MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2021 ME 36 Docket: Ken-20-279 Submitted On Briefs: May 19, 2021 Decided: July 8, 2021
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.
IN RE CHILDREN OF KACEE S.
HORTON, J.
[¶1] Kacee S. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Waterville,
Dow, J.) terminating her parental rights to her four children and from an order
of the court denying her motion for relief from the judgment, see M.R. Civ.
P. 60(b). She contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at
both the trial phase and the post-judgment phase of the case and that the trial
court abused its discretion when it (1) denied the father’s motion to continue
the termination of parental rights hearing despite the mother’s unexplained
absence and (2) determined that termination of the mother’s parental rights
was in the children’s best interests. We conclude that the mother has made a
prima facie showing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at the
trial phase and post-judgment phase of the case, vacate the court’s denial of her 2
second motion for relief from the judgment, and remand for further
proceedings on the motion consistent with this order.1
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts and procedural history are drawn from the
procedural record and the court’s findings after the contested termination
hearing, all of which are supported by competent record evidence. See In re
Child of Radience K., 2019 ME 73, ¶ 2, 208 A.3d 380.
[¶3] The Department of Health and Human Services initiated this case in
September 2019, when it filed its petition for a child protection order and
preliminary protection order against the mother and father as to their four
children.2 The court (Montgomery, J.) entered an order of preliminary
protection that day, placing the children in the Department’s custody. The
court next held a summary preliminary hearing. The mother appeared, waived
1 Based on the present record, we disagree with the mother’s other contentions on appeal. Assuming, without deciding, that the mother has standing to appeal the denial of the father’s motion to continue the hearing, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, considering that the father was seeking a continuance of indefinite duration so that he could “prove himself.” See In re J.B., 2015 ME 25, ¶ 5, 112 A.3d 369 (“We review a court’s decision to deny a motion to continue for abuse of discretion.”). Nor did the court clearly err in making any of its findings underlying its best interest determination. See In re B.C., 2012 ME 140, ¶ 11, 58 A.3d 1118. The court admitted several of the Department’s exhibits and heard testimony from the Department’s witnesses. The failure of the mother’s trial counsel to challenge the Department’s evidence or submit evidence on the mother’s behalf may bear on the mother’s ineffective assistance claim, but the record before us supports the trial court’s findings. See id.
The father consented to termination of his parental rights at the termination hearing and takes 2
no part in this appeal. 3
her right to the hearing, and consented to the entry of the preliminary order.
The court (Stanfill, J.) held a jeopardy hearing at which the mother again
appeared and agreed to the entry of a jeopardy order against her as to all four
children. In June 2020, the Department filed a petition for termination of the
mother’s and father’s parental rights. The mother was served in hand with
notice pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4053 (2021) that the Department had filed the
petition, but the notice did not contain the date of the termination hearing. The
date and time of the hearing was set later by the court and was provided to the
mother’s trial counsel.
[¶4] On September 16, 2020, the court (Dow, J.) held a hearing on the
Department’s termination petition. Although the mother had appeared at court
for the two previous hearings in the case, she did not appear for the termination
hearing. Trial counsel was also absent when the hearing began. The father—
who, at the time, was incarcerated and scheduled to be released in three and a
half months—and his counsel appeared on time. Initially, the father indicated
that he was contesting the petition. However, after a colloquy with the court
about his choice to contest or consent to termination, the father, through his
counsel, requested a continuance so that he could “prove himself” after his 4
release from imprisonment. The Department and the guardian ad litem both
objected to a continuance.
[¶5] It was only then that the mother’s trial counsel came into the
courtroom. He said that he was late because he thought the hearing had been
continued. Although his client was absent and he plainly was not ready to
proceed, he did not join in the father’s motion to continue nor did he make his
own motion to continue or otherwise object to the hearing proceeding without
his client. He told the court that he had notified his client of the hearing date
but failed to point out that his client had appeared at both previous hearings.
