criminal records or judicial records.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see publicly available data at: https://data.cityofdenton.com/dataset/denton-crime- data.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24: Produce all communications and documents sent by you, your attorneys, or agents, employees, or representatives to the media regarding the Marijuana Ordinance or this lawsuit from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
MR 0420 Exhibit F
Defendants Responses to Texas’s Requests for Admissions to Defendants September 30, 2024
MR 0421 Exhibit F Page 1 of 12
CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of the § City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
TO: Plaintiff, the State of Texas, by and through its attorney of record, Jacob Przada and Johnathan Stone, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Special Litigation Division, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711-2548.
Pursuant to Rule 198 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the City of Denton
(the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of
Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee and Chris
Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley, City Manager of
Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton1 (the “Officials” and together
with the City, the “Defendants”) hereby serves their Responses and Objections to
Plaintiff the State of Texas’s (the “State” or “Plaintiff”) First Requests for Admission.
1 Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton.
MR 0422 Exhibit F Page 2 of 12
Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
2 MR 0423 Exhibit F Page 3 of 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 30th day of September, 2024:
Ken Paxton Attorney General
Brent Webster First Assistant Attorney General
Grant Dorfman Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
Ralph Molina Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Jacob Przada Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Johnathan Stone Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. DE LA FUENTE
3 MR 0424 Exhibit F Page 4 of 12
OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS
1. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Memorandum” to the extent it conflicts with the plain meaning of the term and seeks to redefine any documents identified as a “Memorandum” in the record. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
2. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Codification” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
3. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Adoption” to the extent that it seeks to create a legal definition that is contrary to the relevant legal authority in this case. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
4. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Implementation” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
Defendants’ objection to each of these terms applies to each and every request below that uses such term, and is incorporated therein by this statement.
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that the Marijuana Ordinance was adopted on November 22, 2022, following a vote by the City of Denton City Council.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not
4 MR 0425 Exhibit F Page 5 of 12
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to this request as vague and misleading to the extent that it uses the term “adopted” as Plaintiff would define that term.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that following a vote on November 22, 2022, the Marijuana Ordinance became operational by law.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that the June 6, 2023 vote on the Marijuana Ordinance only related to budgetary authorization for the Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4.
5 MR 0426 Exhibit F Page 6 of 12
Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that during the June 6, 2023 vote on the Marijuana Ordinance, the City of Denton City Council considered a duplicate of the Marijuana Ordinance, already adopted on November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to this request as vague and misleading to the extent that it uses the term “adopted” as Plaintiff would define that term.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that following a vote on the Marijuana Ordinance on June 6, 2023, the Marijuana Ordinance remained in the Code of Ordinances.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which
6 MR 0427 Exhibit F Page 7 of 12
is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to the foregoing objections, Defendants cannot admit or deny the Request as worded, and thus Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have been directed not to cite or arrest individuals for misdemeanor levels of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to this request as vague, overbroad, and incomprehensible to the extent that it uses the passive voice (“have been directed”), as it does not state by whom such direction may have been given.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that the Marijuana Ordinance conflicts with Texas Local Government Code 370.003.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—
7 MR 0428 Exhibit F Page 8 of 12
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this Request does not seek admission of a fact but rather a legal contention.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not respond.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that City of Denton Police Department citations and arrests for misdemeanor levels of marijuana have decreased by over 50 percent since November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not respond.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that City of Denton Police Department citations and arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia have decreased by over 50 percent since November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter
8 MR 0429 Exhibit F Page 9 of 12
of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not respond.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Admit that you did not send out a document or communication to employees of the City of Denton Police Department that the Marijuana Ordinance has not been implemented.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Admit that you received a document or communication from the City of Denton Police Department that the Marijuana Ordinance has been implemented.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the
9 MR 0430 Exhibit F Page 10 of 12
discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this Request is vague, overbroad, and unclear as it is directed to multiple persons.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants cannot admit or deny this Request as worded.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit that you directed the City of Denton Police Department not to use the smell of marijuana for probable cause.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this Request is vague, overbroad, and unclear as it is directed to multiple persons.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have received training on the Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the
10 MR 0431 Exhibit F Page 11 of 12
discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this request is vague and overbroad as to the term “training.”
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants cannot admit or deny this Request as worded.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Admit that the City of Denton City Council could change a City of Denton policy relating to the implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this request is overbroad and vague as worded, including the fact that it inquires into a hypothetical. Defendants further object that this Request does not seek admission of a fact but rather a legal conclusion.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants cannot admit or deny this Request as worded.
11 MR 0432 Exhibit F Page 12 of 12
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15: Admit that a new City Manager could change a City of Denton policy relating to the implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this request is overbroad and vague as worded, including the fact that it inquires into a hypothetical. Defendants further object that this Request does not seek admission of a fact but rather a legal conclusion.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants cannot admit or deny this Request as worded.
12 MR 0433 Exhibit G
Deposition Notice – Brian Beck September 13, 2024
MR 0434 Exhibit G Page 1 of 3
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF COUNCILMEMBER BRIAN BECK
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Devin Q. Alexander and Mack Reinwand of the DENTON CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 215 East McKinney, Denton, Texas 76201 and Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 199.2, Plaintiff, The State of Texas, will take the oral deposition of Defendant, Denton City Councilmember
Brian Beck. Please take further notice that the deposition will be conducted remotely, using audio-
visual conference technology (Zoom) on Monday, October 7, 2024 beginning at 9:00 a.m. The
deposition will be recorded by video and stenographic means and will continue for four (4) hours.
Participants are instructed to register in advance using the following link, specific to this
deposition date:
https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZ0ld-2srT0sGNTMYH7gvxUchSSPp4fo9EPL.
MR 0435 Exhibit G Page 2 of 3
After registering, participants will receive a confirmation email from Integrity Legal Support
Solutions containing information and instructions for logging into this remote deposition.
Date: September 13, 2024 Respectfully Submitted, KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
AUSTIN KINGHORN Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone.: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
2 MR 0436 Exhibit G Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I hereby certify that on September 11, 2024, the undersigned attorney sought to confer with counsel for defendants via electronic mail, requesting a response by September 13, 2024, as to whether Councilmember Beck is available for a deposition on October 7, or 15, 2024. On September 13, 2024, counsel for defendants indicated via electronic mail that his clients are opposed to Plaintiff’s jurisdictional depositions. /s/ Jacob E. Przada JACOB E. PRZADA
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 13, 2024, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com Mack Reinwald mack.reinwald@cityofdenton.com Jose (Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com
/s/ Jacob E. Przada Jacob E. Przada
3 MR 0437 Exhibit H
Deposition Notice – Joe Holland September 13, 2024
MR 0438 Exhibit H Page 1 of 3
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF COUNCILMEMBER JOE HOLLAND
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Devin Q. Alexander and Mack Reinwand of the DENTON CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 215 East McKinney, Denton, Texas 76201 and Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 199.2, Plaintiff,
The State of Texas, will take the oral deposition of Defendant, Denton City Councilmember
Joe Holland. Please take further notice that the deposition will be conducted remotely, using audio-
visual conference technology (Zoom) on Monday, October 7, 2024 at 2:00 p.m. The deposition
will be recorded by video and stenographic means and will continue for four (4) hours.
Participants are instructed to register in advance using the following link, specific to this
deposition date:
https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZ0ld-2srT0sGNTMYH7gvxUchSSPp4fo9EPL.
MR 0439 Exhibit H Page 2 of 3
After registering, participants will receive a confirmation email from Integrity Legal Support
Solutions containing information and instructions for logging into this remote deposition.
Date: September 13, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
AUSTIN KINGHORN Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone.: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
2 MR 0440 Exhibit H Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I hereby certify that on September 11, 2024, the undersigned attorney sought to confer with counsel for defendants via electronic mail, requesting a response by September 13, 2024 as to whether Councilmember Holland is available for a deposition on October 7, or 15, 2024. On September 13, 2024, counsel for defendants indicated via electronic mail that his clients are opposed to Plaintiff’s jurisdictional depositions. /s/ Jacob E. Przada JACOB E. PRZADA
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 13, 2024, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com Mack Reinwald mack.reinwald@cityofdenton.com Jose (Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com
/s/ Jacob E. Przada Jacob E. Przada
3 MR 0441 Exhibit I
Deposition Notice – Sara Hensley September 13, 2024
MR 0442 Exhibit I Page 1 of 3
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF CITY MANAGER SARA HENSLEY
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Devin Q. Alexander and Mack Reinwand of the DENTON CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 215 East McKinney, Denton, Texas 76201 and Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 199.2, Plaintiff,
The State of Texas, will take the oral deposition of Defendant, Denton City Manager Sarah
Hensley. Please take further notice that the deposition will be conducted remotely, using audio-
visual conference technology (Zoom) on Tuesday, October 8, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. The deposition
will be recorded by video and stenographic means and will continue for four (4) hours.
Participants are instructed to register in advance using the following link, specific to this
deposition date:
https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZcvf-Chpz4rE9L401AivHwZaDd9iS7IBglW.
MR 0443 Exhibit I Page 2 of 3
After registering, participants will receive a confirmation email from Integrity Legal Support
Solutions containing information and instructions for logging into this remote deposition.
Date: September 13, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
AUSTIN KINGHORN Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone.: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
2 MR 0444 Exhibit I Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I hereby certify that on September 11, 2024, the undersigned attorney sought to confer with counsel for defendants via electronic mail, requesting a response by September 13, 2024 as to whether City Manager Sara Hensley is available for a deposition on October 7, or 15, 2024. On September 13, 2024, counsel for defendants indicated via electronic mail that his clients are opposed to Plaintiff’s jurisdictional depositions. /s/ Jacob E. Przada JACOB E. PRZADA
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 13, 2024, a true and correct copy of the above and forgoing document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com Mack Reinwald mack.reinwald@cityofdenton.com Jose (Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com
/s/ Jacob E. Przada Jacob E. Przada
3 MR 0445 Exhibit J
Deposition Notice – Jessica Robledo September 13, 2024
MR 0446 Exhibit J Page 1 of 3
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF INTERIM POLICE CHIEF JESSICA ROBLEDO
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Devin Q. Alexander and Mack Reinwand of the DENTON CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 215 East McKinney, Denton, Texas 76201 and Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 199.2, Plaintiff,
The State of Texas, will take the oral deposition of Defendant, Denton Interim Police Chief
Jessica Robledo. Please take further notice that the deposition will be conducted remotely, using
audio-visual conference technology (Zoom) on Tuesday, October 8, 2024 at 2:00 p.m. The
deposition will be recorded by video and stenographic means and will continue for four (4) hours.
Participants are instructed to register in advance using the following link, specific to this
deposition date:
https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZcvf-Chpz4rE9L401AivHwZaDd9iS7IBglW.
MR 0447 Exhibit J Page 2 of 3
After registering, participants will receive a confirmation email from Integrity Legal Support
Solutions containing information and instructions for logging into this remote deposition.
Date: September 13, 2024 Respectfully Submitted, KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
AUSTIN KINGHORN Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone.: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
2 MR 0448 Exhibit J Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I hereby certify that on September 11, 2024, the undersigned attorney conferred with counsel for defendants via electronic mail, requesting a response by September 13, 2024, as to whether Interim Police Chief Robledo is available for deposition on October 7, or 15, 2024. On September 13, 2024, counsel for defendants indicated via electronic mail that his clients are opposed to Plaintiff’s jurisdictional depositions.
/s/ Jacob E. Przada JACOB E. PRZADA
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 13, 2024, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com Mack Reinwald mack.reinwald@cityofdenton.com Jose (Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com
/s/ Jacob E. Przada Jacob E. Przada
3 MR 0449 Exhibit K
Deposition Notice – Daryn Briggs September 13, 2024
MR 0450 Exhibit K Page 1 of 3
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF POLICE SERGEANT DARYN BRIGGS
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Devin Q. Alexander and Mack Reinwand of the DENTON CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 215 East McKinney, Denton, Texas 76201 and Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 199.2, Plaintiff,
The State of Texas, will take the oral deposition of Denton Police Sgt. Daryn Briggs. Please take
further notice that the deposition will be conducted remotely, using audio-visual conference
technology (Zoom) on Wednesday, October 9, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. The deposition will be recorded
by video and stenographic means and will continue for four (4) hours.
Participants are instructed to register in advance using the following link, specific to this
deposition date:
https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUtduCgpzIqH9cBwWqdz-55Mg61GYgY0OZJ
MR 0451 Exhibit K Page 2 of 3
After registering, participants will receive a confirmation email from Integrity Legal Support
Solutions containing information and instructions for logging into this remote deposition.
Date: September 13, 2024 Respectfully Submitted, KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
AUSTIN KINGHORN Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone.: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
2 MR 0452 Exhibit K Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I hereby certify that on September 11, 2024, the undersigned attorney sought to confer with counsel for defendants via electronic mail, requesting a response by September 13 , 2024, as to whether Sgt. Briggs is available for a deposition on October 7, or 15, 2024. On September 13, 2024, counsel for defendants indicated via electronic mail that his clients are opposed to Plaintiff’s jurisdictional depositions. /s/ Jacob E. Przada JACOB E. PRZADA
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 13, 2024, a true and correct copy of the above and forgoing document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com Mack Reinwald mack.reinwald@cityofdenton.com Jose (Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com
/s/ Jacob E. Przada Jacob E. Przada
3 MR 0453 Exhibit L
Deposition Notice – Chris Summit September 13, 2024
MR 0454 Exhibit L Page 1 of 3
Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF POLICE LIEUTENANT CHRIS SUMMITT
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Devin Q. Alexander and Mack Reinwand of the DENTON CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 215 East McKinney, Denton, Texas 76201 and Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 199.2, Plaintiff,
The State of Texas, will take the oral deposition of Denton Police Lt. Chris Summitt. Please take
further notice that the deposition will be conducted remotely, using audio-visual conference
technology (Zoom) on Wednesday, October 9, 2024 at 2:00 p.m. The deposition will be recorded
by video and stenographic means and will continue for four (4) hours.
Participants are instructed to register in advance using the following link, specific to this
deposition date:
https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUtduCgpzIqH9cBwWqdz-55Mg61GYgY0OZJ
MR 0455 Exhibit L Page 2 of 3
After registering, participants will receive a confirmation email from Integrity Legal Support
Solutions containing information and instructions for logging into this remote deposition.
Date: September 13, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
AUSTIN KINGHORN Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone.: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
2 MR 0456 Exhibit L Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I hereby certify that on September 11, 2024, the undersigned attorney sought to confer with counsel for defendants via electronic mail, requesting a response by September 13, 2024, as to whether Lt. Chris Summitt is available for a deposition on October 7, or 15, 2024. On September 13, 2024, counsel for defendants indicated via electronic mail that his clients are opposed to Plaintiff’s jurisdictional depositions. /s/ Jacob E. Przada JACOB E. PRZADA
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 13, 2024, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com Mack Reinwald mack.reinwald@cityofdenton.com Jose (Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com
/s/ Jacob E. Przada Jacob E. Przada
3 MR 0457 Exhibit M
Email from Defense Counsel August 22, 2024
MR 0458 Exhibit M Page 1 of 12
Jacob Przada
From: Gabrielle Smith
Follow Up Flag: Follow up Flag Status: Flagged
Hello Jacob,
Following up on this matter in line with my email this morning. I did want to follow up just a bit more regarding the need for discovery at this juncture. Per the State’s petition “this is a case of pure law and discovery is unneeded.” That is consistent with the prior setting in this matter. The proposed discovery plan discussed and captured in your email below seems at odds with that representation and also with the fact that there is a pending jurisdictional challenge.
Nonetheless, we appreciate the collegial working relationship the parties have had in this matter. We can agree to an August 30 disclosure deadline. Additionally, though we are not waiving any right to objection or challenge to any written discovery served and reserve all rights pending actual receipt and review of written discovery requests, you can send written discovery prior to the agreed disclosure deadline and we can stipulate that any response deadline would be calculated from the date of service. I would ask for more information regarding the need for and scope of depositions of the two City employees identified. If you could please advise further, that’d be helpful.
Thanks,
Gabrielle
---------------------- GABRIELLE SMITH Principal 512-322-5820 Direct Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 ---------------------------------- www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800
MR 0459 Exhibit N
Email from Defense Counsel September 13, 2024
MR 0460 Exhibit N Page 1 of 9
Jacob Przada
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob,
We understand that the parties disagree on the issues. That’s why we have courts to resolve such disputes. With that mutual understanding, we further understand that after conferring, we do not have an agreement on the scheduling of various hearings. In the absence of such agreement, the City intends to go forward with setting its Plea to the Jurisdiction for hearing pursuant to the Denton County local rules. We will be requesting a setting for one to two hours, depending on the court’s availability. We understand that your office is unavailable for hearing in September and on October 1st, so we will request dates from the Court for the rest of October. You of course will be copied on our communication to the court.
As to your intention to notice depositions of six different Denton officers and employees, your office is of course free to send whatever deposition notices you wish. The City does not believe that any discovery of “jurisdictional facts” by the plaintiff is necessary or appropriate, particularly in a case in which the plaintiff had the burden of pleading specific acts that it contends would be in violation of the law/ultra vires. The City thus will move for protection as to the referenced notices of deposition if they are indeed sent, so at this point, we do not see the need for further discussion of schedule or logistics as to the depositions the plaintiff may seek.
We do note, however, that as the plaintiff contends that certain facts (as yet not identified) are relevant to the question of jurisdiction and should be subject to discovery, including facts known by Councilmember Brian Beck, Councilmember Joe Holland, City Manager Sara Hensley, Chief Jessica Robledo, Sgt. Daryn Briggs, and Lt. Chris Summitt, Rule 194.2(5) requires both identification of such persons and a statement of the subject matter of each such person’s purported knowledge/connection to the case. Plaintiff’s current disclosures do not disclose Sgt. Briggs or Lt. Summitt as persons with knowledge and further, what they might have knowledge about. We look forward to seeing your supplemented disclosures promptly.
Once we have dates for the hearing on the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction from the Court, we will endeavor to reach an agreement as to a date that works with your availability.
Sincerely,
Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair
MR 0461 Exhibit N Page 2 of 9 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 ----------------------------------
From: Jacob Przada
Joe,
Texas cannot agree with your representation of the issues. You seem to insist that our jurisdictional discovery is not appropriate, while we believe our discovery is, in fact, necessary and appropriate at this time. Because in our previous call, you could not commit to how or whether the City would respond to the substance of our discovery requests– even though your team had told Texas to send written discovery–Texas cannot agree to waive any right to a hearing on jurisdictional discovery without seeing the City’s responses to our discovery.
Courts have broad discretion and allow jurisdictional discovery as to key jurisdictional facts before a PTJ hearing is conducted. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 642–43 (Tex. 2012); see also Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 491 (Tex. 2012). Unless you are willing to agree to a hearing on the Plea to the Jurisdiction and Application for Temporary Injunction on December 9, 2024 without these new conditions, we cannot agree to a hearing on that date.
On Friday, we plan to notice depositions of the following individuals: (1) Councilmember Brian Beck, (2) Councilmember Joe Holland, (3) City Manager Sara Hensley, (4) Interim Police Chief Jessica Robledo, (5) City of Denton Police Sgt. Daryn Briggs, and (6) City of Denton Police Lt. Chris Summitt, in four-hour blocks during the weeks of October 7-11th or October 14-17th. We can conduct these depositions either at the City of Denton or a hotel conference room in the City, or remotely, depending on your team’s availability.
Councilmember Brian Beck (October 7th at 9:00am) or (October 15th at 9:00am) Councilmember Joe Holland (October 7th at 2:00pm) or (October 15th at 2:00pm) City Manager Sara Hensley (October 8th at 9:00am) or (October 16th at 9:00am) Interim Police Chief Jessica Robledo (October 8th at 2:00pm) or (October 16th at 2:00pm) City of Denton Police Sgt. Daryn Briggs (October 9th at 9:00am) or (October 17th at 9:00am) City of Denton Police Lt. Chris Summitt (October 9th at 2:00pm) or (October 17th at 2:00pm)
If we do not hear back from you by Friday at 3:30pm, we will be noticing these depositions for the above dates during the week of October 7-11th. And for clarity, in the event that the PTJ is set for a hearing prior to discovery, we will need to subpoena your relevant clients.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel
MR 0462 Exhibit N Page 3 of 9 Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob,
We understand that you do not agree with our position. We are not asking or suggesting that the OAG agree with our position (that the City will set the PTJ for an earlier hearing date if the OAG moves forward with any earlier hearing).
If, however, the OAG intends to represent to the court that the December 9th setting of the TI and PTJ together is “agreed,” a condition of our agreement is the City’s reservation of its right to seek an earlier setting of its PTJ – which we are informing you the city only intends to do in the even the OAG sets anything else for hearing before the December 9th date. To be clear, the City does not “agree” to a December 9th setting of the TI and PTJ with no reservation or condition. If the OAG is unwilling to acknowledge that the City will communicate any agreed setting on December 9th to the court subject to that condition, then it seems that we do not have an agreement as to a December 9th setting.
The City and the OAG see the discovery issue differently; that is okay, disputes will happen that cannot be resolved except by the court. But the City will not waive its right to respond to any effort by the OAG to compel discovery by asking the court to first determine the question of jurisdiction. If the OAG’s condition is that the City must waive that right in order to reach an agreed setting for December 9th, then the City cannot agree to that condition, and it seems that we cannot reach an agreement on that setting date. If, on the other hand, the OAG is not making that a condition, then we can agree on that setting date. Please let us know which path the OAG chooses.
Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 From: Jacob Przada
MR 0463 Exhibit N Page 4 of 9
Joe,
We do not agree that the City has a right to have its PTJ heard at an earlier date if we seek to obtain a setting on a discovery-related issue, particularly in light of the fact that jurisdictional discovery has already been served. Therefore, we cannot agree that you can communicate a reservation of any “right” to have the PTJ heard sooner than the December 9, 2024 date. However, we do agree to the December 9, 2024 date for a hearing on the PTJ and TI and will notice the hearing.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob,
Understanding that stated reservation, and understanding the City’s position that there is no necessary or appropriate discovery as to jurisdictional facts, and because the time and expense of engaging in such discovery would be contrary to the purpose of ending a case when there is no jurisdiction, in the event that the OAG seeks to set any such hearing in advance of December 9th the City reserves its right to set its PTJ for hearing at the same time. So, we will inform the court to go forward with setting both the PTJ and the TI for hearing on December 9th. We will also inform the court that, in the event that any party sets any other matter for hearing ahead of that date, the City will ask the court to change the setting on the City’s PTJ to that time. We just want to be transparent about our approach on this. We’re not asking you to agree to that condition, we’re just asking if you agree that we may communicate it to the court; that is, a communication that 1) the parties want the December 9th date, and 2) the City’s agreement to this setting does not waive its right to have its PTJ heard sooner in the event that any other matter is set for hearing ahead of the December 9th date.
Thanks,
Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair
MR 0464 Exhibit N Page 5 of 9 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 ----------------------------------
From: Jacob Przada
Good afternoon Joe,
Other than any necessary discovery-related matters, we agree to your request. Thank you for reaching out about this.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob and Jonathan,
Based on current schedules (including hearings and briefing schedules, as well as your information that you are not available in September), the December 9th date works for Denton. We’d note that of all the dates previously discussed, that’s the date that works. We’d expect that the parties wouldn’t set any other matters for hearing in the intervening period. Can we agree on that hearing date for the PTJ and TI, and that approach (this will be the only hearing date set between now and then)?
Let us know, and we’ll inform the court by reply-all to the court’s email.
Thanks,
Joe
---------------------- 5
MR 0465 Exhibit N Page 6 of 9 JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 From: Laurie Dipierro
For 1 day or less in-person, the 481st has the following available:
09/16/24: 9:30 am with Docket Call 09/12/24 at 3:00 pm (Judge Doug Robison visi ng for trial date) 09/30/24: 9:30 am with Docket Call 09/19/24 at 3:00 pm (Judge Doug Robison visi ng for docket call date) 11/12/24: 9:00 am with Docket Call 10/31/24 at 3:00 pm 12/09/24: 9:00 am with Docket Call 11/21/24 at 3:00 pm
Please confer without me included and then include me back in to advise on what date you all agree
Sincerely, Laurie DiPierro 481st District Court Administrator 1450 E. McKinney Street, Floor 4 Denton, Texas 76209 940-349-2270 Laurie.DiPierro@dentoncounty.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
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Laurie,
MR 0466 Exhibit N Page 7 of 9 As always, we very much appreciate the Court’s responsiveness and accommodation in the parties’ scheduling efforts in this matter.
Per the parties’ recent discussions, as well as the Court’s request that the parties confer and agree wherever possible, we respectfully request that the Court inform us of any dates in October when it would have 5 hours to hear both the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and the State’s request for Temporary Injunction.
Thank you for your response in advance, and please let us know if you have any questions or require any further information from us to assist in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jose de la Fuente Counsel for the City of Denton
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 From: Laurie Dipierro
I see the Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdic on filed on May 20th. Please note that the requirement is for counsel to confer upon dates provided by the Court prior to se ng the hearing date with the Court. I have not yet provided those dates for you all to confer upon.
For two hours or less IN PERSON, the 481st has the following available:
September 17th at 1:30 p.m. (Judge Doug Robison visi ng) September 18th at 1:30 p.m. (Judge Doug Robison visi ng) September 19th at 1:30 p.m. (Judge Doug Robison visi ng) October 1st at 1:30 p.m. October 29th at 1:30 p.m. October 30th at 1:30 p.m. November 13th at 1:30 p.m.
Please confer WITHOUT me included and then include me back in once you all have found a mutually agreeable date. Thank you.
Sincerely, Laurie DiPierro
MR 0467 Exhibit N Page 8 of 9 481st District Court Administrator 1450 E. McKinney Street, Floor 4 Denton, Texas 76209 940-349-2270 Laurie.DiPierro@dentoncounty.gov
From: Jacob Przada
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Good morning Ms. Dipierro,
Plaintiff has contacted Counsel for Defendants to discuss dates, but Counsel did not respond.
Defendants have not met and conferred. We ask the Court to allow us to hear back from Defendants before Defendants seek an arbitrary date that does not work for Plaintiff.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Melissa Ethridge
Good morning Ms. Dipierro,
We are looking for available dates in September or October to set our Plea to the Jurisdic on in the above- referenced case. We believe 2 hours should be sufficient. When you have a moment, could you please let me know the Court’s availability?
Thanks very much,
MR 0468 Exhibit N Page 9 of 9 Melissa ---------------------- MELISSA ETHRIDGE Paralegal 512-322-5838 Direct Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 ---------------------------------- www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800
Your text here!
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MR 0469 Exhibit O
Texas’s Discovery Deficiency Letter to Defendants October 4, 2024
MR 0470 Exhibit O Page 1 of 6
Jacob Przada Telephone: (512) 463-2100 Special Counsel for Civil Litigation Facsimile: (512) 457-4410 Jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
October 4, 2024
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. via electronic mail to: Jose (Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com 800 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701
DENTON CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE Devin Q. Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com Mack Reinwand mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com 215 East McKinney amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com Denton, Texas 76201
RE: Discovery Deficiency Conference Cause No. 24-1005-481, State of Texas v. City of Denton, et al., In the 481st Civil District Court of Denton County
Dear Counsel:
We have reviewed Defendants’ September 30, 2024 Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission (Defendants’ responses), and find that they do not represent a good faith effort to comply with the rules governing discovery. The State of Texas invites Defendants to reconsider the deficient responses it tendered to the twenty-two interrogatories, twenty-four requests for production, and fifteen requests for admission that Texas served on August 30, 2024. Defendants’ responses did not provide answers to the majority of Texas’s written discovery requests. Instead, Defendants asserted boilerplate objections to every discovery request without a valid explanation, produced essentially no responsive records, and either declined to answer, or otherwise answered discovery “subject to and without waiving the [] objections.” Almost all of Defendants’ responses asserted the following boilerplate objection: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both
P os t Of fic e Box 12548 , Aust in, Texa s 7 8 7 1 1 - 2 5 4 8 • ( 5 1 2 ) 4 6 3 - 2 1 0 0 • www. texa satto r neyg eneral .gov
MR 0471 Exhibit O Page 2 of 6 October 4, 2024 Discovery Deficiency Conference 2|Page
irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See generally, Defs.’ responses (citations omitted). However, objections to written discovery “must state specifically the legal or factual basis for the objection.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.2(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Rules call for “reasonably tailored responses to discovery requests” rather than “boiler plate discovery . . responses.” In re Shipmon, 68 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.). Here, Texas has served appropriately tailored discovery based on relevant jurisdictional matters. None of the discovery requests seek information readily available to Texas. None ask Defendants to make a legal concession. Nor does Texas fail to identify an appropriate document or category of documents requested. However, Defendants lodge these boilerplate objections without any explanation to allow for a reasonable resolution to discovery disputes. Defendants have not provided proper responses to Texas’s discovery requests and have failed to offer either cognizable objections or proper context for those objections. Texas respectfully requests a fuller, more considered response. To the extent that Texas’s discovery imposes real burdens on Defendants, Texas would have been and now remains open to conferring with Defendants about their responses. Texas hopes to reach a consensus with Defendants on requests that can be clarified and fulfilled, and also objections that can be clarified and/or waived. • Jurisdictional Discovery Objections: Under the Rules, Defendants are not permitted to withhold responsive answers to preliminary discovery requests on the premise that discovery is improper prior to a decision on their Plea to the Jurisdiction (PTJ). In fact, “[t]rial courts considering a plea to the jurisdiction have broad discretion to allow ‘reasonable opportunity for targeted discovery.’” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 642–43 (Tex. 2012). Defendants must comply with their “duty to make a complete response” to Texas’s discovery requests, even as their PTJ is pending. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.1. Further, Defendants are not immune from the instant suit or accompanying discovery process. The State has pled a valid exception to governmental immunity, which its written discovery will elucidate. Defendants cannot refuse to produce information relevant to jurisdictional facts while touting the excuse that jurisdiction is lacking, without blatant prejudice to Texas.
MR 0472 Exhibit O Page 3 of 6 October 4, 2024 Discovery Deficiency Conference 3|Page
• Overbroad, Unduly Burdensome, Vague, Ambiguous, and Unclear Objections: Moreover, in addition to this repeated jurisdictional discovery objection, Defendants objected to several of Texas’s written discovery requests as overbroad, unduly burdensome, or vague and/or ambiguous, and unclear. But “a responding party who objects to a request for production because is it overbroad, unduly burdensome, vague, ambiguous, or unreasonably cumulative or duplicative should explain why the discovery request suffers from each asserted deficiency.” In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 876-77 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, no pet.); see also In re K & L Auto Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239, 253 (Tex. 2021) (stating “a party resisting discovery must do more than make conclusory allegations that the requested discovery is unduly burdensome.”) (citation omitted). Because Defendants did no more than assert these objections without further explanation, Texas has not received adequate discovery responses. Defendants object as overbroad, unduly burdensome, vague, ambiguous, or unclear to the following discovery requests:
Overbroad Interrogatory Nos.: 2, 5, 7, 20, 21 Request for Production Nos.: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Request for Admission Nos.: 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 Unduly Burdensome Interrogatory Nos.: 7, 20, 21 Request for Production Nos.: 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 Vague Interrogatory Nos.: 2, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 Request for Production Nos.: 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Request for Admission Nos.: 1, 4, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 Ambiguous or Interrogatory Nos.: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 Unclear Request for Production Nos.: 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
However, Defendants provide no valid explanation in support of these assertions. Notably, the party asserting an objection on such grounds must provide an explanation in support thereof. In re Volt Power, LLC, No. 12-23-00047-CV, 2023 WL 2804430, at *7 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 5, 2023) (citation omitted). Defendants however have not described the burdens that compliance would create nor explained how the requests are disproportionate to the needs of the case. In fact, Defendants have provided no valid explanation whatsoever to support these objections. Because these objections are insufficient, Defendants should withdraw them and meaningfully respond.
MR 0473 Exhibit O Page 4 of 6 October 4, 2024 Discovery Deficiency Conference 4|Page
• Definitions Objections: Defendants objected to many of Texas’s definitions that use the plain meaning of the word. For example, Defendants objected to definitions pulled from online dictionaries on the basis that they gave the terms “legal significance” and were “in conflict with the plain meaning.” To the extent Defendants have refused to answer requests based on their objections to definitions, Defendants have shirked their responsibility of a good faith response to written discovery. We notice Defendants also objected to Request for Admission 13, because it was “vague and overbroad as to the term ‘training.’” As with Defendants’ other objections, Defendants did not explain how “training” is objectionable. The word is used in its ordinary sense in Request for Admission No. 13, so it is not vague. Tellingly, Defendants understood the meaning of “training” in Request for Production Nos. 17 and 18, where it appears in nearly identical contexts as Request for Admission 13, perfectly well. Nor is the term overbroad just because its plain meaning encompasses a wide range of responsive information—if that is the missing explanation for Defendants’ missing answer. See In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 180 n.1 (“the sheer volume of a discovery request does not in itself render the request irrelevant or overbroad.”). Defendants should withdraw these objections and substantively respond. • Subject to and Without Waiving the Foregoing Objections: Defendants respond to various discovery requests utilizing the language “[s]ubject to and without waiving the foregoing objections.” Defendants’ responses that are “[s]ubject to and without waiving the foregoing objections” violate Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.2 as they do not “state . . . the extent to which the party is refusing to comply with the request” and state the “factual basis for the objection,” since they hide necessary context about what information or material is being provided or withheld. Tex R. Civ. P. 193.2(a), (c). Defendants’ responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4; Request for Production Nos. 1, 2, 4, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, and 24; and Request for Admission Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 all contain this deficient language. Defendants should withdraw this non-responsive, deficient language and provide complete responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4; Request for Production Nos. 1, 2, 4, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, and 24; and Request for Admission Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. • The Common Interest Privilege Objections: Defendants assert the common interest privilege to Interrogatory No. 5 and Request for Production Nos. 6 and 7. This privilege only extends to communications between attorneys concerning litigation. “[T]he rule, as one of its objectives, creates a privilege for a client to prevent the disclosure of confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendering of professional legal services, when such communications are made by the client's lawyer to a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest.” In re
MR 0474 Exhibit O Page 5 of 6 October 4, 2024 Discovery Deficiency Conference 5|Page
Seigel, 198 S.W.3d 21, 27 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, mandamus, den’d); In re Skiles, 102 S.W.3d 323, 326-27 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, orig. proceeding); In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. 2012). Our discovery requests were not targeted to discussions between attorneys that could be subject to the common interest privilege. Significantly, we have reason to believe Defendants are currently withholding responsive information due to this mistaken privilege assertion. City Manager Sara Hensley indicated that she had communicated with city officials regarding the Marijuana Ordinance. See City Council Meeting Transcript, Feb. 21, 2023, 2:56:25-2:58:00 (discussing meetings between City Manager Hensley and City Managers of Harker Heights, Killeen, and Austin, in addition to meetings between City of Denton Police Officials and San Marcos relating to the Marijuana Ordinance). These communications are not subject to the common interest privilege. See id. Moreover, any other communications that are not between lawyers in a pending action are not subject to the common interest privilege. See id. As a result, Defendants must withdraw these objections and respond to Interrogatory No. 5 and Request for Production Nos. 6 and 7. • Criminal and [Civil] Judicial Records Objections: Defendants object to Request for Production Nos. 15, 16, 21, 22, 23 “to the extent that they request criminal or judicial records.” Texas clarifies that it does not request criminal or [civil] judicial records and demands that Defendants withdraw these objections and provide a substantive response to Request for Production Nos. 15, 16, 21, 22, 23. • “Explain” a Policy or Similar Matter Objections: Defendants object to Request for Production Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, stating that the discovery requests “ask[] a party to ‘explain’ a policy or similar matter.” First, in the instructions, Texas states that: “explain” when referring to document or policy, means Defendants must state the following: (1) the nature of the document (e.g., letter, handwritten note), (2) the title or heading that appears on the document, (3) the date of the document and the date of each addendum, supplement, or other addition or change, (4) the identities of the author, signer of the document, and person on whose behalf or at whose request or direction the document was prepared or delivered, (5) the present location of the document and the name, address, position or title, and telephone number of the person or persons having custody of the document, and (6) a summary of the contents of the document. Defendants have been provided unambiguous instructions on how to “explain” a policy. Defendants must withdraw their objections and meaningfully respond to Request for Production Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19.
