IN RE CARLOTZ, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 31, 2023
Docket1:21-cv-05906
StatusUnknown

This text of IN RE CARLOTZ, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION (IN RE CARLOTZ, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
IN RE CARLOTZ, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

No. 21-cv-5906 (RA) IN RE CARLOTZ, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION OPINION AND ORDER

RONNIE ABRAMS, United States District Judge: This is a securities class action brought against CarLotz, Inc. (“CarLotz”) and Acamar Partners Acquisition Corporation (“Acamar”), as well as various related entities and individuals (collectively, “Defendants”), for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”). CarLotz is a purported consignment-to-retail used car marketplace that became a publicly traded company in January 2021 following a de- SPAC transaction with Acamar. Plaintiffs allege that, in the months leading up to the consummation of the merger, Defendants made materially false and misleading statements regarding key aspects of CarLotz’s business model. Defendants now move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge pre-merger statements under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act or to bring claims under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, and that Plaintiffs otherwise fail to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is granted, albeit without prejudice. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the Second Amended Complaint, which, on a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume to be true. See Lynch v. United States, 952 F.3d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2020). CarLotz “purports to be a consignment-to-retail used vehicle marketplace.” SAC ¶ 50. Under this business model, CarLotz provided the necessary services to sell used vehicles at retail— i.e., directly to individual consumers, rather than at auction—and the original owner retained the title until CarLotz could sell the vehicle. Id. CarLotz obtained its inventory from individuals trying to sell used cars, as well as corporate sourcing partners such as rental car companies. Id. If the vehicle could not be sold, it would purportedly be returned to the individual or sourcing partner who owned it. Id. According to Plaintiffs, CarLotz claimed that this business model would net the seller “several thousand dollars more” profit than if they sold their car to a dealership, and it

also allowed CarLotz to operate with “virtually no dollars at risk.” Id. In November 2018—when CarLotz was still a privately held company (“Pre-Merger CarLotz”)—Acamar was incorporated as a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (“SPAC”). Id. ¶ 81. SPACs are shell companies incorporated for the sole purpose of “effecting a merger, capital stock exchange, asset acquisition, stock purchase, reorganization or similar business combination.” Id. They “typically raise capital for an acquisition through an Initial Public Offering (‘IPO’), and that capital is held in trust for a specific period of time, usually 24 months, until a merger can be completed.” Id. ¶ 82. Acamar accordingly had no operations or business activities of its own, but rather was formed “specifically to acquire an existing operating company,” also known as a “de-

SPAC” business combination. Id. ¶ 81. On February 26, 2019, Acamar completed its IPO for a total of $300 million to be held in trust until it could complete an acquisition. Id. ¶ 84. Meanwhile, in November 2019, Pre-Merger CarLotz began exploring a possible sale to a third party. Id. ¶ 85. Pre-Merger CarLotz and Acamar entered into negotiations in September 2020, and on October 21, 2020, the two companies executed a merger agreement. Id. ¶¶ 89-91. The next day, Pre-Merger CarLotz issued a press release publicly announcing the proposed transaction. On December 30, 2020, Acamar published a Form 424B3 Prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) containing details about the merger, and that same day, the Form S-4 registration statement became effective.1 Id. ¶¶ 98-99. Acamar shareholders voted to approve the merger on January 20, 2021, and on January 21, 2021, the merger was effectuated. Id. ¶ 101. CarLotz became a public entity (“Post- Merger CarLotz”), trading on the NASDAQ exchange under the symbol “LOTZ.” Id. Between the public announcement of the proposed merger and the shareholder vote

approving the transaction, officers of Pre-Merger CarLotz made a series of investor presentations that, according to Plaintiffs, included materially false and misleading statements. Pre-Merger CarLotz claimed, for example, that as the “industry’s only consignment-to-retail model . . . we don’t own the inventory that we’re selling” and “any reconditioning dollars are passed through to our seller,” which allowed the company to operate with “limited capital risk.” Id. ¶¶ 93, 118. It also said that most of its clients were paid on a flat-fee basis, which boosted the company’s gross profit per unit (“GPU”). Id. ¶ 175. The company “repeatedly stated” that its business model had “superior unit economics” compared to industry competitors. Id. ¶ 93. Pre-Merger CarLotz further asserted that it had a “deep pool of sourcing partners,” and that 60% of its inventory was

consigned from corporate partners. Id. ¶¶ 93, 168. Michael Bor, the Chief Executive Officer of CarLotz during the relevant time frame, explained that “it’s important to have a wide pool of inventory because frankly, any one of these clients, if they were our only client, would have very homogenous inventory.” Id. ¶ 168. Finally, in describing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Pre-Merger CarLotz stated that the increased demand for used cars created inventories of “historically high levels,” which was overall “positive” for the company. Id. ¶ 74. According to Plaintiffs, in the months following the merger, Post-Merger CarLotz then made a series of disclosures that revealed the misstatements made prior to the merger. First, on

1 Form S-4 is the registration statement that is filed with the SEC in order to publicly offer new securities pursuant to a merger or acquisition. See https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-4.pdf. March 15, 2021, Bor disclosed that “CarLotz had acquired so much excess inventory that it was unable to effectively process all of the vehicles,” creating a “log jam” in inventory that negatively impacted the company’s GPU. Id. ¶ 102. Regarding the company’s corporate sourcing partners, Bor also stated that, “[f]or the fourth quarter of 2020 and continuing during the first quarter of 2021 to date, one of our corporate vehicle sourcing partners has accounted for over 60% of our

vehicles sourced.” Id. ¶ 103. On this news, the company’s stock price fell $0.79, or 8.5%. Id. ¶ 104. Then, on May 10, 2021, Post-Merger CarLotz disclosed that “it had cleared the aforementioned ‘log jam’ of inventory by selling the units with ‘aggressive pricing’ ‘rather than absorbing shipping and reconditioning costs on vehicles returned to the client.’” Id. ¶ 105. According to Plaintiffs, “[t]his statement revealed that CarLotz, not the sourcing partner, had paid for the reconditioning costs on these vehicles, and therefore had much more capital tied up in inventory than previously represented.” Id. The company’s stock price then fell another $0.94, or 14%. Id. ¶ 106. Finally, on May 26, 2021, Post-Merger CarLotz announced that the one corporate sourcing

partner who accounted for 60% of its inventory had “paused” its relationship with the company. Id. ¶ 107. Upon this disclosure, the company’s stock price fell $0.70, or 13.4%. Id. ¶ 108. Plaintiffs allege that these risks had already materialized “in the fourth quarter of 2020,” but that none of it was properly disclosed to investors. Id. ¶ 95. Plaintiff Daniel Erdman first initiated a putative securities fraud class action against CarLotz and its officers on July 8, 2021. Several related actions were subsequently filed.

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