In Re Bay Runner Pipeline, LLC v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided August 12, 2025·No. 13-25-00383-CV·Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-25-00383-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE BAY RUNNER PIPELINE, LLC

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

By amended petition for writ of mandamus, relator Bay Runner Pipeline, LLC (Bay Runner) contends that the trial court 1 abused its discretion by: (1) failing to timely appoint special commissioners and alternate special commissioners in accordance with the Texas Property Code; and (2) requiring a hearing before making these appointments. We

1 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number 2025-CV-0225-A in the 197th District

Court of Willacy County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Adolfo Cordova. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2.

conditionally grant mandamus relief.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 2, 2025, Bay Runner filed an original petition for condemnation against real party in interest Martha McGee regarding a parcel of land that she owns in Willacy County, Texas. Bay Runner alleged that it was developing an approximately 145-mile intrastate pipeline to transport natural gas from Nueces County, Texas, south through Kleberg, Kenedy, and Willacy Counties, ultimately terminating in Cameron County, Texas. Bay Runner explained that upon commencement of operations, the pipeline would transport up to 2.5 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas on behalf of unaffiliated third parties for a transportation fee. Bay Runner explained that it needed to acquire easements and other property rights to construct the pipeline and that it had made “good faith efforts to negotiate and amicably acquire” McGee’s property; however, McGee had not accepted its offers. Bay Runner thus sought to acquire temporary and permanent easements and a right of way across McGee’s property by eminent domain. In its prayer for relief, Bay Runner requested that:

1. The Court appoint three disinterested real property owners who reside in Willacy County as special commissioners and two disinterested real property owners who reside in Willacy County as alternate commissioners;

2. The special commissioners promptly schedule a hearing at a location as near as practical to the Property;

3. The special commissioners assess damages fairly, impartially, and according to the law;

4. Bay Runner be awarded possession pending litigation upon satisfaction of the statutory requirements;

5. The Court enter judgment vesting Bay Runner with the Easements and property rights sought in this condemnation action; and

6. The Court award Bay Runner its costs of suit and any other relief to which Bay Runner may be entitled.

On July 23, 2025, Bay Runner filed an emergency motion to appoint special commissioners. In this motion, Bay Runner explained that the Texas Property Code specifically requires the trial court to appoint special commissioners within thirty days of the date that a condemnation petition has been filed, and it asserted that it had filed its original petition on June 2, 2025, and the thirty-day window for the trial court to appoint special commissioners had passed. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.014(a). Accordingly, Bay Runner requested the trial court to “immediately appoint special commissioners without additional delay or hearing.”

On July 30, 2025, counsel for Bay Runner sent the trial court a letter regarding this case and several other eminent domain cases that it had filed in the 197th District Court from May 30, 2025, through June 10, 2025. Bay Runner advised the trial court that the Texas Property Code required it to appoint special commissioners no later than thirty days after the petitions in these cases were filed, and the thirty-day window in each of the referenced cases expired from June 30, 2025, through July 10, 2025. Bay Runner explained that it had contacted the trial court’s staff to see if orders were forthcoming or if the trial court required additional information; however, “staff advised that the [trial c]ourt would require a hearing prior to issuing any orders appointing special commissioners, and the earliest date for a hearing would be August 20, 2025.” Bay Runner informed the trial court that construction on the pipeline was due to commence on October 1, 2025, and it needed to start construction on that date to complete construction in accordance with its contractual commitments. Bay Runner further stated that “[t]he impending

construction start date, the negative ripple effect of delay, and the significant impact of multiple gaps in property rights along the route, have left Bay Runner with no alternative other than to file a Petition for Writ of Mandamus at [the] Thirteenth Court of Appeals.” Nevertheless, the trial court did not appoint special commissioners, act on Bay Runner’s emergency motion, or set a hearing regarding this case.

On July 30, 2025, Bay Runner filed this original proceeding. By order issued on July 31, 2025, we requested McGee or any others whose interests might be affected by the relief sought to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4, 52.8. On August 5, 2025, McGee, who is proceeding pro se, filed a response stating that she has “no knowledge or feedback regarding this writ.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate Indem.

Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator must show that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion; and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “The relator bears the burden of proving these two requirements.” In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.

Alternatively, when “a trial court issues an order ‘beyond its jurisdiction,’

mandamus relief is appropriate because such an order is void ab initio.” In re

Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding)). In such circumstances, the relator need not show it lacks an adequate appellate remedy. See In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605.

III. EMINENT DOMAIN

Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code governs the exercise of eminent domain authority. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001–.103; REME, L.L.C. v. State, 709 S.W.3d 608, 611 (Tex. 2025) (per curiam). “The eminent domain statute is designed to provide a speedy and fair assessment of damages.” City of Killeen v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 709 S.W.3d 746, 754 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet.) (quoting Gulf Energy Pipeline Co. v. Garcia, 884 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, orig. proceeding)). To facilitate this goal, the Texas Property Code has established a two-part procedure for condemnation proceedings. City of Killeen, 709 S.W.3d at 754.

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