MR 0475 Exhibit O Page 6 of 6 October 4, 2024 Discovery Deficiency Conference 6|Page
• Third Parties: Defendants object to Interrogatory 7 “to the extent that it seeks information regarding third parties that are not within Defendants’ control.” Texas clarifies that it does not ask for information regarding third parties that are not within Defendants’ control and demands a response to the above-referenced discovery requests. Therefore, Defendants must withdraw this objection and provide a fulsome response to Interrogatory 7. Because of these deficiencies, Texas insists that Defendants withdraw their objections or amend their deficient responses and fully respond, indicating if any information has been withheld. Defendants have the burden of pleading and proving the basis for objections. In re Univar USA, Inc., 311 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2010, no pet.). Please advise us regarding your availability for a meet and confer on these outstanding discovery issues.
Sincerely, /s/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov KYLE TEBO Special Counsel kyle.tebo@oag.texas.gov OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF, THE STATE OF TEXAS
MR 0476 Exhibit P
Email from Defense Counsel October 14, 2024
MR 0477 Exhibit P Page 1 of 2
Jacob Przada
From: Gabrielle C. Smith
Follow Up Flag: Follow up Flag Status: Flagged
Hi Jacob,
Following up on the discussion with our team last week regarding discovery matters. While we appreciate the opportunity to confer and the discussion that was had, it is clear that the parties have significantly different views of the jurisdictional question before the Court, and any potential related discovery.
That being said, to the extent we can narrow any dispute, Denton wants to do that. In that spirit, and after further consideration following our conference, Denton is willing to revise its response/objections in part. Based on your representation and clarification that Interrogatory No. 7 does not seek information regarding third parties that are not in Denton’s control, Denton withdraws its objection stated as “to the extent [this request] seek information regarding third parties that are not in Defendant’s control.” However, Denton stands on its remaining objections, and therefore does not have any additional response to this interrogatory. Further, Defendants maintain their remaining objections to the other requests.
Understanding that the parties may still have some disagreement, please advise as the State’s position on Defendant’s discovery response as amended above.
Regards,
Gabrielle
---------------------- GABRIELLE C. SMITH Principal 512-322-5820 Direct Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 ---------------------------------- www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800
Your text here!
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Jacob Przada on behalf of Jacob Przada Bar No. 24125371 jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov Envelope ID: 93300996 Filing Code Description: Motion to Compel Filing Description: Texas's Motion to Compel Depositions and Written Discovery and Response to Motion to Quash and Motions for Protective Order Status as of 10/18/2024 8:43 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Bonnie Freymuth bonnie.freymuth@oag.texas.gov 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Sharon Murray sharon.murray@oag.texas.gov 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: The State Of Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Johnathan Stone 24071779 Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Jacob Przada 24125371 jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Tamera Martinez tamera.martinez@oag.texas.gov 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Kyle Tebo Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: The City Of Denton, Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Amy Hoffee amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Mack Reinwand mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
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James F.Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
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Jacob Przada on behalf of Jacob Przada Bar No. 24125371 jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov Envelope ID: 93300996 Filing Code Description: Motion to Compel Filing Description: Texas's Motion to Compel Depositions and Written Discovery and Response to Motion to Quash and Motions for Protective Order Status as of 10/18/2024 8:43 AM CST
Associated Case Party: The City Of Denton, Texas
Gabrielle C.Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Sydney P.Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Gerard Hudspeth
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Brian Beck
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Vicki Byrd
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Paul Meltzer
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Joe Holland
MR 0481 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Jacob Przada on behalf of Jacob Przada Bar No. 24125371 jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov Envelope ID: 93300996 Filing Code Description: Motion to Compel Filing Description: Texas's Motion to Compel Depositions and Written Discovery and Response to Motion to Quash and Motions for Protective Order Status as of 10/18/2024 8:43 AM CST
Associated Case Party: Joe Holland
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Brandon Chase McGee
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Chris Watts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Sara Hensley
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Doug Shoemaker
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 10/17/2024 9:35:27 PM SENT
MR 0482 Cause No. 24-1005-481
The State of Texas, § In the District Court of Plaintiff, § § v. § § City of Denton; Gerard § Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton; Brian § Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; § Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe § Denton County, Texas Holland, Brandon Chase § McGee, and Chris Watts, § Members of the City Council of Denton; § Sara Hensley, City Manager of § Denton; and Doug Shoemaker, § Chief of Police of Denton; in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st Judicial District
PLAINTIFF’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF REGARDING THE ORDER OF HEARINGS
Introduction
Plaintiff, the State of Texas (“Texas”) has served limited discovery on Defendants that is
narrowly tailored to clarify disputed fact issues pertaining to this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants objected to and otherwise refused to answer Texas’ discovery requests,
prompting Texas to move the Court to compel Defendants to respond. Texas now seeks to have its
Motion to Compel heard prior to Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction. At the heart of both that
issue and Texas’s Motion to Compel is the same question: whether certain disputed facts are
material to the Court’s jurisdiction. When a court’s subject matter jurisdiction hinges on
unresolved fact issues, a district court must postpone deciding its jurisdiction. Put another way, if
the Court agrees with the merits of Texas’ Motion to Compel, then it must defer consideration of
Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction. Therefore, the Motion to Compel must be decided prior to
MR 0483 Defendants’ Plea. As a result, the interests of judicial economy will be best served if the Court first
considers Texas’s Motion to Compel.
Background
On November 22, 2022, the City of Denton adopted an ordinance (the “Ordinance”) that
prohibits Denton police and other municipal employees from enforcing state laws prohibiting
possession of marijuana. Pl.’s Orig. Pet., Appl. for Temp. Inj. and Perm. Inj. (Orig. Pet.) at Ex. 2.
On January 31, 2024, the State of Texas sued the City and named City officials alleging that the
Ordinance violates State law and that by adopting it Defendants had acted ultra vires their lawful
authority. Id. at 1–5.
Defendants responded by filing their Plea to the Jurisdiction on May 20, 2024, arguing that,
despite appearances, Defendants had not taken any action to either adopt or implement the
Ordinance. See, e.g., Def. PTJ at 1–3, 16–19. Defendants’ Plea relied on factual allegations asserting
that the City has disclaimed the Ordinance and has continued to fully enforce State drug laws. Id.
at 1–3. In support of these contentions, Defendants included public statements by various City
officials and signed affidavits from the City Manager and Interim Police Chief. See Def. PTJ Ex. D,
E. But contrary to these contentions, other City officials have claimed or implied that the Ordinance
has been implemented in direct defiance of State law.
Texas served written discovery and deposition notices on Defendants on August 30, 2024,
and September 13, 2024, respectively, intending to investigate the City’s treatment of its Ordinance
and compliance with State law. Defendants argue that Texas’s discovery was improper because the
question of this Court’s jurisdiction can be resolved without development of the facts. See, e.g. Def.
Mtn. to Quash at 2–3. They have therefore refused to respond to any of Texas’s discovery or to
produce witnesses for deposition and have moved for protective orders. In response, Texas filed its
Motion to Compel Depositions and Written Discovery and Response to Defendants’ Motion to
Quash and Motions for Protective Order (“Texas’ Discovery Motion”) requesting the Court grant
Plaintiff an opportunity to take jurisdictional discovery.
MR 0484 On November 5, 2024, the Court instructed Texas to provide a brief “indicat[ing] by what
authority...Judge is able to take up discovery before she hears the Plea to the Jurisdiction.” In
compliance therewith, Texas submits this Supplemental Brief for the Court’s consideration.
Standard
A. The Court has discretion over the order in which it takes up motions.
“Trial courts are generally granted considerable discretion when it comes to managing their
dockets.” In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. 2015); see also In re UpCurve Energy Partners, LLC,
632 S.W.3d 254, 257–58 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (“We ... recognize that courts have
inherent authority to manage their dockets.”); In re Marriage of Harrison, 557 S.W.3d 99, 137 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (“The judge, not the litigant, controls the trial
court docket.”). Thus, absent clear limitation by rule or statute, “[t]he control of the business of
the court is vested in the sound discretion of the trial judge.” In re State ex rel. Skurka, 512 S.W.3d
444, 452 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, no pet.).
The Court’s “inherent authority” to manage its docket entails that “the court has full
discretion, where two or more motions are pending at the same time, as to which motion to hear
first.” 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 36; accord State of Ga. v. Loveless, 454 F.2d 1209, 1210 (5th
Cir. 1972) (“It was within the discretion of the district court to give precedence to the motion to
remand” over Defendant’s motion to dismiss); In re Tijerina, No. 13-21-00305-CV, 2021 WL
6067351 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 22, 2021, no pet.) (implying district courts
“inherent authority” over its docket allowed it to decline to set multiple motions for the same
hearing).
B. The Court must consider disputed facts before ruling on an evidence-based plea to the jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional challenges come in two types. “Typically, the plea [to the jurisdiction]
challenges whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the case. However, a plea to the jurisdiction can also properly challenge the
MR 0485 existence of those very jurisdictional facts.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d
629, 635 (Tex. 2012). When the parties dispute “the existence of jurisdictional facts, we must move
beyond the pleadings and consider evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues.”
Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018).
“If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court
cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,
227–28 (Tex. 2004). Only “if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on
the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law.” Id. at
228.
Argument
The Court should hear Texas’s Discovery Motion first. The order in which motions are
heard falls within the district court’s discretion. Moreover, when the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction hinges on unresolved fact issues, courts should postpone judgment on jurisdictional
challenges and permit limited discovery into disputed jurisdictional facts. Here, discovery into the
City’s conduct concerning the Ordinance, the apparent decline in enforcement of misdemeanor
marijuana possession, conflicting statements by Denton city officials concerning compliance with
State drug laws and related matters would clarify whether Defendants have actually taken action to
implement the Ordinance. Such facts are necessary for the Court to resolve Defendants’
jurisdictional challenge. Additionally, prioritizing Texas’s Discovery Motions satisfies judicial
economy and does not prejudice Defendants.
A. The Court should grant limited discovery before adjudicating Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.
When jurisdictional facts are in dispute—a common occurrence in ultra vires claims against
a government official—a court must resolve those facts prior to determining whether it has
jurisdiction. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635, 642–43. The Court then decides the jurisdictional challenge
by the same standard it would decide a motion for summary judgment. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
In such cases, limited jurisdictional discovery is appropriate. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635, 642–43.
MR 0486 Preliminary discovery is therefore necessary and appropriate “[w]hen the consideration of a trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction requires the examination of evidence.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at
227. Therefore, when development of the factual record would help the court decide its
jurisdiction, courts may—and should—permit “targeted discovery. . . to illuminate jurisdictional
facts.” Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 491 (Tex. 2012).
Faced with a fact-heavy plea to the jurisdiction, “the trial court should deny the plea” or
“allow reasonable opportunity for targeted discovery.” Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 643. Importantly,
district courts may not rule on a jurisdictional plea if the Court’s jurisdiction depends on disputed
facts. Id. at 635 (“[i]f a fact issue exists, the trial court should deny the plea.”); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
at 227–28 (“If the evidence [before the Court] creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional
issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction”). Thus, if the Court finds that
the question of its jurisdiction in intertwined with disputed facts, the Court has two procedural
vehicles with which it can handle Defendants’ Plea: either carry the Plea and permit discovery tailored to “jurisdictional facts” or deny the Plea without prejudice and allow the case to proceed
to discovery. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 643.
In the instant case, numerous disputed facts cloud the question of this Court’s jurisdiction.
The following comprises a non-exhaustive list:
• Different City officials have made conflicting statements about whether the City is still
enforcing misdemeanor marijuana possession. Defendants Hudspeth, Beck, and Hensley
have made public statements either expressly or implicitly denying that the State’s
marijuana possession law is still fully enforced. See Pl. Mtn. to Compel at 7–9 (collecting
publicly available evidence).
• On the other hand, other City officials have denied that the City has or will implement the
Ordinance. They include Defendant Hensley, who has thus offered conflicting assessments
of the Ordinance, and Police Chief Jessica Robledo. Def. PTJ Ex. D, E.
• Despite these statements, citations and arrests by the Denton Police Department for
standalone misdemeanor possession have fallen to near zero levels. Pl. Mtn. to Compel at
MR 0487 8. Nonetheless, Defendants claim that the City “fully enforce[s] the State’s drug laws.”
Def. PTJ at 2.
• At least one Denton Councilmember understood the November 22, 2022, council session
that adopted the Ordinance to be an opportunity for debating the merits of the ballot
initiatives, whereas Defendants allege the Denton City Charter gives the City Council a
“purely ministerial” duty to approve successful ballot initiatives that the Council followed
on November 22. Compare Def. PTJ at 19 (“every act committed by the City Council was
mandatory”) with City Council Sess. Nov. 22, 2022, Statement by Councilmember Beck
at Tr. at 43:30–41 (“[the] process by which the recall took place were fundamentally flawed.
And [] I think that we should be basically rejecting sentence to [sic] section three in the
ordinance as presented”).
The foregoing fact issues clearly illustrate that ruling on Defendants’ Plea without further
discovery would be premature. The factual record, as it currently stands, is ambiguous as to
whether the Ordinance has been implemented to any degree, whether Denton officials regard the Ordinance as valid law that is compatible with State drug law, and whether the City Council’s
enactment of the Ordinance was a ministerial duty. Each of these issues is critically relevant to the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Any steps taken to implement an ordinance that conflicts with
State law—even if such steps turn out to be partial or indirect—would constitute an ultra vires act
by a City official. The discovery that Texas seeks will flesh out these and other jurisdictional facts.
Since the fruits of this discovery will aid the Court’s determination of its jurisdiction, the Court
should decide whether it will permit Texas to conduct limited discovery before it rules on its
jurisdiction.
B. Hearing the Discovery Motions first would serve judicial economy without prejudicing Defendants.
Considering Texas’s Motion to Compel first will expedite the hearing. The relevance of
disputed jurisdictional facts is a threshold question the Court must resolve before it can grant a plea
to the jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28. If, after considering the arguments in Texas’s
MR 0488 Motion to Compel, the Court agrees that its jurisdiction depends on the outcome of disputed fact
issues, it cannot grant Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction. Id. It must then either wait until the
fact issues are resolved to rule on Defendants’ Plea or deny it without prejudice. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d
at 643. These arguments are already before the Court as laid out in Texas’ Discovery Motion and
Defendants’ protective motions, so the Court should hear these motion first.
Conversely, if the Court concludes, after hearing the Discovery Motions, that the facts
presently before it allow it to decide its jurisdiction, then the Court will have simplified the work it
must do to adjudicate the Plea to the Jurisdiction. Defendants’ Plea raises several jurisdictional
arguments based on fact allegations concerning the City’s enactment and implementation of the
Ordinance. Thus, the Court will need to address the factual sufficiency of the record no matter
which motion the Court starts with. This means that a denial of Texas’ Discovery Motions would
expedite the Court’s analysis of Defendants’ Plea. Accordingly, if the Court hears Texas’ Discovery
Motions first, the Court will advance the resolution of both motions, regardless of the conclusion
it reaches. Additionally, the Discovery Motions are simpler than Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction
and the Court will likely be able to resolve them more expeditiously. Aside from the bearing of
disputed facts on jurisdiction, the Discovery Motions raise standard discovery arguments that do
not rest on complicated or unsettled points of law or fact. In this vein, Defendants’ protective
motions focus on rebutting the propriety of discovery by arguing that the Court can conclude that
it lacks jurisdiction without development of the facts—the converse of the position Texas takes.
Only a fraction of their discovery motions address issues that are separate from the propriety of
jurisdictional discovery, and Defendants’ discovery responses merely raise boilerplate objections.
Finally, prioritizing Texas’ Discovery Motions will not prejudice Defendants. As noted
above, Defendants’ Plea puts many of the same facts at issue as Texas’ Discovery Motions.
Defendants cannot complain of prejudice if the Court begins by resolving questions that it will need
to analyze in Defendants’ Plea. Rather, both parties will benefit from the Court resolving the
MR 0489 relevance of disputed facts to its jurisdiction given the importance of this question to all motions
that have been set for hearing.
Just as importantly, the parties lack any right to have the Court decide its jurisdiction upon
their request. Filing a Plea to the Jurisdiction does not entitle the moving party to a decision if the
court believes the question is unripe. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 229 (“the scheduling of a hearing
of a plea to the jurisdiction is left to the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to
evaluate the appropriate time frame for hearing a plea in any particular case”). Defendants may
wish to argue that the Court is bound to determine its jurisdiction at the earliest opportunity.
However, the Rules do not set a deadline for courts to determine their subject matter jurisdiction,
and precedent merely requires the Court to decide its jurisdiction “as early as practicable,” Hearts
Bluff, 381 S.W.3d at 491. Here, jurisdiction cannot be decided until the disputed jurisdictional facts
are ironed out. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should begin the hearing that has been set for
December 12, 2024, by taking up Texas’ Motion to Compel.
MR 0490 Date: December 6, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
KEN PAXTON /S/ ZACHARY L. RHINES Attorney General ZACHARY L. RHINES Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Tex. State Bar No. 24116957 First Assistant Attorney General KYLE TEBO RALPH MOLINA Special Counsel Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Tex. State Bar No. 24137691
AUSTIN KINGHORN OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Deputy Attorney General for Legal Special Litigation Division Strategy P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 RYAN D. WALTERS Tel.: (512) 463-2100 Chief, Special Litigation Division Zachary.Rhines@oag.texas.gov Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing document was filed electronically on December 6, 2024, effecting service on all counsel of record by e-service and/or e-mail in accordance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. /s/ Zachary L. Rhines Zachary L. Rhines
MR 0491 FILED: 12/10/2024 4:43 PM David Trantham Denton County District Clerk By: Alyssa Gongora, Deputy
CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of the § City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
The City of Denton (the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian
Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon
Chase McGee and Chris Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley,
City Manager of Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton1 (the
“Officials” and together with the City, the “Defendants”), file this Response to
Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief Regarding the Order of Hearings:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Court asked the State to provide authority for its argument that it should
be allowed to conduct discovery before the Court takes up Defendants’ Plea to the
Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton, and thus is not a proper 1
defendant. The current Interim Chief of Police of Denton is Jessica Robledo.
MR 0492 Jurisdiction. The State has not provided any such authority applicable to the single
alleged ultra-vires act pleaded in this case. Discovery is both unnecessary and
inappropriate; as the State itself pleaded, “this is a case of pure law and discovery is
unneeded.” Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶ 1.
The State alleged that a single act—the act of the City Council codifying and
publishing an ordinance passed by citizen initiative—violated Local Government
Code Section 370.003, which prohibits the City Council from “adopt[ing] a policy” not
to fully enforce the State’s drug laws. Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶ 22. No discovery is needed
for the Court to decide whether that act violates Section 370.003.
Importantly, no other specific ultra vires act taken by any defendant is alleged
by the State in its Petition, and there is no authority for the proposition that a
plaintiff may bring a claim that does not clear the hurdle of jurisdiction, but then go
fishing via discovery in that very non-jurisdictional case for some fact that might turn
its presently non-jurisdictional claim into a jurisdictional claim.
The State’s sole claim here is non-jurisdictional, and the State knows it. The
State is free to dismiss its case and, if sometime in the future, some defendant
actually does commit an ultra-vires act, file a new claim at that time. Until then, this
case—including discovery—should not proceed any further.
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
The Court’s October 22, 2024 email asked the State to “indicate by what
authority, in this case, [the] Judge is able to take up discovery before she hears the
Plea to the Jurisdiction.” And in this case, there is just one possibly relevant ultra
vires act by certain defendants: the adoption of a policy. That is, Local Government
2 MR 0493 Code Section 370.003, the sole basis of the State’s suit, prohibits just that one thing.
Specifically, certain defendants
. . . may not adopt a policy under which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs . . .
Thus, the sole jurisdictional question before the Court is whether 1) any
defendant covered by Section 670.003 2) adopted a policy not to fully enforce drug
laws. The State was required by the rules to have a good-faith basis to claim that
Defendants wrongfully adopted such a policy before filing suit. A plaintiff cannot file
suit alleging that Defendants—public officials, who act by public action—committed
a wrongful act, and only then go fishing for evidence to support a claim. That’s not
the order of operations for pleadings and discovery in Texas; pleadings matter.
Because pleadings matter, in determining whether it should allow discovery
as to any “jurisdictional facts” about an ultra vires act allegedly taken by any
defendant, the Court should look only to what purported ultra vires acts are alleged
in the State’s Petition. Here, there is only one act alleged as to any defendant(s): the
allegation that the “Denton City Council codified and published the ordinance.” Pl.’s
Orig. Pet. at ¶ 22. That’s it. No other act by any other defendant is alleged. The
State is bound by its pleadings. A plaintiff is not allowed to conduct discovery in the
hopes of finding evidence of some ultra vires act that it has not even pleaded.
So of course, while courts may indeed sometimes consider and allow limited
discovery as to certain disputed facts to rule upon a Plea to the Jurisdiction, such
facts must be relevant to the question before the court. That relevance is what makes
them “jurisdictional facts.” None of the State’s briefed (but not pleaded) “disputed
facts” would answer the sole question before the Court. 3 MR 0494 First, only “the governing body of a municipality . . . [or] municipal police
department” (the only persons prohibited from adopting such a policy by 670.003) are
the relevant parties for the facts of this case. Second, the State is bound to the sole
fact/act alleged in its Petition. The State’s citation to statements made by individual
council members as to their beliefs about the effect of the citizen-passed ordinance
etc. are not relevant to the question of whether “the governing body of a municipality”
“adopt[ed] a policy” by the sole alleged act of “codif[ying] and publish[ing] the
ordinance.” As the State knows, a municipality’s governing body can act only as a
whole, and the statements and opinions of any one council member are not relevant
to determining whether such act took place. Cent. Power & Light Co. v. City of San
Juan, 962 S.W.2d 602, 612 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (a city
acts by votes of its council as a whole); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 551.102 (final action
of a governmental body must be taken in open meeting). Either the Denton City
Council—which acts only as a whole, in open meetings—“adopt[ed] a policy” by taking
the sole action alleged, or it did not. The facts of the actions of the Denton City
Council are not in dispute; the minutes of every Denton City Council meeting are
publicly available.
Second, the number of misdemeanor possession arrests that the Denton Police
Department has conducted over time does not establish whether the police
department has “adopt[ed] a policy.” More to the point, it does not establish whether
there is any “Denton Police Department general order or directive . . . under which
Denton will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs.” Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at page 1
(emphasis added). Section 370.003 does not work in the inverse; it does not require
4 MR 0495 any police department to “fully enforce laws relating to drugs,” and it certainly does
not require a police department to “arrest people for marijuana offenses in a number
that satisfies the State.” No such claim has been or could be pleaded in this case.
Arrests may go up, they may go down, they may remain static. Such circumstances
do not answer the only relevant question: did the Denton Police Department adopt a
policy by issuing a general order or directive not to fully enforce drug laws?
Importantly, the State’s Petition does not allege that the Denton Police Department
has actually taken the act of issuing any such general order or directive. Again,
Denton’s Police Department is a public entity, which transparently publishes its
policies (the General Orders of the Denton Police Department) online.2 The State
could easily ascertain by public record whether any such order had been issued, but
of course, just as with the Denton City Council, no order reflects any such policy
adopted by the Denton Police Department since the passage of the Ordinance.
The question of whether the State has pleaded a valid ultra vires claim against
any defendant should be decided based on 1) the application of the sole pleaded
statute (Local Government Code Section 370.003) to 2) the sole act actually pleaded
as to specific defendants.3 No discovery is necessary to determine that question, as
the sole act alleged (the codification and publishing of the ordinance) is not in
2 See https://www.cityofdenton.com/DocumentCenter/View/814/General-Orders- Updated-Dec-5-2024-PDF?bidId= (Updated December 5, 2024, as reflected at the bottom of each page thereof).
3 Denton notes that the City itself is an entirely improper defendant, either in an ultra- vires action in general or specifically an ultra-vires action based on Section 370.003, which prohibits action only by specifically identified bodies and persons (“a municipality” is not among them).
5 MR 0496 dispute.4 Jurisdiction should be decided based on the act actually pleaded, pursuant
to Section 370.003 as it is actually written.
In addition, the nature of the discovery sought by the State demonstrates that
the State does not actually wish to engage in “jurisdictional discovery,” but rather
wishes to engage into a wide-ranging fishing inspection and inquisition into all
manner of city activities, beliefs and opinions (not official acts) of a number of
individuals, and the like.5 That discovery would not be appropriate even if there was
some disputed jurisdictional fact.
CONCLUSION
As to the single act alleged against a single set of public official defendants, no
“jurisdictional discovery” is necessary or appropriate. Plaintiff is not entitled to file
4 Plaintiff’s citation to City of Houston v. Aspermont Apt. Corp. to try to open some door into discovery as to the customs and practices of certain Denton city employees is inapposite here. City of Houston v. Aspermont Apt. Corp., 1999 Tex.App. Lexis 6721 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] August 27, 1999, pet. denied). The question in that case involving U.S.C. § 1983 claims was whether the city, not any individual official or group of officials, had established a “custom,” which the court expressly distinguished from something “approved or based on a decision of the city’s legislative body or final policymaker.” Id. at *15. In other words, in a case like this one, where what is prohibited is a policy action (adoption) by “the city’s legislative body or final policymaker,” inquiry into whether there is some custom on the part of some city employee is irrelevant. In fact, the Aspermont court made it plain that a City Council can only be held responsible for its “express decision.” Id. at *18 (noting that an action by the City Council must be by an action of the Council itself, citing city charter provisions mirroring Texas law stating that the Council “acts only by ordinance, resolution, or motion, passed by majority vote.”) Thus, all evidence of an allegedly ultra vires act by Denton’s “governing body” (the relevant defendant(s) per section 370.003) is a matter of public record. On top of that, the State has not even alleged that there is some custom of city employees, or some policy-adopting act taken by any defendant other than its allegation that “[t]he Denton City Council codified and published the ordinance.” No inquiry into any possible “custom” of any city employee could establish anything relevant as to the sole purportedly wrongful act alleged: codifying and publishing the ordinance.
5 Defendants therefore incorporate by reference their Motions for Protection and their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Depositions and Written Discovery as if fully set forth herein. 6 MR 0497 suit first, and then go searching after-the-fact for unknown and un-pleaded facts that
might support some future, amended ultra-vires suit. Defendants respectfully
request that the Court deny the State’s request to conduct discovery before the Court
takes action on Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction. Defendants further respectfully
request that the Court grant them such other and further relief to which they may be
justly entitled.
7 MR 0498 Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 8 MR 0499 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 10th day of December, 2024:
Ken Paxton Attorney General
Brent Webster First Assistant Attorney General
Ralph Molina Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
Austin Kinghorn Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Zachary L. Rhines Zachary.Rhines@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Kyle Tebo Kyle.tebo@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE
9 MR 0500 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Cathy Daniels on behalf of Jose de la Fuente Bar No. 00793605 cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Envelope ID: 95167299 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: (Defendants') to Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief Status as of 12/11/2024 8:11 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Amy Hoffee amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Mack Reinwand mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Jose E.de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
James F.Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Gabrielle C.Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Sydney P.Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Kyle Tebo Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Bonnie Freymuth bonnie.freymuth@oag.texas.gov 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Zachary Rhines zachary.rhines@oag.texas.gov 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
MR 0501 FILED: 12/10/2024 4:43 PM David Trantham Denton County District Clerk By: Alyssa Gongora, Deputy
CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of The § City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS AND WRITTEN DISCOVERY
The City of Denton (the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian
Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase
McGee and Chris Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton and Doug Shoemaker,
Chief of Police of Denton1 (the “Officials” and together with the City, the “Defendants”)
file this Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Depositions and Written Discovery and
respectfully shows the Court as follows:
Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton, and thus is not a proper 1
defendant. The current Interim Chief of Police of Denton is Jessica Robledo.
1 MR 0502 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The State’s request to compel discovery in this matter should be denied. The State
purports to seek “jurisdictional discovery,” but there are not any jurisdictional facts that
it needs to discover for the Court to decide the Defendants’ jurisdictional challenge. The
State cites to various information it seeks to learn through discovery, but the dispositive
jurisdictional question is: did any of the Defendants adopt a policy not to fully enforce
the drug laws of the State of Texas? The answer to that question is a matter of public
record, a record that was provided to the State over half a year ago. Discovery about
what other cities did, what officers thought, or the vices of marijuana are immaterial to
the matter of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction comes first and the jurisdictional question is teed
up for the Court. Accordingly, the State’s Motion to Compel Depositions and Written
Discovery Should be denied.
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
Plaintiff’s attempt to compel compliance with supposed jurisdictional discovery
should be denied in this case. Defendants moved for protective orders from both oral
depositions and written discovery sought by the State pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 192.6 on September 18 and September 27. The State’s request for
discovery would subject Defendants to “undue burden, unnecessary expense,
harassment, annoyance” and protecting Defendants from compliance is “in the
interest of justice.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6. Defendants are seeking protection from
responding to discovery while their Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending. 2 In the
2 Defendants also hereby incorporate by reference their Plea to the Jurisdiction as if fully set forth herein.
2 MR 0503 interest of avoiding unnecessary litigation burden and expense, or potential discovery
disputes on claims which should be dismissed, Defendants seek protection from
responding to Plaintiff’s requests in their entirety, and ask the Court to deny
Plaintiff’s motion and stay any discovery pending a ruling on the Plea.
A. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permit the Court to limit the discovery sought here.
The facts relevant to the sole dispositive jurisdictional question (did the city
council or police department adopt a policy not to fully enforce drug laws?) are
undisputed, and all evidence of such facts has long been available to the State.
“Targeted discovery cannot be allowed unless—and only to the extent that—it
is essential to the resolution of a jurisdictional question.” Tex. S. Univ. v. Young, 682
S.W.3d 886, 889 (Tex. 2023) (Young, J. concurring) (emphasis added). The State of Texas
filed suit claiming the Ordinance violated and was preempted by Section 370.003 of the
Texas Local Government Code, and specifically brought a claim against each of the
Defendants asserting that Defendants acted ultra vires by “adopting” the Ordinance.
The relevant statutory provision that the State alleges was violated by each Defendant
states:
The governing body of a municipality, the commissioners court of a county, or a sheriff, municipal police department, municipal attorney, county attorney, district attorney, or criminal district attorney may not adopt a policy under which the entity will not fully enforce laws relating to drugs, including Chapters 481 and 483, Health and Safety Code, and federal law.
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003. The dispositive questions in determining Defendants’
jurisdictional challenge and the State’s claims are addressed by “yes or no” answers
3 MR 0504 concerning formal acts of government officials and public employees; no “jurisdictional
facts” (or any other facts) are at issue other than the acts that the State alleges the
Defendants committed.
The State contends that the Defendants created two jurisdictional fact issues:
(1) that any City of Denton official is implementing the Ordinance, and (2) the City
Councilmembers exercised discretion when they voted on the Ordinance. (Pl.’s Mot. to
Compel at 7.) Notably, the first “fact” is not even pleaded in the State’s Petition. The
State’s attempt to delay the hearing on the plea on the basis of these supposed facts
should be denied.
First, implementation and methods and means of enforcement are not the subject
of Section 370.003. The discovery sought isn’t to establish jurisdiction, it’s a fishing
expedition and an attempt to distract from the straightforward question before this
Court. Second, the public record that exists pursuant to the open meeting laws of the
State of Texas unambiguously reflects that there was no vote by the City Council to
adopt the Ordinance. The City Council’s votes in connection with the Ordinance passed
by the voters are a matter of public record.
Defs.’ Plea to the Jurisd. at Ex. A at 34.
On November 22, 2022, Council only voted on adoption of an ordinance
“canvassing the election returns and declaring results of the Special Elections.” And
4 MR 0505 when presented with the opportunity to actually adopt the Ordinance by City Council
vote, that action was voted down.
(Defs.’ Plea to the Jurisd. at Ex. A at 119.)
