UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
IN RE APPLICATION OF BAPA HOLDINGS, CORP., PURSUANT TO 28 Misc. Action No. 25-00026 (AHA) U.S.C. § 1782 FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING EVIDENCE FOR USE IN A FOREIGN PROCEEDING
Memorandum Opinion and Order
On May 21, 2025, this court granted BAPA Holdings, Corp.’s application for discovery
from NeWay Capital LLC for use in a foreign proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. ECF No. 3.
NeWay filed a motion to vacate the court’s order and to quash the subpoena and, after full briefing
by both parties, the court denied the motion. ECF No. 12. NeWay now moves for a stay pending
appeal. ECF No. 15. After reviewing NeWay’s motion, the court finds it is premised largely on
misconstruing the proceedings before this court, including NeWay’s own deficient and “hide the
ball” approach to litigating personal jurisdiction, which led the court to discount its representations
and evidence. Because NeWay has not satisfied the showing required for a stay pending appeal,
the court denies that motion.
I. Background
In February 2025, BAPA filed an ex parte application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, to obtain
discovery from NeWay for use in a foreign proceeding. ECF No. 1. The court ordered BAPA to
show cause why the application should proceed ex parte. Minute Order (Apr. 2, 2025). The court
accepted BAPA’s showing, which included the expectation that any issues related to the subpoena
could be raised in a motion to quash, should NeWay choose to file one. See ECF No. 2 at 2. The
court authorized BAPA to serve its proposed subpoena on NeWay, relying on BAPA’s evidence that Neway’s principal location was D.C., as indicated on NeWay’s website and in official records.
ECF No. 3 at 1; see ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 7.
After being served with the subpoena, NeWay moved to vacate the court’s order granting
the discovery. ECF No. 5. NeWay challenged whether BAPA’s discovery application should have
been granted, arguing that considering BAPA’s request ex parte violated due process and that
BAPA failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for discovery. Id. at 3–6. NeWay also included
a perfunctory, two-paragraph argument about personal jurisdiction, in which it cited only the
improper “substantial, continuous or systematic connection” test for general jurisdiction. Id. at 4;
see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 (2014) (rejecting formulation of the test allowing
for “the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a
substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business’”).
In its motion, NeWay contested that it was subject to jurisdiction in D.C., characterizing
the Washington, D.C. office that it identifies as its headquarters publicly and in official documents
as a “virtual office” and asserting that NeWay “has not designated Washington, D.C. for general
jurisdiction purposes.” ECF No. 5 at 2. NeWay’s motion represented that “[n]o records are kept”
in D.C. and “[n]o personnel, management, or board members of NeWay physically reside or
otherwise regularly do business” in D.C. Id. NeWay did not clearly identify any jurisdiction where
it could be subject to personal jurisdiction, attaching an affidavit from its counsel stating it is “a
distributed, remote-work company.” ECF No. 5-1 ¶ 2. NeWay asserted that “[t]o the extent it has
a physical operational location” at all, it is in Mississippi, where a board member and a chief of
staff live. Id. ¶ 3. NeWay’s motion did not explain why it had selected the residence of that board
member and employee yet omitted any information about where other employees, including its C-
suite executives, worked from and did not include the details of any actual management or
2 operations in Mississippi. The affidavit offered the obscure statement that “space is licensed for
annual board meetings to occur” in Mississippi “if and to the extent they are physical meetings
and not organized elsewhere.” Id.
In response, BAPA argued that NeWay “resides” or can be “found” within D.C. as required
under § 1782, recognizing that the standard is at least coextensive with the typical due process test
for personal jurisdiction. ECF No. 7 at 5–10. BAPA also included evidence that undermined the
credibility of NeWay’s representations and evidence. This included:
1. NeWay’s public company profiles identify its “Headquarters” as Washington, D.C. and
provide a Washington, D.C. address. ECF No. 7-2 ¶¶ 4, 6.
2. NeWay’s motion omitted information about several of its executives, who had public
profiles indicating they are operating out of D.C., from its motion and affidavit, in favor
of selectively identifying the common location of one board member and chief of staff,
neither of whom were identified as part of the company’s executive team. In particular:
a. NeWay’s website identified six members of its executive team. See ECF No. 7-
5. Neither the board member or chief of staff that NeWay described in its
motion or affidavit were identified as part of the executive team. See id.
b. NeWay’s CEO and chairman, listed as part of the executive team, had a public
profile that identified the “Washington, D.C. metro area” as his location as it
relates to NeWay. ECF No. 7-7.
c. The person listed as NeWay’s COO on the website maintained a public profile
indicating he was operating out of Washington, D.C. until May 2021. ECF No.
