In re: C.C.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: March 4, 2026
• Docket: 25-526
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge John Arrowood

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-526

Filed 4 March 2026

Dare County, No. 22JA000049-270

IN THE MATTER OF: C.C.

Appeals by Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Father from order entered

16 January 2025 by Judge Robert P. Trivette in Dare County District Court. Heard

in the Court of Appeals 10 February 2026.

Jason Senges, for Respondent-Appellant-Father.

Parent Defender Annick Lenoir-Peek, by Assistant Parent Defender Jacky L. Brammer, for Respondent-Appellant-Mother.

Clemmons Family Law, by Holly M. Groce, for Petitioner-Appellee Dare County Department of Social Services.

Michelle F. Lynch, for the Guardian ad Litem.

ARROWOOD, Judge.

Respondents appeal from order for termination of parental rights entered

16 January 2025 finding it in the best interests of the child C.C. (“Charlie1”) due to

neglect by both parents. Respondents argue that the district court lacked subject

1 The parties agree to the pseudonym Charlie pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the North Carolina Rules of

Appellate Procedure. IN RE: C.C.

Opinion of the Court

matter jurisdiction due to an improperly verified petition, and Respondent-Mother

claims that the court failed to make certain findings of fact required by statute. For

the following reasons, we find no error and affirm the district court’s order.

I. Introduction

Charlie was born 8 March 2018. On 8 December 2022 Dare County

Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS” or “Department”) filed a

juvenile petition alleging that Charlie had been neglected. This petition was verified

and signed by Jayonna Harris (“Ms. Harris”), a DHHS social worker, before the

Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court.

The petition noted that the Department had been involved with the family

since it received a Child Protective Service Intake Report 23 June 2020 after

Respondent-Mother was issued a citation for drug paraphernalia while intoxicated

and riding with Charlie in a cab without a car seat. CPS received additional intake

reports on 1 December 2020 and 2 July 2021, concerning domestic violence and

Charlie’s living conditions respectively. On 12 May 2022, the Department responded

to the family’s trailer after receiving an intake report of domestic violence and

injurious environment, after Respondent-Father told the reporter he was seeking a

protective order against Respondent-Mother, who he stated was drinking daily and

was physically abusive towards him in Charlie’s presence. Respondent-Mother was

contacted the following day and stated she was without housing but claimed she was

delivering with DoorDash. The Department learned that Charlie had not been seen

-2- IN RE: C.C.

by a doctor since September 2020, had not been toilet trained, and continued to

require assessment for delayed speech and behavioral issues.

The Department continued to frequently monitor and assist the family

throughout the fall and summer of 2022, reporting additional ongoing concerns about

domestic altercations, unstable housing, drug abuse, and the parents’ consistent

failure to follow through with appointments and communication about services

Charlie required. The family failed to make any substantial progress on their Family

Service Agreement goals, and Charlie was not seen for a wellness visit until

23 November, when he was referred for early intervention and behavioral health

services. When the petition was filed, Charlie was staying with Respondent-Father,

who was not working, and Respondent-Mother would not provide information about

her employment or housing.

On 22 February 2023, law enforcement stopped Respondent-Mother for

speeding, with Charlie in the vehicle, and arrested her for possession of drug

paraphernalia. DHHS responded to the scene and contacted Respondent-Father, who

agreed to keep Charlie in his camper, but requested food for him. It was then

determined that Respondent-Mother had been squatting in a residence without

permission and had no other alternate housing. Earlier that month, police had been

called to remove the family from a motel, where they left drug paraphernalia in their

room.