1. The State’s written discovery seeks information that is irrelevant and/or immaterial to the claims and defenses of this case.
The discovery sought is best obtained not from overbroad and overreaching
written discovery requests, but from the relevant public records (which the State already
has). The discovery sought here should be limited in its entirety as the burden and
expense of substantive responses and potential for additional discovery requests and
discovery disputes regarding same outweighs the likely benefit given the needs of the
case and the limited scope of the questions before this Court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4(b).
Defendants filed an evidentiary plea to the jurisdiction. The State has the burden
to plead a claim for which the City’s and Officials’ immunity is waived. Here, the State
must plead a specific act by a person or entity identified in the statute that would violate
Section 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code. The State hasn’t pleaded any acts
by a person or entity identified in Section 370.003 or facts to support any alleged acts,
only legal conclusions. Legal conclusions (especially when they are wrong) do not
support a claim; factual allegations do, particularly when a plaintiff would allege that
public officials have acted in an ultra-vires manner.
5 MR 0506 The Marijuana Ordinance was adopted by the voters of the City of Denton. The
written requests served by the State are not aimed at answering that question; relevant
examples of these improper requests are provided below:
TO DEFENDANT: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth Brian Beck,
Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara
Hensley, and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 7: Identify any documented changes in Marijuana
use since the Marijuana Ordinance took effect, including but not limited to any
documented changes occurring at the Denton Independent School District, or
in connection to City of Denton Police citations and arrests or traffic and
pedestrian stops.
***
TO DEFENDANTS: Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 8: Identify how many times the Marijuana
Ordinance has been enforced and identify the individuals whom the
Marijuana Ordinance has been enforced against.
***
TO DEFENDANTS: Sara Hensley and Jessica Robledo
INTERROGATORY 9: Identify all jobs to which you have applied from
August 30, 2022 to Present, including the name of the employer, its location,
and the ultimate outcome of your application for that job.
Ex. A, Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s Interrogatories.
6 MR 0507 None of these requests speak to adoption of a policy by a particular defendant not
to fully enforce drug laws of this State. The only possible actionable act pleaded in this
case is the act of alleged adoption of a policy by either the Denton City Council or the
Denton Police Department under which the State’s laws relating to drugs will not be
fully enforced. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 370.003 (“The governing body of a municipality . .
. [or] municipal police department . . . may not adopt a policy under which the entity will
not fully enforce laws relating to drugs . . .”) In the State’s written discovery requests, it
acknowledges that formal action is required as it defines “adoption” as “passage of a
measure into law.” (See Exhibit D, Pl.’s First Reqs. for Admis. to Defs. at 5.3)
“Implementation,” “enforcement,” and other verbs that are not stated in the plain
language of the sole statute upon which the State bases its claim are not at issue.
Discovery about inaction, the wisdom of the citizen-initiative Marijuana Ordinance, or
the discretion exercised by officers in the normal course of police work are of no
consequence to the sole legal issue (did the city council or police department commit the
act of adopting a policy not to fully enforce drug laws?) and thus are of no use to this
Court in determining whether it has jurisdiction. The questions for this Court to consider
in deciding the matters pleaded by the parties can only consider official acts by
government officials or employees. The relevant facts regarding any action, or inaction,
by the Defendants are already fully before the Court. Indeed, when the question of
3 Defendants do not necessarily agree with this definition as a whole, but do agree that the only “acts” that could be actionable as ultra-vires acts contrary to Section 370.003 are 1) official acts of the city council and/or municipal police department 2) to adopt a policy not to fully enforce drug laws.
7 MR 0508 jurisdiction was previously before this Court for decision, the State did not previously
seek a continuance or serve discovery with respect to the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction—
it filed a response and asked the Court to rule. See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Plea to the Jurisd.
at 24 (“Plaintiff, the State of Texas, by and through the Office of the Attorney General,
asks that this Court deny City Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.”). The only reason
that the question of jurisdiction has not already been fully presented to and decided by
the Court is because the proceedings ran long on May 31, 2024, leaving the hearing on
the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction to be continued to a later date. There is no material
or relevant discovery needed to determine the pending jurisdictional question.
2. The depositions sought are not proportional to the needs of the case nor do they seek relevant testimony.
The State also contends that “the depositions that Texas noticed were reasonably
calculated to discovery of facts about the Ordinance’s adoption and implementation.”
(Pl.’s Mot. to Compel at 11.) The State seeks to depose not just individual city
councilmembers and the chief of police, but the City manager and officer. The matter of
whether a policy is adopted is a matter of public record, and while the Ordinance is not
being implemented, even if it were, implementation is not the subject of Section 370.003.
All of the State’s argument relating to implementation and discretion of individual
officers is irrelevant.
None of the six depositions that the State unilaterally noticed should go
forward. Eliciting testimony about the vices or virtues of marijuana use, or the
wisdom of the citizen-initiative ordinance, or the opinions of individual city employees
or officials as to the Ordinance and/or its wisdom, legality, etc. are of no consequence
8 MR 0509 to the sole legal issue (did the city council or police department commit the act of
adopting a policy not to fully enforce drug laws?) and thus are of no use to this Court
in determining whether it has jurisdiction.
a. Individual City Councilmembers
Contrary to the State’s position, the City citing public votes certifying the
election and voting not to adopt the Ordinance as an action of Council does not open
up the floodgates into all realm of examination regarding the thoughts of any one
councilmember. As both the United States and the Texas Supreme Courts have
observed, it is “not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire
into the motives of legislators.” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951), accord
In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. 2001). “In times of political passion, dishonest
or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily
believed. Courts are not the place for such controversies.” Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378
(footnote omitted).
The doctrine of legislative immunity established in Tenney “shields legislative
actors not only from liability, but also from being required to testify about their
legislative activities.” Perry, 60 S.W.3d at 860 (emphasis added); Clear Lake City
Water Auth. v. Salazar, 781 S.W.2d 347, 349–50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.
1989, orig. proceeding) (holding that members of water authority could not be
questioned about legislative activities). As councilmembers, the Deponents therefore
cannot testify about what the City Council did, what the City Council did not do, or
why they or any other councilmember supported or opposed the City Council’s action
(or inaction). The State has not pleaded any acts these councilmembers would have
9 MR 0510 taken outside of their role as voting members of the City Council. Thus, all of their
acts are protected by legislative immunity, including the doctrine’s shield against
being required to testify, the councilmember deponents do not have knowledge of any
relevant discoverable facts. What any individual councilmember believed or thought
is not relevant to the matter of jurisdiction—only action taken, or not taken, by the
Council as a body is relevant.
b. City Manager
To the extent the State seeks discovery from the City Manager as to the City
Council’s intent regarding ministerial actions regarding canvassing the Special
Election and results of same, a municipality’s intent is expressed solely through the
actions of its city council conducted in and pursuant to open meetings, in line with
the open-government laws of this state. Cent. Power & Light Co. v. City of San Juan,
962 S.W.2d 602, 612 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); see also Tex.
Gov’t Code § 551.102 (final action of a governmental body must be taken in open
meeting).
Inasmuch as Sara Hensley was authorized to speak as to the City’s actions, or
inaction, in potentially adopting a policy that would prevent full enforcement of the
drug laws of Texas, the State already attached a copy of the public facing statement
reflecting that the City would not do so to its Original Petition and incorporated it as
part of its pleading. (See Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶¶ 20–21, Ex. 1.) The State has neither
pleaded or even pointed to any other such public statement by Ms. Hensley speaking
on behalf of the City. Ms. Hensley is not an actor subject to Section 370.003, and she
is not alleged to have taken any other action that might implicate Section 370.003.
10 MR 0511 Thus, she does not and cannot have any knowledge of any relevant jurisdictional
facts. The Court should enter an order protecting Ms. Hensley from the State’s
attempt to depose her.
c. Interim Chief of Police and Individual Officers
The State has not pleaded or otherwise identified any policy adopted by the
Denton Police Department in relation to or in response to the Ordinance that would
violate Section 370.003.4 Even according to the State’s own rationale, testimony
sought is not relevant. A supposed “drop off in marijuana possession arrests and
citations,” is by no means a total prohibition.
The Ordinance was adopted by the voters of Denton before Interim Chief
Robledo was hired by the City. Interim Chief Robledo has no relevant firsthand
knowledge of the voters passing the Ordinance and her deposition should not proceed.
Likewise, while Lt. Summit and Sgt. Briggs were subordinate employees of the
Denton Police Department when the voters passed the Ordinance, the State has not
alleged (and cannot allege) that either of them were charged with the task of adoption
of department-wide policies. Any of their personal feelings or opinions about the
Ordinance passed by the voters or any other sentiments connected thereto are
irrelevant to the sole relevant question of whether or not a prohibited policy was
4 Nor could it, as it is apparent from publicly available information that no policy was adopted by the Denton Police Department; the General Orders of the Denton Police Department are and have at all times been publicly available, and do not reflect any change in any relevant policy since the Ordinance was passed by the voters. See https://www.cityofdenton.com/DocumentCenter/View/814/General-Orders-Updated-Dec-5-2024- PDF?bidId= (Updated December 5, 2024, as reflected at the bottom of each page thereof).
11 MR 0512 adopted by the police department. Accordingly, the individual officers do not have
knowledge of any relevant jurisdictional facts and their depositions should not
proceed.
3. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permit the Court to limit the discovery sought here.
“The discovery methods permitted by these rules should be limited by the court
if . . . the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
form some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”
Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4(a). As outlined above, the facts relevant to the sole dispositive
jurisdictional question (did the city council or police department adopt a policy not to
fully enforce drug laws?) are undisputed, and all evidence of such facts has long been
available to the State.
The discovery sought is best obtained not from the testimony of any individual
councilmember, the City Manager, the Interim Chief of Police, or the individual police
officers, but from the public records evidencing the official acts of the City’s governing
body. The discovery sought here should be limited in its entirety as the burden and
expense of preparing witnesses for depositions and defending same outweighs the
likely benefit given the needs of the case and the limited scope of the questions before
this court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4(b).
Thus, Defendants re-urge their Motions for Protective Order limiting discovery in
this case and request that the Court deny the State’s Motion to Compel.
12 MR 0513 B. Defendants’ objections are not boilerplate.
Simply because an objection or response applies to more than one request does
not make it boilerplate. Plaintiff’s chart in fact highlights the specificity among the
responses. Defendants provided substantive responses to the extent possible minimizing
expense in recognition of and appreciation for transparency of the City as a public entity
and our open court system. (See generally, Exhibits A, B, C, Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s
Discovery Requests.) However, Defendants maintain that they are immune from suit,
and thus should be protected from the discovery process in this case.
1. Jurisdictional Objections.
As set out in detail above, Defendants’ objections to discovery based on this
Court’s lack of jurisdiction are well founded. And as the State itself pleaded, “this is a
case of pure law and discovery is unneeded.” (Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at ¶ 1.) Likewise, to the
extent there is a decline in arrests for low-level marijuana offenses, that has nothing to
do with what official action City Council or the Police Department took in adopting a
policy to regarding enforcement of drug laws.
The Ordinance was passed on November 8, 2022. The hearing on Defendants’
jurisdictional plea and the State’s Request for Temporary Injunction were originally set
to be heard on May 31, 2024. All facts relating to the passage of the Ordinance by the
voters and the City’s official actions subsequent thereto have been known for well over a
year, and are pleaded in the State’s Petition. While the Parties communicated often in
the weeks and months leading up to the May 31 hearing date, no written discovery was
served by either party. Not only did the parties not seek written discovery prior to that
hearing, the parties entered into a written agreement via e-mail not to exchange even
13 MR 0514 initial disclosures until after those hearings were set to have occurred. (Exhibit E,
Scheduling Email Correspondence.) Due to time constraints created by a lengthy
hearing on the State’s Motion to Strike Plea in Intervention on May 31, the State
requested that the Court continue the hearing on Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction
and State’s Request for Temporary Injunction. Defendants’ evidentiary Plea to the
Jurisdiction included witness statements and certified public records, but the State did
not identify the need to conduct discovery to address the Plea to the Jurisdiction.
No pleadings have changed, and no facts have changed in the intervening six
months. The facts regarding the passage of the Ordinance and all official acts of the City
and any of its officials in connection with same are a matter of public record, and
Defendants affirmatively supplied those records to the State as part of their
jurisdictional challenge. In fact, the only change that has occurred since the original
May 31 hearing date is that district court judges in Hays and Travis Counties granted
pleas to the jurisdiction filed by other cities and officials dismissing nearly identical
claims brought by the State against cities in those jurisdictions whose citizens passed
similar initiatives. (See Exhibit F, Order Granting the City of Austin’s Plea to the
Jurisdiction; see also Exhibit G, Order Granting the City of San Marcos’s Plea to the
Jurisdiction.)
Again, jurisdictional discovery is not needed in this case. See Klumb v. Hous.
Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the request for continuance to seek jurisdictional discovery where “[n]one of the
14 MR 0515 discovery mentioned by Plaintiffs could have raised a fact issue material to the
determination of the jurisdictional plea.”); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d
275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (trial court did not abuse
discretion in denying discovery “based on purported need for jurisdictional discovery”
where party could not show discovery sought “would be material to the trial court’s
assessment of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction”). The State has not articulated a sound
reason it now needs this discovery, because there is no good reason for delaying a
decision on the issue of immunity implicated by the pending pleadings. The goal of a
plea to the jurisdiction “is to defeat a cause of action for which the state has not waived
sovereign immunity (usually before the state has incurred the full costs of litigation).”
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). Immunity
serves “to shield the public from the costs and consequences of improvident actions of
their governments.” Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006).
The legal question is “did any of the Defendants adopt a policy in violation of
Section 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code?” The only “policy” the State
identifies in its pleading is the Marijuana Ordinance. So, then the question is “did any
of the Defendants adopt the Marijuana Ordinance?” The answer to that based on public
records attached to Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is “no.” (Defs.’ Plea to the Jurisd.
at Ex. A.)
There is no dispute that the Proposition was on the ballot for the November 8,
2022 election. There is no dispute that the City canvassed and certified the results of
that election. There is no dispute that the Ordinance was published in the City’s Code
15 MR 0516 of Ordinances. Any matters beyond that are not within the purview of Section 370.003,
and thus are not needed to decide the matter of jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs do not cite what among the evidence filed by the City and Officials
creates an issue or dispute of any material fact. The meeting minutes show that the
election was called. The election records show that a majority of the voters approved the
proposition that is the ordinance. The records show that when given the opportunity to
adopt the ordinance as an act of city council, that motion failed. The City should not be
forced to expend public resources engaging in non-jurisdictional discovery trying to
defend against a lack of action.
The facts aren’t in dispute, the law is. And the Court has everything it needs to
decide the law in this case.
2. Overbroad and unduly burdensome.
While these are two separate objections, both of these objections apply to an
overlapping set of requests. Each of the specific requests identified ask for information
from a number of sources about different actions and persons not identified in
Section 370.003 of the Texas Government Code that does and could not go toward
proving whether or not it is more or less true that the City Council adopted a policy like
the one of which the State complains. As mentioned above, a municipality acts through
its city council in and pursuant to open meetings. Cent. Power & Light Co. v. City of San
Juan, 962 S.W.2d 602, 612 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); see also
Tex. Gov’t Code § 551.102 (final action of a governmental body must be taken in open
meeting). These requests are not limited to records regarding City Council action in
calling the election or the vote City Council vote choosing not to adopt the Ordinance.
16 MR 0517 And in fact those records were already previously produced to the State. (See Exhibit
C, Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s 1st RFPs at Resp. No. 2.) And the communications were likewise
equally available as the State attached them to its own Original Petition in this matter.
Here, where the matter of jurisdiction is the sole question, discovery that goes beyond
that is clearly creates undue burden for a party that is immune from suit, which is
apparent from the context of the objection.
For those reasons, Defendants objections to Interrogatories Nos. 7, 20, and 21 and
Requests for Production Nos. 1, 3, 4, 8, and 10–14 were properly asserted.
3. Vagueness and ambiguity objections.
The State also takes issue with Defendants objections raised on the basis of
vagueness and ambiguity. For each of these, it is not clear what response the State is
looking for either because of lack of specificity or because the State paints with too broad
of a brush.
Request for Production No. 11 for example is unclear, as it asks for
“demonstratives of marijuana” at City Council meetings. Is it asking for a copy of records
regarding citations? Use? Complaints? The wording of the request is unclear.
Likewise, with respect to Interrogatory No. 11, asking Defendants to explain a
policy is not clear. This request is not asking the Defendants to confirm whether or not
there is a policy, or to the extent there is a stated policy, what it is. Rather, this request
asks Defendants to explain policies and practices, written and unwritten relating to
funding for THC testing. Is this request asking what tests are run? How that decision
is made? It is not clear what it is asking for. What is clear is that it is not germane to a
jurisdictional fact in dispute.
17 MR 0518 For those reasons, Defendants objections to Interrogatories Nos. 2, 7, 10–19,
Requests for Production Nos. 9, 11, 15–23, and Requests for Admission Nos. 1–4, 6, and
10–15, were impermissibly vague, and the objection was properly asserted. Likewise,
Defendants objections to Interrogatories Nos. 10–19 and Requests for Production Nos.
11, 15–23 on the basis that the requests were ambiguous as worded were properly
asserted.
4. Common Privilege Objections.
To the extent that documents that would be responsive include communication
by and between the city attorneys for the respective parties, Defendants continue to
assert this objection.
5. Objections as to Certain Definitions.
The State says that “training” should be obvious with respect to Request for
Admission No. 13 but in the context of the full request, it is unclear. The full request
states “Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have received
training on the Marijuana Ordinance.” Is this request asking whether employees of the
Police Department have been told what the Ordinance says? Does it instead mean that
officers or other personnel were instructed to act in accordance with the text of the
Ordinance? Is there some third option the State is instead inquiring about? The same
lack of clarity applies to the use of training in Requests for Production Nos. 17 and 18.
6. Criminal and Judicial Records Objection.
The State contends that it does not seek criminal or judicial records. However,
the State asks for “all communications or documents within your possession, relating to
18 MR 0519 citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses,
and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia.”
Defendants provided the State access to the publicly available crime data and
statistics or the City, and the motion to compel indicates a desire for additional records
which would fall within the scope of judicial or criminal records.
7. Subject to and without waiving objections.
It is clear from context that Defendants objections do not extend to documents
already produced in this case or otherwise available through other means (e.g., the City’s
website). The objections otherwise apply, which is evident from the response and the
parties’ conference efforts in this matter. Where Defendants could readily identify
documents or responses otherwise already available, it did so.
Accordingly, the Court should sustain Defendants objections.
C. Defendants’ Motion to Quash and for Protective Order.
In addition to responding to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and the arguments and
support set out above, Defendants incorporate by reference their September 18 and
September 27, 2024 discovery motions as if fully set out herein.
The State must, and has not, show a genuine dispute of material fact—that’s the
standard on which courts decide evidentiary pleas to the jurisdiction. The State cites to
public statements by individuals about their sentiments on the ordinance and a more
recent statement made in a September City Council meeting by the Mayor. The Mayor’s
September 2024 question to legal counsel, which was not answered or further discussed
because of this very litigation, does not create a fact question. What any individual police
officer thinks of the ordinance, what the mayor thinks, or general sentiments regarding
19 MR 0520 marijuana use, are not material facts for the purpose of deciding Defendants’
jurisdictional plea. None of those facts tend to make it more or less true what official
action the City Council or the Police Department did, or in this case did not, take.
Accordingly, the State has failed to identify “jurisdictional discovery” necessary to
further delay ruling on Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.
D. Not capitulating to the State’s demand for unnecessary discovery does not constitute a failure to confer in good faith.
The Parties did confer regarding the need for discovery, yet, and as evidenced by
the discovery motions before the Court, there are disagreements not just to specific
requests but the propriety of discovery altogether in this case.
The parties conferred regarding the dispute as to the propriety of discovery in this
case on more than one occasion. (Exhibit H, Email Conference re Depositions and
Motion for Protective Order; Exhibit I, Email re Call to Meet-and-Confer Call.) It was
evident that the parties did not agree on the fundamental issue of whether discovery
was appropriate, and Defendants filed a motion for protection accordingly. Further, to
the extent possible while balancing the need to limit the expenditure of public dollars in
a matter where the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, Defendants nonetheless
provided objections and responses where able and identified public records in an effort
to strike an appropriate balance in this case. As for depositions, witnesses identified and
counsel were unable to appear for the depositions as noticed, but given the larger
objection to taking depositions, put that matter to the Court prior to engaging in
additional scheduling disputes.
20 MR 0521 CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the reasons stated above, Defendants respectfully pray the Court deny
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Depositions and Written Discovery, to protect them from
compliance with written discovery and depositions while the Plea to the Jurisdiction
is pending, and grant such other and further relief to which Defendants may be justly
entitled.
21 MR 0522 Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532 By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
22 MR 0523 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 10th day of December, 2024:
Ken Paxton Attorney General
Brent Webster First Assistant Attorney General
Ralph Molina Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
Austin Kinghorn Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Zachary L. Rhines Zachary.Rhines@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Kyle Tebo Kyle.tebo@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE
23 MR 0524 EXHIBIT A
MR 0525 CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of the § City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
TO: Plaintiff, the State of Texas, by and through its attorneys of record, Jacob Przada and Johnathan Stone, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Special Litigation Division, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711-2548.
Pursuant to Rule 197 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the City of Denton
(the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of
Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee and Chris
Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley, City Manager of
Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton1 (the “Officials” and together
with the City, the “Defendants”) hereby serves their Responses and Objections to
Plaintiff the State of Texas’s (the “State” or “Plaintiff”) First Set of Interrogatories,
1 Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton.
MR 0526 which responses are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference for all
purposes.
2 MR 0527 Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
3 MR 0528 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 30th day of September, 2024:
Ken Paxton Attorney General
Brent Webster First Assistant Attorney General
Grant Dorfman Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
Ralph Molina Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Jacob Przada Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Johnathan Stone Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. DE LA FUENTE
4 MR 0529 Objections to Definitions
1. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Enforce” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
2. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “The Cities” to the extent it defines municipalities “acting in concert” and implies collusion or some other coordinated effort with undefined entities and undefined acts.
3. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Codification” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
4. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Adoption” to the extent that it seeks to create a legal definition that is contrary to the relevant legal authority in this case. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
5. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Implementation” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
6. “Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Policy” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined to the extent it conflicts with the plain meaning of the term and seeks to redefine any documents identified as a “Policy” in City’s records. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
Defendants’ objection to each of these terms applies to each and every request below that uses such term, and is incorporated therein by this statement.
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify all documents utilized to assist in any way with the preparation of the answers to each of the interrogatories.
5 MR 0530 RESPONSE: See documents attached to Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction filed in this case on May 20, 2024.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Explain the process to change, adopt, or implement a different policy or ordinance than a policy or ordinance currently codified, adopted, or implemented by the City of Denton.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this Interrogatory is overbroad and vague, and not tailored to the issues and claims involved in this case.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions. For facts supporting the Court’s lack of jurisdiction, see Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction filed in this case.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify every person who has firsthand factual information about this case, rebuttal or impeachment evidence in this case, or who is expected testify in this case, including your experts or rebuttal witnesses, and provide a brief statement of each individual’s connection with the case. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283
6 MR 0531 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Defendants’ Initial Disclosures and Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: State the legal theories and describe in general the factual bases for your defenses. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(j), 197.1.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Defendants’ Initial Disclosures and Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify any City of Denton employees and third- parties, including the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killeen, Austin, and San Marcos, and media personnel with whom you discussed codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458
7 MR 0532 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as overbroad to the extent that it would impermissibly seek information protected by the common interest privilege. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, Defendants will refrain from answering this Interrogatory.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: If you contend that the Marijuana Ordinance can, or cannot be changed to comply with the City Charter, Ordinance, or a policy, state the factual basis for your claim and identify all documents relied on for your response.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request because it incorporates and assumes an incorrect and impermissible predicate legal conclusion as to the Marijuana Ordinance’s legality. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify any documented changes in Marijuana use since the Marijuana Ordinance took effect, including but not limited to any documented changes occurring at the Denton Independent School District, or in
8 MR 0533 connection to City of Denton Police citations and arrests or traffic and pedestrian stops.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the extent that it seeks information regarding third parties that are not within Defendants’ control. Defendants also object to this interrogatory as vague, overbroad, and unduly burdensome in its entirety. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions. For facts supporting the Court’s lack of jurisdiction, see Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction filed in this case.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify how many times the Marijuana Ordinance has been enforced and identify the individuals whom the Marijuana Ordinance has been enforced against.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
9 MR 0534 RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify all jobs to which you have applied from August 30, 2022 to Present, including the name of the employer, its location, and the ultimate outcome of your application for that job.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, Defendants will refrain from answering this Interrogatory.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to funding for THC testing that was in effect during the period spanning February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to
10 MR 0535 the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to funding for THC testing that has been in effect during the period spanning November 22, 2022, to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to the use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause that was in effect during the period spanning February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension
11 MR 0536 Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to the use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause that has been in effect during the period spanning November 22, 2022, to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
12 MR 0537 INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to
13 MR 0538 the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458
14 MR 0539 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for felony- level marijuana offenses that was in effect from February 13, 2021, to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
15 MR 0540 INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to citations or arrests for felony- level marijuana offenses that has been in effect from November 22, 2022, to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this request as vague and ambiguous to the extent that it asks a party to “explain” a policy or similar matter. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Identify all inquiries by the public about confusion relating to codification, implementation, or adoption of the City of Denton’s Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this interrogatory as vague, facially overbroad and unduly burdensome to the extent it would require Defendants to review all public inquiries and determine the state of mind of the inquirer. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not
16 MR 0541 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Identify all documents relied upon in developing the current City of Denton Police Department Policy and Police Directive or General Orders relating to misdemeanor-level marijuana offenses.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to this interrogatory as vague, facially overbroad, and unduly burdensome in its entirety. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this case, therefore Defendants will refrain from disclosing any merits-related contentions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: If you have ever been convicted of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, state the nature of the charge and the date and place of arrest and conviction. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(B), 609(a).
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Interrogatory as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors,
17 MR 0542 which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the information sought by this Interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the forgoing objections, Defendants refrain from answering this Interrogatory.
18 MR 0543 EXHIBIT B
MR 0544 CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of the § City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
TO: Plaintiff, the State of Texas, by and through its attorney of record, Jacob Przada and Johnathan Stone, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Special Litigation Division, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711-2548.
Pursuant to Rule 198 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the City of Denton
(the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of
Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee and Chris
Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley, City Manager of
Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton1 (the “Officials” and together
with the City, the “Defendants”) hereby serves their Responses and Objections to
Plaintiff the State of Texas’s (the “State” or “Plaintiff”) First Requests for Admission.
1 Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton.
MR 0545 Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
2 MR 0546 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 30th day of September, 2024:
Ken Paxton Attorney General
Brent Webster First Assistant Attorney General
Grant Dorfman Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
Ralph Molina Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Jacob Przada Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Johnathan Stone Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. DE LA FUENTE
3 MR 0547 OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS
1. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Memorandum” to the extent it conflicts with the plain meaning of the term and seeks to redefine any documents identified as a “Memorandum” in the record. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
2. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Codification” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
3. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Adoption” to the extent that it seeks to create a legal definition that is contrary to the relevant legal authority in this case. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
4. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Implementation” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
Defendants’ objection to each of these terms applies to each and every request below that uses such term, and is incorporated therein by this statement.
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that the Marijuana Ordinance was adopted on November 22, 2022, following a vote by the City of Denton City Council.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not
4 MR 0548 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to this request as vague and misleading to the extent that it uses the term “adopted” as Plaintiff would define that term.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that following a vote on November 22, 2022, the Marijuana Ordinance became operational by law.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that the June 6, 2023 vote on the Marijuana Ordinance only related to budgetary authorization for the Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4.
5 MR 0549 Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that during the June 6, 2023 vote on the Marijuana Ordinance, the City of Denton City Council considered a duplicate of the Marijuana Ordinance, already adopted on November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to this request as vague and misleading to the extent that it uses the term “adopted” as Plaintiff would define that term.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that following a vote on the Marijuana Ordinance on June 6, 2023, the Marijuana Ordinance remained in the Code of Ordinances.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which
6 MR 0550 is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to the foregoing objections, Defendants cannot admit or deny the Request as worded, and thus Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have been directed not to cite or arrest individuals for misdemeanor levels of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to this request as vague, overbroad, and incomprehensible to the extent that it uses the passive voice (“have been directed”), as it does not state by whom such direction may have been given.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that the Marijuana Ordinance conflicts with Texas Local Government Code 370.003.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—
7 MR 0551 Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this Request does not seek admission of a fact but rather a legal contention.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not respond.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that City of Denton Police Department citations and arrests for misdemeanor levels of marijuana have decreased by over 50 percent since November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not respond.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that City of Denton Police Department citations and arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia have decreased by over 50 percent since November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter
8 MR 0552 of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not respond.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Admit that you did not send out a document or communication to employees of the City of Denton Police Department that the Marijuana Ordinance has not been implemented.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Admit that you received a document or communication from the City of Denton Police Department that the Marijuana Ordinance has been implemented.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the
9 MR 0553 discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this Request is vague, overbroad, and unclear as it is directed to multiple persons.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants cannot admit or deny this Request as worded.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit that you directed the City of Denton Police Department not to use the smell of marijuana for probable cause.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this Request is vague, overbroad, and unclear as it is directed to multiple persons.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have received training on the Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the
10 MR 0554 discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this request is vague and overbroad as to the term “training.”
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants cannot admit or deny this Request as worded.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Admit that the City of Denton City Council could change a City of Denton policy relating to the implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this request is overbroad and vague as worded, including the fact that it inquires into a hypothetical. Defendants further object that this Request does not seek admission of a fact but rather a legal conclusion.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants cannot admit or deny this Request as worded.
11 MR 0555 REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15: Admit that a new City Manager could change a City of Denton policy relating to the implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the admission sought by this Request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object that this request is overbroad and vague as worded, including the fact that it inquires into a hypothetical. Defendants further object that this Request does not seek admission of a fact but rather a legal conclusion.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendants cannot admit or deny this Request as worded.
12 MR 0556 EXHIBIT C
MR 0557 CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; § BRIAN BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of § Denton, VICKI BYRD, PAUL § MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BRANDON CHASE McGEE, and § CHRIS WATTS, Members of the § City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of § Denton; and DOUG SHOEMAKER, § Chief of Police of Denton, in their § official capacities, § Defendants. § 481st JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
TO: Plaintiff, the State of Texas, by and through its attorneys of record, Jacob Przada and Johnathan Stone, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Special Litigation Division, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711-2548.
Pursuant to Rule 196 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the City of Denton
(the “City”) and Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of
Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee and Chris
Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley, City Manager of
Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton1 (the “Officials” and together
with the City, the “Defendants”) hereby serves their Responses and Objections to
Plaintiff the State of Texas’s (the “State” or “Plaintiff”) First Requests for Production,
1 Doug Shoemaker is no longer the Chief of Police of Denton.
MR 0558 which responses are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference for all
purposes.
MR 0559 Respectfully submitted,
DEVIN Q. ALEXANDER Denton City Attorney’s Office 215 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76201 (940) 349-8333 (940) 382-7923 Facsimile For email contact and service regarding this case, please include email addresses for all listed attorneys in the To: field, and include amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com in the cc: field, until requested otherwise.
Mack Reinwand City Attorney State Bar No. 24056195 mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com
Devin Alexander Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 24104554 devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELLE & TOWNSEND, P.C. 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 322-5800 Facsimile: (512) 472-0532
By: /s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. de la FUENTE (Attorney-in-Charge) State Bar No. 00793605 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com JAMES F. PARKER State Bar No. 24027591 jparker@lglawfirm.com GABRIELLE C. SMITH State Bar No. 24093172 gsmith@lglawfirm.com SYDNEY P. SADLER State Bar No. 24117905 ssadler@lglawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
MR 0560 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to the following attorneys via the Court’s electronic filing case management system and electronic mail on this 30th day of September, 2024:
Ken Paxton Attorney General
Brent Webster First Assistant Attorney General
Grant Dorfman Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
Ralph Molina Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy
Ryan D. Walters Chief, Special Litigation Division
Jacob Przada Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel Johnathan Stone Johnathan.Stone@oag.texas.gov Special Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Jose E. de la Fuente JOSE E. DE LA FUENTE
MR 0561 OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
1. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Enforcement” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
2. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “The Cities” to the extent it defines municipalities “acting in concert” and implies collusion or some other coordinated effort with undefined entities and undefined acts.
3. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of Supporting” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
4. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Memorandum” to the extent it conflicts with the plain meaning of the term and seeks to redefine any documents identified as a “Memorandum” in the record. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
5. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Codification” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
6. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Adoption” to the extent that it seeks to create a legal definition that is contrary to the relevant legal authority in this case. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
7. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Implementation” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory authority. Further, Defendants object to this term as defined as it is in conflict with the plain meaning. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
8. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s definition of “Reprioritization” to the extent it seeks to give legal significance to a term not defined by the relevant statutory
MR 0562 authority. Defendants will treat the term as having its plain meaning, and as is consistent with any relevant legal authority.
Defendants’ objection to each of these terms applies to each and every request below that uses such term, and is incorporated therein by this statement.
RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Produce all communications and documents sent or received by you, from November 2, 2021 to Present, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance, including communications in which you were copied.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Produce all policies or memoranda created by you, from November 2, 2021 to Present, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—
MR 0563 Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 124. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and citizens groups, including Ground Game Texas, Decriminalize Denton, any parties supporting the Marijuana Ordinance, or their agents, employees, or representatives, regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the public
MR 0564 relating to enforcement of the Marijuana Ordinance and the Marijuana laws of the State of Texas.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and law enforcement or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
MR 0565 RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killeen, Austin, and San Marcos or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Denton City Council did not adopt an ordinance affecting the enforcement of marijuana-related offenses, and actions taken or not taken by other cities are not a part of the claims in this lawsuit. Defendants further object to this request as overbroad to the extent that it seeks documents that would be subject to the common interest privilege. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killeen, Austin, and San Marcos or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of a Marijuana Ordinance by the Cities of San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killeen, Austin, and San Marcos from November 2, 2021 to Present.