[¶6] The court denied the father’s motion to continue and declared a
recess to enable the father to meet with his attorney and to decide whether to
contest or consent to termination. After the recess, the father consented to the
termination of his parental rights.
[¶7] The court then commenced an evidentiary hearing on the
Department’s petition as to the mother. The Department’s only witnesses were
the Department’s permanency caseworker assigned to the case and the
guardian ad litem. Trial counsel’s cross-examination consisted of six questions
to the caseworker and none to the guardian ad litem. After the Department
rested, trial counsel presented no evidence on the mother’s behalf. However, 5
he did tell the court that he had sent a text to the mother that the hearing had
begun and that the mother had not responded. At no time did trial counsel
request that the record remain open for a limited time so that he could speak
with his client and determine whether she had any evidence to present.
[¶8] The court did not invite closing argument, and trial counsel did not
request an opportunity to present it. Instead, the court stated on the record its
findings by clear and convincing evidence that the Department had proved all
four statutory criteria for parental unfitness. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)
(2021). It next determined that termination of the mother’s parental rights was
in the children’s best interests. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) (2021). The
court entered a judgment terminating her parental rights as to the four
children. Because the termination of the mother’s parental rights was
involuntary, a byproduct of the court’s judgment is that she will be subject to
an “aggravating factor” in any future child protection proceeding involving her
child. See 22 M.R.S. § 4002(1-B)(C) (2021); see also 22 M.R.S. §§ 4034(4),
4036-B(3), 4041(2)(A-2)(1), 4052(2-A)(B) (2021). The mother timely
appealed from the judgment. See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2021); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
[¶9] After filing the notice of appeal, trial counsel moved to withdraw
from the case, and interim counsel was appointed to represent the mother. 6
Interim counsel filed a combined motion for relief from judgment, pursuant to
M.R. Civ. P. 60(b), and to set aside default, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P 55(c).3
Although the Rule 60(b) motion did not expressly assert a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel at the trial phase, it recited the same list of alleged
shortcomings in trial counsel’s performance that the mother relies on in her
ineffective assistance claim before us. However, the motion contained no
supporting affidavit, meaning that even if it had expressly asserted an
ineffective assistance claim, it was still facially deficient. See In re Tyrel L.,
2017 ME 212, ¶ 10, 172 A.3d 916. The court denied the motion.
[¶10] Interim counsel then moved for further findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the court’s denial of the motion. See M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).4
Before the court could rule on her Rule 52(b) motion, the mother filed a notice
of appeal of the judgment denying her Rule 60(b) motion. See 22 M.R.S. § 4006.
The court granted the Rule 52(b) motion, stating only that “the mother’s
[Rule 60(b)] motion was denied for the reasons stated in the Department’s . . .
Response.”
3Because the mother had already appealed the judgment, interim counsel filed a motion here requesting that the appeal be stayed pending disposition of the combined motion. We granted the motion and proceedings resumed before the trial court. 4The court did not take evidence in connection with its denial of the M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, so the M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) motion was not appropriate. 7
[¶11] Next, interim counsel moved to withdraw. We granted interim
counsel’s motion, appointed appellate counsel, and consolidated the appeal of
the original termination judgment with the appeal of the denial of the
Rule 60(b) motion. Appellate counsel filed in the trial court a second Rule 60(b)
motion for relief from judgment. This motion expressly alleged ineffective
assistance of trial counsel and added an ineffective assistance claim as to the
mother’s interim counsel. It also included the required affidavit. See In re M.P.,
2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 19, 21, 126 A.3d 718. Appellate counsel also asked that we
enlarge the briefing period for the consolidated appeal. See M.R. App. P. 10(a).