7-8.
3 d. Another executive team member, identified as an officer and advisory board
member, also had a public profile identifying his current location as
Washington, D.C. The profile also identified him as having served as NeWay’s
“Executive Director.” ECF No. 7-9.
3. NeWay’s website identifies Washington, D.C. as its sole location, providing a D.C.
address and phone number. ECF No. 7-2 ¶ 4; ECF No. 7-4.
4. Contemporaneous records support that NeWay’s principal place of business is
Washington, D.C., not Mississippi:
a. NeWay’s Annual Reports from 2018 to 2025 signed by NeWay officers,
including NeWay’s affiant, specified Washington, D.C. as NeWay’s “principal
office.” ECF No. 7-2 ¶¶ 18–21; ECF Nos. 7-17, 7-18, 7-19.
b. SEC forms signed by NeWay’s CEO placed him at NeWay’s Washington D.C.
address and identified Washington, D.C. as NeWay’s “principal place of
business.” ECF No. 7-2 ¶¶ 14–17; ECF Nos. 7-14, 7-15, 7-16
5. A property record indicates that the Mississippi address NeWay provided in its motion
was a residential home owned by one of the company’s board members and that board
member’s spouse. ECF No. 7-2 ¶¶ 5, 13; ECF No. 7-13.
In its reply brief, NeWay cited for the first time the applicable legal standard for general
jurisdiction and attempted to introduce new evidence that it chose to omit from its original motion.
But NeWay continued to omit obviously relevant information, in favor of obscure representations.
For example, after BAPA indicated NeWay’s CEO operates from Washington, D.C., NeWay
submitted a cursory affidavit from the CEO identifying Maryland as his U.S. place of residence,
consistent with him working in D.C. ECF No. 8-5 ¶ 2. The affidavit stated the CEO spends “a
4 significant portion” of time traveling internationally and does not “continuously” work from D.C.
but did not identify any place of work in the U.S. other than D.C. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. Similarly, after
NeWay omitted any mention of someone who worked as its “Executive Director” and had a public
profile identifying D.C. as his place of work, NeWay offered a similar cursory affidavit that
confirmed he also lives in Maryland and provided only vague representations that he does not
“continuously” do business in D.C for NeWay. ECF No. 8-4 ¶¶ 2–3. In other words, NeWay’s best
effort to rebut BAPA’s evidence tying NeWay to D.C. relied on where the omitted executive team
members lived (which did not rebut, and was consistent with, NeWay having its principal place of
business in D.C.) and identified D.C. as the only U.S. location where they did work. NeWay’s
evidence accordingly did not rebut BAPA’s showing that these executives work for NeWay in
Washington, D.C.
NeWay’s reply also attempted to rebut BAPA’s evidence by disclaiming the information
on its own website as “outdated” and “inaccurate.” ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 3. According to NeWay, the
person identified on the website as its COO in Washington, D.C. had ceased working for NeWay
in 2021. Id. However, NeWay did not dispute that the COO was another executive who had worked
from D.C. during his tenure. See id. ¶ 5. That is, NeWay’s reply did not meaningfully dispute that
until recently NeWay’s executive team included three members conducting their U.S.-based work
for the company from D.C.—with no indication that any of those three individuals conducted their
business for NeWay from Mississippi—and continued to have two such members conducting their
work from D.C. See id. NeWay also did not address the fact that neither of the two people it had
identified as residing in Mississippi had been identified as members of the executive team. See
ECF No. 7-5; ECF No. 8-1. Indeed, the affidavit of the chief of staff suggested otherwise. See ECF
5 No. 8-2 ¶¶ 1, 3 (chief of staff describing role as “coordinating between executives and board
members” and traveling to Washington D.C. to support work on request).
NeWay’s new evidence on reply also undermined the credibility of its earlier submissions.
For example, in its initial motion NeWay argued that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in
D.C. on the representation that “[n]o records are kept in Washington.” ECF No. 5 at 2. But in reply,
the affidavit of an operations manager clarified that “[a]ll business records are kept digitally”—
context which renders the point neutral, at best, and would not favor jurisdiction in any particular
place. ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 5. The affidavit then stated that to the extent company records are stored in
any physical location temporarily, they are stored in D.C. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7. The operations manager
further identified D.C. as “the only central physical point of contact for business communications
with the entire executive team.” Id. ¶ 7.
