In Re Chase & Sanborn Corp.

124 B.R. 368, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 214
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.
DecidedJanuary 25, 1991
Docket19-12626
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 124 B.R. 368 (In Re Chase & Sanborn Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 124 B.R. 368, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 214 (Fla. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: CREDITOR TRUSTEE’S MOTION UNDER SECTION 502(d) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (I)

A. JAY CRISTOL, Bankruptcy Judge.

THIS MATTER came before the Court on January 2,1991 on the motion of Paul C. Nordberg, the Creditor Trustee of the Estate of the Debtor, for an order under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code disallowing all of the claims in this bankruptcy case of Arab Banking Corporation (“ABC”), unless within ten days of the entry of an order on this motion in the Creditor Trustee’s favor ABC pays to the Creditor Trustee $1,550,000 representing two voidable preferences that it previously received. ABC opposes the motion on the ground that it is premature. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.

The Facts

The facts are not in dispute. In 1986 the Creditor Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against ABC, a commercial bank, to recover certain voidable transfers (hereinafter “Arab /”). The Bankruptcy Court and the District Court initially ruled against the Creditor Trustee’s claims. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit by decision dated June 27, 1990 reversed, holding that ABC had received two voidable preferences from the Debtor under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, one in the amount of $400,000 on March 3, 1983 and a second in the amount of $1,150,000 on March 31, 1983. Nordberg v. Arab Banking Corp. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 904 F.2d 588, 592-97 (11th Cir.1990). The Circuit Court further held that the preferences were “recoverable” by the Creditor Trustee from ABC because it was the “initial transferee” of the preferences within the meaning of Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 599-600. The time for ABC to appeal from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, i.e., to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, has expired.

ABC has not to date paid to the Creditor Trustee the two preferences totalling $1,550,000.

ABC for its part has made claims against the Debtor’s Estate. First, ABC asserted an $11 million fraud counterclaim against the Creditor Trustee in Arab I. Additionally, ABC filed a proof of claim in this bankruptcy case, which the Creditor Trustee challenged in a contested matter in this Court (hereinafter “Arab II”).

In Arab I this Court rejected ABC’s fraud counterclaim. In Arab II this Court rejected ABC’s $3.3 million fraud and $1.2 million constructive trust claims, but allowed a $5.3 million claim based on the Debtor’s guarantee of ABC’s loan to a *370 third party. Those rulings in Arab I and Arab II are pending in various stages of appeal or remand from appeal.

While Arab II was on appeal in the District Court, the Creditor Trustee moved in that Court for an order under § 502(d) disallowing ABC’s claims in bankruptcy (and dismissing the appeal as moot). Before the § 502(d) motion was fully briefed, however, the District Court decided on October 18, 1990 the Arab II appeal and remanded specific questions to this Court for further proceedings. (That order has been stayed and Arab II remains on appeal in the District Court while that Court considers a pending motion for rehearing.) In a separate order, the District Court declined to reach the merits of the § 502(d) motion and, instead, denied the motion without prejudice to its renewal before this Court.

The Governing Law

ABC contends that the Creditor Trustee’s § 502(d) motion is premature and should be denied because “no judgment has been entered in the preference action {‘Arab /’) declaring the amount of ABC’s liability” and because “the amount of prejudgment interest, if any, due to the Trustee on the preference liability is yet to be determined.” ABC Mem. at 2 and 12. These arguments are unpersuasive.

Section 502(d), in material part, provides:

... the court shall disallow any claim of any entity from which property is recoverable under section ... 550 ... of this title or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section ... 547 ... of this title, unless such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for which such entity or transferee is liable under ... this title.

Nothing on the face of the statute or any case requires the entry of a judgment as a prerequisite to the disallowance under § 502(d) of a preferred creditor’s claims. Indeed pursuant to § 502(d) courts have disallowed the claim of a creditor that received and failed to return a preference where the trustee not only lacked a judgment imposing liability for the preference, but could not obtain a judgment because the preference claim was time barred. That is, the trustee was permitted to use § 502(d) defensively to disallow the preferred creditor’s claim even though he could not obtain an affirmative judgment for the amount of the preference due to the bar of the statute of limitations. Matter of Eye Contact, 97 B.R. 990 (W.D.Wis.1989); In re Larsen, 80 B.R. 784 (E.D.Va.1987); Matter of Mid Atlantic Fund, Inc., 60 B.R. 604 (S.D.N.Y.1986).

What is necessary for the invocation of § 502(d) is a judicial determination that the creditor received a preference (and has failed to repay it). In the Matter of Colonial Services Company, 480 F.2d 747, 749 (8th Cir.1973); In re J.R. Palmenberg Sons, Inc., 76 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir.1935), aff'd, 297 U.S. 230, 56 S.Ct. 451, 80 L.Ed. 657 (1936); Nebraska Mercantile Co. v. Nathanson Bros. Co., 20 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir.1927); Exchange Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Peyton, 18 F.2d 776, 777 (5th Cir.1927); In the Matter of Eye Contact, Inc., 97 B.R. 990, 992 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1989); In re W & T Enterprises, Inc., 84 B.R. 838, 840 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1988); In re Jean P. Larsen, 80 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1987); Irving Trust Co. v. Frimitt, 1 F.Supp. 16, 17 (S.D.N.Y.1932); In re Oppenheimer, 140 F. 51, 53 (N.D.Iowa 1905). Here, the Eleventh Circuit expressly and unconditionally held that ABC received a $400,000 preference on March 3,1983 and a $1,150,000 preference on March 31, 1983. ABC did not petition for a writ of certiorari. The Circuit Court’s determination is now final and unreviewable. There is no open issue or further proceeding that can change the determination that ABC received the two preferences. *

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124 B.R. 368, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 214, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-chase-sanborn-corp-flsb-1991.