In re Beasley

523 B.R. 281, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 5141, 2014 WL 7339034
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedDecember 22, 2014
DocketNo. 09-30534-EJC
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 523 B.R. 281 (In re Beasley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Beasley, 523 B.R. 281, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 5141, 2014 WL 7339034 (Ga. 2014).

Opinion

[283]*283 OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL DISCHARGE

EDWARD J. COLEMAN, III, Bankruptcy Judge.

This case is before the Court on the Motion to Compel Discharge Under Section 1328(A) [sic] of Title II [sic] of the United States Code (“Motion”) (dckt. 80) filed by Joshua and Jennifer Beasley (“Debtors ”), which seeks the refund of all amounts received by the Chapter 13 Trustee in excess of the $40,980.00 that Debtors’ confirmed plan provided would be paid in monthly installments over five years. Huon Le, the Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee”), filed a response objecting to the relief sought. The parties disagree about whether Debtors should receive credit for a $1,084.57 money order that Debtors paid to Trustee and that Trustee immediately disbursed to satisfy the unsecured portion of a creditor’s claim pursuant to the terms of an order granting the sale of that creditor’s collateral. Because the Court concludes that the sale order modified Debtors’ plan by providing for an additional payment of $1,084.57, the proper amount that Trustee must turn over to Debtors is $367.67.

I. JURISDICTION

This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), and the Standing Order of Reference signed by Chief Judge Anthony A. Alaimo on July 13, 1984. This is a “core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) (“matters concerning the administration of the estate”) and (L) (“confirmation of plans”). In accordance with Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties do not dispute the relevant facts. Debtors filed a Chapter 13 petition on September 19, 2009. (Dckt. 1.) Debtors proposed a plan with monthly payments of $683.00 for sixty months and a zero-percent dividend to unsecured creditors based on their calculation that the applicable commitment period was five years and that the amount of their disposable income was determined under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) because they have above-median income. (Dckt. 1, at 37; dckt. 7.) Pursuant to General Order 2007-2, the Court entered an order to commence withholding $683.00 per month from Mr. Beasley’s employer. (Dckt. 13.) The Court confirmed Debtors’ plan on November 10, 2009. (Dckt. 33.)

On October 14, 2013, Debtors filed a motion to sell their 2007 Ford F-150 (“truck”). (Dckt. 70.) This truck secured the claim of Georgia Federal Credit Union (“credit union ”), which had been bifurcated by the' plan into a secured and unsecured portion. When the motion to sell was filed, the secured portion of that claim had already been paid in full. (Dckt. 70.) The motion to sell provided for the full repayment of the unsecured portion of the credit union’s claim so that the credit union would release its lien before all plan payments were completed.

On November 19, 2013, the Court entered an order granting the motion to sell in the form prepared by Debtors and consented to by Trustee. (Dckt. 74.) The sale order provided that (1) the sale of the truck for $8,000.00 was approved; (2) $1,084.57 of that amount was to be turned over to Trustee to be disburse “immediately” to the credit union on Claim 1.1 (unsecured portion of claim); and (3) the credit union was required to release its lien on the truck once it received that amount and Claim 1.0 and 1.1 were to be “reduced to amount paid.” Debtors and Trustee com[284]*284plied with the terms of the sale order. The confirmed plan as filed did not provide that the unsecured portion of the credit union’s claim would be paid in full. Debtors did not file a separate plan modification in connection with their motion to sell the truck.

If Debtors had paid Trustee only the $683.00 for sixty months (as stated in their plan), Trustee would have received only $40,980.00. However, Trustee has received a total of $42,432.24 from all sources: $683.00 money order, payroll deductions, and $1,084.57 money order. In addition to disbursing the proceeds from the $1,084.57 money order to the credit union, Trustee has disbursed $40,401.98 to creditors and still has $945.69 remaining.

On August 7, 2014, Debtors filed the Motion now under the Court’s consideration, seeking a discharge and to be reimbursed for all payments made to Trustee in excess of what was required under their confirmed plan. (Dckt. 80.) On August 12, 2014, Trustee filed a response objecting to the Motion on the basis that Debtors had not complied with the applicable commitment period of five years because the Motion was filed during the fifty-ninth month of their plan to repay creditors. The Court held a hearing on September 9, 2014, which was continued to October 14, 2014. (Dckt. 86.) The Court ordered that a release of wages order be submitted and that Trustee cease any disbursements pending the resolution of the Motion. At the October 14, 2014 hearing, the parties asked for yet another continuance so that they could “work out” a stipulation of facts prior to the hearing. Consequently, the Court continued to the hearing to December 9, 2014; however, a joint stipulation of facts was never submitted. After the conclusion of the December 9 hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Debtors’ Motion Is No Longer Premature

As a threshold matter, Debtors filed the Motion during the fifty-ninth month of their plan, seeking, inter alia, a discharge on the grounds that plan payments were complete. As Trustee correctly points out, in Whaley v. Tennyson (In Tennyson), 611 F.3d 873 (11th Cir.2010), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the “applicable commitment period” is a temporal term that establishes the minimum duration of a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. Debtors’ counsel conceded at the October 14, 2014 hearing that Tennyson applies and, as a result, the Motion was premature. Due to continuances of the hearing on the Motion, however, the five-year minimum duration of Debtors’ plan has been satisfied and the Motion is no longer premature.

B. The Plan Was Modified by Virtue of the Sale Order

“A Chapter 13 plan of confirmation has res judicata effect unless it is subsequently modified by a bankruptcy court order.” Sys. & Servs. Techs., Inc. v. Davis (In re Davis), 314 F.3d 567, 570 (11th Cir.2002) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1327, 1329).

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523 B.R. 281, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 5141, 2014 WL 7339034, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-beasley-gasb-2014.