Due to the foregoing series of events and the family’s continued noncompliance,

-3- IN RE: C.C.

the Department filed a petition dated 23 February 2023 “to remove [Charlie] from his

home until this matter can be properly addressed before the court.” The amended

petition replicates in full the original 27-page petition dated 8 December 2022 and

adds five additional pages. The additional pages detailed Respondent-Mother’s

arrest and both parent’s ongoing failure to engage with services for Charlie and

provide him stable housing. The first additional page contains the dated signature

of Ms. Harris. It is marked “Received by Magistrate” at 4:40 p.m. on

23 February 2023 and signed by Magistrate M.R. Clark (“Magistrate Clark”).

Magistrate Clark simultaneously issued a nonsecure custody order, also dated

23 February 2023 at 4:40 p.m. The order noted a “reasonable factual basis to believe”

Charlie was at risk based on the “petition and request for nonsecure custody,” and

listed the extensive efforts by DSS to prevent or eliminate the need for the placement.

Magistrate Clark signed the order “M.R. Clark For the Honorable Judge Trivette” in

the box marked “Signature of Judge/Judge’s Designee” and recorded the time

Magistrate Clark received the Judge’s telephonic approval for the order that day. The

order set the first nonsecure custody hearing for 1 March 2023. On 27 February 2023

DHHS filed a motion to amend the original petition and seek non-secured custody.

This amendment was allowed in an order issued 1 March 2023, ordering service of

the amended petition via hand delivery and setting both pre-adjudication and

adjudication hearings. In issuing the order for continued non-secure custody, the

court ordered weekly hourlong supervised visits with both Respondents.

-4- IN RE: C.C.

On 3 May 2023, Respondent-Father was absent for the adjudication hearing

but Respondent-Mother stipulated to extensive facts, including that Charlie “is a

neglected juvenile.” On 15 May 2023, the court issued factual findings substantially

in accord with the stipulated facts, adjudged that Charlie was neglected, ordered him

to remain in custody, and ordered Respondents to cooperate with the Family Services

Case Plan.

At the subsequent disposition on 7 June 2023, the court found “the parents

continue to have poor communication with the Department, lack appropriate

residence to care for Chase, continue to use illegal substances without attending

consistent treatment or completing requested drug screens” and “are unable to meet

their own needs, let alone the needs of a young child.”

Respondents’ compliance had not improved by 3 January 2024, when the court

made reassuring findings about Charlie’s progress in his foster home and changed

his primary plan to termination of parental rights and adoption. The court relieved

the Department of the obligation to pursue reunification on 24 April 2024. The

Department moved to terminate parental rights on 17 July 2024.

After three hearings held between October 2024 and January 2025, the court

found by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that terminating Respondents’

parental rights was in Charlie’s best interests. The court found that Respondents

“have recurring issues with substance abuse and domestic violence since the

Department’s involvement,” “have expressed limited insight regarding the long-term

-5- IN RE: C.C.

effects of their substance abuse and domestic violence and how those issues affect

their parenting,” have not “provided a consistent stable living environment,” and

“have essentially been repeating the same behavioral patterns and have done

minimal to nothing to address the concerning behaviors.” On the other hand, the

court found that Charlie’s adoption by his foster parents “is highly likely and

forthcoming pending the termination” and that they had “stated they are committed

to providing long term care for [Charlie] and have a strong bond.” Respondents filed

written notice of appeal on 10 February 2025.

II. Discussion

A. The Amended Petition

Both Respondents argue that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over the case, alleging that the petition dated 23 February 2023 was unverified and

thereby deprived the court of jurisdiction in all subsequent proceedings in this case.

“The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be considered by the court at any time,

and may be raised for the first time on appeal.” In re T.B., 177 N.C. App. 790, 791

(2006). We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. In re M.C., 244

N.C. App. 410, 413 (2015) (citation omitted).

Abuse, neglect, and dependency actions are governed by the Juvenile Code,

which requires that such petitions “be drawn by the [DSS] director, verified before an

official authorized to administer oaths, and filed by the clerk, recording the date of

filing.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 591 (2006) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7b-403(a)). The

-6- IN RE: C.C.

properly verified juvenile petition invokes the trial court’s jurisdiction, which is then

established throughout the proceeding stages of the case, including a termination

hearing. Id. at 593. A Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court is empowered by statute

to administer oaths. N.C.G.S. § 11-7.1.

It is undisputed that, as to the first juvenile petition dated 8 December 2022,

the Deputy Clerk administered the verification by Ms. Harris, who properly verified

and signed the document. This verification was sufficient to invoke the court’s

jurisdiction over subsequent proceedings. See In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 593.

Respondents are correct that the amended petition does not contain language

explicitly stating that its contents were verified by the administration of an oath. The

amended petition of 23 February 2023 shows the date and the signature of Ms.

Harris, as well as the signature of Magistrate Clark and the time stamp of 4:40 p.m.

Also at 4:40 p.m. on the same day, Magistrate Clark issued the nonsecure custody

order with telephonic approval from Judge Trivette, pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-404,

7B-502, 7B-508. Such nonsecure custody orders may only be issued if the court find

“a reasonable factual basis to believe the matters alleged in the petition are true.”

N.C.G.S. § 7B-503 (2023). Accordingly, the simultaneous order states not only that

the court has subject matter jurisdiction to order nonsecure custody “based on the

verified petition,” but that the court reached conclusions based on the “petition and

request for nonsecure custody,” that the court found the requisite “reasonable factual

basis to believe that the matters alleged in the petition are true,” and that it was

-7- IN RE: C.C.

therefore contrary to the juvenile’s welfare to remain with Respondents.

“Generally there is a presumption that a public official in the performance of

an official duty acts in accordance with the law and the authority conferred upon

him.” State v. Watts, 289 N.C. 445, 449 (1976) (citations omitted). Where the trial

court acts lawfully, “every presumption not inconsistent with the record will be

indulged in favor of jurisdiction.” Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 557

(1987) (cleaned up). “The burden is on the party asserting want of jurisdiction to

show such want.” Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419, 424 (1951) (citation omitted). A

magistrate has the power to administer oaths which verify pleadings such as the

amended petition. N.C.G.S. § 7A-292 (2023).

Respondent-Mother argues that the record contains “no indication that the

social worker swore an oath that the contents were true in front of anyone authorized

to receive oaths.” But Respondents were here required to show positive evidence

showing that Magistrate Clark neglected to administer the oath, leaving a “want of

jurisdiction.” Dellinger, 234 N.C. at 424. Magistrate Clark was empowered by

statute to administer an oath, and the record shows that, in all accompanying details,

the court followed the lawful procedure for receiving the petition and issuing the

order. Therefore, we decline to disturb the “prima facie presumption of rightful

jurisdiction.” In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 708 (2016) (quoting Williamson v. Spivey, 224

N.C. 311, 313 (1944)).

Even if the amended petition had been unverified, this would not have

-8- IN RE: C.C.

deprived the court of jurisdiction on these facts. Respondent-Mother relies upon two

important jurisdictional decisions to argue otherwise. In the former, our Supreme

Court found that where the initial juvenile petition was unverified, the court was

deprived of jurisdiction throughout the case, and this Court vacated the void

proceeding. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 598. Similarly, in the latter, the Supreme Court

found that, where the motion for termination of parental rights was similarly

unverified, this deprived the court of jurisdiction over the subsequent termination

hearing. In re O.E.M., 379 N.C. 27, 37 (2021).

But neither case is on point, as it is uncontested that both the initial

jurisdiction-conferring petition and the motion for termination in this case were

properly verified. By comparison, this court considered a closely analogous appeal in

In re J.A.K., 242 N.C. App. 383 (2015) (unpublished). The case is instructive on this

question. As here, DSS filed an original petition alleging a child was neglected. Id.