We permitted the trial court to act on the mother’s pending motion and directed
that the appeal proceed thereafter. The trial court has subsequently denied the
second motion as untimely in light of the deadline that we established in In re
M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 20, 126 A.3d 718.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Availability of Review
[¶12] The mother argues that she received ineffective assistance of
counsel at both the trial and post-judgment phases of her case. Before we can
address the mother’s claim with regard to either stage, we must determine
whether it is properly before us. We have articulated a specific procedure by 8
which a parent can bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a
termination case. Id. ¶¶ 19-21 & n.5. If a parent wishes to make a claim of
ineffective assistance without relying on evidence extrinsic to the trial court
record, the parent may do so via an appeal directly from the termination
judgment. In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶ 6, 144 A.2d 50. But “if the basis for
the parent’s ineffectiveness challenge is not clear from the existing record . . . ,
the parent must promptly move for relief from a judgment terminating his or
her parental rights . . . .” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In both circumstances,
the parent “must execute and file an affidavit stating, with specificity, the basis
for the claim.” Id. ¶ 7 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶13] An affidavit filed on direct appeal “must not contain information
that is extrinsic to the existing record.” Id. If a parent claims ineffective
assistance through a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, the parent
“must file an affidavit setting out the extrinsic information underlying the
claim.” Id. ¶ 8. Such a motion allows the trial court to “make a prompt
preliminary determination of whether to allow the parties to present additional
testimony if a party makes such a request, and then to promptly decide the
ineffectiveness claim based on a proper record.” Id. 9
[¶14] Here, the mother’s ineffective assistance claim relies on matters
both within and outside the trial court record—what she labels as deficiencies
in her trial counsel’s performance as revealed in the trial transcript, and also
what she asserts are his out-of-court failures to counsel her, prepare for trial,
and give her notice of the hearing date. However, her initial Rule 60(b) motion
did not expressly assert an ineffectiveness claim, although it alleged the
substantive elements of ineffective assistance. Moreover, the initial Rule 60(b)
motion failed to include an affidavit. The mother has since corrected those
deficiencies, but not within the time frames we have said must be observed. In
In re M.P., we said that the parent should file the Rule 60(b) motion and affidavit
asserting an ineffectiveness claim within twenty-one days after the expiration
of the period for appealing the judgment. 2015 ME 138, ¶ 20, 126 A.3d 718. In
other words, the mother’s first Rule 60(b) motion was timely but not in proper
form, and her second was in proper form but not timely.
[¶15] Because parents are entitled to due process, however, and because
“[d]ue process is a flexible concept that we analyze in the context of the
particular situation at hand,” Adoption by Jessica M., 2020 ME 118, ¶ 9,
239 A.3d 633 (quotation marks omitted), our decision in In re M.P. left open the
possibility that, “in exceptional and unusual circumstances, a parent may move 10
for relief pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) outside of [the twenty-one-day]
period.” 2015 ME 138, ¶ 20 n.4, 126 A.3d 718.
[¶16] This case presents such exceptional and unusual circumstances. It
would be a strange system of justice that allowed a parent’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding one attorney to be stymied because another
attorney rendered ineffective assistance in asserting the claim. We implicitly
recognized that point in In re Aliyah M., in which the appellant parent failed to
submit an affidavit in connection with her ineffectiveness claim. 2016 ME 106,
¶ 10, 144 A.3d 50. Despite her failure to present the claim properly, we went
on to evaluate her counsel’s performance in detail, and we decided that “[e]ven
if the mother had presented her claim of ineffective representation in a
procedurally proper way, her contention would be unavailing.” Id. ¶ 11.
[¶17] In light of the extraordinary circumstances of this case, we
conclude that the mother’s ineffectiveness claim is timely5 and properly before
us for review and therefore turn to the question of whether she has made a
5Key to our conclusion is the fact that the mother has moved expeditiously, albeit not always effectively, at every phase—her notice of appeal was timely, her first Rule 60(b) motion was timely but incomplete, and she took corrective action in the form of a revised motion without undue delay. Unlike the appellant in Aliyah M., who never presented an affidavit in support of her ineffectiveness claim, either in the trial court or on appeal, see 2016 ME 106, ¶ 10, 144 A.3d 50, the mother in this case has promptly cured her interim counsel’s defective motion by filing the required affidavit with her curative Rule 60(b) motion. Time is of the essence in child protection proceedings, and, had the mother failed to pursue her ineffectiveness claim with diligence and alacrity, we might well have come to a different conclusion. 11
prima facie showing of ineffective assistance so as to enable her claim to
proceed to a hearing before the trial court.