MR 0566 OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Denton City Council did not adopt an ordinance affecting the enforcement of marijuana-related offenses, and actions taken or not taken by other cities are not a part of the claims in this lawsuit. Defendants further object to this request as overbroad to the extent that it seeks documents that would be subject to the common interest privilege. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Denton Independent School District, or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding codification, adoption, or implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not
MR 0567 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Produce all disciplinary statistics relating to violations of the Marijuana Ordinance or any related policy or memorandum by employees of the City of Denton Police Department from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. The State’s claim in this case involves official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and employees of the City of Denton Police Department or their agents, and representatives regarding reprioritization of Marijuana enforcement, including misdemeanor
MR 0568 marijuana possession or misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia offenses from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this Request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Produce all copies of communications or documents within your possession relating to the City of Denton Police Administration’s demonstrative of marijuana at a City Council meeting from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and fails to identify a document or
MR 0569 category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Produce all communications and documents sent to or received from, or exchanged by and between you and the Denton County Public Health District or their agents, employees, or representatives regarding marijuana use in the City of Denton from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to funding by the City of Denton or the City of Denton Police Department for THC testing from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the
MR 0570 discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to funding by the City of Denton or the City of Denton Police Department for THC testing from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that this request is overbroad and unduly burdensome in its entirety, and that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
MR 0571 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants further object to the extent that this request seeks criminal records or judicial records.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see publicly available data at: https://data.cityofdenton.com/dataset/denton-crime- data.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not
MR 0572 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants further object to the extent that this request seeks criminal records or judicial records.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see publicly available data at: https://data.cityofdenton.com/dataset/denton-crime- data.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to training on the Marijuana Ordinance from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the
MR 0573 discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
MR 0574 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Based on the foregoing objections, and based further on the fact that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses, Defendants will not produce documents responsive to this Request.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses from February 13, 2021 to November 22, 2022.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R.
MR 0575 Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants further object to the extent that this request seeks criminal records or judicial records.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see publicly available data at: https://data.cityofdenton.com/dataset/denton-crime- data.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for felony-level marijuana offenses from November 22, 2022 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants further object to the extent that this request seeks criminal records or judicial records.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see publicly available data at: https://data.cityofdenton.com/dataset/denton-crime- data.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: Produce all communications or documents within your possession, relating to citations or arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana offenses, and for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia, where the subject expressed that they thought it was lawful to possess marijuana or marijuana paraphernalia, from November 22, 2022 to Present.
MR 0576 OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. Defendants further object to the Request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and fails to identify a document or category of documents with reasonable particularity. Defendants further object to the extent that this request seeks criminal records or judicial records.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see publicly available data at: https://data.cityofdenton.com/dataset/denton-crime- data.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24: Produce all communications and documents sent by you, your attorneys, or agents, employees, or representatives to the media regarding the Marijuana Ordinance or this lawsuit from November 2, 2021 to Present.
OBJECTION: Defendants object to this request as they are immune from suit. Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is pending before the Court, and the discovery sought is both irrelevant and immaterial to resolution of the matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 405 S.W.3d 204, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015); see also Quested v. City of Hous., 440 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The State’s claim in this case solely concerns official action taken, or rather not taken, by government actors, which is a matter of public record, and thus Defendants object that any information relevant to the claims is equally available to Plaintiff. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4. Defendants also object that the documents sought by this request are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3.
RESPONSE: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
MR 0577 EXHIBIT D
MR 0578 Cause No. 24-1005-481
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITY OF DENTON; GERARD § HUDSPETH, Mayor of Denton; BRIAN § BECK, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton; VICKI § DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS BYRD, PAUL MELTZER, JOE § HOLLAND, BRANDON CHASE § McGEE, and JILL JESTER, Members of § the City Council of Denton; SARA § HENSLEY, City Manager of Denton; and § JESSICA ROBLEDO, Interim Chief of § Police of Denton; in their official capacities, § 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO DEFENDANTS
To: Defendants, The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, Sara Hensley, and Jessica Robledo, by and through their counsel of record, Jose E. De la Fuente, James F. Parker, Gabrielle C. Smith, and Sydney P. Sadler, of LLOYD GOSSELINK ROCHELE & TOWNSEND, P.C., 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900, Austin, Texas 78701.
Plaintiff, the State of Texas, serves these Requests for Admission on Defendants, as allowed
by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 198. Defendants must respond to the following Requests for
Admission within thirty (30) days after service and supplement all responses in accordance with
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
.
MR 0579 Date: August 30, 2024 Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON /S/ Jacob Przada Attorney General of Texas JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel BRENT WEBSTER Tex. State Bar No. 24125371 First Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RALPH MOLINA TEXAS Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Special Litigation Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station AUSTIN KINGHORN Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Deputy Attorney General for Legal Strategy Telephone: (512) 463-2100 Jacob.Przada@oag.texas.gov RYAN D. WALTERS Chief, Special Litigation Division COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 30, 2024, a true and correct copy of this document has been served via electronic service and/or email to the following:
Counsel for Defendants: Jose ( Joe) de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com James Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com Gabrielle Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com Catherine Daniels cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Sydney Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com Devin Alexander devin.alexander@cityofdenton.com
/S/ Jacob Przada JACOB PRZADA Special Counsel
2 MR 0580 INSTRUCTIONS
1. Unless otherwise specified, the time period covered by any Request for Admission (“admission” or “admissions,” as applicable) is from November 2, 2021, through the present.
2. Pursuant to Rule 198 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (TRCP) you are required to serve a separate response to each of the following Requests for Admission. Each matter is admitted without the necessity of a court order, unless, on or before thirty (30) days after service of these requests, you serve upon attorneys for Plaintiff a written answer or objection addressed to each request, signed by you or your attorney.
3. If you deny a matter on which an admission is requested, your denial must fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires you to qualify your answer or deny only the part of the matter on which the admission is requested, you must specify so much of the matter as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. You may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failing to admit or deny a matter unless you state that you have made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or easily obtainable by you is insufficient to enable you to admit or deny the matter.
4. The singular shall be construed to include the plural, and the plural shall be construed to include the singular, as necessary to bring within the scope of each Request all responses that might otherwise be construed outside its scope.
5. The connectives “and” and “or” and the phrase “and/or” shall be construed disjunctively or conjunctively as necessary to bring within the scope of each Request all responses that might otherwise be construed outside its scope.
6. The use of any past, present, or future tense of any verb shall not be construed to limit or otherwise modify the time period covered by these Requests. Each Request should be read to include the past, present, or future tense of any verb as necessary to bring within the scope of each Request all responses that might otherwise be construed outside its scope.
3 MR 0581 DEFINITIONS
1. “Plaintiff” or “defendant,” as well as a party’s full or abbreviated name or a pronoun referring to a party, means the party, and when applicable, the party’s agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly, including any attorney.
2. “You” or “your” means: (1) The City of Denton, (2) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (3) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (4) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (5) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (6) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (7) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At- Large, (8) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, (9) Defendant Sara Hensley, City Manager of Denton, and (10) Defendant Jessica Robledo, Interim-Chief of Police of Denton as well as, successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
3. “Communication” means any exchange or transmission of words or ideas to another person or an entity, including without limitation, conversations, discussions, letters, memoranda, interoffice communication platforms, social media platforms, instant messaging programs, meetings, notes, speeches, or other transfers of information, whether written, oral, or by any other means, whether direct or indirect, formal or informal, and includes any document which abstracts, digests, transcribes, or records any such communication.
4. “And/or,” “and,” and “or” refer to all listed categories inclusively, not exclusively (i.e., not the option of producing one group of documents, or another, nor of producing documents for one group of the listed persons or entities, but not others).
5. “Document” and “documents” mean all documents and tangible things, in the broadest sense allowed by Rule 192.3(b) and comment 2 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
6. “Possession” means actual care, custody, control, or management.
7. “Marijuana” means the plant Cannabis sativa L., and any preparation thereof, excluding Hemp.
8. “Paraphernalia” means equipment, a product, or material that is used or intended for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, or concealing a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, or in injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
4 MR 0582 9. “Memorandum” means a brief written message or report from one person or department in an organization to another.
10. “Codification” means the process of collecting, organizing, and consolidating local government ordinances and regulations into a comprehensive document.
11. “Adoption” means passage of a measure into law.
12. “Implementation” means placing an ordinance into effect.
13. “City Council” means: (1) Defendant Gerard Hudspeth, the Mayor of Denton, (2) Defendant Brian Beck, the Mayor Pro Tem of Denton and Councilmember for District #2, (3) Defendant Vicki Byrd, Councilmember for District #1, (4) Defendant Paul Meltzer, Councilmember for District #3, (5) Defendant Joe Holland, Councilmember for District #4, (6) Defendant Brandon Chase McGee, Councilmember At-Large, (7) Defendant Jill Jester, Councilmember At-Large, as well as successors, predecessors, divisions, subsidiaries, present and former officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting on behalf of the successors, predecessors, divisions, and subsidiaries.
14. “City of Denton Police Department” means the City of Denton Police Department, located at 601 E Hickory St, Denton, TX 76205.
15. “The Marijuana Ordinance” means Chapter 21 – Offenses, Article V - Marijuana Enforcement of the City of Denton Code of Ordinance, Proposition B to the November 8, 2022, City of Denton Election, and the Voter Initiative Petition preceding the Proposition.
16. All undefined terms and phrases have not only the meaning ascribed to them by ordinary custom and usage, but also the meaning ascribed to them by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.
5 MR 0583 PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 1. Admit that the Marijuana Ordinance was adopted on November 22, 2022, following a vote by the City of Denton City Council.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 2. Admit that following a vote on November 22, 2022, the Marijuana Ordinance became operational by law.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 3. Admit that the June 6, 2023 vote on the Marijuana Ordinance only related to budgetary authorization for the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 4. Admit that during the June 6, 2023 vote on the Marijuana Ordinance, the City of Denton City Council considered a duplicate of the Marijuana Ordinance, already adopted on November 22, 2022.
ADMIT OR DENY
6 MR 0584 If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 5. Admit that following a vote on the Marijuana Ordinance on June 6, 2023, the Marijuana Ordinance remained in the Code of Ordinances.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 6. Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have been directed not to cite or arrest individuals for misdemeanor levels of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 7. Admit that the Marijuana Ordinance conflicts with Texas Local Government Code 370.003.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 8. Admit that City of Denton Police Department citations and arrests for misdemeanor levels of marijuana have decreased by over 50 percent since November 22, 2022.
7 MR 0585 ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 9. Admit that City of Denton Police Department citations and arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia have decreased by over 50 percent since November 22, 2022.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 10. Admit that you did not send out a document or communication to employees of the City of Denton Police Department that the Marijuana Ordinance has not been implemented.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 11. Admit that you received a document or communication from the City of Denton Police Department that the Marijuana Ordinance has been implemented.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 12. Admit that you directed the City of Denton Police Department not to use the smell of marijuana for probable cause.
8 MR 0586 ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton and Jessica Robledo
Request 13. Admit that employees of the City of Denton Police Department have received training on the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 14. Admit that the City of Denton City Council could change a City of Denton policy relating to the implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TO DEFENDANTS: The City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Brian Beck, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee, Jill Jester, and Sara Hensley
Request 15. Admit that a new City Manager could change a City of Denton policy relating to the implementation of the Marijuana Ordinance.
ADMIT OR DENY
If “Deny” provide explanation: ____________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
9 MR 0587 EXHIBIT E
MR 0588 From: Richard Gladden
Jacob and Jose,
My clients agree to this proposal.
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob,
The City agrees to this proposal.
Joe de la Fuente
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 ---------------------------------- Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 Your text here!
****ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT ****
A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email (and all attachments) is confidential, legally privileged, and covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Unauthorized use or dissemination is prohibited. If you have received this message in error please delete it immediately. For more detailed information click http://www.lglawfirm.com/email-disclaimer/ .
MR 0589 NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e-mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ . From: Jacob Przada
Hi all,
I hope you are well. Would counsel be willing to stipulate to service of disclosures on June 21, 2024? Finally, would counsel agree to exchanging Exhibit and Witness lists for the hearing by Tuesday, May 28, 2024?
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jacob Przada Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2024 10:30 AM To: Jose de la Fuente
Hi Joe,
We will do that. Thanks for reaching out.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob and Richard,
Per the court’s email this morning, we will be serving a notice of hearing for the two matters Denton wants heard (our PTJ and Special Exceptions); y’all should do the same for the matters you want heard on your behalf.
MR 0590 Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 Your text here!
****ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT ****
A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email (and all attachments) is confidential, legally privileged, and covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Unauthorized use or dissemination is prohibited. If you have received this message in error please delete it immediately. For more detailed information click http://www.lglawfirm.com/email-disclaimer/ .
NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e-mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ . From: Jacob Przada
Thanks, Joe. It sounds like May 31st works for the Pleas to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Strike, and Temporary Injunction to be heard at the same time, with the Court to likely carry rulings until all argument has been heard. Although Mr. Gladden referenced Denton’s Special Exceptions, we are unopposed to that being heard on the 31st as well.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Richard Gladden
Exactly Jose. This is all good with my clients.
MR 0591 Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 12, 2024, at 4:58 PM, Jose de la Fuente
Richard,
With that clarification (I was going to remind you of it in any case, as the AG is entitled to have their TI hearing go into the queue – I’m sure the court will carry any rulings until all of the various motions have been presented), Denton is fine with that. Bottom line – everything set for hearing, jurisdiction goes first (as it does), and then the remaining items are stacked for the court to take up in due order.
If we can nail down this agreement, we’ll let the court know ASAP to hold that date, and we’ll list the items to be heard. The notices of hearing can then issue once the court makes the setting.
Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 Your text here!
****ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT ****
A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email (and all attachments) is confidential, legally privileged, and covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Unauthorized use or dissemination is prohibited. If you have received this message in error please delete it immediately. For more detailed information click http://www.lglawfirm.com/email-disclaimer/ .
NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e-mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ . From: Richard Gladden
I neglected to mention Mr. Paxton's application for a temporary injunction. Assuming we agree that it will be heard after the please to jurisdiction are first heard by the Court, my agreement sent in my last email stands as stated. 4
MR 0592 From: Richard Gladden
Gentlemen,
The Defendant-Intervenors agree to setting the hearing for May 31, 2024, provided the pleas to jurisdiction of the Defendant-Intervenors and the City of Denton are heard first, and the City's special exceptions and Mr. Paxton's motion to strike being heard on the same date and at the same time thereafter.
If all parties are in agreement, Defendant-Intervenors authorize either of you (Mr. Przada or Mr. De La Fuente) to inform the Court's coordinator of this agreement via email, provided counsel for all parties, including me, are included on the said email communication to the Court.
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob and Richard,
Taking this offline so we just confer among counsel . . . May 31st works for me. So long as we make it clear to the court that it’s a half day for 1) our two PTJs, 2) the AG’s TI, and 3) the AG’s Motion to Strike (all of which can be heard in a half-day window), then can we agree on that date? Otherwise, we’re looking at June 25th.
Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct ---------------------------------- 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800
Your text here!
****ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT ****
MR 0593 A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email (and all attachments) is confidential, legally privileged, and covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Unauthorized use or dissemination is prohibited. If you have received this message in error please delete it immediately. For more detailed information click http://www.lglawfirm.com/email-disclaimer/ .
NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e-mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ . From: Tina Lopez
Good afternoon,
The hearing set on May 10th has been removed. Here are dates available for ½ day for your motion to strike: 5/2 at 9:30am 5/31 at 9:30am 6/25 at 1:30pm Please confer with all parties and submit agreed date and time.
Sincerely,
Tina Lopez 481st District Court Administrator 1450 E. McKinney, 4th Floor Denton, TX 76209 Tina.Lopez@DentonCounty.gov 481st Website: https://www.dentoncounty.gov/1574/481st-District-Court You may review case records or court dockets here. All hearings in the 481st District Court are held in person.
From: Jacob Przada
MR 0594 Cc: Heather Dyer
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Ms. Lopez,
Thank you so much for your responsiveness and for working with us on these dates. As you and I discussed, the May 10, 2024 date was placed on hold, not set, and was subsequently determined to not work for all parties. At that point, we notified Court Administration of the same.
Despite Mr. Gladden’s misunderstanding of this situation, and my previous email this week to him and all counsel, where we indicated that Court staff would be notified that the May 10, 2024 date did not work, we look forward to working with him to identify a hearing date. Thank you again for your time.
Best regards,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Richard Gladden
Ms. Lopez,
I represent the Defendant-Intervenors in the above-referenced case.
MR 0595 Earlier this week I discovered one of the other attorneys in this case apparently caused the pending matters to be scheduled for a half-day hearing on May 10, 2024. I then expressed my objection to that date to all opposing counsel. However, I now see that Mr. Prazda, without further conference with me, has apparently scheduled his client's motion to strike for the same date, May 10, 20024.
I realize Mr. Przada is a relatively inexperienced attorney and that he may not be familiar with the local Uniform Rules of Denton County, particularly those that require him to confer with opposing counsel before causing a hearing to be set, and that require him to include opposing counsel on all email communications he has with you or the Court. Regardless of these circumstances, at this juncture I would appreciate it if you would remove from the Court's calendar any hearing on any pending pleadings filed by any party currently scheduled for any hearing May 10, 20024. No hearing for that date has ever been agreed to by any attorney in this case, other than Mr. Przada, and all other counsel informed Mr. Przada of this fact last week.
All attorneys for the parties agreed last week that the May 10, 2024, hearing date would be canceled, and we further mutually agreed we would all attempt to agree on a new date for all pending pleadings in the next few days. I expect we will be able to do so.
Thank you.
From: Jose de la Fuente
Dear Ms. Lopez,
Thank you so much for your responsiveness to our recent scheduling inquiries. And, as you requested, we are including counsel for all parties in this email and any other similar communications going forward.
All parties appreciate the demands on the court’s calendar, as well as your notification to us last week that the first available date for a ½ day hearing slot in this matter would be July 3rd. In discussing that option among the parties, the Office of the Attorney General would like to see if there are any earlier options available, and we of course would like to do what we can to accommodate their scheduling preferences; perhaps an earlier slot has opened up since our prior communication?
MR 0596 Again, we appreciate the demands on the court’s calendar, and we appreciate your efforts thus far to accommodate the parties’ request for a ½ day hearing. We likewise appreciate any other information you can provide and any alternate/additional dates, should any now be available.
Thank you for your attention to this matter,
Jose de la Fuente Counsel for the City of Denton
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 ---------------------------------- www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800
Your text here!
****ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT ****
A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email (and all attachments) is confidential, legally privileged, and covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Unauthorized use or dissemination is prohibited. If you have received this message in error please delete it immediately. For more detailed information click http://www.lglawfirm.com/email-disclaimer/ .
NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e-mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ .
Jacob and
MR 0597 EXHIBIT F
MR 0598 06/12/2024 09:01:30AM Velva L. Price District Clerk Travis County D-1-GN-24-000586 CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-000586
THE STATE OF TEXAS, IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff,
Vv.
CITY OF AUSTIN; KIRK PRESTON WATSON, Mayor of Austin; PAIGE ELLIS, Mayor Pro Tem of Austin; NATASHA HARPER-MADISON, VANESSA FUENTES, JOSE VELASQUEZ, JOSE "CHITO" VELA, RYAN ALTER, MACKENZIE KELLY, OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS LESLIE POOL, ZOHAIB "ZO" QADRI, and ALISON ALTER, Members of the City Council of Austin; JESUS GARZA, Interim City Manager of Austin; and ROBIN HENDERSON, Interim Chief of Police of Austin, in their official capacities, Defendants,
GROUND GAME TEXAS, Intervenor-Defendant. 419T JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION CAME TO BE HEARD on June 10, 2024, Defendants' Plea to the Jurisdiction. Having
considered the pleadings, responses, as well as the arguments of counsel and the applicable law,
the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Plea should be and accordingly is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs claims against Defendants asserted in this cause are hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE, without leave to amend.
SIGNED on June 11, 2024.
a? ram a oifer, Judge Presidir g >
MR 0599 EXHIBIT G
MR 0600 CAUSE NO. 24-0267 THE STATE OF TEXAS, § INTHE DISTRIGRCOURT Plaintiff, HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS § at 0.5% o'clock_?_M. v. § Cm JUL 22 2024 CITY OF SAN MARCOS, JANE HUGHSON, Mayor of San Marcos, § , DISTRICT CLERK MATTHEW MENDOZA, SAUL GONZALES, ALYSSA GARZA, § HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS SHANE SCOTT, MARK GLEASON, § and JUDE PRATHER, Members of § the City Council of San Marcos; § STEPHANIE REYES, City § Manager of San Marcos; and STAN § STANDRIDGE, Chief of Police of § San Marcos, in their official § capacities, § Defendants. § 207th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER GRANTING PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
On June 27, 2024, came on to be heard the City of San Marcos (the "City") and
Jane Hughson, Mayor of San Marcos, Matthew Mendoza, Saul Gonzales, Alyssa
Garza, Shane Scott, Mark Gleason, and Jude Prather, Members of the City Council
of San Marcos; Stephanie Reyes, City Manager of San Marcos; and Stan Standridge,
Chief of Police of San Marcos; in their official capacities (the "Officials" and together
with the City, the "Defendants") (the "Officials" and together with the City, the
"Defendants") Plea to the Jurisdiction ("Plea"). The Court, having reviewed the Plea
and the argument of counsel, is of the opinion that Defendants' Plea should be, and
therefore is, GRANTED.
It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED with
prejudice to refiling.
MR 0601 SIGNED this of 2024.
t
JUDGE PRESTDING
MR 0602 EXHIBIT H
MR 0603 From: Jose de la Fuente Sent: Friday, September 13, 2024 10:41 AM To: Jacob Przada; Melissa Ethridge; Kyle Tebo Cc: Johnathan Stone; Gabrielle C. Smith; Catherine Daniels Subject: RE: Cause No. 24-1005-481; State v. City of Denton et al.
Jacob,
We understand that the parties disagree on the issues. That’s why we have courts to resolve such disputes. With that mutual understanding, we further understand that after conferring, we do not have an agreement on the scheduling of various hearings. In the absence of such agreement, the City intends to go forward with setting its Plea to the Jurisdiction for hearing pursuant to the Denton County local rules. We will be requesting a setting for one to two hours, depending on the court’s availability. We understand that your office is unavailable for hearing in September and on October 1st, so we will request dates from the Court for the rest of October. You of course will be copied on our communication to the court.
As to your intention to notice depositions of six different Denton officers and employees, your office is of course free to send whatever deposition notices you wish. The City does not believe that any discovery of “jurisdictional facts” by the plaintiff is necessary or appropriate, particularly in a case in which the plaintiff had the burden of pleading specific acts that it contends would be in violation of the law/ultra vires. The City thus will move for protection as to the referenced notices of deposition if they are indeed sent, so at this point, we do not see the need for further discussion of schedule or logistics as to the depositions the plaintiff may seek.
We do note, however, that as the plaintiff contends that certain facts (as yet not identified) are relevant to the question of jurisdiction and should be subject to discovery, including facts known by Councilmember Brian Beck, Councilmember Joe Holland, City Manager Sara Hensley, Chief Jessica Robledo, Sgt. Daryn Briggs, and Lt. Chris Summitt, Rule 194.2(5) requires both identification of such persons and a statement of the subject matter of each such person’s purported knowledge/connection to the case. Plaintiff’s current disclosures do not disclose Sgt. Briggs or Lt. Summitt as persons with knowledge and further, what they might have knowledge about. We look forward to seeing your supplemented disclosures promptly.
Once we have dates for the hearing on the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction from the Court, we will endeavor to reach an agreement as to a date that works with your availability.
Sincerely,
Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair
MR 0604 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 ----------------------------------
From: Jacob Przada
Joe,
Texas cannot agree with your representation of the issues. You seem to insist that our jurisdictional discovery is not appropriate, while we believe our discovery is, in fact, necessary and appropriate at this time. Because in our previous call, you could not commit to how or whether the City would respond to the substance of our discovery requests– even though your team had told Texas to send written discovery–Texas cannot agree to waive any right to a hearing on jurisdictional discovery without seeing the City’s responses to our discovery.
Courts have broad discretion and allow jurisdictional discovery as to key jurisdictional facts before a PTJ hearing is conducted. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 642–43 (Tex. 2012); see also Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 491 (Tex. 2012). Unless you are willing to agree to a hearing on the Plea to the Jurisdiction and Application for Temporary Injunction on December 9, 2024 without these new conditions, we cannot agree to a hearing on that date.
On Friday, we plan to notice depositions of the following individuals: (1) Councilmember Brian Beck, (2) Councilmember Joe Holland, (3) City Manager Sara Hensley, (4) Interim Police Chief Jessica Robledo, (5) City of Denton Police Sgt. Daryn Briggs, and (6) City of Denton Police Lt. Chris Summitt, in four-hour blocks during the weeks of October 7-11th or October 14-17th. We can conduct these depositions either at the City of Denton or a hotel conference room in the City, or remotely, depending on your team’s availability.
Councilmember Brian Beck (October 7th at 9:00am) or (October 15th at 9:00am) Councilmember Joe Holland (October 7th at 2:00pm) or (October 15th at 2:00pm) City Manager Sara Hensley (October 8th at 9:00am) or (October 16th at 9:00am) Interim Police Chief Jessica Robledo (October 8th at 2:00pm) or (October 16th at 2:00pm) City of Denton Police Sgt. Daryn Briggs (October 9th at 9:00am) or (October 17th at 9:00am) City of Denton Police Lt. Chris Summitt (October 9th at 2:00pm) or (October 17th at 2:00pm)
If we do not hear back from you by Friday at 3:30pm, we will be noticing these depositions for the above dates during the week of October 7-11th. And for clarity, in the event that the PTJ is set for a hearing prior to discovery, we will need to subpoena your relevant clients.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel
MR 0605 Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob,
We understand that you do not agree with our position. We are not asking or suggesting that the OAG agree with our position (that the City will set the PTJ for an earlier hearing date if the OAG moves forward with any earlier hearing).
If, however, the OAG intends to represent to the court that the December 9th setting of the TI and PTJ together is “agreed,” a condition of our agreement is the City’s reservation of its right to seek an earlier setting of its PTJ – which we are informing you the city only intends to do in the even the OAG sets anything else for hearing before the December 9th date. To be clear, the City does not “agree” to a December 9th setting of the TI and PTJ with no reservation or condition. If the OAG is unwilling to acknowledge that the City will communicate any agreed setting on December 9th to the court subject to that condition, then it seems that we do not have an agreement as to a December 9th setting.
The City and the OAG see the discovery issue differently; that is okay, disputes will happen that cannot be resolved except by the court. But the City will not waive its right to respond to any effort by the OAG to compel discovery by asking the court to first determine the question of jurisdiction. If the OAG’s condition is that the City must waive that right in order to reach an agreed setting for December 9th, then the City cannot agree to that condition, and it seems that we cannot reach an agreement on that setting date. If, on the other hand, the OAG is not making that a condition, then we can agree on that setting date. Please let us know which path the OAG chooses.
Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 From: Jacob Przada
MR 0606
Joe,
We do not agree that the City has a right to have its PTJ heard at an earlier date if we seek to obtain a setting on a discovery-related issue, particularly in light of the fact that jurisdictional discovery has already been served. Therefore, we cannot agree that you can communicate a reservation of any “right” to have the PTJ heard sooner than the December 9, 2024 date. However, we do agree to the December 9, 2024 date for a hearing on the PTJ and TI and will notice the hearing.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob,
Understanding that stated reservation, and understanding the City’s position that there is no necessary or appropriate discovery as to jurisdictional facts, and because the time and expense of engaging in such discovery would be contrary to the purpose of ending a case when there is no jurisdiction, in the event that the OAG seeks to set any such hearing in advance of December 9th the City reserves its right to set its PTJ for hearing at the same time. So, we will inform the court to go forward with setting both the PTJ and the TI for hearing on December 9th. We will also inform the court that, in the event that any party sets any other matter for hearing ahead of that date, the City will ask the court to change the setting on the City’s PTJ to that time. We just want to be transparent about our approach on this. We’re not asking you to agree to that condition, we’re just asking if you agree that we may communicate it to the court; that is, a communication that 1) the parties want the December 9th date, and 2) the City’s agreement to this setting does not waive its right to have its PTJ heard sooner in the event that any other matter is set for hearing ahead of the December 9th date.
Thanks,
Joe
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair
MR 0607 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 ----------------------------------
From: Jacob Przada
Good afternoon Joe,
Other than any necessary discovery-related matters, we agree to your request. Thank you for reaching out about this.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
Jacob and Jonathan,
Based on current schedules (including hearings and briefing schedules, as well as your information that you are not available in September), the December 9th date works for Denton. We’d note that of all the dates previously discussed, that’s the date that works. We’d expect that the parties wouldn’t set any other matters for hearing in the intervening period. Can we agree on that hearing date for the PTJ and TI, and that approach (this will be the only hearing date set between now and then)?
Let us know, and we’ll inform the court by reply-all to the court’s email.
Thanks,
Joe
---------------------- 5
MR 0608 JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 From: Laurie Dipierro
For 1 day or less in-person, the 481st has the following available:
09/16/24: 9:30 am with Docket Call 09/12/24 at 3:00 pm (Judge Doug Robison visiting for trial date) 09/30/24: 9:30 am with Docket Call 09/19/24 at 3:00 pm (Judge Doug Robison visiting for docket call date) 11/12/24: 9:00 am with Docket Call 10/31/24 at 3:00 pm 12/09/24: 9:00 am with Docket Call 11/21/24 at 3:00 pm
Please confer without me included and then include me back in to advise on what date you all agree
Sincerely, Laurie DiPierro 481st District Court Administrator 1450 E. McKinney Street, Floor 4 Denton, Texas 76209 940-349-2270 Laurie.DiPierro@dentoncounty.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
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Laurie, 6
MR 0609 As always, we very much appreciate the Court’s responsiveness and accommodation in the parties’ scheduling efforts in this matter.
Per the parties’ recent discussions, as well as the Court’s request that the parties confer and agree wherever possible, we respectfully request that the Court inform us of any dates in October when it would have 5 hours to hear both the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and the State’s request for Temporary Injunction.
Thank you for your response in advance, and please let us know if you have any questions or require any further information from us to assist in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jose de la Fuente Counsel for the City of Denton
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 From: Laurie Dipierro
I see the Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdicfion filed on May 20th. Please note that the requirement is for counsel to confer upon dates provided by the Court prior to sefting the hearing date with the Court. I have not yet provided those dates for you all to confer upon.
For two hours or less IN PERSON, the 481st has the following available:
September 17th at 1:30 p.m. (Judge Doug Robison visifing) September 18th at 1:30 p.m. (Judge Doug Robison visifing) September 19th at 1:30 p.m. (Judge Doug Robison visifing) October 1st at 1:30 p.m. October 29th at 1:30 p.m. October 30th at 1:30 p.m. November 13th at 1:30 p.m.
Please confer WITHOUT me included and then include me back in once you all have found a mutually agreeable date. Thank you.
Sincerely,
MR 0610 Laurie DiPierro 481st District Court Administrator 1450 E. McKinney Street, Floor 4 Denton, Texas 76209 940-349-2270 Laurie.DiPierro@dentoncounty.gov
From: Jacob Przada
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Good morning Ms. Dipierro,
Plaintiff has contacted Counsel for Defendants to discuss dates, but Counsel did not respond.
Defendants have not met and conferred. We ask the Court to allow us to hear back from Defendants before Defendants seek an arbitrary date that does not work for Plaintiff.
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Melissa Ethridge
Good morning Ms. Dipierro,
We are looking for available dates in September or October to set our Plea to the Jurisdiction in the above-referenced case. We believe 2 hours should be sufficient. When you have a moment, could you please let me know the Court’s availability?
Thanks very much, 8
MR 0611 Melissa ---------------------- MELISSA ETHRIDGE Paralegal 512-322-5838 Direct Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 ---------------------------------- www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800
Your text here!
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MR 0612 EXHIBIT I
MR 0613 From: Jacob Przada
Joe,
We will plan to call you tomorrow at 4:30pm on your direct line. Thank you.
Best regards,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
From: Jose de la Fuente
It does. Do you want to call me, have me call you, or set up a call-in number?
Je
---------------------- JOSE DE LA FUENTE Litigation Practice Group Chair 512-322-5849 Direct 512-844-9078 Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. ---------------------------------- 816 Congress Ave., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701 www.lglawfirm.com | 512-322-5800 Your text here!
****ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT ****
A "REPLY TO ALL" OF THIS EMAIL COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT. PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO LEGAL COUNSEL.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email (and all attachments) is confidential, legally privileged, and covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Unauthorized use or dissemination is prohibited. If you have received this message in error please delete it immediately. For more detailed information click http://www.lglawfirm.com/email-disclaimer/ .
MR 0614 NOT AN E-SIGNATURE: No portion of this email is an "electronic signature" and neither the author nor any client thereof will be bound by this e-mail unless expressly designated as such as provided in more detail at www.lglawfirm.com/electronic-signature-disclaimer/ . From: Jacob Przada
Good evening Joe,
Does 4:30pm on Friday work for you to speak with us regarding City of Denton?