DSS was ordered to take non-secure custody of the child that day. Id. Four days

later, DSS filed an amended petition reiterating all the allegations from the original

petition, adding new allegations after new events came to DSS’s attention. Id. The

parent’s parental rights were later terminated. Id. The father appealed, arguing

that because the amended petition was not verified, the trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to enter subsequent custody orders, and therefore, because DSS

therefore had no legal custody over the child, it had no standing to terminate parental

rights. Id. Relying upon In re T.R.P., we determined that his argument was without

-9- IN RE: C.C.

merit because the trial court’s ongoing subject matter jurisdiction was firmly

established by the properly verified initial juvenile petition. Id. So too here.

B. Termination of Parental Rights

Respondent-Mother argues on appeal that the court abused its discretion in

terminating parental rights without making findings on all relevant considerations

the evidence placed before the court, as required by statute. N.C.G.S. S 7B-1110(a).

Specifically, she argues that the court did make findings as to its alleged failure to

order a minimum duration for her weekly visits after the initial non-secure custody

order, that Charlie’s foster parents were not actually a pre-adoptive placement, and

that Charlie’s foster parents rejected gifts from the Respondents.

We review the order for abuse of discretion and ask whether the ruling is “so

arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re N.G.,

186 N.C. App. 1, 10–11 (2007) (quotes omitted). We only reverse a trial court’s

decision that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests when this

conclusion was “manifestly unsupported by reason.” In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142,

146 (2008), aff’d 363 N.C. 368 (2009).

In juvenile cases, this court does not address findings and conclusions already

settled by the trial court’s earlier binding orders. In re Y.Y.E.T., 205 N.C. App. 120,

123 (2010). Respondent-Mother’s first argument is not preserved for appellate

review, as she made no appeal as to numerous prior orders ordering weekly visits,

and she is estopped from raising issues resolved by those earlier adjudication and

- 10 - IN RE: C.C.

disposition orders. The court ordered DHHS to arrange weekly hourlong supervised

visits with each parent at the first nonsecure custody hearing. Subsequent orders

maintained the direction to continue facilitating weekly visits. DHHS generally

scheduled visits according to this initial plan unless intervening events made such

visits impossible, as when Respondents were incarcerated. Moreover, the record

shows Respondent-Mother often failed to appear for visits without notice, even when

she was not incarcerated. Whether Respondent-Mother visited with Charlie long

enough would have been irrelevant to the court’s ultimate decision, where it also

found that she attended only 49 of 91 available weekly visitations in the first place.

Respondent-Mother’s next arguments concerning Charlie’s foster parents are

likewise without merit, and we find no abuse of discretion. The record contains

evidence that Charlie’s foster parents had committed to caring for Charlie

indefinitely, which was sufficient to make requisite findings about the “quality of the

relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adopted parent[s].” N.C.G.S. §

7B-1110. In its final court report, DHHS reported that the foster parents “are

committed to providing long-term care” and expressed their belief that they were

“bonded and excited about their future together.” The GAL volunteer testified that

the foster placement “would lean toward adoption . . . when the proverbial rubber

meets the road, they would take him because he’s a great kid.” The social worker

testified that they “say he has a home with them forever, how[ever] long he needs to

be there.” There is simply no basis to conclude that the court’s findings on this

- 11 - IN RE: C.C.

question were manifestly unreasonable. In any event, “[t]he absence of an adoptive

placement for a juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to

terminating parental rights.” In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217, 223 (2014).

The record mentions Charlie’s foster parents rejecting some of Respondent

Father’s gifts because his room was getting crowded with toys. The court heard

testimony that both Respondents agreed not to bring any additional toys. But

Respondent-Mother has failed to show that this was ultimately relevant to the court’s

findings. Even if Respondents had brought a toy every time they visited Charlie, the

court could have reasonably reached its decision to terminate their parental rights

given the overwhelming evidence that “[t]here has been no progress by either

Respondent.”

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision

to terminate Respondents’ parental rights, and that the court had subject matter

jurisdiction throughout proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders.

AFFIRMED.

Judges CARPENTER and GORE concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

- 12 -