B. Standard of Review
[¶18] The right of parenthood is fundamental. Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000). The Due Process Clauses of the United States and
Maine Constitutions, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A, protect a
parent’s “right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
[his or] her children.” In re Children of Bethmarie R., 2018 ME 96, ¶ 23,
189 A.3d 252 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the
trial court must ensure that a parent facing termination of his or her parental
rights has a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Adoption by Jessica M.,
2020 ME 118, ¶ 12, 239 A.3d 633.
[¶19] “A parent alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in a child
protection case has the burden to show that (1) counsel’s performance was
deficient, i.e., that there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or
inattention of counsel amounting to performance below what might be
expected from an ordinary fallible attorney; and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the parent’s interests at stake in the termination proceeding to the
extent that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” In re 12
Children of Jeremy A., 2018 ME 82, ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602 (alteration omitted)
(quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the mother must overcome “a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
Our review is to determine “whether the evidence in that record creates a
prima facie showing of ineffectiveness.” In re Tyrel L., 2017 ME 212, ¶ 8,
172 A.3d 916 (quotation marks omitted) (noting that an ineffectiveness claim
must be based on the existing record).
[¶20] Counsel’s tactics and strategy are entitled to “substantially
heightened deference.” Pineo v. State, 2006 ME 119, ¶ 16, 908 A.2d 632.
Counsel’s performance is not deficient if the record reflects a flawed but
ultimately understandable trial strategy. See, e.g., In re Child of Kimberlee C.,
2018 ME 134, ¶ 6, 194 A.3d 925 (citing, as proof of counsel’s effective
assistance, that counsel made numerous objections, presented evidence, and
conducted a “rigorous[] cross-examin[ation]” of the Department’s witnesses);
Levesque v. State, 664 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995) (holding that, where a
defendant was not “deprived of an otherwise available substantial ground of
defense,” counsel was effective pursuant to the Strickland standard). Rather, 13
the performance must be “manifestly unreasonable.” Pineo, 2006 ME 119, ¶ 13,
908 A.2d 632.
[¶21] Because the trial court has not addressed the mother’s
ineffectiveness claim, our task is to determine whether the mother has made a
prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to justify a
remand to the trial court for a hearing on the claim. See In re Tyrel L.,
2017 ME 212, ¶ 8, 172 A.3d 916.
C. Claim of Ineffective Assistance in the Trial Phase
[¶22] We address the mother’s claim of ineffective assistance at the trial
phase first because if the mother cannot make a prima facie showing of
ineffectiveness on the part of her trial counsel, any ineffectiveness on the part
of her interim counsel becomes irrelevant.
[¶23] As to her trial counsel, the mother’s ineffectiveness claim relies on
both matters within the trial record and extrinsic matters. She contends that
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to (1) advise her of her
options regarding voluntary termination; (2) ensure that she had actual notice
of the termination hearing; and (3) prepare for the hearing, object to the
hearing proceeding in her absence, or present any defense on her behalf. 14
[¶24] The mother highlights trial counsel’s failure to advise her of the
opportunity to consent to the termination of her parental rights as evidence
that she was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. She contends that
trial counsel never told her that this was an option, though she points to no
evidence in the existing trial court record to support her claim. See In re Tyrel L.,
2017 ME 212, ¶ 11, 172 A.3d 916. However, had she attended the hearing, she
would have witnessed the colloquy between the court and the father about his
choice of contesting or consenting to termination. That colloquy included
discussion of the aggravating factor that results from involuntary termination.