NeWay’s new evidence on reply also did not provide any credible support for NeWay’s
argument that its principal place of business is in Mississippi. For example, NeWay’s reply did not
address why its principal place of business should be determined based on the location of the one
board member and employee it selected, rather than the place where its executive team members,
including its CEO, conduct business for the company (with no evidence that any executive team
members conduct work in Mississippi). NeWay did not address why it had consistently identified
Washington, D.C., not Mississippi, as its headquarters publicly and as its principal place of
business in its annual reports and SEC filings. Indeed, Neway did not provide a single record
indicating it did any actual business in Mississippi. And NeWay did not rebut BAPA’s showing
that the Mississippi address NeWay had offered was simply the residence of a single board member
and his wife. See ECF No. 8-3 ¶ 4. NeWay instead continued to make the obscure representation
that “board meetings are licensed to occur” in Mississippi—a statement that has little to no actual
6 meaning (for instance, leaving out whether any board meeting has ever actually occurred at the
residence and reserving the possibility that board meetings have all occurred elsewhere). ECF No.
8 at 4. Indeed, the NeWay board member who has “licensed a portion of” his home for “annual
meetings,” explained that “all annual meetings have been conducted virtually to date,” confirming
that no annual meetings have actually occurred in Mississippi. ECF No. 8-3 ¶ 4.
Following NeWay’s reply, BAPA challenged NeWay’s late evidence on reply and sought
leave to file a sur-reply to the extent the court considered the new evidence. ECF No. 9. The court
found it unnecessary to decide whether NeWay’s new evidence was properly before the court
because, even considering it, NeWay’s principal place of business was D.C., not Mississippi. The
court denied NeWay’s motion to vacate and to quash the subpoena. ECF No. 12. The court
observed that § 1782’s inquiry into where a party “resides or is found” is generally understood as
at least coextensive with the usual due process analysis and accordingly includes the general
jurisdiction inquiry into “where the defendant is ‘essentially at home.’” Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
Applying that standard, the court concluded that NeWay’s evidence could not overcome BAPA’s
“far more substantial showing” that NeWay is “at home” in D.C. Id. at 3. The court also rejected
NeWay’s argument that the subpoena was overbroad, noting that any such issues could be
addressed through routine discovery processes. Id. at 5 n.2. NeWay now seeks a stay pending
appeal.
II. Discussion
“A stay pending appeal is an ‘extraordinary’ remedy.” KalshiEX LLC v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n, 119 F.4th 58, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Citizens for Resp. & Ethics
in Wash. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 904 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam)). In
determining whether to grant a stay pending appeal, the court considers (1) whether NeWay has
made a strong showing that it will likely succeed on the merits of its appeal; (2) whether NeWay
7 will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay; (3) whether a stay will substantially injure other parties;
and (4) whether a stay is in the public interest. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). The first two factors are “the most critical.” Id.
Here, none of the factors favor a stay.
A. NeWay Is Not Likely To Succeed
NeWay has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. NeWay claims its appeal raises
“fundamental questions” about the court’s jurisdiction—namely, “whether this Court applied the
correct legal standard in concluding it has personal jurisdiction over NeWay.” ECF No. 15 at 1, 3.
But that is premised on misconstruing the court’s opinion, not on any actual disagreement about
or error in the correct standard. NeWay’s appeal instead contests application of the legal standard
for general jurisdiction to the particular record in this case, relying on evidence that this court gave
little weight to because of its evasion and dubious credibility (to the extent the evidence was
properly before the court at all).
According to NeWay, the court failed to apply the correct legal standard for general
personal jurisdiction, which asks where NeWay is “essentially at home,” and paradigmatically
includes its “state of incorporation” and “principal place of business.” ECF No. 15 at 3 (quoting
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127). That argument is not likely to succeed for many reasons.
