In Re Barnes Foundation

672 A.2d 1364, 449 Pa. Super. 81, 1996 Pa. Super. LEXIS 452
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 15, 1996
Docket1641
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 672 A.2d 1364 (In Re Barnes Foundation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Barnes Foundation, 672 A.2d 1364, 449 Pa. Super. 81, 1996 Pa. Super. LEXIS 452 (Pa. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

TAMILIA, Judge.

This Opinion follows our Judgment Order Per Curiam of May 17, 1995, which authorized the Barnes Foundation Trustees to permit off-site exhibition of selected works of art owned by the Barnes Foundation. Allocatur to the Supreme Court was requested following our May 17th Order and was denied on May 26, 1995. In re Barnes Foundation, 541 Pa. 649, 664 A.2d 539 (1995).

*84 While the Barnes Foundation appeal at No. 00794 Philadelphia, 1994, was held to be moot in this Court’s Order of March 8, 1995, 1 and in In re The Barnes Foundation, 443 Pa.Super. 369, 661 A.2d 889 (1995) (Barnes I), the emergency appeal and hearing at No. 01641 Philadelphia, 1995, was timely and brings us to a basic consideration of the issues posed by Friends of Barnes (hereinafter Friends) and of Barnes Students (hereinafter Students). Considering the issue raised by the Trustees as to the role of the Students in this appeal, as stated in Barnes I at No. 02605 Philadelphia, 1994, the students have no standing. This is so for either of two reasons. At the time of Barnes I, the Students, represented solely by Nicholas Tinari, had no standing as Tinari was not a student at the time, having been expelled. This Court also held in Barnes I at No. 02085 Philadelphia, 1993, that mandamus did not lie for Tinari’s reinstatement, and as a matter of contract, no breach of contract was alleged or proven for termination of the student status. The grounds for termination were found to be on-going, vexatious and substantial and neither the trial court nor this Court would intervene in a decision by the trustees to suspend under those facts. Even though reinstatement might have occurred prior to the instant appeal, the Students have no standing on the issues of this case because their appointment to the Board of Trustees ad litem by Judge Stefan was purely for the limited purpose to provide the court with facts about the educational process and curriculum of the Foundation’s Art Department from the perspective of current and future students. Unfortunately, the Students have used this wedge to engage in what must be described as frivolous and harassing conduct which has done nothing but run up attorneys’ fees for the Foundation. (Slip Op., Stefan, J., 8/9/91.) Based upon the ruling of Judge Stefan and this Court on appeal, the trial court erred in refusing to grant preliminary objection as to “student” participation. The matter of standing is jurisdictional and may not be waived by the court refusing to decide the case on a technical basis (Judge Ott, *85 T.T., 5/10/95, p. 6), but electing to proceed on the merits. The Trustees objected to that disposition, preserving the issue on the record (T.T. at 8), thereby requiring our disposition of that issue on appeal.

As to the standing of the Friends of Barnes Foundation, the Foundation likewise raised an issue as to their standing which was also ignored by the court in its dismissal of all preliminary objections. This issue was likewise preserved for appeal by the Foundation. Prior to ruling on that issue, the case was considered on the merits by the panel of this Court as it appeared to be the propitious means of expediting an emergency appeal when the record was not available to determine the standing issue as to the “Friends.” This Opinion will focus on the merits which required resolution by the trial court as part of a continuum of the preceding cases and the several petitions to permit loans and touring of the art considered by Judge Stefan. The trial court proceeded to hear the request of the trustees to extend the venue, permitting the Students and Friends to contest this action. Nothing in the record subsequently forwarded to this Court established that the Friends have standing. Having issued our Per Curiam Order on the assumption that they did have standing, we will proceed to support that Order on the merits, as though they did have standing. Only in the Procedural Background Statement of the Adjudication and Decree of February 1, 1994 is there a reference to Friends of Barnes in conjunction with the Violette de Mazia Trust as co-protagonists requesting denial of the petition by the trustee. It would appear the de Mazia Trust has standing and as a “Friend of Barnes” it permits this matter to go forward on the merits. Treating these cases as a continuum, there is a basis for according standing to the Friends of Barnes, as including the de Mazia Trust, Violette de Mazia was the long-time assistant, co-author and traveling companion of Dr. Barnes, who was given special status in the Barnes indenture. Her trust, following her decease, was designed to continue the support and interest in the Foundation she manifested during her life and pursuant to the Foundation indenture.

*86 As to Friends of Barnes, we have held in the previously entered Per Curiam Order of May 17, 1995, following the emergency argument conducted by conference call before a panel of this Court, that the reasoning of Judge Stefan, as applied to new facts, controls in this case with the same opportunities (gain without harm) central to Judge Stefan’s decision. Judge Ott, who assumed jurisdiction upon the death of Judge Stefan, deviated from Judge Stefan’s analysis, which is the law of the case, and withdrew to a technical application of the trust agreement which would have unnecessarily denied the Foundation the ability to enlarge its endowment and protect what could be an inevitable defeasance of the trust based upon a corpus which fails to earn sufficient income to fulfill the dominant intent of the trust to preserve the art works intact and to teach students.

The 1922 trust agreement provided for no loans of the art and preservation of the art in the building created for that purpose and to educate students. When two purposes of a trust become conflicted and the dominant intent of the trust to preserve the institution created by the trust becomes imperiled, some provisions of the trust, such as a no-loan policy, must give way to the dominant purpose if this can be done reasonably. In re Mears Estate, 299 Pa. 217, 149 A. 157 (1980) (Equity will prevent failure of definite charity by employing other means, where necessary, to carry out substantial intention of donor). The role of the Court is to look back to the mind of the settlor of the trust, to determine what he would have done when faced with conditions which were unanticipated at the time of the creation of the trust and nearly as possible to fulfill the intention of the conveyor. In re Bodine’s Trust, 429 Pa. 260, 239 A.2d 315 (1968). Blind adherence to the terms of the trust agreement could result in the trust losing its public non-tax status and financially defaulting to the point the art works sought to be preserved in the Barnes Foundation would be sold off or assigned to some other institution which would not respect the wishes of Dr. Barnes and might in fact be the very institutions he had strongly opposed during his lifetime. The Friends of Barnes *87

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Barnes Foundation
683 A.2d 894 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
672 A.2d 1364, 449 Pa. Super. 81, 1996 Pa. Super. LEXIS 452, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-barnes-foundation-pasuperct-1996.