It follows that, had she participated in the hearing, she could have engaged in a
similar colloquy.
[¶25] Another aspect of the mother’s ineffectiveness claim that relies on
extrinsic facts is her contention that trial counsel failed to notify her of the date
and time of the termination hearing. The court found only that she was served
in hand with notice of the termination petition. The mother contends that she
missed the hearing because trial counsel—who had received notice of the date
and time of the hearing—failed to provide her with that information. Cf. In re
Child of Haley L., 2019 ME 108, ¶ 18 & n.6, 211 A.3d 1148 (stating that notice of
the scheduled time for a hearing need only be served upon counsel and that the 15
mother’s appearance at the hearing is proof enough that counsel provided her
with actual notice).
[¶26] Though the mother relies mostly on extrinsic evidence to support
her argument that she was never provided with actual notice of the hearing, see
supra ¶¶ 23, 25, the existing record does provide some support for her
assertions. First, the mother appeared for both her summary preliminary
hearing and her jeopardy hearing. Next, the transcript reflects that trial counsel
appeared well after the hearing began and claimed that he believed the matter
had been continued.6
[¶27] The mother also relies on what she labels as her trial counsel’s
failures of advocacy before and during the hearing. Specifically, she notes that
trial counsel never submitted a witness or exhibit list, presented no evidence,
called no witnesses, and offered no closing argument, and that his only effort at
defending her parental rights consisted of a cursory cross-examination of the
Department’s caseworker and an objection to one question. Cf. In re Child of
Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 6, 194 A.3d 925. Trial counsel’s lack of
6 His decision not to join the father’s motion to continue is made all the more puzzling based on this revelation. 16
participation in the hearing left the Department’s narrative entirely
unchallenged.
[¶28] The mother contends—with support in the record—that by
neither joining in the father’s motion to continue nor making his own motion,
trial counsel did not advocate at all for his client’s “meaningful opportunity to
be heard.” In re G.W., 2014 ME 30, ¶ 7, 86 A.3d 1228; cf. In re Child of James R.,
2018 ME 50, ¶ 17, 182 A.3d 1252 (“In termination cases, . . . due process
requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce
evidence and present witnesses, [and] the right to respond to claims and
evidence . . . .”) (quotation marks omitted). Although we defer to counsel’s trial
strategy when assessing an ineffectiveness claim, the mother’s trial counsel
does not appear to have employed any trial strategy. See Pineo, 2006 ME 119,
¶ 16, 908 A.2d 632.
[¶29] For these reasons, we conclude without hesitation that the mother
has made at least a prima facie showing that her trial counsel’s performance fell
below the standard for an “ordinary fallible attorney” and was manifestly
unreasonable. In re Children of Jeremy A., 2018 ME 82, ¶¶ 21, 24, 187 A.3d 602
(quotation marks omitted). 17
D. Prejudice at the Termination Phase
[¶30] The prejudice element of an ineffectiveness claim requires the
court to “determine if there is a reasonable probability that the ineffectiveness
resulted in a different outcome—meaning, whether ineffective assistance of
counsel rose to the level of compromising the reliability of the judgment and
undermining confidence in it.”7 Id. ¶ 21 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks
omitted). For purposes of her appeal, it is the mother’s burden to make a
prima facie showing that the “errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect
on the defense.” Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 14, 125 A.3d 1163
(alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶31] It is not clear from the record whether the mother can credibly
contend that trial counsel’s substandard performance deprived her of the
opportunity to avoid termination of her parental rights. What is clear is that
7 There exists an exception to the Strickland standard in circumstances where counsel’s performance is deemed so egregiously deficient that prejudice is presumed. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). “In Cronic, the Court identified three specific circumstances that warranted the presumption. The first and most obvious is a complete denial of counsel at a critical stage. The second occurs if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. And, the third occurs when the circumstances are such that even a fully competent attorney, could not provide effective assistance of counsel.” Fusi v. O’Brien, 621 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (alterations omitted) (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). “In cases where counsel’s ineffectiveness amounts to the constructive denial of the assistance of counsel, prejudice is legally presumed and need not be affirmatively proved.” Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 17, 125 A.3d 1163 (quotation marks omitted). We have not applied the Cronic standard in the parental rights context, nor does this case require us to decide whether to do so, because the mother has met her burden to make a prima facie showing that counsel’s deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice. See In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 25, 126 A.3d 718. 18
her absence from the hearing deprived her of the opportunity to choose to
consent to termination and avoid incurring an aggravating factor. Cf. In re
Children of Jeremy A., 2018 ME 82, ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602. For a parent to incur an
aggravating factor is not a trivial consequence. Among other things, it means
that, if another child of the parent is the subject of a child protection proceeding,
the court may relieve the Department of the duty to make reasonable efforts to
prevent the removal of the child from the home, 22 M.R.S. § 4036-B(3), and may
relieve the Department of its obligation to attempt reunification between the
child and the parent, 22 M.R.S. § 4041(2)(A-2)(1).