First, that’s the test this court applied. See ECF No. 12 at 2–3. The court explained that
§ 1782’s inquiry into where a party “resides or is found” is generally understood as at least
coextensive with the usual due process analysis. Id. at 2 (citing In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520,
528 (2nd Cir. 2019)). The court explained that this includes the general jurisdiction inquiry into
“where the defendant is ‘essentially at home’” and, accordingly, generally includes the “district
where it is headquartered or incorporated.” Id. at 2–3 (citations omitted). The court considered
numerous factors and credited evidence supporting the conclusion that NeWay is “at home” in
8 D.C., including the substantial, contemporaneous evidence that NeWay itself understood its
headquarters to be in D.C. Cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010) (recognizing in the
context of diversity jurisdiction that “in practice” a company’s principal place of business “should
normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters”). This included BAPA’s
evidence regarding NeWay’s own website, its executive team’s locations and public profiles, and
NeWay’s annual reports and SEC filings which had for several years identified D.C. as its principal
place of business. ECF No. 12 at 3. The court also reached this conclusion based on NeWay’s
failure to offer any credible evidence of an alternative principal place of business. See id.
(concluding that NeWay’s evidence that its “chief of staff and one board member apparently live”
in Mississippi failed to outweigh BAPA’s “far more substantial” evidence that even NeWay has
consistently viewed itself “as an organization headquartered in D.C.”). As set forth above, even
assuming NeWay’s reply evidence could be properly considered, it continued to omit obviously
relevant evidence and did not rebut BAPA’s evidence that the CEO, another executive team
member, and, until recently, a second C-suite executive performed their U.S.-based work from
D.C. NeWay simply continued to advance Mississippi as its sole alternative, based on the location
of two people who were not on the executive team and the obscure representation that “board
meetings are licensed to occur” there. ECF No. 8 at 4; ECF Nos. 8-2, 8-3.
Second, NeWay’s likelihood of success is also complicated by its litigation conduct, which
included filing a deficient motion and proceeding in a manner that essentially sandbagged the
plaintiffs. As noted, NeWay’s motion failed to cite the proper legal standard for general
jurisdiction or provide any relevant legal analysis. The motion offered only a cursory assertion that
it had “not designated Washington, D.C. for general jurisdiction purposes” with an affidavit that
lacked facial credibility (for example, advancing the location of NeWay’s chief of staff and one
9 board member while omitting any details about where NeWay’s executive team members work)
and that relied on obscured legalese (for example, indicating that “space is licensed for annual
board meetings to occur” in Mississippi “if and to the extent they are physical meetings and not
organized elsewhere”). ECF No. 5 at 2; ECF No. 5-1 ¶ 3. This court therefore applied the correct
legal standard despite NeWay’s deficient motion. Only in reply did NeWay first address the
“essentially at home” test and attempt to submit numerous affidavits bearing on that inquiry. Thus,
even setting aside this court’s conclusion that NeWay’s evidence deserved little weight and failed
to credibly rebut BAPA’s showing, NeWay would have to overcome potential forfeiture of the
relevant issues given its cursory, underdeveloped argument and its bait-and-switch approach. See
Gold Rsrv. Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 146 F. Supp. 3d 112, 126 (D.D.C. 2015)
(explaining that “perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by
pertinent authority” are deemed waived); In re Sealed Case, 77 F.4th 815, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
(“It is well established that an argument first presented in a reply brief before the district court is
forfeited.”); N.Y. Rehab. Care Mgmt., LLC v. NLRB, 506 F.3d 1070, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(explaining that “in order to prevent the ‘sandbagging’ of another party, ‘we have generally held
that issues not raised until the reply brief are waived’” (citation omitted)); Twin Rivers Paper Co.
LLC v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 934 F.3d 607, 615 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining that “an argument
is forfeited if the petitioners ‘were obscure on the issue in their opening brief and only warmed to
the issue in their reply brief’” (citation omitted)). And if NeWay could overcome the consequences
of its deficient briefing and litigation conduct, this court would then have to address the issue it
reserved as to whether NeWay’s reply evidence was properly before the court in the first place.
See ECF No. 9; McAllister v. District of Columbia, 689 F. App’x 646, 646–47 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(recognizing that it is within a district court’s discretion to decline to consider evidence “submitted
10 for the first time” on reply); Zynovieva v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 19-cv-3445, 2021 WL 3472628,
at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2021) (“Generally, evidence submitted in reply comes too late.”). 1
Third, the new arguments NeWay offers in its motion for a stay are themselves unsound.