Best,
Jacob E. Przada Special Counsel Special Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General of Texas Telephone: (512) 936-2669 Email: jacob.przada@oag.texas.gov
MR 0615 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Cathy Daniels on behalf of Jose de la Fuente Bar No. 00793605 cdaniels@lglawfirm.com Envelope ID: 95167299 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: (Defendants') to Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief Status as of 12/11/2024 8:11 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Richard Gladden richscot1@hotmail.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Amy Hoffee amy.hoffee@cityofdenton.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Devin Q.Alexander Devin.Alexander@cityofdenton.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Mack Reinwand mack.reinwand@cityofdenton.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Jose E.de la Fuente jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
James F.Parker jparker@lglawfirm.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Gabrielle C.Smith gsmith@lglawfirm.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Sydney P.Sadler ssadler@lglawfirm.com 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Kyle Tebo Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Bonnie Freymuth bonnie.freymuth@oag.texas.gov 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
Zachary Rhines zachary.rhines@oag.texas.gov 12/10/2024 4:43:47 PM SENT
MR 0616 1
2 VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUME(S)
3 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 24-1005-481
4 THE STATE OF TEXAS, IN THE DISTRICT COURT
VS. 6 CITY OF DENTON, DENTON; BRIAN BECK, MAYOR PRO 8 TEM OF DENTON; VICKI BYRD, 481ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT PAUL MELTZER, JOE HOLLAND, CHRIS WATTS, MEMBERS OF THE 10 CITY COUNCIL OF DENTON; SARA HENSLEY, CITY MANAGER OF 11 DENTON; AND, DOUG SHOEMAKER, CHIEF OF POLICE OF DENTON; IN DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS
14 ******************************
16 *****************************
17 On December 12, 2024, the following proceedings
18 came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered
19 cause before the HONORABLE CRYSTAL EDMONSON LEVONIUS,
20 Judge presiding in the 481st Judicial District Court,
21 held in Denton, County of Denton, Texas, before
22 Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, in and for the State of Texas.
23 Proceedings reported by stenotype, record produced
24 by computer-aided transcription.
25 ************************
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0617 2
2 APPEARING FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
3 Mr. Kyle Stephen Tebo TSB #24137691 4 Mr. Zachary Louis "Zac" Rhines Office of the Attorney General - State of Texas 5 Capitol Station P.O. Box 12548 6 Austin, Texas 78711 512-463-2080 7 Kyle.Tebo@oag.texas.gov Zachary.Rhines@oag.texas.gov 8
9 APPEARING FOR ALL NAMED DEFENDANTS: 10 Mr. Jose E. 'Joe' de la Fuente 11 TSB #00793605 Ms. Gabrielle Cherie Smith 12 TSB #24093172 Lloyd, Gosselink, Rochelle & Townsend 13 816 Congress Avenue Suite 1900 14 Austin, Texas 78701-2478 512-322-5849 15 jdelafuente@lglawfirm.com gsmith@lglawfirm.com 16
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0618 3
2 VOLUME 1
4 DECEMBER 12, 2024 PAGE VOL
5 Caption................................... 1 1
6 Appearances............................... 2 1
7 Chronological Index -- Volume 1........... 3 1
8 Proceedings............................... 6 1
9 State's Motion to Compel
10 Argument by Mr. Tebo............ 5 1
11 Argument by Mr. de la Fuente.... 13 1
12 Rebuttal Argument by Mr. Tebo... 24 2
13 Court's Ruling.................. 29 1
14 Texas' Interrogatories to Defendants
15 Exhibit A....................... 30 1
16 Texas' Requests for Production to Defendants
17 Exhibit B....................... 49 1
18 Texas' Requests for Admissions to Defendants
19 Exhibit C....................... 74 1
20 Defendants' Motion to Quash &
21 Motion For Protection from
22 Deposition Notices.............. 85 1
23 Adjournment............................... 99 1
24 Court Reporter's Certificate.............. 100 1
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0619 4
1 **************************
3 December 12, 2024
4 **************************
09:16AM 5 THE COURT: We're on the record in Cause
09:16AM 6 No. 24-1005-481 styled, The State of Texas vs. The City
09:16AM 7 of Denton, Joe Holland, Mayor of Denton; Brian Beck,
09:16AM 8 Mayor Pro-Tem of Denton; Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer,
09:17AM 9 Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee; and Chris Watts,
09:17AM 10 Members of City Council of Denton; Sara Hensley, City
09:17AM 11 Manager; and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton;
09:17AM 12 in their official capacities.
09:17AM 13 Attorneys, please state your name and the
09:17AM 14 parties you represent.
09:17AM 15 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, my name is
09:17AM 16 Kyle Tebo, and with me is my colleague, Zachary Rhines,
09:17AM 17 from the Office of the Attorney General representing the
09:17AM 18 State of Texas.
09:17AM 19 MS. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor. It's
09:17AM 20 Gabrielle Smith and Jose de la Fuente representing the
09:17AM 21 City of Denton and the individually named City
09:17AM 22 officials.
09:17AM 23 THE COURT: And, Mr. Tebo, did you say
09:17AM 24 cocounsel is Mr. Lyons?
09:17AM 25 MR. TEBO: No, Your Honor. Sorry.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0620 5
09:17AM 1 Mr. Rhines with an "R."
09:17AM 2 THE COURT: Thank you.
09:17AM 3 We are set this morning for a plea to the
09:17AM 4 jurisdiction; however, I understand, before we take up
09:17AM 5 that plea, that the State of Texas does want to bring
09:17AM 6 forward a motion to be able to conduct discovery in
09:18AM 7 advance of that plea to the jurisdiction. You may begin
09:18AM 8 whenever you're ready, Mr. Tebo.
09:18AM 9 MR. TEBO: Thank you, Your Honor.
09:18AM 10 Do I understand that the Court is
09:18AM 11 beginning by hearing the motion to compel?
09:18AM 12 THE COURT: Yes.
09:18AM 13 MR. TEBO: Thank you, Your Honor.
09:18AM 14 Your Honor, I'd like to start out by
09:18AM 15 laying before the Court the three possible ways that the
09:18AM 16 Court could rule on all of the motions that are before
09:18AM 17 it today. So it's both the State's motion to compel and
09:18AM 18 the defendant's plea to jurisdiction because they all
09:18AM 19 have to do with this Court's jurisdiction.
09:18AM 20 There are three ways that the Court can
09:18AM 21 decide the motion before it today. None of those would
09:18AM 22 terminate the case. Which of these three the Court
09:18AM 23 chooses will depend on whether the Court believes that
09:18AM 24 the determination of its jurisdiction hangs on un -- on
09:18AM 25 disputed fact issues related to that -- to its
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0621 6
09:18AM 1 jurisdiction.
09:18AM 2 If the Court agrees with the State, that
09:19AM 3 it has to look to disputed jurisdictional facts before
09:19AM 4 ruling on this jurisdiction, then the Court should
09:19AM 5 postpone the determination of its jurisdiction, either
09:19AM 6 deny or carry defendant's plea to the jurisdiction, and
09:19AM 7 grant the State's motion to compel limited discovery and
09:19AM 8 to jurisdictional facts. That's door number one,
09:19AM 9 Your Honor.
09:19AM 10 Door number two is the Court agrees with
09:19AM 11 defendants. They agree that there are no relevant
09:19AM 12 jurisdictional facts, and they agree that the
09:19AM 13 allegations in the State's petition do not support this
09:19AM 14 Court's jurisdiction. In that case, the Court can grant
09:19AM 15 the plea to the jurisdiction but not with prejudice to
09:19AM 16 the State. Defendants ultimately allege a defect in the
09:19AM 17 State's pleading. They say that the Court should not go
09:20AM 18 beyond the State's petition to consider actions by the
09:20AM 19 City that tends to suggest that it is implementing an
09:20AM 20 unlawful ordinance in decriminalizing marijuana because
09:20AM 21 those allegations are made -- were made after the State
09:20AM 22 filed its original petition. That's just a pleading
09:20AM 23 defect. All of this for a pleading defect, Your Honor.
09:20AM 24 And, in Texas, plea to the jurisdiction
09:20AM 25 practice says that, unless the Court looks at the
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0622 7
09:20AM 1 pleadings and can affirmatively negate its jurisdiction,
09:20AM 2 it has to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to replead.
09:20AM 3 So the most that defendants can get out of this hearing
09:20AM 4 is an opportunity for the State to replead. If
09:20AM 5 Your Honor terminates this case, you would deprive the
09:20AM 6 State of its due process rights.
09:20AM 7 Door number three, let's say that the
09:20AM 8 Court still believes that it doesn't need to look to
09:20AM 9 unresolved fact issues to decide its jurisdiction. It's
09:21AM 10 just going to stick to the pleadings. Well, there is
09:21AM 11 one fact material to jurisdiction that the parties don't
09:21AM 12 dispute, and that is that on November the 22nd, 2022,
09:21AM 13 the City Council of Denton voted to adopt an ordinance
09:21AM 14 that decriminalizes marijuana. The State contends that
09:21AM 15 that is a ultra vires act that overcomes the City's
09:21AM 16 sovereign immunity, and, therefore, establishes this
09:21AM 17 Court's jurisdiction in this case.
09:21AM 18 Defendants disagree about the character
09:21AM 19 of that November 22nd vote. They say that it was not
09:21AM 20 ultra vires. So there is an option today where the
09:21AM 21 Court takes up the plea, agrees with the State that the
09:21AM 22 November 22nd vote was ultra vires and denies the plea
09:21AM 23 to the jurisdiction determining that it does have --
09:21AM 24 that the Court does have jurisdiction to hear the case.
09:21AM 25 Now, I wanted to go through those three
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0623 8
09:22AM 1 options just to sort of lay out for the Court a handy
09:22AM 2 framework for this hearing. Option number one, the
09:22AM 3 Court has to look to jurisdictional facts that are not
09:22AM 4 resolved yet before determining its jurisdiction.
09:22AM 5 Option number two, the State -- excuse me, the Court
09:22AM 6 agrees that it can look only to the pleadings and does
09:22AM 7 not find in those pleadings allegations sufficient to
09:22AM 8 support its jurisdiction has to allow the State an
09:22AM 9 opportunity to replead. Option number three, the Court
09:22AM 10 still doesn't -- still feels that it doesn't need to
09:22AM 11 look to unresolved fact issues to decide its
09:22AM 12 jurisdiction but, looking to the pleadings, believes
09:22AM 13 that, on the basis of the November 22nd vote, the Court
09:22AM 14 does have jurisdiction to hear this case. So three
09:22AM 15 doors.
09:22AM 16 Now, the State thinks that the Court
09:22AM 17 should choose door number one because there are
09:22AM 18 significant unresolved fact issues that are material to
09:22AM 19 this Court's jurisdiction, so the Court should,
09:23AM 20 therefore, grant the State's motion to compel because at
09:23AM 21 this juncture the Court cannot decide its jurisdiction
09:23AM 22 without limited discovery into those unresolved
09:23AM 23 jurisdictional fact issues. The Supreme Court says in
09:23AM 24 Miranda [sic] Consolidated School District vs. Garcia,
09:23AM 25 and again -- excuse me, in Mission Consolidated School
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0624 9
09:23AM 1 District vs. Garcia and, again, in Miranda vs. Texas
09:23AM 2 Parks and Wildlife Department, that, if the Court
09:23AM 3 concludes that its jurisdiction hangs on unresolved fact
09:23AM 4 issues, it cannot grant a jurisdictional plea. It has
09:23AM 5 to allow time for plaintiff to develop facts relevant to
09:23AM 6 its jurisdiction. As long as the plaintiff, in this
09:23AM 7 case the State, can bring up some evidence tending to
09:23AM 8 suggest that the Court does have jurisdiction, the Court
09:23AM 9 should allow an opportunity for limited discovery.
09:23AM 10 And that's what we have in this case,
09:23AM 11 Your Honor. Here's what the parties dispute. The
09:24AM 12 defendants say that, after the city council adopted the
09:24AM 13 marijuana ordinance, that the City -- that the City took
09:24AM 14 no further action with respect to that ordinance. They
09:24AM 15 didn't implement it in any respect. They took no action
09:24AM 16 whatsoever. The ordinance just sits idly in the
09:24AM 17 municipal law books.
09:24AM 18 Now, after defendants made that claim in
09:24AM 19 response to the State's petition, the State did a little
09:24AM 20 research. And we noticed that in the year following
09:24AM 21 adoption of the ordinance, marijuana enforcement in
09:24AM 22 Denton of misdemeanor possession fell off the cliff.
09:24AM 23 Stand alone arrest or citations for misdemeanor
09:24AM 24 possession declined from double digits to just three for
09:24AM 25 20 -- in the year 2023. So we have near zero
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0625 10
09:24AM 1 enforcement, stand alone enforcement, of misdemeanor
09:24AM 2 marijuana possession. In other words, the City enacted,
09:25AM 3 adopted a marijuana ordinance saying that Denton is not
09:25AM 4 going to enforce misdemeanor possession. And, in the
09:25AM 5 year following, we see that Denton doesn't enforce
09:25AM 6 marijuana misdemeanor possession. That tends to suggest
09:25AM 7 that the City is implementing the ordinance despite what
09:25AM 8 the defendants initially said in response to the State's
09:25AM 9 petition.
09:25AM 10 Number two, we have a number of
09:25AM 11 statements by various City of Denton officials saying
09:25AM 12 that the City is not following state marijuana laws.
09:25AM 13 Most recent of these at a September 24th city council
09:25AM 14 meeting, Defendant Hudspeth, so the mayor of the City of
09:25AM 15 Denton, said -- and let me just get the quote right so
09:25AM 16 that I have it. The mayor said, in public session, that
09:25AM 17 the City, quote, is not enforcing marijuana laws.
09:26AM 18 Referring to the State's -- both state and federal
09:26AM 19 marijuana possession laws. And he's not the only one,
09:26AM 20 Your Honor. Although I don't see how it could get any
09:26AM 21 more explicit than the City -- the Mayor of the City of
09:26AM 22 Denton saying that the City is not enforcing state
09:26AM 23 marijuana laws. That's strong evidence tending to
09:26AM 24 suggest that the defendants' allegation that the
09:26AM 25 marijuana ordinance is just sort of sitting idly on the
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0626 11
09:26AM 1 law books is not the whole truth at least.
09:26AM 2 But the mayor is not the only one.
09:26AM 3 Council Member Beck, in a council session dated
09:26AM 4 June 6th, called the ordinance a policy that might be in
09:26AM 5 conflict with Texas Local Government Code 370.3. 370.3,
09:26AM 6 which we'll get later to in the hearing, prohibits the
09:26AM 7 governing body of a municipality from adopting any
09:26AM 8 policy where it does not fully enforce the State's drug
09:27AM 9 laws. So you have a city council member, again, one of
09:27AM 10 the named defendants, saying that because of this
09:27AM 11 ordinance, the City is not fully enforcing the State's
09:27AM 12 drug laws.
09:27AM 13 Then you have statements made by the city
09:27AM 14 manager, Defendant Hensley. Defendant Hensley is
09:27AM 15 interesting because defendants, in their plea to the
09:27AM 16 jurisdiction, in part rely on State -- public statements
09:27AM 17 that she made for their assertion that this -- the City
09:27AM 18 is not implementing the ordinance. Well, if you grill
09:27AM 19 down into some of those statements, what she actually
09:27AM 20 said on the public record is a lot more ambiguous.
09:27AM 21 Defendant Hensley, both in a memo post-dating the
09:27AM 22 adoption of the vote, and in a press release predating
09:27AM 23 the election vote, both of those are actually in the
09:27AM 24 defendant's plea to the jurisdiction as Exhibit C. It
09:28AM 25 recognizes that, at least in part -- it recognizes that,
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0627 12
09:28AM 1 in part, the ordinance conflicts with the state drug
09:28AM 2 laws. But she also says that the City is working out --
09:28AM 3 is reviewing the ordinance and working out steps to
09:28AM 4 implement the ordinance -- parts of the ordinance.
09:28AM 5 So, referring to Defendant's Exhibit C,
09:28AM 6 the press release dated November 9th, 2022, about two
09:28AM 7 weeks before the adoption vote, Defendant Hensley says
09:28AM 8 that the City staff has been working to determine which
09:28AM 9 portions of the ordinance will be incorporated into the
09:28AM 10 police department's general orders, which, to me at
09:28AM 11 least, reads like a statement saying that the City
09:28AM 12 intends to implement part of the ordinance. Which
09:28AM 13 parts, the State does not know. The State would like to
09:29AM 14 find out both that specific issue and generally what
09:29AM 15 steps the City is taking with respect to the ordinance
09:29AM 16 by conducted -- conducting limited discovery into those
09:29AM 17 issues which are highly relevant to whether the Court
09:29AM 18 has jurisdiction. Because action taken to implement an
09:29AM 19 unconstitutional ordinance is ultra vires conduct that
09:29AM 20 overcomes the City's sovereign immunity and establishes
09:29AM 21 this Court's jurisdiction.
09:29AM 22 Therefore, limited discovery is highly
09:29AM 23 appropriate at this stage in the proceedings, and the
09:29AM 24 discovery that Texas served on defendants is targeted to
09:29AM 25 jurisdictional issues and reasonably calculated to
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0628 13
09:29AM 1 uncover information related to this Court's jurisdiction
09:29AM 2 related to whether and what steps the City has taken
09:29AM 3 with respect to this unconstitutional marijuana
09:29AM 4 ordinance. That by its own terms, I mean the title of
09:29AM 5 the ordinance is ending citations and arrests for
09:30AM 6 low-level marijuana offenses. By its own terms, the
09:30AM 7 ordinance deprives the State of part of its drug laws.
09:30AM 8 If that ordinance is in fact being implemented by the
09:30AM 9 City, then there's no question the defendants are
09:30AM 10 committing or have committed ultra vires conduct that
09:30AM 11 suffices to establish this Court's jurisdiction. The
09:30AM 12 discovery that Texas served is completely calculated to
09:30AM 13 shedding light on that issue.
09:30AM 14 With that, Your Honor, I'm content to
09:30AM 15 rest as to the merits of the State's motion to compel.
09:30AM 16 If Your Honor would like to hear more on any of the
09:30AM 17 issues I've raised -- I've raised, or, if Your Honor
09:30AM 18 would like to hear the State's position on the plea to
09:30AM 19 the jurisdiction I can continue speaking
09:30AM 20 THE COURT: I don't think it's necessary.
09:31AM 21 Will it be Ms. Smith or Mr. de la Fuente
09:31AM 22 that will be arguing?
09:31AM 23 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, I'll be
09:31AM 24 speaking to the discovery issues. Ms. Smith will be
09:31AM 25 speaking to the plea to the jurisdiction.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0629 14
09:31AM 1 THE COURT: Thank you.
09:31AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: The Court knows that
09:31AM 3 jurisdiction comes first. That's the question that the
09:31AM 4 Court teed up. It comes before discovery or anything
09:31AM 5 else. And, importantly, the question the Court teed up
09:31AM 6 was, explain why anyone should -- why you should be able
09:31AM 7 to conduct discovery before the plea to the jurisdiction
09:31AM 8 in this case, in this case, the pleaded case before this
09:31AM 9 Court.
09:31AM 10 And, in the filing and in the arguments
09:31AM 11 here, the State has not made that connection, has not
09:31AM 12 provided any valid justification for the need for
09:31AM 13 discovery before it takes up the PTJ. And let's talk
09:31AM 14 about jurisdictional discovery. Jurisdictional
09:31AM 15 discovery is a thing that exists out there in the law,
09:31AM 16 but it's a very narrow one. It is only allowed to
09:32AM 17 discover contested facts that are relevant and material
09:32AM 18 to the specific question at issue of jurisdiction teed
09:32AM 19 up based on the pleaded case, not an imaginary case, the
09:32AM 20 pleaded case. And we cite the Klumb vs. Houston
09:32AM 21 Municipal Employment System -- Retirement System cases.
09:32AM 22 Those all lay out the very narrow parameters of
09:32AM 23 jurisdictional discovery. And the point of a plea to
09:32AM 24 the jurisdiction is, of course, to resolve the question
09:32AM 25 of jurisdiction before the governmental entity incurs
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0630 15
09:32AM 1 significant litigation costs. I mean the -- the State
09:32AM 2 here has sent here six deposition notices, detailed deep
09:32AM 3 discovery -- written discovery. None of it's
09:32AM 4 appropriate, but it would all be costly.
09:32AM 5 In a case where the allegation is that
09:32AM 6 certain public officials have committed ultra vires
09:33AM 7 acts, it's kind of hard to imagine what jurisdictional
09:33AM 8 facts could be in doubt. And understanding that the
09:33AM 9 statute we're talking about here, Local Government Code
09:33AM 10 370.003, only contains prohibitions against, for the
09:33AM 11 purposes of this case, the governing body of the entity,
09:33AM 12 that is the city council as a whole, and the Denton
09:33AM 13 Police Department, not the City by the way, just those
09:33AM 14 two things. And the verb that they cannot do is adopt a
09:33AM 15 policy.
09:33AM 16 Most ultra vires cases, functionally all,
09:33AM 17 allege that a public official has committed a certain
09:33AM 18 act. You have committed act "X." The law says why. I
09:33AM 19 overlay the law on the act and determine whether the act
09:33AM 20 violates the law. There's no fact dispute. There's no
09:33AM 21 need for a fact dispute. And if you can't come up with
09:34AM 22 some wrongful act that the individuals have taken,
09:34AM 23 especially when they're entities that act entirely in
09:34AM 24 the public eye, then there is none. There is no
09:34AM 25 ultra vires act.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0631 16
09:34AM 1 And the State pleaded, in its pleading,
09:34AM 2 and this is what we're bound to, there was one act taken
09:34AM 3 by certain defendants, the Denton City Council, and it
09:34AM 4 contends the act constitutes adopting a policy not to
09:34AM 5 fully endorse -- enforce drug laws. And that act is the
09:34AM 6 alleged act of the Denton City Council of codifying and
09:34AM 7 publishing an ordinance passed by the Denton voters.
09:34AM 8 THE COURT: And hold on one moment,
09:34AM 9 Mr. de la Fuente.
09:34AM 10 (Off the record discussion with IT
09:36AM 11 department representative.)
09:36AM 12 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. de la Fuente.
09:36AM 13 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Have they got you all
09:36AM 14 wired up?
09:36AM 15 THE COURT: No, they're taking away -- they
09:36AM 16 took away the tower. So they're going to go fix it in
09:36AM 17 my office.
09:36AM 18 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Is your laptop up?
09:36AM 19 THE COURT: I'm using the court reporter's
09:36AM 20 laptop.
09:36AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Whatever works.
09:36AM 22 THE COURT: It works. It works.
09:36AM 23 MR. DE LA FUENTE: So to tie it back,
09:36AM 24 Your Honor, we -- we have a pleaded act, the act of
09:36AM 25 codifying and publishing an ordinance that was passed by
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0632 17
09:36AM 1 the voters, and that is alleged to be the act, the
09:36AM 2 prohibited act, of adopting a policy not to fully
09:36AM 3 enforce the drug laws. And that's the pleaded act. And
09:36AM 4 the State has either stated a valid ultra vires claim by
09:36AM 5 that pleaded act, or it hasn't. And that's the sole
09:36AM 6 legal question -- in fact, as the State said in its life
09:36AM 7 petition, this is a case of pure law and discovery is
09:36AM 8 unneeded.
09:36AM 9 We were teed up before this Court on this
09:36AM 10 plea to the jurisdiction six months ago. No discovery
09:37AM 11 was needed before that. There's nothing that's changed
09:37AM 12 now. The acts -- the only acts that could be done,
09:37AM 13 as -- as have been referenced, are acts of the city
09:37AM 14 council, which are done only in open public meetings and
09:37AM 15 recorded in -- in minutes and the reference to general
09:37AM 16 policy as the police department, which I'll get to in a
09:37AM 17 second, are published online. I mean there's no secret
09:37AM 18 of the general orders of the Denton Police Department.
09:37AM 19 The State says -- let me -- it does need
09:37AM 20 to be clarified. The Court, and every party before it,
09:37AM 21 do need to stick with the pleadings as they exist and
09:37AM 22 are on file. The State hasn't amended its petition. It
09:37AM 23 has had months to do so. It hasn't. There's a reason
09:37AM 24 it hasn't. There's no act that it can allege. The idea
09:37AM 25 of, well, you carry the plea to the jurisdiction to let
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0633 18
09:37AM 1 them replead, that doesn't need to be done if
09:37AM 2 re-pleading would be futile. And here Ms. Smith is
09:38AM 3 going to explain how the argument of whether
09:38AM 4 philosophically some other individuals, et cetera, are
09:38AM 5 doing something that the State might deem implementing
09:38AM 6 the ordinance. Maybe Denton Police Officers aren't
09:38AM 7 enthusiastic about marijuana enforcement now. I don't
09:38AM 8 know. It doesn't matter because a police officer does
09:38AM 9 not adopt a policy, and a police officer is not the
09:38AM 10 Denton Police Department. Those verbs, implementing,
09:38AM 11 are not the doorway. The doorway is adopting a policy
09:38AM 12 by the city council for the Denton Police Department.
09:38AM 13 If -- if the State wants to -- to do
09:38AM 14 discovery in -- into some other acts, it needs to plead
09:38AM 15 that those acts were taken, but it can't do it. That's
09:38AM 16 why. And you don't get to file suit saying, you know, I
09:38AM 17 just don't like the way you're thinking, so let me dig
09:38AM 18 around and see if I can find an ultra vires act. Now,
09:38AM 19 is it possible that sometime in the future, some future
09:38AM 20 Denton City Council or some iteration of the Denton
09:39AM 21 Police Department will adopt a policy that -- that the
09:39AM 22 Attorney General would say, "Aha, here it is," maybe.
09:39AM 23 And, if they do, they know exactly where this courthouse
09:39AM 24 is, and they file a suit based on that new act.
09:39AM 25 But today they don't have an act to
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0634 19
09:39AM 1 allege. That's why they haven't alleged one. The State
09:39AM 2 wants to question -- let's talk about what the discovery
09:39AM 3 they really want is. They want to question multiple
09:39AM 4 individual council members. Why? As a matter of law,
09:39AM 5 no individual council member has the authority or power
09:39AM 6 to do anything. What their beliefs or opinions are
09:39AM 7 absolutely irrelevant. This is black letter law in
09:39AM 8 Texas. A City council speaks and acts only as a whole,
09:39AM 9 and what legislators think is shielded from discovery by
09:39AM 10 legislative immunity.
09:39AM 11 Let's say two council members think this
09:39AM 12 policy is legal, multiple others saying it's illegal,
09:40AM 13 but none of them voted to adopt it, the only thing that
09:40AM 14 matters is the act of council as a whole whether it
09:40AM 15 voted to adopt a policy or not. If they want to
09:40AM 16 question individual police officers, none of them adopt
09:40AM 17 any policies. The police department has policies and
09:40AM 18 adopts policies by its general order. That's what they
09:40AM 19 say in their petition that, you know, it would be
09:40AM 20 adopted in the police department general orders.
09:40AM 21 And really, in their discovery, they
09:40AM 22 define adoption as passage of a measure into law.
09:40AM 23 Remember, adopt is the gate -- is the doorway verb here.
09:40AM 24 The general orders of the police department are
09:40AM 25 published online. They're updated whenever they change.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0635 20
09:40AM 1 They're public records. If there was a fact to plead,
09:40AM 2 they would plead it. It isn't there. There is no
09:40AM 3 policy adopted.
09:40AM 4 And, based on the case before this Court,
09:40AM 5 there's not a single jurisdictional fact in dispute.
09:41AM 6 The ordinance was passed by the voters. It was codified
09:41AM 7 and published as required by the City charter. Did that
09:41AM 8 act violate Section 370.003 or not? If the Court -- and
09:41AM 9 I appreciate there's -- if the Court does want to go
09:41AM 10 down into detail of individual discovery requests, so
09:41AM 11 that should only happen if the Court is inclined to
09:41AM 12 allow any discovery. We have quite a few good
09:41AM 13 objections to those on their own, but I think some
09:41AM 14 discussion of what that discovery seeks demonstrates how
09:41AM 15 out of bounds and not relevant of the question of
09:41AM 16 whether the City or the police department adopted a
09:41AM 17 policy these questions are.
09:41AM 18 There's discovery questions about
09:41AM 19 communications between the City and other cities that
09:41AM 20 passed similar ordinances. How does that prove or
09:41AM 21 disprove whether the City -- whether the city council
09:41AM 22 adopted a policy? And, by the way, that's important.
09:41AM 23 Again, it's not the City. The State just keeps using
09:41AM 24 the -- the actor of the City, and the 370.003 does not
09:42AM 25 say that a city or a municipality may not adopt a
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0636 21
09:42AM 1 policy. Again, Ms. Smith will get into this in detail,
09:42AM 2 but it says that the governing body or the police
09:42AM 3 department may not adopt a policy.
09:42AM 4 Discovery about what individual council
09:42AM 5 members think or thought or police officers thought, or
09:42AM 6 even the job history. By the way, requiring the job
09:42AM 7 history of the police -- chief of police, none of that's
09:42AM 8 relevant to establishing whether a proper defendant, one
09:42AM 9 of the people or an entity that's listed in 370.003,
09:42AM 10 adopted a policy. Discovery about whether marijuana use
09:42AM 11 has gone up or down, there's no allegation that failure
09:42AM 12 to achieve some arrest number is a legal requirement.
09:42AM 13 The law is narrow. It forbids adopting a policy which
09:42AM 14 is passage of a measure into law according to the
09:42AM 15 State's own definition. Implementing it is not in
09:43AM 16 there. It's adopting a policy.
09:43AM 17 Discovery about inaction, the wisdom or
09:43AM 18 desirability of the ordinance, or the discretion
09:43AM 19 exercised by individual police officers, I mean,
09:43AM 20 Your Honor, I know some police officers. They kind of
09:43AM 21 listen to the public mood. I mean I think the public
09:43AM 22 mood in Denton was made pretty clear. The people aren't
09:43AM 23 very interested in the police department spending its
09:43AM 24 resources on marijuana arrests. And whether or not
09:43AM 25 anyone adopts a policy, the police officers may -- may
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0637 22
09:43AM 1 be of the opinion that, you know what, when I'm out and
09:43AM 2 about, I'm just not going to -- my priority is not going
09:43AM 3 to be this. Maybe it is. That's the discretion of an
09:43AM 4 individual police officer. That has no bearing on
09:43AM 5 whether the Denton Police Department adopted a policy.
09:43AM 6 Is there a general order telling the police orders,
09:43AM 7 don't do these things? There's no allegation of that
09:43AM 8 nor could there be. And that's why, by the way,
09:43AM 9 amendment would be futile.
09:43AM 10 I think there's a question maybe even
09:44AM 11 of -- of the city council counting the votes once --
09:44AM 12 once the voters voted. That's an administerial act.
09:44AM 13 That's not going to be a basis for a claim going
09:44AM 14 forward. There is no act of adoption by counting votes.
09:44AM 15 Really the -- the narrow question before the Court is
09:44AM 16 based on one pleaded act, and that's codifying and
09:44AM 17 publishing the ordinance. And, based on that what, and
09:44AM 18 what I would have expected in the briefing that the
09:44AM 19 State filed would have been, here's the act I've
09:44AM 20 pleaded, here's facts that would prove that act. Here
09:44AM 21 that's kind of pointless because we're assuming the act
09:44AM 22 is true, yes, the -- the ordinance was codified and
09:44AM 23 published. So what jurisdictional fact is at issue as
09:44AM 24 to the verb question of adopting a policy by the city
09:44AM 25 council or the Denton Police Department? There isn't
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0638 23
09:44AM 1 one. There isn't a fact question. There isn't a
09:45AM 2 disputed issue of material relevant fact.
09:45AM 3 So, with that, look, the State may have
09:45AM 4 its reasons for -- for wanting to conduct discovery on a
09:45AM 5 policy issue that's important to it, questioning the
09:45AM 6 wisdom of the Denton voters, all -- all of that sort of
09:45AM 7 thing, but certain defendants are prohibited from
09:45AM 8 adopting a policy. That's what the ultra vires standard
09:45AM 9 is here. And there's no fact dispute, and there's no
09:45AM 10 fact question that would tend to make the resolution of
09:45AM 11 that legal issue more correct one way or the other.
09:45AM 12 For that reason, Your Honor,
09:45AM 13 pre-jurisdictional -- pre-decision discovery on the
09:45AM 14 question of jurisdiction would be -- would be irrelevant
09:45AM 15 and would be improper. It would violate, really, the
09:45AM 16 reason why the -- why jurisdiction comes first. It
09:45AM 17 would be subjecting the City to needless discovery and
09:45AM 18 expense when the Court can resolve a legal question
09:45AM 19 before it right now.
09:45AM 20 And -- and, again, I think Ms. Smith will
09:46AM 21 touch on the fact that re-pleading is -- is futile and
09:46AM 22 not going to be a necessary outcome. So we don't -- we
09:46AM 23 don't agree with the listed menu of resolutions for the
09:46AM 24 Court. The resolutions for the Court are deny
09:46AM 25 discovery, grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0639 24
09:46AM 1 dismiss the case. And, which by the way, the City of
09:46AM 2 Denton has taken less action than even the other two
09:46AM 3 cities that have had their question decided as
09:46AM 4 non-jurisdictional in this state already.
09:46AM 5 Thank you, Your Honor
09:46AM 6 THE COURT: Any final word, Mr. Tebo?
09:46AM 7 MR. TEBO: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
09:46AM 8 First -- the first thing I'd like to do
09:46AM 9 is highlight that Mr. de la Fuente's remarks are all
09:46AM 10 about the State having made a defective pleading.
09:46AM 11 They're all tending to say that the State's original
09:46AM 12 petition is a -- has a pleading defect, and, therefore,
09:46AM 13 with that in mind, I'd like to just reiterate and
09:46AM 14 emphasize that if Your Honor agrees with that position,
09:47AM 15 the thing to do is allow the State an opportunity to
09:47AM 16 replead because black letter law, plea to the
09:47AM 17 jurisdiction practice in Texas, has to allow an
09:47AM 18 opportunity for amendment unless the Court reads the
09:47AM 19 pleadings and sees that they, quote, unquote,
09:47AM 20 affirmatively negate the Court's jurisdiction.
09:47AM 21 Mr. de la Fuente has not said anything
09:47AM 22 that the -- to the effect that the State's petition
09:47AM 23 affirmatively negates the Court's jurisdiction. And,
09:47AM 24 instead, he said that Your Honor should not look to the
09:47AM 25 evidence the State has cited tending to suggest that the
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0640 25
09:47AM 1 City is implementing the marijuana ordinance because
09:47AM 2 that was not in -- that is not in our original petition.
