In re Boyd

731 S.E.2d 876, 399 S.C. 356, 2012 WL 3793185, 2012 S.C. LEXIS 173
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedAugust 29, 2012
DocketNo. 27164
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 731 S.E.2d 876 (In re Boyd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Boyd, 731 S.E.2d 876, 399 S.C. 356, 2012 WL 3793185, 2012 S.C. LEXIS 173 (S.C. 2012).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) and respondent have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to the imposition of any sanction in Rule 7(b), RLDE. Respondent requests that any suspension or disbarment be made retroactive to July 14, 2011, the date of his interim suspension. In the Matter of Boyd, 393 S.C. 367, 713 S.E.2d 296 (2011). In addition, respondent agrees to pay the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct (the Commission) within thirty (30) days of the imposition of discipline and to complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School prior to seeking reinstatement. We accept the Agreement and disbar respondent from the prac[358]*358tice of law in this state, retroactive to July 14, 2011. Further, we order respondent to pay the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion. Respondent shall not file a Petition for Reinstatement until he has completed the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows.

Facts

Matter I

Complainant A, the Executive Director for a development corporation, retained respondent on June 9, 2010, to foreclose three properties on behalf of the corporation. Respondent was to be paid $1,500.00, plus court costs, for each foreclosure action. Respondent mailed out certified letters to each debtor advising they had fifteen days to become current with their monthly payments to the development corporation. Two of the debtors paid their arrearages; one debtor, a funeral home, did not pay the arrearage.

Respondent agreed to pursue the foreclosure action against the funeral home and was paid $1,650.00 for that representation. At times during the representation, respondent assured Complainant A that the foreclosure was proceeding. Respondent also told Complainant A that he was waiting on a hearing date when, in fact, he had not filed anything with the court.

On August 9, 2010, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months. In the Matter of Boyd, 388 S.C. 516, 697 S.E.2d 603 (2010). Respondent did not notify Complainant A of his suspension. Instead, respondent offered advice to Complainant A regarding the foreclosure action while he was suspended from the practice of law.

When Complainant A learned respondent had not filed the foreclosure action, he requested a refund of the fees paid to respondent. Initially, respondent refused to refund the money, stating the fee was non-refundable. In February 2011, respondent refunded the money to Complainant A in order to avoid a lawsuit.

[359]*359 Matter II

As noted above, on August 9, 2010, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months. Id. He was reinstated to the practice of law on June 14, 2011. In the Matter of Boyd, 393 S.C. 159, 711 S.E.2d 898 (2011). Prior to his suspension, respondent worked for a law firm. At the time, a law student named Richard Thomas Roe1 worked at the same firm.

In May 2011, Claimant A had a pending matter before the Workers’ Compensation Commission. Michael Petit, Esquire, represented the insurance carrier on Claimant A’s claim.

On May 25, 2011, after Richard Thomas Roe was sworn-in as a member of the South Carolina Bar and while respondent was suspended from the practice of law, respondent sent a letter to Mr. Petit on behalf of Claimant A under the assumed name of Tom Roe. The May 25, 2011, letter was on the letterhead of a fictitious law firm that respondent called “Roe Law, LLC.” The address on the letterhead was respondent’s home address. The telephone number on the letterhead was respondent’s cell phone number. Respondent’s May 25, 2011, letter included a Notice of Appearance on Behalf of Claimant A with the Workers’ Compensation Commission signed by respondent using the assumed name Tom Roe.

Believing that respondent was an attorney named Tom Roe, Mr. Petit prepared a settlement agreement and forwarded it to respondent at the address on the letterhead. On May 28, 2011, respondent signed the settlement agreement on behalf of Claimant A using the assumed name Tom Roe. The settlement agreement was filed by Mr. Petit who was unaware at the time that Tom Roe was a name fabricated by respondent.

On June 9, 2011, respondent sent a copy of the Notice of Appearance on Behalf of Claimant A, signed by respondent using the assumed name Tom Roe, to the Workers’ Compensation Commission by email using the email address which included the phrase “tomroelaw@.” The same day, the Workers’ Compensation Commission issued a notice of settlement hearing to be held on June 14, 2011.

[360]*360On June 10, 2011, respondent telephoned the South Carolina Bar from his cell phone and left a message identifying himself as Tom Roe and requesting an address change for bar member Tom Roe. A member of the staff at the Bar returned the call and left a voice mail message with instructions about how to change the address.

On June 13, 2011, respondent faxed a document entitled “Termination of Attorney/Client Relationship” to Mr. Petit under the assumed name Tom Roe. On June 14, 2011, the settlement hearing was held by Workers’ Compensation Commissioner Derrick Williams. Claimant A did not appear and no one appeared on his behalf.

On June 15, 2011, at approximately 9:00 a.m., respondent called the South Carolina Bar a second time, falsely represented himself as Tom Roe, and requested that the address on file for that attorney be changed. The address respondent requested that the Bar use was his home address. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on June 15, 2011, Commissioner Williams held a conference call in which he called the number in the file for “Tom Roe.” Mr. Petit also participated in the conference call. Respondent answered the call and falsely identified himself as Tom Roe. During the conference call, respondent falsely stated that he was a graduate of Clemson University and the Charleston School of Law. He gave Commissioner Williams the bar number for Richard Thomas Roe.

On June 22, 2011, respondent appeared at a rescheduled hearing before Commissioner Williams, falsely identified himself as Tom Roe, and gave a false bar number to the commissioner. At that hearing, respondent requested to be relieved from representation of Claimant A. Commissioner Williams instructed respondent to submit a written motion and proposed order. On June 24, 2011, respondent submitted a Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for Claimant A to the Workers’ Compensation Commission. Respondent signed the name “Tom Roe” to the motion.

Matter III

On May 20,2011, and May 31, 2011, while he was suspended from the practice of law, respondent accepted two installment payments of $750.00 from a potential client for representation [361]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Boyd
748 S.E.2d 777 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 2013)
People v. McNamara
311 P.3d 662 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
731 S.E.2d 876, 399 S.C. 356, 2012 WL 3793185, 2012 S.C. LEXIS 173, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-boyd-sc-2012.