In Re Bryer

386 B.R. 895, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1271
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.
DecidedApril 24, 2008
Docket18-22506
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 386 B.R. 895 (In Re Bryer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Bryer, 386 B.R. 895, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1271 (Fla. 2008).

Opinion

ORDER FINDING NORTH STAR CAPITAL ACQUISITION LLC AND NELSON, WATSON & ASSOCIATES, LLC IN CIVIL CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATING DISCHARGE INJUNCTION AND FOR NOT APPEARING AT THE APRIL 21, 2008 HEARING

JOHN K. OLSON, Bankruptcy Judge.

THIS CASE is before me on the Order to Show Cause Why North Star Capital Acquisition LLC (“North Star”) and Nelson, Watson & Associates, LLC (“Nelson”) Should Not Be Held In Contempt for Violating Discharge Injunction (the “Show Cause Order”) [DE 26]. A hearing on the Show Cause Order was set for April 21, *898 2008 at 9:31 a.m. Both entities were directed to appear and explain why they had engaged in conduct which appeared to violate the discharge injunction previously entered in this case. The Show Cause Order provided that, “In the event that either Nelson, Watson & Associates, LLC or North Star Capital Acquisition LLC fail to appear as directed ... they will be held in contempt of this Court and appropriate sanctions will be imposed.” At the April 21st hearing no counsel appeared on behalf of either North Star or Nelson. Accordingly, both entities are in civil contempt and appropriate sanctions will be levied.

The Debtor has received a demand for payment from Nelson seeking to collect on an account on which the original creditor was Wells Fargo Financial (‘Wells Fargo”) and on which the current creditor is North Star. A copy of the demand is attached to the Motion to Reopen Chapter 7 Case [DE 24]. The Debtor filed his petition in this case on April 4, 2007. He scheduled a debt owed to Wells Fargo in the amount of $976, the amount alleged by Nelson as having been originally owed to Wells Fargo and which it seeks to collect (with interest) for North Star. The Debtor received his bankruptcy discharge on July 3, 2007, and this case was closed on July 20, 2007.

Section 524 of the bankruptcy code provides the debtor with a discharge injunction against collection of debts discharged in bankruptcy, and thus embodies the “fresh start” concept of the bankruptcy code. This provision is the barrier that prevents creditors from reaching the debt- or’s wages, property or assets. Section 524 provides, in relevant part:

(a) A discharge in a ease under this title
(2) Operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived ...

11 U.S.C. § 524. The demand sent to the Debtor by Nelson on behalf of North Star violates this injunction.

Based on their failure to appear at the April 21st hearing and their violation of the § 524 discharge injunction, North Star and Nelson are in contempt of court. I must therefore consider the appropriate sanction to impose based on this contemptuous conduct. The Court’s power to determine that a party is in contempt of the court is based both in 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), Hardy v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Hardy), 97 F.3d 1384, 1390 (11th Cir. 1996); Placid Refining Co. v. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc., 108 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. 1997), and in the inherent power of the federal courts to sanction contemptuous conduct, Glatter v. Mroz (In re Mroz), 65 F.3d 1567, 1574-75 (11th Cir.1995); Eck v. Dodge Chemical Co., 950 F.2d 798 (1st Cir.1991).

The inherent power of the federal court to punish for contemptuous conduct is well established and this power reaches both conduct before the court and that beyond the court’s confines, for “the underlying concern that gave rise to the contempt power was not ... merely the disruption of court proceedings. Rather, it was disobedience to the orders of the Judiciary, regardless of whether such disobedience interfered with the conduct of trial.” Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 798, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) (citations omitted).

In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 *899 (1991), the Supreme Court addressed the nature and scope of the inherent power vested in the federal courts. The judicial branch has the ability to control the overall judicial proceedings, i.e., to maintain the decorum of the institution, which includes the conduct of parties involved. Chambers, at 501 U.S. at 43-44, 111 S.Ct. 2123. Such inherent powers, for example, include a federal court’s ability to investigate and vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the court, to bar from the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a trial, to dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens, and it may act sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute. Id. at 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123. In Chambers, the Supreme Court discussed the ability of the judiciary to sanction counsel by awarding attorney’s fees as a penalty for inappropriate conduct. 501 U.S. at 42-43, 111 S.Ct. 2123. For example, circumstances which may dictate the exercise of inherent power to assess attorney fees against counsel, include those where a party has acted in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id. at 45-46, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (internal citations omitted).

However, the Supreme Court, in Chambers, warned that a court must “exercise caution in invoking its inherent power,” stating:

Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion. A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process ... When there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the inherent power. But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.

501 U.S. at 44, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (internal citations omitted). I am thus authorized to cite North Star and Nelson for contempt under the courts’ inherent powers for a showing of “bad faith,” Hardy, 97 F.3d at 1389, n. 3 (citing Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1575).

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Bluebook (online)
386 B.R. 895, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1271, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-bryer-flsb-2008.