NeWay premises its motion for a stay on Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010), in which the
Supreme Court adopted a “nerve center” test to determine a corporation’s domicile for the purpose
of diversity jurisdiction. It should be telling that NeWay did not cite Hertz in any of its previous
briefing before this court. Even in its motion for a stay, NeWay does not acknowledge or offer any
analysis regarding the distinction between diversity jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. See
Morinville v. US Inventor, Inc., No. 24-cv-3422, 2025 WL 370983, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2025)
(explaining that “both the legal test for personal jurisdiction and the concerns underlying personal
jurisdiction are distinct from the test and concerns when it comes to subject matter jurisdiction and
determining principal place of business”). And, in any event, NeWay’s “nerve center” would
plainly be D.C.—where the members of its executive team perform work and NeWay itself has
understood its headquarters to be—and not in Mississippi—where there does not appear to be any
actual control or direction. See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93 (2010) (explaining that “principal place
of business” is “best read as referring to the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control,
and coordinate the corporation’s activities,” which “should normally be the place where the
1 NeWay has never requested an evidentiary hearing and has forfeited any such request. In any event, the court would have concluded that NeWay had not made a sufficient showing to warrant an evidentiary hearing. See World Wide Travel Inc. v. Travelmate US, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013), on reconsideration, No. 13-cv-1333, 2014 WL 12526712 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2014) (explaining that when “personal jurisdiction is challenged, ‘the district judge has considerable procedural leeway in choosing a methodology for deciding the motion,’” and the court “may rest on the allegations in the pleadings, collect affidavits and other evidence, or even hold a hearing” (quoting 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351 (3d ed. 2004))). Although NeWay requested oral argument, the court concluded that it would not aid in resolution of the legal issues in this case.
11 corporation maintains its headquarters”); see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (citing Hertz with
approval in relation to discussion of “principal place of business” as a paradigm basis for general
jurisdiction).
Indeed, NeWay’s argument distorts Hertz and engages in the very the type of manipulation
the Supreme Court eschewed in that case. In Hertz, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility
that a party would engage in “jurisdictional manipulation,” by misdirecting the court as to its actual
place of business through “the mere filing” of annual reports or SEC filings with a different
location, or through “a mail drop box, a bare office with a computer, or the location of an annual
executive retreat.” 559 U.S. at 97. That is what NeWay attempts to do here: divert the court from
considering the location where members of the executive team conduct their business and that
company officers have consistently understood as its headquarters publicly and in official records,
by providing conclusory affidavits asserting that “Washington, DC is not the ‘nerve center’ for
NeWay Capital LLC’s operations.” ECF No. 8-2 ¶ 3; ECF No. 8-3 ¶ 3; ECF No. 8-4 ¶ 4; ECF No.
8-5 ¶ 4; ECF No. 8-7 ¶ 3. NeWay argues its “nerve center” is in Mississippi based on the location
of two people who are not on its executive team and the obscure assertion that “space is licensed
for annual board meetings to occur” there “if and to the extent they are physical meetings and not
organized elsewhere.” ECF No. 5-1 ¶ 3. The Supreme Court predicted this very example of
manipulation, warning that a company’s nerve center is “not simply an office where the
corporation holds its board meetings (for example, attended by directors and officers who have
traveled there for the occasion)” and is, instead, the “actual center of direction, control, and
coordination.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93. 2
2 NeWay misleadingly suggests that the Supreme Court prohibited giving weight to the place that executives have consistently identified as a company’s headquarters and principal place of
12 B. NeWay Has Not Shown Irreparable Harm
NeWay has not shown irreparable harm. This case involves the granting of a routine
discovery order under § 1782, under the routine process for doing so. See In re Qatar Nat’l Bank,
No. 24-mc-35, 2025 WL 445188, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2025), aff’d sub nom. Qatar Nat’l Bank
v. Perles L. Firm, P.C., No. 25-7029, 2025 WL 2945746 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 2025) (explaining that
courts “routinely rely on” the Intel factors “in evaluating requests under Section 1782”); In re
Masters, 315 F. Supp. 3d 269, 272 (D.D.C. 2018) (explaining that “district courts are generally
authorized to review a § 1782 application on an ex parte basis”); Gushlak v. Gushlak, 486 Fed.
App’x 215, 217 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that “it is neither uncommon nor improper for district
courts to grant applications made pursuant to § 1782 ex parte”).
NeWay asserts that it “faces compelled disclosure of confidential business information and
potentially trade secrets that cannot be ‘undisclosed’” and highlights that it is a “non-party” to the
underlying proceeding. ECF No. 15 at 6–7. That could, of course, be said about any § 1782
discovery order and, indeed, any routine third-party discovery in district courts. See In re Noguer,
No. 18-mc-498, 2019 WL 1034190, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2019) (explaining that the “mere fact
that information, once disclosed, cannot be ‘undisclosed’” is “true in most, if not all, Section 1782
cases (not to mention ordinary discovery orders)” and “is therefore not enough by itself to warrant
a finding of irreparable harm”). Moreover, the protection of confidential business information or
business in official documents—here, in years of annual reports and SEC filings. ECF No. 15 at 3–5. That is not correct. The Supreme Court cautioned that a party may not use such filings to manipulate its principal place of business. See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 97. It has never suggested that contemporaneous, official records of the location company officers identified as their headquarters and principal place of business are not relevant in confirming a company’s principal place of business. Indeed, it is because such records are regularly considered that courts must be mindful of manipulation. Here, that executive team members identified D.C. as the company’s headquarters and principal place of business, consistent with the actual location of control, is properly considered.
13 trade secrets is routinely addressed in discovery, including through an appropriate protective order.
And, as the court explained, any concern about the subpoena being too “extensive” is also germane
to discovery disputes. See ECF No. 12 at 5 n.2. Such disputes should be narrowed by the parties
themselves and, to the extent needed, by this court, and are not something for NeWay to bring to
a court of appeals in the first instance. NeWay gives no reason for departing from routine
procedures here. Id. 3
C. BAPA Has Shown Substantial Injury
The court also finds BAPA would be substantially injured by a stay in this context. Aside
from its misguided personal jurisdiction arguments, NeWay does not meaningfully contest BAPA
has satisfied the statutory prerequisites under § 1782. See ECF No. 15 at 6 (offering only a cursory
assertion that BAPA has not satisfied the Intel factors without any supporting authority). However,
BAPA has submitted a declaration explaining that if a stay issues, there is serious risk it will lose
the opportunity to make use of the evidence it is entitled to “for use” in the Guatemalan proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 1782; see ECF No. 17 at 14; ECF No. 17-1 ¶¶ 12–16; see also HRC-Hainan Holding
Co., LLC v. Yihan Hu, No. 19-mc-80277, 2020 WL 1274877, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020)
(observing that “[a]pplicants will be substantially injured by a stay, as they would almost surely
not be able to benefit from the documents or information they have obtained, discovery which the
Court has determined is relevant to the two foreign proceedings”); In re Noguer, 2019 WL
1034190, at *5 (holding that substantial injury may occur where the applicants “may lose
altogether any chance to use the materials they seek in the [foreign] appellate proceedings”).
3 NeWay has not yet sought any protective order. BAPA has represented it “would not oppose a reasonable protective order or confidentiality agreement” and, “indeed, has reached out to counsel for NeWay on this exact topic.” ECF No. 17 at 12.
14 D. The Public Interest Does Not Favor A Stay
The public interest does not favor a stay; rather, a stay would frustrate the dual purposes of
§ 1782: “providing efficient assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging
foreign countries by example to provide similar assistance to our courts.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 252 (2004); see also In re Application of Hornbeam Corp., No.
14-mc-424, 2017 WL 2241522, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017) (finding the public interest favored
denying a stay of the use of records produced pursuant to § 1782 because such discovery serves
“the public interests in justice, fair play, and full disclosure, as well as the truth in foreign actions”
(cleaned up)); HRC-Hainan Holding Co., LLC, 2020 WL 1274877, at *6 (holding that the public
interest was served by allowing § 1782 discovery “to proceed” because “[d]oing so might aid the
[foreign] tribunal in better understanding the truth of the matter and thus better enable it to render
an informed and fair decision”).
NeWay argues the public interest is on its side because BAPA “weaponized” § 1782 by
using “ex parte procedures” to “withhold jurisdictional evidence from the original application and
deploy it only after the respondent objects.” ECF No. 18 at 13. That characterization of the record
is inaccurate. BAPA sought and obtained a discovery order under § 1782 through the routine
procedure for doing so. While that procedure began ex parte, as it often does, the court afforded
NeWay a full opportunity to contest the application of § 1782 through a motion to vacate and
quash the subpoena. In those proceedings, it is NeWay that has litigated the case in a manner that
is less than inspiring. As noted, NeWay does not meaningfully contest that BAPA has shown it
seeks discovery “for use” in a foreign proceeding and, to the extent NeWay takes issue with having
to produce records for that purpose, its grievance is with Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
15 III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the court denies NeWay’s motion to stay proceedings pending appeal,
ECF No. 15.
AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge
Date: January 15, 2026