09:47AM 3 Let's say that that position is correct, Your Honor
09:47AM 4 grants the State an opportunity to -- an opportunity to
09:47AM 5 replead, the State places those allegations into an
09:47AM 6 amended petition, then we would just be back in
09:47AM 7 Your Honor's court arguing about the proprietary of
09:47AM 8 jurisdictional discovery and the ability of the Court to
09:48AM 9 decide its jurisdiction again.
09:48AM 10 That being said, the Court doesn't need
09:48AM 11 to agree with Mr. de la Fuente. It does not need to
09:48AM 12 agree with the defendant's position that the -- that it
09:48AM 13 has to exclusively focus on the pleadings because the
09:48AM 14 parties -- excuse me, because the State has alleged at
09:48AM 15 this juncture facts tending to suggest that the City has
09:48AM 16 taken steps implementing the marijuana ordinance. Those
09:48AM 17 are the facts that I just cited to Your Honor when I
09:48AM 18 gave my proponent presentation. The steep decline in
09:48AM 19 marijuana enforcement and statements from various City
09:48AM 20 officials tending to suggest that there are steps being
09:48AM 21 taken to implement the ordinance. Not to sound
09:48AM 22 dramatic, Your Honor, but how can they say that the
09:48AM 23 State is not alleging those when I'm alleging them now
09:49AM 24 and when the State has alleged them in its motion to
09:49AM 25 compel?
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0641 26
09:49AM 1 It is true that those are not in our
09:49AM 2 petition because, at the time that we filed the
09:49AM 3 petition, the State was -- did not expect defendants to
09:49AM 4 turn around and say that the marijuana ordinance they
09:49AM 5 adopted was a dead letter that was not being
09:49AM 6 implemented. Generally, when municipalities adopt
09:49AM 7 legislation, it is with the intent to implement it. And
09:49AM 8 the State did not have -- the State was surprised that
09:49AM 9 the defendants have taken the path that they have taken.
09:49AM 10 I would also point out that this -- that
09:49AM 11 defendants' definition of pleadings is a little -- a
09:49AM 12 little constricted. Not -- they're exclusively talking
09:49AM 13 about the State's petition but pleadings includes
09:49AM 14 defendants' responsive pleadings. So the answer that's
09:49AM 15 been filed saying that they were not taking -- taking
09:49AM 16 steps to implement the ordinance as well as the plea to
09:50AM 17 the jurisdiction, which is the response to the State's
09:50AM 18 petition, is therefore a responsive pleading.
09:50AM 19 Those two pleadings allege the City is
09:50AM 20 not taking -- implementing steps, so that allegation is
09:50AM 21 in the pleadings. And discovery that is responsive to
09:50AM 22 that allegation, even on sort of the attack that the
09:50AM 23 defendants are taking whereby the Court has to focus on
09:50AM 24 pleadings exclusively, it's still before the Court.
09:50AM 25 Like, if Your Honor takes that perspective, the issue of
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0642 27
09:50AM 1 whether or not the City is implementing the ordinance is
09:50AM 2 still before the Court because the defendants have
09:50AM 3 alleged that they are not taking any implementing steps.
09:50AM 4 I also would like to say that defendants' conception of
09:50AM 5 the State's case is too narrow as well.
09:50AM 6 They want to focus on a single word that
09:50AM 7 appears in a single statute, adopt. The State -- the
09:50AM 8 State's position is that the marijuana ordinance is
09:50AM 9 preempted because it conflicts with Chapter 481 of the
09:51AM 10 State health and safety code which describes marijuana
09:51AM 11 possession in any amount, number one. Number two, the
09:51AM 12 marijuana ordinance conflicts with Local Government Code
09:51AM 13 370.007, which prohibits the governing body of a
09:51AM 14 municipality, and various other governmental actors,
09:51AM 15 from adopting any policy which conflicts -- or sorry,
09:51AM 16 whereby they do not fully enforce the State's drug laws.
09:51AM 17 And there are two statues at issue. The
09:51AM 18 State did allege both of those statutes in its petition.
09:51AM 19 And ultra vires conduct, for the purpose of this case,
09:51AM 20 is either adopting a policy that conflicts with State
09:51AM 21 law or implementing a policy that conflicts with State
09:51AM 22 law. That's -- that is the definition of ultra vires
09:51AM 23 conduct from case law. Subordinate entities, like
09:52AM 24 municipalities, they cannot have laws, that is they
09:52AM 25 cannot have laws that are in conflict with state law.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0643 28
09:52AM 1 And they also cannot take steps that substantively
09:52AM 2 contradict state law. Both of those are unlawful acts,
09:52AM 3 ultra vires acts. So the Court can bound its
09:52AM 4 jurisdiction either on the acts that the City has taken
09:52AM 5 to adopt a policy whereby they do not fully enforce drug
09:52AM 6 laws, or steps that the City has taken to implement any
09:52AM 7 such policy.
09:52AM 8 THE COURT: Okay.
09:52AM 9 MR. TEBO: Finally, if I can be spared one
09:52AM 10 more moment, Your Honor, I would just like to emphasize
09:52AM 11 the appropriateness of the discovery that the State
09:52AM 12 served on defendants. It is all targeted toward the
09:52AM 13 jurisdictional questions. Instead of lodging
09:52AM 14 particularized objections to any of the State's written
09:52AM 15 discovery, defendants instead stood their ground on the
09:52AM 16 impropriety of jurisdictional discovery.
09:52AM 17 All of the other objections the
09:53AM 18 defendants lodged were boilerplate without any
09:53AM 19 particularized explanation for the merits of those
09:53AM 20 objections. And the State's depositions -- deposition
09:53AM 21 of six City of Denton employees is also highly
09:53AM 22 appropriate. Each of them is likely to have knowledge
09:53AM 23 about the City's conduct with respect to the marijuana
09:53AM 24 ordinance. Two of them are city council members, one of
09:53AM 25 them is the Denton City Manager, one of them is the
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0644 29
09:53AM 1 Denton Chief of Police, and two of them are senior
09:53AM 2 Denton Police Officers. They're all in a position to
09:53AM 3 know about whether or not the City is enforcing State
09:53AM 4 drug laws, whether or not the City is implementing the
09:53AM 5 marijuana ordinance.
09:53AM 6 Legislative privilege is ordinarily not
09:53AM 7 available for the notice to city council members in
09:53AM 8 cases where a municipality, by its own actions, have
09:53AM 9 made the conduct of its officials at issue. So I mean,
09:54AM 10 in this case, the issue is the City passed, adopted a
09:54AM 11 marijuana ordinance -- excuse me, an ordinance
09:54AM 12 decriminalizing marijuana that is an act that places --
09:54AM 13 excuse me, that is an act that inserts the city council
09:54AM 14 members into this controversy. They're the ones who
09:54AM 15 voted to adopt it. They're also in a position to know.
09:54AM 16 I mean as -- I borrow the words of defendants, members
09:54AM 17 of the governing body of the City of Denton, they are in
09:54AM 18 a position to know whether the City is taking any steps
09:54AM 19 to implement the ordinance that they voted to adopt.
09:54AM 20 So the deposition of all six persons is
09:54AM 21 appropriate, not privileged, not objectionable.
09:54AM 22 THE COURT: Thank you.
09:54AM 23 MR. TEBO: Thank you, Your Honor.
09:54AM 24 THE COURT: Thank you.
09:54AM 25 At this time, I do believe that limited
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0645 30
09:54AM 1 discovery is appropriate, and so I am going to carry the
09:55AM 2 plea to the jurisdiction. It does appear that the
09:55AM 3 discovery requested was looking towards disputed
09:55AM 4 jurisdictional facts.
09:55AM 5 At this time, do you-all wish to go
09:55AM 6 through each of the discovery requests individually?
09:55AM 7 MR. DE LA FUENTE: If Your Honor is going
09:55AM 8 to allow limited discovery, then I do think we need to
09:55AM 9 walk through them one-by-one because, certainly, some of
09:55AM 10 these are way beyond the bounds of individual or -- of
09:55AM 11 any of the jurisdictional facts that even the State
09:55AM 12 would -- would argue are relevant here.
09:55AM 13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
09:56AM 14 So I am looking at Exhibit A which are
09:56AM 15 the interrogatories --
09:56AM 16 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Yes, sir.
09:56AM 17 THE COURT: -- to the defendants.
09:56AM 18 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Sure.
09:56AM 19 Yes, Your Honor. Let's go through where
09:56AM 20 we have objected to Interrogatory No. 2 --
09:56AM 21 THE COURT: Okay.
09:56AM 22 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- asking
09:56AM 23 specifically --
09:56AM 24 Your Honor, may I remain seated?
09:56AM 25 THE COURT: Yes, you may.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0646 31
09:56AM 1 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Thank you.
09:56AM 2 THE COURT: I think that's the easiest way
09:56AM 3 to do it.
09:56AM 4 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Thank you.
09:56AM 5 Explaining the process to change, adopt,
09:56AM 6 or implement a different policy or ordinance than a
09:56AM 7 policy or ordinance --
09:56AM 8 THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. You're going to
09:56AM 9 have to slow down if you're going to read.
09:56AM 10 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- currently, codify,
09:56AM 11 adopted, or implemented by the City. The City has
09:57AM 12 objected on the basis of jurisdiction on that -- on the
09:57AM 13 basis that that is an inappropriate piece of discovery
09:57AM 14 based on jurisdiction. If I understand, Your Honor is
09:57AM 15 allowing limited jurisdictional discovery, that is the
09:57AM 16 sole basis for our objection on this one, and,
09:57AM 17 therefore, we understand you're overruling our
09:57AM 18 objection?
09:57AM 19 THE COURT: I'm overruling the objection to
09:57AM 20 Interrogatory No. 2.
09:57AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Okay. Interrogatory
09:57AM 22 No. 3, identify every person who has firsthand factual
09:57AM 23 information about this --
09:57AM 24 THE COURT: If you would, just read very
09:57AM 25 slowly so the court reporter can get everything you're
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0647 32
09:57AM 1 saying.
09:57AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Thank you, Your Honor.
09:57AM 3 THE COURT: Go ahead.
09:57AM 4 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Bottom line, identifying
09:57AM 5 every person who has firsthand -- firsthand factual
09:57AM 6 information about this case, and we objected to that on
09:58AM 7 the basis that -- of both immunity and that it is not
09:58AM 8 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
09:58AM 9 admissible evidence because the breadth of what the
09:58AM 10 State is saying is firsthand knowledge is any human
09:58AM 11 being -- if they're arguing implementing or enforcing
09:58AM 12 marijuana laws in the City of Denton, identify every
09:58AM 13 police officer, identify every judge who adjudicates a
09:58AM 14 case, identify every -- every court official who would
09:58AM 15 consider a case. I'm not sure what --
09:58AM 16 THE COURT: And so help me understand that
09:58AM 17 because they asked for firsthand information. And so
09:58AM 18 every judge, how would we have firsthand information?
09:58AM 19 Would we not have the information from some other
09:58AM 20 source?
09:58AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I have no idea where the
09:58AM 22 information would come from. At this point, I'm
09:58AM 23 concerned mostly about every individual -- identifying
09:58AM 24 every police officer in the City of Denton.
09:58AM 25 MR. TEBO: Well, if I may, Your Honor?
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0648 33
09:58AM 1 THE COURT: Go ahead.
09:59AM 2 MR. TEBO: I totally agree with the point
09:59AM 3 Your Honor just made. This is limited to persons who
09:59AM 4 have, quote, unquote firsthand factual information, not
09:59AM 5 just everyone who has continuous connections with the
09:59AM 6 marijuana ordinance. I think that's a fair question,
09:59AM 7 Your Honor.
09:59AM 8 MR. DE LA FUENTE: If that's -- if that's
09:59AM 9 the case, Your Honor, then -- then I imagine our answer
09:59AM 10 is going to be the city manager and the police chief.
09:59AM 11 THE COURT: And, if that's the answer, I
09:59AM 12 think that's appropriate. I'm going to overrule the
09:59AM 13 objection.
09:59AM 14 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Interrogatory No. 4,
09:59AM 15 stating the legal theories and general factual bases for
09:59AM 16 our defenses. Our objections are entirely
09:59AM 17 jurisdictional, and, therefore, I would ask the Court to
09:59AM 18 overrule our objection on the record.
09:59AM 19 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the
09:59AM 20 objection.
09:59AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Interrogatory No. 5,
09:59AM 22 identify any City of Denton employees and third-parties,
10:00AM 23 including several listed cities, and media personnel
10:00AM 24 with whom you discussed codification, adoption, or
10:00AM 25 implementation of the marijuana ordinance. We objected
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0649 34
10:00AM 1 to that as -- as overbroad, as seeking information that
10:00AM 2 would be protected by the common interest privilege.
10:00AM 3 There are numerous cities, including cities represented
10:00AM 4 by this law firm, who had similar citizen initiative
10:00AM 5 ordinances, and there were communications among them
10:00AM 6 discussing legal positions and strategies in litigation
10:00AM 7 as well as how on earth could communications with other
10:00AM 8 cities be relevant to whether the City adopted or is
10:00AM 9 implementing its own marijuana ordinance.
10:00AM 10 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, if I could --
10:00AM 11 THE COURT: Go ahead.
10:00AM 12 MR. TEBO: The way that defendants framed
10:00AM 13 their objection, it's a little but more specific. They
10:00AM 14 said it's overbroad only to the extent that it would
10:01AM 15 seek information protected by the common interest
10:01AM 16 privilege. Common interest privilege, as I understand
10:01AM 17 it, is more or less a species of the attorney-client
10:01AM 18 privilege, so this objection is limited to any contact
10:01AM 19 that the City defendants might have had that is also
10:01AM 20 content of a attorney-client type of communication.
10:01AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Actually, Your Honor, we
10:01AM 22 also objected that the information is not reasonably
10:01AM 23 lead -- calculated to lead to the discovery of
10:01AM 24 admissible evidence. What discussions were had with
10:01AM 25 some third-party cities has no relevance on what Denton
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0650 35
10:01AM 1 actually did. Again, these have to be acts of Denton.
10:01AM 2 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, if I may, in the
10:01AM 3 first place, that latter objection is purely a
10:01AM 4 boilerplate objection. It's just saying, this
10:01AM 5 discovery, we don't have to respond to it because it's
10:01AM 6 not proper discovery under Rule 192. There's no
10:01AM 7 explanation in there. And defendants cannot invent an
10:02AM 8 explanation as to its inappropriateness at this stage.
10:02AM 9 Any objection they did not raise with particularity at
10:02AM 10 the time the response was due is waived.
10:02AM 11 Number two, at least some of what
10:02AM 12 Interrogatory No. 5 asks would be relevant to the
10:02AM 13 Court's jurisdiction. So all of the City's listed in
10:02AM 14 this interrogatory enacted similar marijuana decrim
10:02AM 15 ordinances, and communications with them could have
10:02AM 16 raised the City's position as to how it can go about
10:02AM 17 implementing the ordinance in a way that flies under the
10:02AM 18 radar of the State to take a specific example.
10:02AM 19 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, but the
10:02AM 20 ultimate question is: What did the City do? And we had
10:02AM 21 a -- we had a meet and confer about this particular one.
10:02AM 22 I mean we met and conferred about all of these, and
10:02AM 23 we -- we certainly discussed this particular point. And
10:02AM 24 the fact that we cited to the language of the rule is
10:03AM 25 not boilerplate, it's the language of the rule. There's
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0651 36
10:03AM 1 a reason that -- what did you talk about -- the intent
10:03AM 2 and belief and the communications of the City have no
10:03AM 3 relevance what -- what the governing body or police
10:03AM 4 department did. There has to be an ultra vires act.
10:03AM 5 MR. TEBO: What the City said --
10:03AM 6 THE COURT: Hold on one moment. At this
10:03AM 7 time, I am going to overrule the objection as to it
10:03AM 8 being reasonably calculated to lead to admissible
10:03AM 9 discovery. However, I do believe that there could be
10:03AM 10 some information that is privileged. And, to the extent
10:03AM 11 that the information is privileged, I'd ask that you
10:03AM 12 guys create a privilege log and maintain that so that we
10:03AM 13 know the information is being withheld.
10:03AM 14 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor,
10:03AM 15 Interrogatory No. 6 is, if you contend that the
10:04AM 16 ordinance can or cannot be changed to comply with the
10:04AM 17 City charter, ordinance, or a policy, state the factual
10:04AM 18 basis for your claim. And our objections on that are
10:04AM 19 both as to the jurisdiction and also because it assumes
10:04AM 20 an incorrect and impermissible predicate, legal
10:04AM 21 conclusion as to the legality of the marijuana
10:04AM 22 ordinance.
10:04AM 23 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule your
10:04AM 24 objection to Interrogatory 6.
10:04AM 25 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Interrogatory No. 7,
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0652 37
10:04AM 1 identify any documented changes in marijuana use since
10:04AM 2 the marijuana ordinance took effect including but not
10:04AM 3 limited to any documented changes occurring at the
10:04AM 4 Denton Independent School District or a connection to
10:04AM 5 the City of Denton police citations and arrests for
10:05AM 6 traffic and pedestrian stops.
10:05AM 7 And, Your Honor, and on this one we
10:05AM 8 certainly objected to the extent that there are publicly
10:05AM 9 available records. They are publicly available.
10:05AM 10 Likewise, it seeks information regarding third parties
10:05AM 11 not within our control. Denton ISD is an independent
10:05AM 12 entity. And we also objected to this as vague and
10:05AM 13 overbroad and unduly burdensome is what on earth are we
10:05AM 14 talking about is any documented changes in marijuana
10:05AM 15 use --
10:05AM 16 THE COURT: And let me --
10:05AM 17 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- what are we obligated
10:05AM 18 to look for --
10:05AM 19 THE COURT: -- let me stop you there. At
10:05AM 20 this time, I'm going to sustain that objection as I am
10:05AM 21 not sure as -- as well how you would document the
10:05AM 22 changes in marijuana use.
10:05AM 23 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Interrogatory No. 8 is
10:06AM 24 identify how many times the marijuana ordinance has been
10:06AM 25 enforced, and identify the individuals whom the
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0653 38
10:06AM 1 ordinance has been enforced against. As we understood
10:06AM 2 this --
10:06AM 3 THE COURT: And, Mr. Tebo, you're going to
10:06AM 4 have to help me out with this one.
10:06AM 5 MR. TEBO: Yes, Your Honor.
10:06AM 6 Your Honor, it is asking pretty much the
10:06AM 7 most basic jurisdictional question of law which is how
10:06AM 8 many times has the -- has the marijuana ordinance been
10:06AM 9 enforced, how many times, when, and against whom. The
10:06AM 10 marijuana ordinance being enforced means action taken to
10:06AM 11 implement the marijuana ordinance
10:06AM 12 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I don't understand that
10:06AM 13 at all, and I'm not -- honestly, I don't know what it
10:06AM 14 means.
10:06AM 15 THE COURT: And so anytime that I am having
10:06AM 16 to understand exactly what the question means, then I
10:06AM 17 understand why the other side would not understand what
10:07AM 18 it means. So, if you can explain to me what you're
10:07AM 19 asking for, are you asking for the number of times that
10:07AM 20 people were not arrested because of the ordinance, or is
10:07AM 21 it the fact that people were still arrested in light of
10:07AM 22 the ordinance?
10:07AM 23 MR. TEBO: We're asking how many specific
10:07AM 24 instances the marijuana ordinance has been implemented.
10:07AM 25 That would include times where a -- where Denton Law
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0654 39
10:07AM 1 Enforcement chose to refrain from arresting a person
10:07AM 2 just because of the ordinance rather than due to other
10:07AM 3 discretionary factors.
10:07AM 4 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, I can't even
10:07AM 5 begin to tell you how I would go about doing that. Ask
10:07AM 6 every individual police officer, "What did you do on
10:07AM 7 Tuesday?"
10:08AM 8 THE COURT: Well, no, snarky remarks,
10:08AM 9 please. But, no, I do understand, so I will sustain
10:08AM 10 your objection to eight.
10:08AM 11 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, may I ask, may the
10:08AM 12 State be allowed an opportunity to re-propagate
10:08AM 13 Interrogatory No. 8 --
10:08AM 14 THE COURT: Yes.
10:08AM 15 MR. TEBO: -- so it's more clear?
10:08AM 16 THE COURT: Absolutely.
10:08AM 17 MR. TEBO: Thank you, Your Honor.
10:08AM 18 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Interrogatory No. 9,
10:08AM 19 identify all jobs to which you've applied from
10:08AM 20 August '22 -- August 30th, 2022, to present. If I am
10:08AM 21 correct, I believe that's just the police chief, but I'm
10:08AM 22 not sure looking at this, but I don't see how that could
10:08AM 23 be relevant to anything?
10:08AM 24 THE COURT: Mr. Tebo?
10:08AM 25 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, this interrogatory
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0655 40
10:08AM 1 is more of a background question. If the Court feels
10:08AM 2 that it is not narrowly targeted enough, then we --
10:09AM 3 we're happy to withdraw it. However, the State does
10:09AM 4 think that, even though it's a little ancillary, it will
10:09AM 5 still give background information that will be useful
10:09AM 6 to -- it will shed light on other jurisdictional issues.
10:09AM 7 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I don't have any idea
10:09AM 8 what jurisdictional issue.
10:09AM 9 THE COURT: Give me one moment, please.
10:09AM 10 And this interrogatory only went to the police chief?
10:09AM 11 MR. TEBO: I believe it went to all
10:09AM 12 defendants. But the purpose of the --
10:09AM 13 Am I mistaken about that?
10:09AM 14 MS. SMITH: No, Your Honor.
10:09AM 15 MR. TEBO: Excuse me, Your Honor.
10:09AM 16 The reason that we propagated this was
10:09AM 17 because at the time we sent this discovery, Police
10:09AM 18 Chief Robledo I believe had either just become the
10:09AM 19 permanent police chief or was still the interim police
10:09AM 20 chief, and we believe that she might have been -- served
10:09AM 21 time in other municipalities that had similar
10:10AM 22 ordinances, and so this sort of background information
10:10AM 23 will kind of give the State a little bit of a -- will
10:10AM 24 give the State a background on Ms. Robledo's kind of
10:10AM 25 familiarity with these sorts of ordinances.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0656 41
10:10AM 1 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, I would
10:10AM 2 suggest what any police officer's or police chief's
10:10AM 3 experience in some other jurisdiction may have been, I
10:10AM 4 don't think there is any case in the case by
10:10AM 5 Ms. Robledo, by the way, at least relevant to the time
10:10AM 6 period. I don't see how that's relevant to whether the
10:10AM 7 City of Denton adopted a policy in response to the
10:10AM 8 ordinance being passed by the citizens.
10:10AM 9 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the
10:10AM 10 objection as to Interrogatory 9.
10:10AM 11 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Interrogatory 10, asks
10:10AM 12 to explain the written or unwritten City of Denton
10:10AM 13 Police Department policy, practice, or procedure
10:10AM 14 relating to funding for THC testing that was in effect
10:11AM 15 during the period spanning February 13, 2021, to
10:11AM 16 November 22, 2022.
10:11AM 17 And we objected to this on multiple
10:11AM 18 bases. First and foremost, it was vague and ambiguous
10:11AM 19 in that it asks the party to explain a policy, practice,
10:11AM 20 or procedure. I don't know what explaining a policy,
10:11AM 21 practice, or procedure is. There either is one or there
10:11AM 22 isn't. If it's identify a policy, practice, or
10:11AM 23 procedure, that might be something that -- that we could
10:11AM 24 do that if we have that in our general orders. But
10:11AM 25 explain it, is that offering an opinion, telling a story
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0657 42
10:11AM 1 about it?
10:11AM 2 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the
10:11AM 3 objection to Interrogatory 11.
10:11AM 4 MR. TEBO: Your Honor --
10:11AM 5 MR. DE LA FUENTE: 10.
10:11AM 6 MR. TEBO: -- did you say Interrogatory 11?
10:11AM 7 THE COURT: Yes.
10:11AM 8 MR. TEBO: I believe we were on 10.
10:12AM 9 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. They're very
10:12AM 10 similar. Yes, I'm overruling 10.
10:12AM 11 MR. TEBO: Thank you, Your Honor.
10:12AM 12 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And you're saying the
10:12AM 13 difference between 10 and 11, 10 is the policy -- the
10:12AM 14 policy question before the citizen initiative ordinance
10:12AM 15 was passed. 11 is the same question for the period
10:12AM 16 after it was passed.
10:12AM 17 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the
10:12AM 18 objection to Interrogatory 11.
10:12AM 19 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Interrogatory No. 12 has
10:12AM 20 a similar defect, but it's even more challenging.
10:12AM 21 Explain the written or unwritten City of Denton Police
10:12AM 22 Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to
10:12AM 23 the use of the smell of marijuana for probable cause
10:12AM 24 that was in effect during the period spanning
10:12AM 25 February 13th, '21, to November 22 of '22. And, again,
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0658 43
10:13AM 1 this was a period predating passage of the ordinance.
10:13AM 2 And, again, Your Honor, explaining -- asking to explain
10:13AM 3 a policy as opposed to identify a policy is a question
10:13AM 4 I'm not sure you can -- especially, an unwritten policy,
10:13AM 5 I don't -- I don't even know how to do that.
10:13AM 6 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the
10:13AM 7 objection to 12.
10:13AM 8 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 13 is the same
10:13AM 9 interrogatory for the period after the ordinance.
10:13AM 10 THE COURT: I'm going to also overrule the
10:13AM 11 objection to 13.
10:13AM 12 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Interrogatory No. 14,
10:13AM 13 explain the written or unwritten Denton Police
10:13AM 14 Department policy, practice, or procedure relating to
10:13AM 15 citations or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor
10:14AM 16 possession of marijuana possessions and for misdemeanor
10:14AM 17 possession of marijuana paraphernalia that was in effect
10:14AM 18 from February 13, '21, to November 22nd, '22.
10:14AM 19 THE COURT: I'm going to take that up along
10:14AM 20 with Interrogatory No. 15 because they are
10:14AM 21 interconnected.
10:14AM 22 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Yes, Your Honor. And I
10:14AM 23 don't even know what we mean by policies relating to
10:14AM 24 citations or arrests. I mean that's -- that's pretty --
10:14AM 25 pretty broad, explaining what on earth it means as to
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0659 44
10:14AM 1 our procedure relating to arrests. I mean it's not the
10:14AM 2 criteria or an actual asking about this general order
10:14AM 3 that may exist. I don't know how to explain -- I don't
10:14AM 4 even know what I'm necessarily looking for much less how
10:14AM 5 to explain it.
10:14AM 6 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the
10:14AM 7 objections to 14 and 15.
10:14AM 8 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Interrogatory No. 16 and
10:14AM 9 17 are the same time period breakdown. The question
10:15AM 10 being explain the written or unwritten police department
10:15AM 11 policy, practice, or procedure relating to training on
10:15AM 12 the marijuana ordinance.
10:15AM 13 THE COURT: I'm overruling the objections
10:15AM 14 to 16 and 17.
10:15AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: 18 and 19 are the same
10:15AM 16 time period breakdown. Explain the written or unwritten
10:15AM 17 City of Denton Police Department policy, practice, or
10:15AM 18 procedure relating to the citations or arrests for
10:15AM 19 felony level marijuana offenses.
10:15AM 20 THE COURT: And I'm overruling the
10:15AM 21 objections to 18 and 19.
10:15AM 22 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 20, identify all
10:15AM 23 inquiries by the public about confusion relating to
10:15AM 24 codification, implementation, or adoption of the City of
10:16AM 25 Denton's marijuana ordinance.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0660 45
10:16AM 1 THE COURT: What number did you indicate?
10:16AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 20.
10:16AM 3 THE COURT: Oh, sorry.
10:16AM 4 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And we specifically
10:16AM 5 objected to this one as vague, basically overbroad, and
10:16AM 6 then unduly burdensome to the extent that it would
10:16AM 7 require defendants to review all public inquires,
10:16AM 8 determine the state of mind of purpose of the inquirer,
10:16AM 9 which city council member got an e-mail from a
10:16AM 10 constituent about the marijuana ordinance in general,
10:16AM 11 was there confusion. I don't know what was there
10:16AM 12 confusion means. And, frankly, I don't know what any
10:16AM 13 public inquiry -- how any public inquiry is relevant to
10:16AM 14 whether a policy was adopted, enforced, or implemented
10:16AM 15 by the City. If some citizen sends an e-mail to their
10:16AM 16 council member in favor, opposing, asking a question,
10:16AM 17 how do I -- I'm trying to figure out we're going to have
10:16AM 18 to sort through all citizen communications, figure out
10:16AM 19 which ones even mention marijuana, then figure out which
10:17AM 20 ones reflect confusion.
10:17AM 21 THE COURT: I would assume that there would
10:17AM 22 be a process for doing this for open records requests
10:17AM 23 that are very similar; would there not be?
10:17AM 24 MR. DE LA FUENTE: There actually, in
10:17AM 25 asking to determine the state of mind the inquirer, no.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0661 46
10:17AM 1 We would be able to ask for more specificity because
10:17AM 2 we're not -- we are not obligated to -- a public entity
10:17AM 3 is not obligated to make a judgment call of the state of
10:17AM 4 mind of the inquirer. If there was public information
10:17AM 5 request that said, all citizen communications that
10:17AM 6 mentioned marijuana, then -- then that could be done.
10:17AM 7 But as to judging -- adjudicating the state of the mind
10:17AM 8 of the inquirer, the open records law allow us to ask a
10:17AM 9 secondary question of the inquirer saying, we need more
10:17AM 10 clarity on that so we can actually determine what you're
10:17AM 11 looking for.
10:17AM 12 THE COURT: And so then would you be okay
10:17AM 13 with the interrogatory if they took out the words
10:17AM 14 about -- about confusion and which inquiries by the
10:17AM 15 public relate to codification, implementation, or
10:17AM 16 adoption of the marijuana ordinance?
10:18AM 17 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I mean I will suggest
10:18AM 18 that that's probably going to be thousands upon
10:18AM 19 thousands of documents. I mean this was -- this was an
10:18AM 20 important issue to the citizens, and -- and I mean -- is
10:18AM 21 there a time frame on this? Is it before the ordinance
10:18AM 22 was passed when people were lobbying and talking about
10:18AM 23 this? Was it --
10:18AM 24 MR. TEBO: As Your Honor pointed out, this
10:18AM 25 is the sort of question that they would have to respond
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0662 47
10:18AM 1 to through a PIA request.
10:18AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: But how is it relevant
10:18AM 3 to a jurisdictional fact, Your Honor? What -- what an
10:18AM 4 individual citizen was saying, certainly before even
10:18AM 5 passage, I can't imagine what jurisdictional fact that's
10:18AM 6 relevant to.
10:18AM 7 THE COURT: And I can see it in my mind
10:18AM 8 what it could be, and so I am going to overrule in part
10:18AM 9 and sustain in part in that I am going to ask that the
10:18AM 10 words about confusion be stricken, and that it be
10:18AM 11 limited to inquiries relating to the codification,
10:18AM 12 implementation, or adoption of the City of Denton's
10:18AM 13 marijuana ordinance.
10:19AM 14 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And, Your Honor, can it
10:19AM 15 be limited as to time as well after the actual citizen
10:19AM 16 vote?
10:19AM 17 THE COURT: Well, I assumed that that is
10:19AM 18 exactly what they're asking for since it says
10:19AM 19 codification, implementation, and adoption.
10:19AM 20 MR. DE LA FUENTE: That is the
10:19AM 21 understanding that it's only after the citizen vote,
10:19AM 22 then we understand.
10:19AM 23 THE COURT: That is my understanding.
10:19AM 24 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Then we understand your
10:19AM 25 ruling.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0663 48
10:19AM 1 Interrogatory No. 21, identify all
10:19AM 2 documents relied upon in developing the current City of
10:19AM 3 Denton Police Department policy and police directive for
10:19AM 4 general orders relating to misdemeanor marijuana
10:19AM 5 offenses.
10:19AM 6 We objected to this as overbroad because
10:19AM 7 the current general policy was the general order
10:19AM 8 relating to marijuana -- misdemeanor marijuana predates
10:20AM 9 the ordinance. So, one, we would be going into history
10:20AM 10 of what the police department was considering, and, two,
10:20AM 11 it doesn't reflect any consideration of the citizen
10:20AM 12 initiative ordinance.
10:20AM 13 THE COURT: So I'm going to overrule the
10:20AM 14 objection and ask that you answer to 21. And, if the
10:20AM 15 current ordinance is from previous -- or if the current
10:20AM 16 orders are from pre-ordinance, then I would expect that
10:20AM 17 the answer would be just that.
10:20AM 18 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Thank you, Your Honor.
10:20AM 19 22 is a question of all parties about if
10:20AM 20 they've ever been convicted -- convicted of a felony or
10:20AM 21 crime involving moral turpitude. That's not narrowly
10:20AM 22 tailored to jurisdictional discovery.
10:20AM 23 THE COURT: Mr. Tebo?
10:20AM 24 MR. TEBO: The State can withdraw that
10:21AM 25 interrogatory, Your Honor.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0664 49
10:21AM 1 THE COURT: Okay.
10:21AM 2 And moving on to Exhibit B.
10:21AM 3 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Those were the RFPs
10:21AM 4 or --
10:21AM 5 THE COURT: The requests for production.
10:21AM 6 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Sorry, Your Honor.
10:21AM 7 Getting to the right -- oh, I got it.
10:21AM 8 Request for Production No. 1, Your Honor,
10:22AM 9 was produce all communications and documents sent or
10:22AM 10 received by the City regarding codification, adoption,
10:22AM 11 or implementation of the marijuana ordinance including
10:22AM 12 communications in which you were copied.
10:22AM 13 And, Your Honor, I do remind, allowing
10:22AM 14 jurisdictional discovery is a limited creature. It's
10:22AM 15 designed to prevent the City from having to incur
10:22AM 16 significant expense in responding to discovery, and it
10:22AM 17 must be narrowly tailored. This is every communication
10:22AM 18 sent or received regarding the ordinance from
10:22AM 19 November 2nd to '21 to present, before it was passed,
10:22AM 20 anything. So the first e-mail that anyone got about,
10:22AM 21 hey, there's a citizen initiative out there. That's
10:22AM 22 responsive
10:22AM 23 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, the only way the
10:22AM 24 jurisdictional discovery is tailored is the subject
10:22AM 25 matter of that discovery. It has to be about things
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0665 50
10:23AM 1 relevant to jurisdictional facts. It's not about the
10:23AM 2 breadth or the strenuousness that it's going to take to
10:23AM 3 respond to -- respond to discovery.