[¶32] Because the record indicates that trial counsel did not advocate for
his client at the hearing and that the mother incurred an aggravating factor, we
conclude that she has made a prima facie showing that the deficiencies in her
trial counsel’s performance undermine faith in the reliability of the judgment.
See In re Children of Jeremy A., 2018 ME 82, ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602.
E. Claim of Ineffective Assistance in the Post-Judgment Phase
[¶33] The mother argues that interim counsel’s assistance was
ineffective because interim counsel’s Rule 60(b) motion did not properly
present the claim of ineffective assistance by trial counsel. 19
[¶34] Interim counsel completed three tasks during her participation in
this case: she filed a Rule 60(b) motion, a motion for further findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and a notice of appeal of the denial of her Rule 60(b) motion.
The Rule 60(b) motion did not include an affidavit setting forth the basis of an
ineffectiveness claim as to trial counsel, thereby virtually guaranteeing that it
would be denied. See In re Tyrel L., 2017 ME 212, ¶ 10, 172 A.3d 916. Given
interim counsel’s extremely limited role in this case, this crucial mistake
undoubtedly constitutes prima facie evidence of performance below “what
might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney.” In re Children of
Jeremy A., 2018 ME 82, ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602; cf. In re Tyrel L., 2017 ME 212, ¶ 10,
172 A.3d 916 (stating that a parent’s failure to submit a signed and sworn
affidavit “alone is a sufficient basis for us to decline to remand the
ineffectiveness claim to the trial court”).
F. Prejudice at the Post-Judgment Phase
[¶35] Interim counsel’s mistake prevented the trial court from reaching
the merits of the mother’s initial Rule 60(b) motion. Had the motion been in
proper form, the court would have held an evidentiary hearing. See In re M.P.,
2015 ME 138, ¶ 12, 126 A.3d 718. 20
[¶36] Interim counsel’s performance therefore deprived the mother of
the opportunity to be heard on her ineffectiveness claim against trial counsel,
such that we cannot trust the process below as having produced a just result.
See In re Children of Jeremy A., 2018 ME 82, ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602. We conclude
that the mother has made a sufficient showing of prejudice resulting from
ineffectiveness on the part of her interim counsel.
CONCLUSION
[¶37] Based on the mother’s prima facie showing of ineffective
assistance of counsel at both the trial phase of the case and the post-judgment
phase, and based also on our conclusion that the mother’s second Rule 60(b)
motion was both proper and timely in light of the extraordinary circumstances
presented in this case, we vacate the trial court’s denial of her second
Rule 60(b) motion and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the motion. See
In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 20 n.4, 126 A.3d 718.
The entry is:
Order denying the mother’s second motion for relief from judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 21
Ashley T. Perry, Esq., Sanders, Hanstein & Carey, P.A., Farmington, for appellant mother
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Waterville District Court docket number PC-2019-64 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY