In re Carlos P.

78 Misc. 2d 851, 358 N.Y.S.2d 608, 1974 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1509
CourtNew York City Family Court
DecidedJuly 1, 1974
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 78 Misc. 2d 851 (In re Carlos P.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York City Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Carlos P., 78 Misc. 2d 851, 358 N.Y.S.2d 608, 1974 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1509 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1974).

Opinion

Stanley Gartenstein, J.

“ I am invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe * * * I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me * * * When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination * * * anything except me. It is * * # often * * * wearing on the nerves * * * you doubt if you really exist * * * It’s when you feel'like this that * * * you ache with the need to convince yourself that you do exist in the real world * * * and you strike out with your fists, you curse, and you swear to make them recognize you. And, alas, it’s seldom successful.” (From Invisible Man by Ralph Ellison.) (Copyright 1947, 1952 .by Ralph Ellison. Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc.)

Perhaps a history of our time will someday define the function of the law and its courts as the intervener between an individual struggling to be recognized as human and the vast bureaucracy which tends to dehumanize him.

Bureaucracy and red tape have a way of feeding on themselves. When they trap a human being, he is categorized; placed on the assembly line; labeled, packaged and delivered at the end of this treadmill wholly anesthetized as a neat stack of reports, each of which has picked up its requisite complement of marginal initials on the way. When the frustration becomes intolerable, this human being is often impelled to perform some act affirming that he is in fact alive and unique. In his rage, [852]*852the delinquent youth who is promised but receives no treatment might well become the misfit of tomorrow. It is tragic enough that society’s insoluble problems contribute to this process. But it is criminal when we are given a chance to intervene and let it pass us by. The court is here given this opportunity, indeed, the positive statutory duty to do so.. In the light of the unsatisfactory choice of dispositional alternatives which society at large has made available to this court, a condition for which society has the temerity to blame the court itself, it will not allow this opportunity to slip through its fingers.

the pacts :

Carlos is before the court for disposition in two delinquency proceedings in which substantially similar allegations of criminal mischief and burglary were established and findings made. He was on remand (secure detention) from January 25 to April 16, 1974, when he was paroled to his mother. His family is known to this court; his mother was herself a respondent-in prior separate, proceedings in which Carlos was adjudicated a neglected child. Considering the family background of criminal and delinquent behavior involving other siblings, it is reasonable to conclude that Carlos never had a chance to “ make it ” in his surroundings.

In the midst of this classic cycle of poverty, neglect and delinquency, one social worker, Sister Lillian of his neighborhood parish, took Carlos under her wing and motivated within him a thirst for education and development of his capacities, which appear to be in the manual arts. At one hearing, Carlos’ attorney brought into the courtroom beautiful, creative examples of his handiwork. The boy’s talents appear to be ideally suited for development at a vocational high school, in this instance, East New York Vocational High School, located within reasonable proximity of his home. Carlos is now out of school and using every effort of his own and Sister Lillian’s to enroll. Admission tó this school has been denied him because he was at Spofford on remand by court order when the deadline for applications came and went. A short history of his frustrations and the endless referral from one office to another, to no avail, has been supplied by Sister Lillian and is part ,of the probation record.

JOINDER OF BOARD OF EDUCATION:

The dispositional hearing was scheduled for May 10, 1974 at which time, the court, hearing of the refusal of the school to [853]*853admit Carlos, issued process joining the principal of the school and the board of education as parties. Counsel for the board and the principal appeared at the next hearing pursuant to court mandate and although objecting to their being joined as parties, nevertheless demanded a hearing proffered by the court as to whether or not an order pursuant to section 255 of the Family Court Act directing Carlos’s admission would be in his best interests. Upon specific admonition by the court that an objection to being so joined was inconsistent with the hearing on the merits so proffered and accepted, the board nevertheless elected to proceed on the merits. The hearing was set at the mutual convenience of counsel and the parties. When it was reached, the board appeared and waived it, now framing its objection on the sole ground that section 255 as amended in 1972 dealt only with neglect and abuse proceedings under article 10 of the act and did not authorize any order against the board of education. Despite the fact that it elected not to participate in the hearing granted at its request, it again took the contradictory stance of objecting to the consideration of certain dispositional material; then, a third time, took the inconsistent stance of accepting the court’s offer to examne these reports and comment upon them. The board is thus estopped not once, but three times. The court holds jurisdiction over it perfected.

. Before examining section 255 of the Family Court Act, certain background perspectives must be considered.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT:

The problems Carlos faces are far from unique. An eloquent plea for the services which the legislative and executive branches have not provided was made in October, 1973 by the Office of Children’s Services of the Judicial Conference in a report entitled Juvenile Injustice. In a study of dispositional alternatives for juveniles before the court, statistics showed that: a) Only 21% came from intact families, b) 87% were in the 13- to 16-year-old category, traditionally the most difficult to place, c) 73% were school truants, d) 59% were on welfare, e) 31% had other siblings before the court.

As a result thereof and because of the lack of adequate facilities, the court was unable to follow the recommendations of psychologists, psychiatrists and probation officers in a considerable majority of the cases surveyed.

The report, in large measure, blamed the failure to move ahead vis-a-vis solutions to these problems on (p. 74) “ the fragmented and compartmentalized delivery of service systems [854]*854that allow each department and agency to say let someone else provide for the child ’ ”,

The school in question, and the board by backing the school’s position, now say the same thing about this boy. But Carlos is not a commercial commodity or fungible goods and this school is where he belongs.

section 255:

The Legislature’s answer to the deplorable situation later cited by the Office of Children’s Services was the amendment of section 255 of the Family Court Act, enacted during a time of growing recognition that this court, charged with the responsibility of intervention in people’s lives, was consistently denied facilities giving it any meaningful alternatives. At a time when the law mandated treatment (see Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F. 2d 451; Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781; Sas v. Maryland, 334 F. 2d 506) society provided hone. The very reason for the existence of this court as a separate entity — that of providing services — was too often illusory.

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84 Misc. 2d 569 (NYC Family Court, 1975)
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Bluebook (online)
78 Misc. 2d 851, 358 N.Y.S.2d 608, 1974 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1509, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-carlos-p-nycfamct-1974.