10:23AM 4 THE COURT: But help me understand if it
10:23AM 5 goes back to 2021, how does that help with jurisdiction?
10:23AM 6 MR. TEBO: So the way that the State framed
10:23AM 7 it is -- is that communications about the ordinance and
10:23AM 8 reflecting defendants' beliefs about whether or not it
10:23AM 9 is consistent with state law or relevant to the Court's
10:23AM 10 jurisdiction. But if Your Honor disagrees, then we'd be
10:23AM 11 happy to limit this request to post ordinance.
10:23AM 12 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I don't even understand
10:23AM 13 what communications being sent to us could be relevant
10:23AM 14 to. Frankly, I have a hard time about the communication
10:23AM 15 sent by city officials, but anybody can send whatever
10:23AM 16 they want to the City. It doesn't -- it doesn't have
10:24AM 17 any bearing on what the city council or police
10:24AM 18 department actually did.
10:24AM 19 MR. TEBO: Well, Your Honor, respectfully,
10:24AM 20 sometimes it does.
10:24AM 21 THE COURT: But help me understand how?
10:24AM 22 MR. TEBO: I mean some communications --
10:24AM 23 well, communications are often two-way, Your Honor. And
10:24AM 24 if it's -- if the communication is about something the
10:24AM 25 City has done, then communications both received and
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0666 51
10:24AM 1 sent by the City are relevant.
10:24AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I can't see how,
10:24AM 3 Your Honor.
10:24AM 4 THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to overrule
10:24AM 5 in part and sustain in part, and I will require them to
10:24AM 6 produce all communications and documents that were sent.
10:24AM 7 MR. DE LA FUENTE: By the City?
10:24AM 8 THE COURT: By the City.
10:24AM 9 MR. DE LA FUENTE: By the City officials.
10:24AM 10 From what period, Your Honor --
10:24AM 11 THE COURT: From the --
10:24AM 12 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- from the passage of
10:24AM 13 the ordinance?
10:24AM 14 THE COURT: Yes.
10:24AM 15 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, could I quickly
10:24AM 16 clarify that by passage of the ordinance we mean
10:24AM 17 November 22nd, 2022?
10:25AM 18 THE COURT: Okay.
10:25AM 19 MR. TEBO: Thank you.
10:25AM 20 THE COURT: That's fair.
10:25AM 21 MS. SMITH: And just so it's very clear.
10:25AM 22 So when we're talking about passage, we're talking about
10:25AM 23 whenever the vote was certified -- public vote
10:25AM 24 certified.
10:25AM 25 MR. TEBO: Yes.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0667 52
10:25AM 1 THE COURT: Yes.
10:25AM 2 MS. SMITH: Okay. Thank you.
10:25AM 3 THE COURT: Request No. 2.
10:25AM 4 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Request No. 2 is produce
10:25AM 5 all policies or memoranda created by the defendants from
10:25AM 6 November 2nd, 2021, regarding codification, adoption, or
10:25AM 7 implementation of the marijuana ordinance. We did
10:25AM 8 object to overbroad, and we did follow the -- the -- it
10:25AM 9 says it's not calculated to lead to the discovery of
10:25AM 10 admissible evidence. Pending the resolution of that,
10:25AM 11 Your Honor, we will let the Court know that we will have
10:25AM 12 some objections. Some -- we'll plead privilege on some
10:25AM 13 of these items, and we'll produce a privilege log.
10:25AM 14 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to overrule
10:25AM 15 the request [sic] for Request No. 2.
10:26AM 16 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And Request No. 3 is
10:26AM 17 quite similar to Request No. 1. It's the communications
10:26AM 18 sent to or received from certain citizen groups or any
10:26AM 19 party supporting the ordinance. It's the same sort of
10:26AM 20 query, and we would ask the Court to -- frankly, the
10:26AM 21 Court's ruling on item, on Request No. 1 will result in
10:26AM 22 the production of anything responsive to this. So if
10:26AM 23 Your Honor would just treat No. 3 as the same way as
10:26AM 24 No. 1, then we'll be consistent.
10:26AM 25 THE COURT: And as far as Request No. 3,
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0668 53
10:26AM 1 I'm going to overrule the objection and require that all
10:26AM 2 responsive information to 3 be presented.
10:26AM 3 MR. DE LA FUENTE: So a broader response --
10:26AM 4 THE COURT: Yes.
10:26AM 5 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- than Request No. 1?
10:26AM 6 THE COURT: Yes.
10:27AM 7 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Okay.
10:27AM 8 No. 4, produce all communications and
10:27AM 9 documents sent or received between the City and the
10:27AM 10 public relating to enforcement of the marijuana
10:27AM 11 ordinance and the marijuana laws of the State of Texas,
10:27AM 12 unrestricted as to time or anything else.
10:27AM 13 So, if ten years ago if someone sent us
10:27AM 14 an e-mail that said, I don't think you should spend
10:27AM 15 resources on this --
10:27AM 16 THE COURT: And my understanding of reading
10:27AM 17 this is that it would be after the implementation so the
10:27AM 18 November '22 date. And so we can confine it to that
10:27AM 19 November '22 date.
10:27AM 20 What was the November '22 date?
10:27AM 21 MR. TEBO: That was the day that the city
10:27AM 22 council voted to adopt the --
10:27AM 23 THE COURT: I'm sorry. November the what
10:27AM 24 though?
10:27AM 25 MR. TEBO: Oh, 2022 -- November 22nd, 2022.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0669 54
10:28AM 1 THE COURT: So after November 22nd, 2022.
10:28AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And, Your Honor, the
10:28AM 3 similar broad request in Request No. 1 you confined to
10:28AM 4 sent by the City?
10:28AM 5 THE COURT: Yes.
10:28AM 6 And then what is -- I'm sorry. What
10:28AM 7 number were we on?
10:28AM 8 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 4.
10:28AM 9 THE COURT: Yes.
10:28AM 10 MR. TEBO: Your Honor --
10:28AM 11 THE COURT: Yes.
10:28AM 12 MR. TEBO: -- can we have, for those
10:28AM 13 communications to which the City sent a response, could
10:28AM 14 the Court also require that the message sent to the City
10:28AM 15 be included for context?
10:28AM 16 THE COURT: Yes, I think that's
10:28AM 17 appropriate.
10:28AM 18 MR. TEBO: Okay. Could we also have that
10:28AM 19 qualification with respect to your ruling to RFA
10:28AM 20 No. 1 -- or RFP No. 1.
10:28AM 21 THE COURT: I think that that is fair
10:28AM 22 because I think, when you're pulling up what you sent,
10:28AM 23 that you would also would pull up what was received.
10:29AM 24 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Understood, Your Honor.
10:29AM 25 THE COURT: Okay. Request No. 5.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0670 55
10:29AM 1 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Between -- this is
10:29AM 2 documents sent or received or exchanged between law
10:29AM 3 enforcement whether agents, employees, or
10:29AM 4 representatives regarding codification, adoption, or
10:29AM 5 implementation of the ordinance from November 2nd, 2021.
10:29AM 6 THE COURT: And, Mr. Tebo, help me
10:29AM 7 understand why back to 2021.
10:29AM 8 MR. TEBO: Again, when the State propounded
10:29AM 9 this written discovery, we did so with the thought that
10:29AM 10 time leading up to adoption of the ordinance would also
10:29AM 11 be relevant to -- to see how the City planned to
10:29AM 12 effectuate the ordinance after adoption or whether it
10:29AM 13 had any plans to do so.
10:29AM 14 THE COURT: And so I'm going to overrule
10:29AM 15 the objection to Request 5.
10:30AM 16 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And not limit it as to
10:30AM 17 time?
10:30AM 18 THE COURT: That is correct.
10:30AM 19 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, Request --
10:30AM 20 MS. SMITH: Understanding that there might
10:30AM 21 be some privilege in there.
10:30AM 22 THE COURT: And, if there is privilege on
10:30AM 23 any of these requests, just please --
10:30AM 24 MS. SMITH: That's what I figured. I just
10:30AM 25 thought I would say it --
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0671 56
10:30AM 1 THE COURT: Thank you.
10:30AM 2 MS. SMITH: -- thank you, Your Honor.
10:30AM 3 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Request for Production
10:30AM 4 No. 6 is similar to the interrogatory regarding
10:30AM 5 communications or documents exchanged with the cities of
10:30AM 6 San Antonio, Elgin, Harker Heights, Killeen, Austin,
10:30AM 7 San Marcus, regarding codification.
10:30AM 8 Again, Your Honor, I just can't imagine
10:30AM 9 how any of this is relevant.
10:30AM 10 THE COURT: And I can see how it would be.
10:30AM 11 And so I'm going to overrule the objection to the extent
10:30AM 12 that it's not covered by privilege. And, if there is
10:30AM 13 privileged information, please include that in a
10:30AM 14 privilege log.
10:30AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And Request for
10:30AM 16 Production No. 7 goes one layer deeper even. It asks
10:31AM 17 for those same types of communications regarding the
10:31AM 18 codification, adoption, or implementation of marijuana
10:31AM 19 ordinances by those cities not by Denton.
10:31AM 20 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the
10:31AM 21 objection to the extent that they were produced to or
10:31AM 22 received from those cities.
10:31AM 23 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Request No. 8 are
10:31AM 24 communications and documents between the defendants and
10:31AM 25 the Denton School District regarding the marijuana
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0672 57
10:31AM 1 ordinance. The Denton School District is -- the school
10:31AM 2 district is not an entity listed in 370.003. It's not
10:31AM 3 an entity under our -- the City's authority. I truly
10:32AM 4 don't understand what relevant fact any communications
10:32AM 5 at all with -- with the school district --
10:32AM 6 THE COURT: Are there Denton City Police
10:32AM 7 Officers that work inside the Denton Independent School
10:32AM 8 District?
10:32AM 9 MR. DE LA FUENTE: There -- there may be.
10:32AM 10 I -- honestly, I can't -- I mean --
10:32AM 11 MR. TEBO: Your Honor --
10:32AM 12 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- I'm sure there are
10:32AM 13 from time to time.
10:32AM 14 THE COURT: Hold on. The court reporter is
10:32AM 15 not going to be able to get two people speaking.
10:32AM 16 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I'm sure there are from
10:32AM 17 time to time, Your Honor, but they're subject to the
10:32AM 18 jurisdiction of the Denton Police Department and the
10:32AM 19 Denton Police Department orders as opposed to than
10:32AM 20 these -- these aren't DISD officers.
10:32AM 21 THE COURT: And so, Mr. Tebo?
10:32AM 22 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, it is the State's
10:32AM 23 understanding that City of Denton Police Officers are
10:32AM 24 responsible for public safety in schools falling in the
10:32AM 25 Denton ISD, and so this would produce to the State any
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0673 58
10:32AM 1 communications regarding Denton Police Officer
10:32AM 2 activities regarding marijuana possession in Denton ISD
10:32AM 3 schools.
10:32AM 4 THE COURT: And that makes sense to me.
10:33AM 5 I'm going to overrule the objection.
10:33AM 6 And hold on one moment.
10:33AM 7 (Off-the-record discussion with court
10:33AM 8 reporter.)
10:33AM 9 THE COURT: Okay. We're going to do
10:33AM 10 Request No. 9, and then we're going to take a 15-minute
10:33AM 11 break because she's been going for about an hour and a
10:33AM 12 half.
10:33AM 13 MR. DE LA FUENTE: You bet. Thank you,
10:33AM 14 Your Honor.
10:33AM 15 No. 9, produce all disciplinary
10:33AM 16 statistics relating to violations of the marijuana
10:33AM 17 ordinance or any related policy or memorandum by
10:33AM 18 employees of the City of Denton Police Department from
10:33AM 19 November 22nd, 2022, to present.
10:33AM 20 THE COURT: And so, if those documents
10:33AM 21 exist, then I will overrule the objection. To the
10:33AM 22 extent that you would have to create those documents. I
10:34AM 23 am going to sustain the objection.
10:34AM 24 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Thank you, Your Honor.
10:34AM 25 THE COURT: And so let's go ahead and take
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0674 59
10:34AM 1 15 minutes. I'll see you back about 10:50.
10:34AM 2 (Recess.)
10:52AM 3 THE COURT: Okay. We're back on the
10:53AM 4 record.
10:53AM 5 Okay. Request No. 10?
10:53AM 6 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Yes, Your Honor.
10:53AM 7 This is about communications and
10:53AM 8 documents to and from employees of the police department
10:53AM 9 or their agents and representatives regarding the
10:53AM 10 re-prioritization of marijuana enforcement including
10:53AM 11 misdemeanor marijuana possession or misdemeanor
10:53AM 12 possession of paraphernalia from November of '21 to
10:53AM 13 present.
10:53AM 14 And all the expected objections to this
10:53AM 15 one, Your Honor. And, again, to clarify the
10:53AM 16 November 2000 -- the November 22nd, 2022, date was the
10:53AM 17 date that the city council canvassed the public votes,
10:53AM 18 the administerial act of canvassing the votes. I mean I
10:53AM 19 just -- I just want to be real clear that we're talking
10:53AM 20 about an event -- the council had no discretion of it.
10:53AM 21 So it was administerial. If they hadn't done it, they'd
10:54AM 22 have been sued. They'd have been here in front of you.
10:54AM 23 So we've been talking about that as the adoption date
10:54AM 24 that council -- I just want to be very clear. That
10:54AM 25 was -- that was the date that the votes became official.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0675 60
10:54AM 1 That's all that was.
10:54AM 2 THE COURT: And so I am going to sustain in
10:54AM 3 part and overrule in part Request No. 10 in that I am
10:54AM 4 going to allow it after November 22nd, 2022, since it
10:54AM 5 asks for a re-prioritization which I think would only
10:54AM 6 have taken place after November 22nd, 2022.
10:54AM 7 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Request No. 11,
10:54AM 8 communications or documents within your possession
10:54AM 9 relating to the City of Denton Police Administration's
10:54AM 10 demonstrative of marijuana at a city council meeting
10:54AM 11 from November '21 to present.
10:55AM 12 Really, there's two big issues with this,
10:55AM 13 Your Honor. One, I think they're asking for something
10:55AM 14 specific, but I don't know what it is.
10:55AM 15 THE COURT: And I'll just stop you there.
10:55AM 16 Mr. Tebo?
10:55AM 17 MR. TEBO: That is correct, Your Honor.
10:55AM 18 Following adoption of the ordinance, this
10:55AM 19 city police department contributed to a number of
10:55AM 20 presentations about the City's drug enforcement
10:55AM 21 policies. So both before adoption and after adoption
10:55AM 22 they put on a number of presentations about their drug
10:55AM 23 enforcement policies. We think that roping in a year
10:55AM 24 and a half prior to adoption is still relevant because
10:55AM 25 it will enable the State to point out any change that
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0676 61
10:55AM 1 may have taken -- we'll have -- we'll have a contrast
10:55AM 2 about before and after.
10:55AM 3 THE COURT: And then --
10:55AM 4 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I don't even know who to
10:55AM 5 ask about it. I don't -- I'm not -- I really,
10:55AM 6 Your Honor, don't. I'm kind of hunting and pecking
10:55AM 7 here. And, by the way, even communications or documents
10:55AM 8 relating to that. You're not -- you're not even asking
10:56AM 9 for -- it's not just asking for a demonstrative. It's
10:56AM 10 asking for anything related to the demonstrative. So,
10:56AM 11 first, I have to figure out what they're talking about.
10:56AM 12 I mean you have to -- tell me what meetings. I mean if
10:56AM 13 there were meetings that they know about, tell me what
10:56AM 14 they were.
10:56AM 15 THE COURT: And did you have a second
10:56AM 16 objection? I cut you off.
10:56AM 17 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Sure. The -- the next
10:56AM 18 layer of documents -- communications and documents
10:56AM 19 relating to those. I mean understanding that if a
10:56AM 20 Denton Police Officer or somebody affiliated with the
10:56AM 21 department put on some presentation at a council
10:56AM 22 meeting, then maybe underneath, I don't know if he's got
10:56AM 23 an e-mail about scheduling or anything, and I can't
10:56AM 24 imagine how that's relevant. I don't know what I'm
10:56AM 25 looking for, and I don't know why it's relevant, and I
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0677 62
10:56AM 1 don't know why the layer underneath is relevant.
10:56AM 2 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, if I may, that's
10:56AM 3 relevant to the communication strategies of the
10:56AM 4 demonstratives. We want to know, kind of, what went
10:56AM 5 into crafting those demonstratives, if there was
10:56AM 6 anything that they -- because those presentations were
10:57AM 7 public, we want to know if there was anything that the
10:57AM 8 police department left out in order to massage the
10:57AM 9 optics of their presentation that would still be
10:57AM 10 relevant to how the City is enforcing marijuana laws.
10:57AM 11 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule that
10:57AM 12 objection.
10:57AM 13 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Can we get some
10:57AM 14 specificity as to what meetings and presentations we're
10:57AM 15 supposed to be looking for? I mean, at this point, I --
10:57AM 16 truly, we're going to have to look through the records
10:57AM 17 of all open meetings from November 2nd, '21 to present
10:57AM 18 to figure out which ones -- if they know which ones
10:57AM 19 they're talking about, they do have a duty to request
10:57AM 20 with reason particularity.
10:57AM 21 THE COURT: And I don't understand why that
10:57AM 22 would be an issue. I would think anytime that they're
10:57AM 23 making a presentation on marijuana, at least in my
10:57AM 24 practice when I was doing something similar, I always
10:57AM 25 knew where I was presenting, and I had my presentations.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0678 63
10:57AM 1 I just don't understand why --
10:57AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: But I don't even know
10:58AM 3 who I'm asking. If they're saying --
10:58AM 4 THE COURT: The police administration.
10:58AM 5 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Which administrators?
10:58AM 6 Which individuals? I mean --
10:58AM 7 THE COURT: Well, do they have multiple
10:58AM 8 people that do presentations on marijuana? I would
10:58AM 9 assume that maybe they have --
10:58AM 10 MR. DE LA FUENTE: There may have been
10:58AM 11 individual police officers who came in and put on their
10:58AM 12 own presentations, or there may have been something
10:58AM 13 officially done by the department. I -- really,
10:58AM 14 Your Honor, I'm truly -- my ignorance is not feign.
10:58AM 15 It's legit --
10:58AM 16 MR. TEBO: Respectfully --
10:58AM 17 THE COURT: I just don't understand how one
10:58AM 18 would not know who within their department gives
10:58AM 19 presentations similar to that --
10:58AM 20 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Now I'm looking in --
10:58AM 21 THE COURT: -- like the person who does
10:58AM 22 drug or D.A.R.E. or, like, is in charge of --
10:58AM 23 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Here's -- here's my
10:58AM 24 challenge, Your Honor. We're spending public dollars to
10:58AM 25 look for these, and the Public Information Act, you're
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0679 64
10:58AM 1 right -- I mean, you're right, you fall back to the
10:58AM 2 Public Information Act that requires you to produce
10:58AM 3 things. It also has a mechanism in there, if you're
10:58AM 4 going to require the City to go hunt and peck and
10:58AM 5 produce the volume of documents to be reimbursed for its
10:59AM 6 costs in doing that, and this process does not have
10:59AM 7 that. It does have rules that require you to request
10:59AM 8 with reasonable particularity. If the State has a
10:59AM 9 belief that there was a presentation at a meeting, tell
10:59AM 10 me the date.
10:59AM 11 THE COURT: Do you-all know the dates?
10:59AM 12 MR. TEBO: Well, Your Honor, we know
10:59AM 13 examples, but we don't -- the State is not in a position
10:59AM 14 to know every single presentation the Denton Police
10:59AM 15 Department gave.
10:59AM 16 THE COURT: With some, I certainly
10:59AM 17 understand your frustration. With this answer, I don't
10:59AM 18 understand your frustration because it seems to me
10:59AM 19 like -- this one doesn't seem so hard for me to answer.
10:59AM 20 MS. SMITH: I would also say, Your Honor,
10:59AM 21 that there was -- I mean, and if you look at the case
10:59AM 22 caption, Doug Shoemaker is listed as the chief of
10:59AM 23 police. Obviously, Doug Shoemaker is no longer with the
10:59AM 24 City of Denton. So there has been some change in
10:59AM 25 turnover. And so that is part of the challenge as well.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0680 65
10:59AM 1 We are trying to identify these documents, so I hear
10:59AM 2 what you're saying, Your Honor. But when I'm trying to
11:00AM 3 figure out where these things might live, if there's
11:00AM 4 even a helpful of, hey, let's start with the -- you
11:00AM 5 know, September 24th, 2024, meeting and then being able
11:00AM 6 to search those people.
11:00AM 7 MR. TEBO: All we want is a good faith
11:00AM 8 search.
11:00AM 9 THE COURT: And that's what I would assume,
11:00AM 10 and I assume that your response is, this is -- this is
11:00AM 11 what we could find.
11:00AM 12 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Request No. 12,
11:00AM 13 Your Honor, produce all communications and documents to
11:00AM 14 or from the Denton County Public Health District. And,
11:00AM 15 Your Honor, here's -- here's the real problem here. How
11:00AM 16 far afield are we going? This is all getting into, is
11:00AM 17 marijuana good or bad, do you think it's good policy to
11:00AM 18 have marijuana enforcement or not, is this a public
11:00AM 19 health issue or not. This is getting into the public
11:00AM 20 policy behind the ordinance which is not relevant to
11:01AM 21 whether anything was ever adopted.
11:01AM 22 THE COURT: And so if you want to limit it
11:01AM 23 to whether or not it's going to be enforced as far as
11:01AM 24 12, like, for example, if there are communications to
11:01AM 25 the Denton County Public Health District that say, we
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0681 66
11:01AM 1 are going to enforce this rigorously or --
11:01AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: But that's the county.
11:01AM 3 It's not even an entity we have any authority over.
11:01AM 4 THE COURT: No, between -- but it's not
11:01AM 5 going to their e-mail to get it, it's just if there were
11:01AM 6 e-mails between the defendants and this entity is my
11:01AM 7 understanding.
11:01AM 8 MR. TEBO: Correct, Your Honor --
11:01AM 9 MR. DE LA FUENTE: But there's no
11:01AM 10 enforcement authority that -- it's the Denton County
11:01AM 11 Public Health District. I can't imagine what role they
11:01AM 12 have.
11:01AM 13 THE COURT: That's why, in your possession,
11:01AM 14 so it's not going to ask them.
11:01AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: But it's about --
11:01AM 16 Your Honor --
11:01AM 17 THE COURT: Well, if they don't have a
11:01AM 18 role, then I would assume that you wouldn't have any
11:01AM 19 documents --
11:01AM 20 MR. DE LA FUENTE: But, Your Honor, there
11:01AM 21 may be discussions -- there may be policy discussions,
11:01AM 22 but if there's, you know, local coordination which talk
11:01AM 23 about all kind of health issues --
11:02AM 24 THE COURT: And I think that, if there are
11:02AM 25 policy discussions, then that is very relevant to
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0682 67
11:02AM 1 jurisdiction.
11:02AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, and I think
11:02AM 3 this -- okay. But I'm afraid there's a misapprehension
11:02AM 4 on the breadth of -- of the actual fact question being
11:02AM 5 teed up. Because this is about whether marijuana is
11:02AM 6 good or bad not whether the City adopted a --
11:02AM 7 THE COURT: And let me stop you there.
11:02AM 8 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- policy.
11:02AM 9 THE COURT: Let me stop you there.
11:02AM 10 And I specifically said I'm happy to
11:02AM 11 limit it to enforcement. And so, if we're -- if we're
11:02AM 12 talking about whether or not this is going to be
11:02AM 13 enforced, then I believe that that is relevant to
11:02AM 14 jurisdiction. Whether or not it's good or bad, then I
11:02AM 15 don't think -- I agree with you, I don't think that's
11:02AM 16 necessarily relevant.
11:02AM 17 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Okay, Your Honor.
11:02AM 18 THE COURT: And so 12 we will limit it to
11:02AM 19 communications and documents regarding the enforcement
11:02AM 20 of the ordinance.
11:02AM 21 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, could, instead of
11:02AM 22 enforcement of the ordinance, you change it to
11:03AM 23 enforcement of marijuana laws --
11:03AM 24 THE COURT: I think that's --
11:03AM 25 MR. TEBO: -- with both state law and the
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0683 68
11:03AM 1 ordinance.
11:03AM 2 THE COURT: Yes, that's fine.
11:03AM 3 MR. TEBO: Thank you, Your Honor.
11:03AM 4 THE COURT: 13?
11:03AM 5 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 13, is
11:03AM 6 communications relating to funding by the City or the
11:03AM 7 City of Denton for THC testing. Again --
11:03AM 8 THE COURT: I think that's fair.
11:03AM 9 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Can it be limited to
11:03AM 10 documents specifically related to that funding as
11:03AM 11 opposed to all the City general budget documents that
11:03AM 12 embedded within the police budget is going to be --
11:03AM 13 THE COURT: I don't think they asked for
11:03AM 14 all the funding documents. I think they asked for those
11:03AM 15 limited to THC testing. And I assume that what they're
11:03AM 16 requesting is, if prior to November 22nd, '22, and then
11:03AM 17 the next question, after November 22nd, '22, whether we
11:03AM 18 said, "This year we need a thousand dollars for THC
11:03AM 19 testing. And, after 2022, oh, we need $20 for THC
11:04AM 20 testing." I assume that's what they're looking for.
11:04AM 21 Like, we don't -- we don't believe we're going to need
11:04AM 22 tests because we're not going to enforce it. And so as
11:04AM 23 for 13 and 14, I think that's fair, and I am going to
11:04AM 24 overrule the objection. And I know my numbers weren't
11:04AM 25 realistic.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0684 69
11:04AM 1 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, Request
11:04AM 2 No. 15, I'm actually looking to try to figure out the
11:04AM 3 difference between them. But all communications or
11:04AM 4 documents within your possession relating to citations
11:04AM 5 or arrests for Class A or Class B misdemeanor possession
11:04AM 6 of marijuana offenses and misdemeanor possession of
11:04AM 7 marijuana paraphernalia from February of '21 to the
11:04AM 8 canvassing date of November 22nd, '22.
11:04AM 9 And then 16 is for the same, from
11:04AM 10 November 22nd after. And, Your Honor, we -- we
11:05AM 11 absolutely objected to this on its -- on its overbreadth
11:05AM 12 and relating to citations or arrests. I mean are we
11:05AM 13 talking about individual arrest documents when
11:05AM 14 Steve Jones got a citation?
11:05AM 15 THE COURT: Okay. I don't think that
11:05AM 16 that's what they're --
11:05AM 17 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I mean, Your Honor --
11:05AM 18 THE COURT: I see your point. Hold on one
11:05AM 19 moment.
11:05AM 20 Sorry. I assumed that you were asking
11:05AM 21 for statistics, are you asking, for, like individual
11:05AM 22 citations?
11:05AM 23 MR. TEBO: Well, Your Honor, we want to
11:05AM 24 make sure we get responsive documents. We don't know
11:05AM 25 how the City keeps records related to its marijuana
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0685 70
11:05AM 1 enforcement.
11:05AM 2 THE COURT: And so I'm going to sustain it
11:05AM 3 in part and overrule it in part. To the extent that
11:05AM 4 there are documents related to statistics that exist,
11:06AM 5 then I would expect those to be turned over. If we're
11:06AM 6 asking for individual citations or tickets, like, for
11:06AM 7 drug paraphernalia, I can't imagine how you would do
11:06AM 8 that. But I certainly know that, when I was with the
11:06AM 9 DA's office, we had documents that showed arrests for
11:06AM 10 each of these offenses.
11:06AM 11 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, may I be heard --
11:06AM 12 THE COURT: Yes.
11:06AM 13 MR. TEBO: -- please?
11:06AM 14 Instead of narrowing the RFP just to
11:06AM 15 statistics, if -- so what the Court is getting at, is we
11:06AM 16 want to exclude individual tickets citations like that,
11:06AM 17 we could just stipulate that this RFP does not ask for
11:06AM 18 individualized reports of citations or arrests. But,
11:06AM 19 like, if they don't have something that is a statistic,
11:06AM 20 it's more, like, maybe a report or something like that,
11:06AM 21 we want that to --
11:06AM 22 THE COURT: Okay.
11:06AM 23 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- be included.
11:06AM 24 MS. SMITH: And, Your Honor, the -- the
11:06AM 25 link to all of the public reports and statistics was
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0686 71
11:06AM 1 provided in our responses to discovery already. So I
11:06AM 2 don't know if they --
11:06AM 3 THE COURT: And so, if there are no other
11:07AM 4 documents that are responsive, I would expect that no
11:07AM 5 other documents are responsive.
11:07AM 6 And, yes, I will grant your request to
11:07AM 7 not just say statistics to limit it based on the wording
11:07AM 8 you've used.
11:07AM 9 MR. TEBO: Thank you, Your Honor.
11:07AM 10 MR. DE LA FUENTE: So that's No. 15 and 16?
11:07AM 11 THE COURT: Yes, sir.
11:07AM 12 MS. SMITH: Can you repeat that wording for
11:07AM 13 my notes?
11:07AM 14 THE COURT: 17 to me it looks like those
11:07AM 15 are connected as well.
11:07AM 16 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Reports. Was that your
11:07AM 17 word?
11:07AM 18 MR. TEBO: The stipulation that I propose
11:07AM 19 is that these RFPs exclude individualized documents
11:07AM 20 relating to citations or arrests for marijuana use.
11:07AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And 17 and 18 are
11:07AM 22 companion requests for before the -- the canvassing.
11:08AM 23 And, again, I just -- I do want to clarify, for the
11:08AM 24 discovery purposes, when we're talking about the
11:08AM 25 November 22nd date, we're treating that as the
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0687 72
11:08AM 1 canvassing date not --
11:08AM 2 THE COURT: Right.
11:08AM 3 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- we're not calling
11:08AM 4 that an adoption date; is that correct?
11:08AM 5 THE COURT: That's correct.
11:08AM 6 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Okay.
11:08AM 7 THE COURT: And so, with regard to
11:08AM 8 training, I think that is -- that is fair if training
11:08AM 9 changed.
11:08AM 10 MR. DE LA FUENTE: All right. No. --
11:08AM 11 THE COURT: Actually, 19 and 20 I think are
11:08AM 12 very similar.
11:08AM 13 MR. DE LA FUENTE: They are.
11:08AM 14 THE COURT: And so 19 and 20 I'm also going
11:08AM 15 to overrule those objections as I think those are fair.
11:08AM 16 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And No. 21 and 22 are
11:08AM 17 very similar.
11:08AM 18 THE COURT: To the misdemeanor, and I think
11:09AM 19 we should limit it the same way.
11:09AM 20 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Okay. On no
11:09AM 21 individualized arrest information?
11:09AM 22 THE COURT: Correct.
11:09AM 23 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And 23 is even more
11:09AM 24 challenging because this is where the subject expressed
11:09AM 25 that they thought it was lawful to possess.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0688 73
11:09AM 1 Your Honor --
11:09AM 2 THE COURT: I know. I get it. I get it.
11:09AM 3 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- it's utterly
11:09AM 4 irrelevant.
11:09AM 5 THE COURT: Well, I -- I'm not going to say
11:09AM 6 it's not relevant because I can see the relevance.
11:09AM 7 However, I'm not sure how, without, like, viewing
11:09AM 8 body cam and reading every offense report you would be
11:09AM 9 able to find that information, so I'm going to sustain
11:09AM 10 the objection to 23.
11:09AM 11 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, may I be heard on
11:10AM 12 that --
11:10AM 13 THE COURT: You can.
11:10AM 14 MR. TEBO: -- a little bit?
11:10AM 15 THE COURT: Yes.
11:10AM 16 MR. TEBO: So all -- the only duty to
11:10AM 17 respond to this discovery is a good faith search. If
11:10AM 18 upon a good faith search -- but not one that's super
11:10AM 19 strenuous, just a good faith search, if they don't
11:10AM 20 recover responsive material then --
11:10AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, there's no
11:10AM 22 good faith search doesn't involve looking at everybody's
11:10AM 23 camera footage.
11:10AM 24 THE COURT: I know. That is -- if you
11:10AM 25 asked me to do a good faith search, I would --
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0689 74
11:10AM 1 MR. TEBO: I understand, Your Honor.
11:10AM 2 THE COURT: -- I don't see a way how to do
11:10AM 3 it with good faith without an extremely strenuously
11:10AM 4 search, so I'm going to sustain the objection to 23.
11:10AM 5 MR. TEBO: I understand. Thank you,
11:10AM 6 Your Honor.
11:10AM 7 THE COURT: 24.
11:10AM 8 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Communications sent by
11:10AM 9 any of the defendants' folks regarding the marijuana
11:10AM 10 ordinance or this lawsuit from November '21 to present.
11:10AM 11 THE COURT: I think that all is fair game,
11:10AM 12 so I'm going to overrule your objection.
11:10AM 13 Okay. I'm going to move on to Exhibit C
11:10AM 14 which is the Requests for Admissions.
11:11AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: These, I think, will be
11:11AM 16 a little easier, Your Honor, because, you know, most of
11:11AM 17 them are subject to an objection, we deny or admit.
11:11AM 18 There are a couple that I think we'll need to take up.
11:11AM 19 THE COURT: Okay. Let me know where you
11:11AM 20 think I need to go.
11:11AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: All right. And -- and
11:11AM 22 Your Honor, Request for Admission No. 1 is one we -- we
11:11AM 23 have to stick with the very last objection to it. It
11:11AM 24 uses the term adopted as they define the term. They
11:11AM 25 created a legal definition of adoption. And we have to
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0690 75
11:11AM 1 stand on our objection to them imposing a legal
11:11AM 2 definition. As to the definition under the law, we can
11:11AM 3 answer this. But, as to their definition, we cannot.
11:12AM 4 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, they didn't make an
11:12AM 5 objection that our use of the term adopted calls for a
11:12AM 6 conclusion, which it doesn't by the way. They didn't
11:12AM 7 make that objection. It's not there in their discovery
11:12AM 8 responses.
11:12AM 9 MR. DE LA FUENTE: It's right here. It's
11:12AM 10 vague and misleading to the extent that you used the
11:12AM 11 term adopted --
11:12AM 12 MR. TEBO: Yeah, but you're not saying it's
11:12AM 13 vague or misleading. You're saying that it's forcing a
11:12AM 14 legal conclusion --
11:12AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I'm saying it's vague.
11:12AM 16 THE COURT: Hold on.
11:12AM 17 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- and misleading as to
11:12AM 18 the form.
11:12AM 19 THE COURT: Hold on one moment. The Court
11:12AM 20 reporter cannot get what everybody is saying.
11:12AM 21 Sustained.
11:12AM 22 MS. SMITH: Your Honor, it's in our
11:12AM 23 objections to definitions, No. 3.
11:12AM 24 MR. DE LA FUENTE: It creates a legal
11:12AM 25 definition that is contrary to relevant legal authority
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0691 76
11:12AM 1 in this case. We will treat it as having its plain
11:12AM 2 meaning as is consistent with the legal authority. We
11:12AM 3 have to stand on that objection, Your Honor.
11:12AM 4 MR. TEBO: With that clarification, the
11:12AM 5 State only meant adoption in its plain meaning. So, if
11:12AM 6 that's their only objection, then we're fully satisfied
11:12AM 7 for adoption to be understood in its plain meaning.
11:12AM 8 THE COURT: Okay.
11:12AM 9 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And -- and, Your Honor,
11:12AM 10 I guess that's just -- again, understanding the
11:12AM 11 confusion here, the canvassing is not the adoption.
11:12AM 12 THE COURT: Right.
11:12AM 13 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Okay. I mean treating
11:13AM 14 it with its plain legal meaning, having -- in other
11:13AM 15 words, sustaining our objection, it will be given its --
11:13AM 16 its plain legal meaning then you're overruling the other
11:13AM 17 objections which are jurisdictionally based.
11:13AM 18 THE COURT: Yes, that is correct.
11:13AM 19 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 2 is entirely
11:13AM 20 jurisdictional objections. It's following a vote which
11:13AM 21 was the canvassing vote. It became operational by law
11:13AM 22 and --
11:13AM 23 THE COURT: And what is your objection to
11:13AM 24 that question?
11:13AM 25 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Our objections are
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0692 77
11:13AM 1 that -- are all on immunity and that whether or not the
11:13AM 2 ordinance became operational is not the -- is not the
11:13AM 3 actual relevant question. But those are all of our
11:13AM 4 jurisdictional arguments.
11:13AM 5 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the
11:13AM 6 objection.
11:13AM 7 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 3 are all
11:14AM 8 jurisdictional objections.
11:14AM 9 THE COURT: And I'm going to overrule the
11:14AM 10 objection.
11:14AM 11 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 4 includes the same
11:14AM 12 objection to the use of the term adopted, as we've
11:14AM 13 already discussed. Presuming Your Honor sustains that
11:14AM 14 objection, we may answer as to the properly understood
11:14AM 15 legal meaning, then the remaining objections are
11:14AM 16 jurisdictional.
11:14AM 17 THE COURT: That is correct.
11:14AM 18 MR. TEBO: Can I just, like, ask to
11:14AM 19 clarify?
11:14AM 20 THE COURT: Yes.
11:14AM 21 MR. TEBO: So defendants' objection was
11:14AM 22 that adoption was not being used in its plain meaning --
11:14AM 23 THE COURT: And so it --
11:14AM 24 MR. TEBO: -- and by that I understood its
11:14AM 25 colloquial meaning, not some sort of -- not any legal
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0693 78
11:14AM 1 definition of the term.
11:14AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I'm not adopting the
11:14AM 3 State's definition of adoption.
11:14AM 4 THE COURT: Correct.
11:14AM 5 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I'm not going to use
11:14AM 6 their definition. We'll use what we believe is a
11:15AM 7 correct legal definition.
11:15AM 8 THE COURT: Yes.
11:15AM 9 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 5 is all
11:15AM 10 jurisdictional objections.
11:15AM 11 Are those overruled?
11:15AM 12 THE COURT: Then I will overrule 5.
11:15AM 13 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 6, we have
11:15AM 14 jurisdictional objections as well as an objection to it
11:15AM 15 being vague and incomprehensible to the extent that it
11:15AM 16 uses the passive voice. They have been directed not to
11:15AM 17 cite or arrest individuals. Well, the citizens had an
11:15AM 18 initiative and voted on an ordinance and told the --
11:15AM 19 told the police what they wanted. Have been directed by
11:15AM 20 whom?
11:15AM 21 THE COURT: It said by -- oh, I see your --
11:15AM 22 so you're saying whether they had been directed by the
11:16AM 23 citizens --
11:16AM 24 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I'm -- I'm being a
11:16AM 25 little bit of a grammar nerd here, but it's an important
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0694 79
11:16AM 1 grammar nerd point, Your Honor.
11:16AM 2 THE COURT: I like grammar nerds.
11:16AM 3 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Only -- only the
11:16AM 4 relevant -- the defendants in this case are relevant.
11:16AM 5 If somebody sent in a demand letter to the police and
11:16AM 6 told them, "We passed this. You better not enforce."
11:16AM 7 If the citizens voted --
11:16AM 8 THE COURT: Well, what if -- what if the
11:16AM 9 police chief told the assistant police chief, "Go tell
11:16AM 10 your employees --"
11:16AM 11 MR. DE LA FUENTE: If -- if this was about
11:16AM 12 defendants had been directed by any defendant not to do
11:16AM 13 so, that would be a different request for admission.
11:16AM 14 MR. TEBO: I understand what Your Honor is
11:16AM 15 getting at. So, if the assistant police chief is not
11:16AM 16 defendant but still a control person within the City of
11:16AM 17 Denton, so we can just stipulate that we don't need the
11:16AM 18 citizen body of Denton with reference to RFA No. 6.
11:16AM 19 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Directed by any
11:16AM 20 defendant or at the direction of a defendant.
11:16AM 21 THE COURT: That works for me.
11:16AM 22 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Okay.
11:16AM 23 MR. TEBO: Your Honor is not narrowing
11:16AM 24 directed in RFA No. 6, it's just to the named defendants
11:17AM 25 though, but to the City of Denton, its employees, and
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0695 80
11:17AM 1 officers --
11:17AM 2 THE COURT: Yes, that would be --
11:17AM 3 MR. TEBO: -- inclusive --
11:17AM 4 THE COURT: -- correct.
11:17AM 5 MR. TEBO: -- inclusive of that. Okay.
11:17AM 6 THE COURT: But I would assume they would
11:17AM 7 do that under the direction of one of the defendants.
11:17AM 8 MR. TEBO: I understand, Your Honor. It
11:17AM 9 makes sense.
11:17AM 10 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 7, we do flat out
11:17AM 11 object. In addition to our jurisdictional objections,
11:17AM 12 that it seeks not an admission of fact but a legal
11:17AM 13 conclusion.
11:17AM 14 THE COURT: I'll sustain that objection.
11:17AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Numbers 8 and 9 are --
11:17AM 16 are similar. They are about misdemeanor levels of
11:17AM 17 marijuana, arrests having decreased, and misdemeanor
11:17AM 18 possession of paraphernalia having decreased. Our
11:17AM 19 objections are jurisdictional based on that.
11:18AM 20 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule those
11:18AM 21 objections.
11:18AM 22 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 10, I think all of
11:18AM 23 our objections here are jurisdictional.
11:18AM 24 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule your
11:18AM 25 objections to 10.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0696 81
11:18AM 1 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 11 is a little
11:18AM 2 trickier on the grammar. Admit that you received a
11:18AM 3 document or communication from the police department
11:18AM 4 that the marijuana ordinance has been implemented. It's
11:18AM 5 directed to multiple -- it's directed to, again, the
11:18AM 6 City. I don't --
11:19AM 7 THE COURT: And I'm going to overrule that
11:19AM 8 objection.
11:19AM 9 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 12, admit that you
11:19AM 10 directed the City of Denton Police Department not to use
11:19AM 11 the smell of marijuana for probable cause. To whom is
11:19AM 12 this directed?
11:19AM 13 THE COURT: I assume the City of Denton and
11:19AM 14 Jessica Robledo.
11:19AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Well, but it's not.
11:19AM 16 MS. SMITH: No. 12?
11:19AM 17 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 12?
11:19AM 18 MS. SMITH: Yes, it is.
11:19AM 19 MR. DE LA FUENTE: It is. Okay. Sorry.
11:19AM 20 THE COURT: So I will overrule 12.
11:19AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: 13, admit that employees
11:20AM 22 of the City of Denton Police Department have received
11:20AM 23 training on the marijuana ordinance.
11:20AM 24 THE COURT: I think that's fair also, so
11:20AM 25 I'm going to overrule that objection.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0697 82
11:20AM 1 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, can we get
11:20AM 2 some clarity as to, again, what the term training is? I
11:20AM 3 mean is that formal training by the police department?
11:20AM 4 Or is that, you read about the ordinance in the paper
11:20AM 5 and --
11:20AM 6 THE COURT: Well, that -- the paper would
11:20AM 7 not be training.
11:20AM 8 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I would hope not.
11:20AM 9 THE COURT: I don't know how the paper
11:20AM 10 would be training.
11:20AM 11 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Okay, Your Honor.
11:20AM 12 THE COURT: I assume that the police said,
11:20AM 13 "we're having a training," or your supervisor says,
11:20AM 14 "Today I'm going to tell you about how we are going to
11:20AM 15 smell marijuana." That would be training.
11:20AM 16 MS. SMITH: And just -- just for
11:20AM 17 clarification, kind of to your last point, Your Honor,
11:20AM 18 so the -- you know, today we're having a training, I
11:20AM 19 think that's clear. But if there's communication about
11:20AM 20 the citizen initiative, but it's not clear that it's
11:20AM 21 training, it's just communication about the fact that
11:21AM 22 the citizens have this vote, I guess how do we -- you
11:21AM 23 know, I don't know --
11:21AM 24 THE COURT: Well, I think that the term
11:21AM 25 training implies that this is how we are going to do
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0698 83
11:21AM 1 this, or this is how we do this. So --
11:21AM 2 MS. SMITH: So communication with
11:21AM 3 instruction?
11:21AM 4 THE COURT: -- just saying it's passed,
11:21AM 5 that does not -- that's not training. But if it says --
11:21AM 6 I would -- I would use the plain meaning of training.
11:21AM 7 MR. DE LA FUENTE: No. 14, admit that the
11:21AM 8 City of Denton City Council could change a City of
11:21AM 9 Denton policy relating to the implementation of the
11:21AM 10 marijuana ordinance. Fundamentally, it inquires into a
11:21AM 11 hypothetical, and it's not about an admission of fact
11:21AM 12 but a legal conclusion.
11:21AM 13 THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that
11:21AM 14 objection.
11:21AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And No. 15 is --
11:21AM 16 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, may I be heard on
11:21AM 17 RFA No. 14?
11:21AM 18 THE COURT: Yes.
11:21AM 19 MR. TEBO: So what it's asking is how the
11:22AM 20 city council understands its powers with respect to the
11:22AM 21 marijuana ballot initiative both before and after they
11:22AM 22 adopted it as an ordinance. I think that's fair game.
11:22AM 23 It's relevant to the jurisdiction. And it's something
11:22AM 24 that defendants would or are likely to know.
11:22AM 25 MR. DE LA FUENTE: What we believe we can
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0699 84
11:22AM 1 do has nothing to do with what we did.
11:22AM 2 THE COURT: And let me stop you. I'm going
11:22AM 3 to sustain objection No. 14.
11:22AM 4 MR. TEBO: Thank you, Your Honor.
11:22AM 5 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And No. 15 is -- is the
11:22AM 6 same question about the -- about the city manager. It's
11:22AM 7 the same thing.
11:22AM 8 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule No. 15.
11:22AM 9 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Even to the extent it
11:22AM 10 inquires into a hypothetical? I mean that's a straight
11:23AM 11 up improper RFA asking about a hypothetical.
11:23AM 12 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, respectfully,
11:23AM 13 neither of these RFAs inquiry about hypotheticals. They
11:23AM 14 ask what the powers of the city manager and city council
11:23AM 15 respectively are with respect to the marijuana
11:23AM 16 ordinance --
11:23AM 17 MR. DE LA FUENTE: That's not what they
11:23AM 18 ask.
11:23AM 19 MR. TEBO: -- what sort of action did they
11:23AM 20 take.
11:23AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: That's not what it asks.
11:23AM 22 MR. TEBO: It's about what they could do.
11:23AM 23 THE COURT: Okay. Hold on one moment. Let
11:23AM 24 me read it again.
11:23AM 25 I'm going to overrule that objection.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0700 85
11:23AM 1 I'm going to stay with what I initially said.
11:24AM 2 Okay. Exhibit --
11:24AM 3 MR. TEBO: To clarify, Your Honor, you're
11:24AM 4 overruling 15 but sustaining 14?
11:24AM 5 THE COURT: Yes.
11:24AM 6 MR. TEBO: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
11:24AM 7 THE COURT: And then what is the next thing
11:24AM 8 we need to go over?
11:24AM 9 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I think we need to go
11:24AM 10 over our motion to quash and motion for protection on
11:24AM 11 deposition notices which is Tab 5 of -- oh, I haven't
11:24AM 12 given you your paper notebook. I can.
11:24AM 13 THE COURT: I like paper.
11:24AM 14 MS. SMITH: I'll do it.
11:24AM 15 MR. TEBO: Could I clarify, Your Honor, in
11:24AM 16 granting the State's motion to compel, did you grant it
11:24AM 17 with respect to written discovery only, or also with
11:24AM 18 respect to the depositions that the State has requested?
11:24AM 19 THE COURT: Ask your question one more
11:25AM 20 time.
11:25AM 21 MR. TEBO: Absolutely, Your Honor.
11:25AM 22 So the Court granted the State's motion
11:25AM 23 to compel. The motion to compel seeks both written
11:25AM 24 discovery and six depositions of city council employees
11:25AM 25 and officials.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0701 86
11:25AM 1 THE COURT: And I am granting the motion to
11:25AM 2 compel for the depositions as well. However, if there
11:25AM 3 are specific objections that you wish to be heard, I
11:25AM 4 will take those up.
11:25AM 5 MR. TEBO: Thank you, Your Honor.
11:25AM 6 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And we do need to take
11:25AM 7 those up, Your Honor.
11:25AM 8 MS. SMITH: Your Honor, if I may approach
11:25AM 9 and give you this binder he left up here.
11:25AM 10 THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate it.
11:25AM 11 MS. SMITH: Thank you.
11:25AM 12 THE COURT: You said Tab 5?
11:25AM 13 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Yes, Your Honor. And
11:25AM 14 really you can -- on the first two pages you can kind of
11:25AM 15 get the list of the -- the witnesses they're seeking.
11:25AM 16 THE COURT: Uh-hum.
11:25AM 17 MR. DE LA FUENTE: There are two city
11:26AM 18 council members -- wait, yeah, two, two city council
11:26AM 19 members, the city manager, interim police chief, and two
11:26AM 20 police officers, a sergeant and lieutenant.
11:26AM 21 Your Honor, the first thing that we have
11:26AM 22 to take up is the two city council members. And,
11:26AM 23 Your Honor, we provided black letter authority, the City
11:26AM 24 Council of the City of Denton, of any city like it, can
11:26AM 25 only act as a whole. The individual thoughts of an
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0702 87
11:26AM 1 individual legislator are irrelevant as a matter of law
11:26AM 2 to the actions of the city council and the city as a
11:26AM 3 whole. Further, they are immune from discovery as to
11:26AM 4 their individual thought processes and actions.
11:26AM 5 And, Your Honor, I will tell you, this is
11:26AM 6 one on -- on which, if need be, the City would have
11:26AM 7 mandamus because city council members can never be
11:27AM 8 subjected to a deposition for -- for subject matter like
11:27AM 9 this. It would be utterly improper to depose city
11:27AM 10 council members from the word go. There's not a
11:27AM 11 relevant question that could be asked, and I would
11:27AM 12 challenge the State to say what one of those questions
11:27AM 13 would be that would make the fact of whether the City of
11:27AM 14 Denton, as a whole, the city council as a whole, adopted
11:27AM 15 any policy. No city council member has any individual
11:27AM 16 power.
11:27AM 17 THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Tebo?
11:27AM 18 MR. TEBO: Defendants assertion that
11:27AM 19 city -- the city council can only be questioned as a
11:27AM 20 body, as a collective body, rather than individual
11:27AM 21 members, there is no authority for that assertion. City
11:27AM 22 council members can be questioned about their acts as
11:27AM 23 officials. The State only wants to question them about
11:27AM 24 their acts as officials.
11:28AM 25 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor --
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0703 88
11:28AM 1 MR. TEBO: It is true that subjective
11:28AM 2 impressions, motivations, those are privileged.
11:28AM 3 THE COURT: Uh-hum.
11:28AM 4 MR. TEBO: The State is not going to ask
11:28AM 5 about those. If the State inadvertently does pose such
11:28AM 6 a question during a deposition, that would an
11:28AM 7 opportunity for a privilege assertion, and the
11:28AM 8 defendant's counsel would have the opportunity to assert
11:28AM 9 that privilege, and the State would respect that. So
11:28AM 10 we're not going to get into privileged territory with
11:28AM 11 respect to city council members. And, if we do, by
11:28AM 12 denying the motion to quash, the Court is not going to
11:28AM 13 vacate that privilege.
11:28AM 14 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor --
11:28AM 15 MR. TEBO: Instead --
11:28AM 16 THE COURT: Hold on one moment.
11:28AM 17 MR. TEBO: -- the State is going to ask the
11:28AM 18 two city council members about their actions with
11:28AM 19 respect to the ordinance and about the City's action
11:28AM 20 with respect to the ordinance. The city council
11:28AM 21 presides generally over the city government of Denton,
11:28AM 22 so they're in a position to know about all the actions
11:28AM 23 that the City has taken with respect to the marijuana
11:28AM 24 ordinance.
11:28AM 25 THE COURT: Why those two particular
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0704 89
11:29AM 1 sitting city councilmen versus --
11:29AM 2 MR. TEBO: Well --
11:29AM 3 THE COURT: -- all of them?
11:29AM 4 MR. TEBO: -- we thought it might be a
11:29AM 5 little onerous on defendants if we deposed each and
11:29AM 6 every city council member, but if Your Honor thinks that
11:29AM 7 that is the right way to do it then we --
11:29AM 8 THE COURT: I'm just trying to understand
11:29AM 9 why those two.
11:29AM 10 MR. TEBO: There's no special motivation.
11:29AM 11 We didn't single out -- single out those two. We picked
11:29AM 12 those two because we know that they were on the city
11:29AM 13 council when the ordinance vote was taken, the adoption
11:29AM 14 vote was taken.
11:29AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, Central
11:29AM 16 Power and Light vs. City of San Juan, I mean this is
11:29AM 17 long-standing law --
11:29AM 18 THE COURT: And can you --
11:29AM 19 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- a municipality's
11:29AM 20 intent --
11:29AM 21 THE COURT: Hold on one moment.
11:29AM 22 Can you show me a page? It looks like
11:29AM 23 you're looking, and so I want to look at what you are
11:29AM 24 reading as well.
11:29AM 25 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Page -- it's at Tab 5 --
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0705 90
11:29AM 1 THE COURT: Yes.
11:29AM 2 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- Page -- yeah, 8 to 9,
11:29AM 3 beginning at the bottom of Page 8 --
11:29AM 4 THE COURT: And then, if you would, just
11:29AM 5 speak slowly. Go ahead.
11:29AM 6 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Your Honor, it is black
11:30AM 7 letter that a municipality's intent is expressed solely
11:30AM 8 through the actions of a city council in opening
11:30AM 9 meetings in line with the open government laws in this
11:30AM 10 state. As Central Power and Light, likewise, I know I
11:30AM 11 briefed -- we briefed that point in our response to
11:30AM 12 their request -- the response to the motion to compel is
11:30AM 13 before the Court as well. I can give you a page on that
11:30AM 14 tab, if you would give me just a moment.
11:30AM 15 MR. TEBO: If I may jump in here --
11:30AM 16 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Here we go, Your Honor.
11:30AM 17 A better place to read is at Tab 12, and I'll give you a
11:30AM 18 moment to get there.
11:30AM 19 THE COURT: I'm there.
11:30AM 20 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Page 9, we have full
11:30AM 21 briefing. It is not consonant with our scheme of
11:31AM 22 government for a court to inquire into the motives of
11:31AM 23 legislators. The doctrine of legislative immunity
11:31AM 24 shields legislative actors.
11:31AM 25 THE COURT: You said Tab 12, Page 9?
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0706 91
11:31AM 1 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Yes, Your Honor. That's
11:31AM 2 a more detailed briefing.
11:31AM 3 THE COURT: Oh, sorry. I got it. There
11:31AM 4 was a couple of page nines. All right. I'm there.
11:31AM 5 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I mean this is
11:31AM 6 U.S. Supreme Court and Texas Supreme Court law. It is
11:31AM 7 not consonant with our scheme of government for a court
11:31AM 8 to inquire into the motives of legislators and,
11:31AM 9 specifically, citing In re: Perry. Legislative
11:31AM 10 immunity shields legislator actors not only from
11:31AM 11 liability, but also from being required to testify about
11:31AM 12 their legislative activities.
11:31AM 13 The only activities city council members
11:31AM 14 have is legislative activities. They cannot testify as
11:31AM 15 to what the council did. The council acted only in a
11:31AM 16 vote. They are not competent to testify as to anything
11:32AM 17 else. There's no relevant knowledge they could have.
11:32AM 18 And this is -- I mean it would be text impropriety to
11:32AM 19 require a city council member, two, six, eight, however
11:32AM 20 many you want, to testify about their legislative
11:32AM 21 activities. The legislative -- the action of the city
11:32AM 22 council is reflected in votes of the city council in
11:32AM 23 open meetings. And there's a period at the end of that
11:32AM 24 sentence as a matter of law.
11:32AM 25 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Tebo?
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0707 92
11:32AM 1 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, counsel is
11:32AM 2 misreading these cases. It is true that the State
11:32AM 3 cannot -- or that the subjective motives of city council
11:32AM 4 members cannot be inquired into without raising
11:32AM 5 privilege concerns. The State doesn't dispute that.
11:32AM 6 We're not going to -- we're going to try to avoid those
11:32AM 7 questions. But the idea that individual council members
11:32AM 8 can't testify about decisions that the City took, that
11:32AM 9 has no basis in law, and it's just spatially a little
11:32AM 10 difficult to swallow --
11:33AM 11 THE COURT: Help me --
11:33AM 12 MR. TEBO: -- there are city council --
11:33AM 13 THE COURT: Help me understand what one
11:33AM 14 question would be.
11:33AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: What objective fact --
11:33AM 16 THE COURT: Hold on.
11:33AM 17 MR. TEBO: We're going to ask -- we're
11:33AM 18 going to ask both city council members about actions
11:33AM 19 that the City has taken with respect to the marijuana
11:33AM 20 ordinance --
11:33AM 21 THE COURT: But give me an example of a
11:33AM 22 question. And if you --
11:33AM 23 MR. TEBO: How has --
11:33AM 24 THE COURT: -- you can take a minute.
11:33AM 25 MR. TEBO: -- how has City policy changed
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0708 93
11:33AM 1 after November 22nd, 2022, in light of marijuana
11:33AM 2 ordinance? That's number one. Number two, we'd like to
11:33AM 3 ask Council Member Beck, in particular, it escaped my
11:33AM 4 memory a second ago, Your Honor, him, in particular,
11:33AM 5 about some of the statements that he has made about
11:33AM 6 marijuana policy in the City following the ordinance.
11:33AM 7 He is -- he is one of the City officials who has said
11:33AM 8 that, following adoption of the ordinance, the City has
11:33AM 9 a policy that is inconsistent with local government
11:34AM 10 370.003. He said that in public.
11:34AM 11 THE COURT: Yeah. So -- and that's my
11:34AM 12 question. If he has said it in public, and we know he
11:34AM 13 said it, then what is the point of the deposition?
11:34AM 14 MR. TEBO: Well, we -- we want to
11:34AM 15 understand exactly what he means by that. We want to
11:34AM 16 understand if that's still the case today because he
11:34AM 17 made that statement, I think, half a year ago, and we
11:34AM 18 want to know why he made that statement. What actions
11:34AM 19 of the City justify his assertion that the City is now
11:34AM 20 in violation of state law.
11:34AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: That's all subjective
11:34AM 22 belief --
11:34AM 23 MR. TEBO: That's not subjective.
11:34AM 24 MR. DE LA FUENTE: -- and --
11:34AM 25 THE COURT: Hold on. I don't need any
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0709 94
11:34AM 1 argument.
11:34AM 2 MR. TEBO: Of course, Your Honor. We're
11:34AM 3 asking about acts that he knows about.
11:34AM 4 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Any individual
11:34AM 5 legislator could be right or wrong. They don't set the
11:34AM 6 policy. Only the council by the vote does.
11:34AM 7 THE COURT: No, I understand the argument.
11:35AM 8 I understand the argument. And I am trying to see in my
11:35AM 9 mind if there are questions that they can ask and so
11:35AM 10 give me a moment.
11:35AM 11 MR. TEBO: Your Honor, if I could just put
11:35AM 12 it this way?
11:35AM 13 THE COURT: Okay.
11:35AM 14 MR. TEBO: Even if it's true, if the city
11:35AM 15 council collectively as the body sets policy, the
11:35AM 16 council members individually know about that policy by
11:35AM 17 virtue of being on the council.
11:35AM 18 THE COURT: And I am going to sustain the
11:35AM 19 objection as to -- as to the two city council members.
11:35AM 20 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And, Your Honor, then
11:35AM 21 that takes us to the city manager.
11:35AM 22 THE COURT: And I'm going to overrule the
11:35AM 23 objection as to the city manager.
11:35AM 24 MR. DE LA FUENTE: May we have some
11:35AM 25 direction and limitation from the Court? Because I will
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0710 95
11:35AM 1 tell you, this is my concern, much of the written
11:35AM 2 discovery already is full case discovery, and we -- we
11:35AM 3 strongly believe goes beyond any jurisdictional fact.
11:36AM 4 THE COURT: Right.
11:36AM 5 MR. DE LA FUENTE: A deposition with no
11:36AM 6 limitation would be equally improper. On what -- what
11:36AM 7 subject matter may the city manager be deposed? I mean
11:36AM 8 the question is whether the City has adopted a policy.
11:36AM 9 And I -- I mean, from the nature of the very inquiries
11:36AM 10 in written discovery, I expect a full-ranging deposition
11:36AM 11 which will be well beyond the bonds of jurisdictional
11:36AM 12 facts. The State needs to present which jurisdictional
11:36AM 13 facts it wants to inquire about, and it should be
11:36AM 14 limited to only a jurisdictional fact deposition.
11:36AM 15 That's not what's been noticed.
11:36AM 16 THE COURT: And I understand. Okay. So
11:36AM 17 help me understand. Mr. Tebo, are you limiting the
11:36AM 18 depositions to jurisdictional facts?
11:36AM 19 MR. TEBO: That's right, Your Honor. After
11:36AM 20 written discovery is gone and done, we will frame the
11:36AM 21 topics that we would like to -- we will work up the
11:36AM 22 topics that we would like to inquire into during these
11:36AM 23 depositions. They will all be with respect to
11:37AM 24 jurisdictional facts.
11:37AM 25 THE COURT: And so is --
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0711 96
11:37AM 1 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I mean it's the
11:37AM 2 tautology. I don't know what they think the
11:37AM 3 jurisdictional facts are going to be.
11:37AM 4 THE COURT: Well, I'm sure they don't know
11:37AM 5 at this time either. They haven't gotten the discovery.
11:37AM 6 MR. DE LA FUENTE: And so, Your Honor --
11:37AM 7 THE COURT: And so the other thing we can
11:37AM 8 do is perhaps carry the motion to quash until after the
11:37AM 9 written discovery has been concluded, and then we could
11:37AM 10 see if there are topics for which we can limit the
11:37AM 11 deposition.
11:37AM 12 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I think that would be
11:37AM 13 highly appropriate, Your Honor.
11:37AM 14 THE COURT: Okay.
11:37AM 15 MR. TEBO: Is Your Honor suggesting that
11:37AM 16 the State purpose a list of topics in advance of these
11:37AM 17 depositions?
11:37AM 18 THE COURT: What I'm saying is after
11:37AM 19 written discovery is complete --
11:37AM 20 MR. TEBO: Okay.
11:37AM 21 THE COURT: -- and then we can take up the
11:37AM 22 motion to quash at that time, and then we can discuss
11:37AM 23 whether or not the -- after you are better prepared for
11:37AM 24 what information you have found with related to
11:37AM 25 jurisdiction and what topics would be appropriate for a
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0712 97
11:37AM 1 deposition.
11:37AM 2 MR. TEBO: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
11:38AM 3 MR. DE LA FUENTE: I think that addresses
11:38AM 4 the matters before the Court. We would -- we do think
11:38AM 5 there's a basis to take up --
11:38AM 6 May I have a moment?
11:38AM 7 THE COURT: Of course, yes.
11:38AM 8 MR. DE LA FUENTE: We do think there are
11:38AM 9 some arguments based on the plea to the jurisdiction
11:38AM 10 that are just legal issues that could be taken up, and
11:38AM 11 the Court could rule on portions of the plea to the
11:38AM 12 jurisdiction today.
11:38AM 13 THE COURT: I am not going to do that
11:38AM 14 today. I'm going to take that up after discovery is --
11:38AM 15 the jurisdictional discovery is complete so that we can
11:38AM 16 then take up everything at once.
11:38AM 17 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Okay. With respect to
11:38AM 18 the -- the orders on the written discovery, at this
11:38AM 19 point, I do think, in the interest of the City having
11:39AM 20 clarity and what is expected of it, if the parties could
11:39AM 21 confer and prepare a written order for the Court that
11:39AM 22 would be most helpful while we've done our best job
11:39AM 23 taking notes today.
11:39AM 24 THE COURT: I think that is -- I would
11:39AM 25 expect no less.
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0713 98
11:39AM 1 MR. DE LA FUENTE: As long as there's an
11:39AM 2 understanding, Your Honor, that the parties have the
11:39AM 3 opportunity to confer regarding an order and present it
11:39AM 4 to Your Honor for signature?
11:39AM 5 THE COURT: Of course, yes, please.
11:39AM 6 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Okay. Thank you.
11:39AM 7 THE COURT: Anything further to take up
11:39AM 8 today?
11:39AM 9 MR. TEBO: Could I clarify Your Honor's
11:39AM 10 ruling on the motion to quash. You're carrying the
11:39AM 11 entire motion --
11:39AM 12 THE COURT: Yes, I am.
11:39AM 13 MR. TEBO: -- with regard to all six --
11:39AM 14 THE COURT: I am.
11:39AM 15 MR. TEBO: -- depositions?
11:39AM 16 Okay. Thank you.
11:39AM 17 THE COURT: And then we'll go over it
11:39AM 18 again.
11:39AM 19 MR. TEBO: Okay. I understand. I
11:39AM 20 appreciate it. Thank you.
11:39AM 21 MR. DE LA FUENTE: One more, Your Honor,
11:40AM 22 please.
11:40AM 23 MS. SMITH: I do have a question,
11:40AM 24 Your Honor. Just now you talked about the motion to
11:40AM 25 quash. You had already sustained our objection as to
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0714 99
11:40AM 1 the two individual council members.
11:40AM 2 THE COURT: I did, and that will be subject
11:40AM 3 to reconsideration if they find something out in written
11:40AM 4 discovery that they want to bring to my attention. I
11:40AM 5 don't suspect that the ruling would change. However, I
11:40AM 6 will be happy to take up the whole motion together.
11:40AM 7 MS. SMITH: Okay. So you -- so you are
11:40AM 8 still -- you still are holding by ruling but subject to
11:40AM 9 reconsideration?
11:40AM 10 THE COURT: Yes.
11:40AM 11 MR. DE LA FUENTE: That's all we needed to
11:40AM 12 clarify.
11:40AM 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you all. I
11:40AM 14 appreciate you.
11:40AM 15 MR. DE LA FUENTE: Thank you, Your Honor.
11:40AM 16 THE COURT: We're off the record.
11:40AM 17 (Proceedings concluded at 11:40 a.m.)
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0715 100
COUNTY OF DENTON ) 3
4 I, Kristin M. Anderson, Official Court
5 Reporter in and for the 481st Judicial District Court,
6 Denton County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that
7 the above and foregoing contains a true and correct
8 transcription of all portions of evidence and other
9 proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the
10 parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's
11 Record, in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of
12 which occurred in open court or in chambers and were
13 reported by me.
14 I further certify that this Reporter's
15 Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects
16 the exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective
17 parties.
18 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND this the 7th day
19 of January, 2025.
21 s / K r i s t i n M. A n d e r s o n _ Kristin M. Anderson, Texas CSR #9351 22 Expiration Date: 10/31/2025 Official Court Reporter 23 Denton County Courthouse 481st Judicial District Court 24 1450 E. McKinney Street, 4th Floor Denton, Texas 76209 25 940-349-2272 kristin.anderson@dentoncounty.gov
Kristin M. Anderson, CSR, RPR, FCRR MR 0716
In Re City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee and Chris Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley, City Manager of Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton, in Their Official Capacities v. the State of Texas (In Re City of Denton, Gerard Hudspeth, Mayor of Denton, Brian Beck, Mayor Pro Tem of Denton, Vicki Byrd, Paul Meltzer, Joe Holland, Brandon Chase McGee and Chris Watts, Members of the City Council of Denton, Sara Hensley, City Manager of Denton, and Doug Shoemaker, Chief of Police of Denton, in Their Official Capacities v. the State of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.