[Cite as In re A.W., 2025-Ohio-853.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN THE MATTER OF : JUDGES: : Hon. Andrew J. King, P.J. A.W. : Hon. Robert G. Montgomery, J. : Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J. : : : Case No. 2024CA00060 : : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 2021 DEP 00200
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: March 12, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Appellant - Defendant For Appellee - Plaintiff
BRIAN A. SMITH SARAH E. EXTEN Brian A. Smith Law Firm, LLC Richland County Children Services 123 South Miller Road, Suite 250 731 Scholl Road Fairlawn, OH 44333 Mansfield, OH 44907 Montgomery, J.
{¶1} Appellant S.W., the biological mother of minor child A.W., appeals the
decision of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, awarding
permanent custody of A.W. to appellee Richland County Children Services Board
(“RCCSB”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} A.W. was born on May 12, 2020, to mother, S.W. (appellant), and father,
T.W. On November 4, 2021, A.W. was placed in emergency shelter care and soon
thereafter, RCCSB filed a complaint alleging that A.W. was a dependent child. On
December 16, 2021, appellant admitted that A.W. was a “dependent” as defined by the
Ohio Revised Code. On February 16, 2022, a hearing took place and appellant consented
to granting RCCSB temporary custody of A.W.
{¶3} The problems underlying the finding of dependency included appellant’s
mental health problems, exposing A.W. to criminal activity, domestic violence between
appellant and her husband (A.W.’s father), substance abuse and other harmful behaviors,
A.W.’s ongoing need for medical care, and appellant’s need for parenting skills. RCCSB
filed its case plan designed to remedy the underlying problems and attempt reunification.
Said plan included appellant engaging in mental health treatment, treatment focused on
anger management and domestic violence, treatments for her substance abuse issues,
and addressing issues of resource management. The trial court adopted and approved
the plan. While appellant eventually tried to accomplish some of the case plan objectives,
she ultimately demonstrated an inability to sustain progress over time. {¶4} For example, on January 22, 2022, appellant underwent a psychological
evaluation with Dr. Aimee Thomas, a licensed psychologist and licensed professional
clinical counselor with Lighthouse Family Center and was diagnosed with Major
Depressive Disorder (recurrent and severe), Generalized Anxiety, PTSD, Dependent
Personality Disorder, and Cannabis Use Disorder. One of appellant’s biggest obstacles
was her relationship with her husband, who was violent toward her on numerous
occasions.
{¶5} Dr. Thomas recommended extensive counseling for appellant as well as
intensive additional services. In January 2023, nearly one year after Dr. Thomas’
recommendations, appellant finally engaged in counseling services with A.W.’s father,
through Family Life Counseling. Despite counseling, and despite the violence, appellant
remained committed to her husband and continued to minimize the significant concerns
that contributed to A.W.’s removal. Importantly, the Magistrate and trial court determined
that neither appellant nor her husband ever accessed the more “intense” services
available to them, and specifically designed to provide them with the level of intervention
recommended in Lighthouse Family Center's evaluation and report.
{¶6} Appellant also has a long history of drug abuse, even telling Dr. Thomas
that after her discharge from military service she began smoking marijuana all day every
day to address physical and emotional pain. The Magistrate found that A.W.’s “parents
consistently tested positive for illegal substances for the entire first year this matter
pended before the court. [Appellant] submitted to drug screens * * * on seventeen
different occasions.” See Magistrate’s Decision at p.3. Six of those screens were positive
for illegal substances – all positive for marijuana and two were also positive for cocaine. The Magistrate found no evidence that any of the samples were tainted or collected
improperly.
{¶7} Although A.W. resided in her foster home from November 1, 2021, through
September 5, 2023, as appellant began putting forth some effort to achieve her case plan
objectives RCCSB recognized these efforts and increased visitation. In early September
2023, A.W. was even permitted to stay with her parents for two consecutive thirty-day
“trial” home visits. However, on October 25, 2023, the agency conducted an
unannounced home visit and randomly tested both parents for drug use; both parents
tested positive for cocaine and marijuana. A.W. was removed and returned to foster care.
On October 31, 2023, A.W. also tested positive for marijuana. The parents claimed they
had “no idea” how A.W. could have tested positive.
{¶8} Thereafter, on November 1, 2023, over a year and half since temporary
custody was awarded to RCCSB, the agency filed a motion for permanent custody and
requested that appellant’s parental rights be permanently terminated. Even after this
filing, on November 6, 2023, A.W.’s father and appellant tested positive for cocaine and
marijuana. Rather than either of the parents taking any responsibility for their drug use,
they tried to discredit the validity of the collection and testing process.1
{¶9} On February 12, 2024, the permanent custody hearing took place, and the
following individuals testified: Dr. Aimee Thomas; Matthew Levitas - forensic toxicologist
with Forensic Fluid Laboratories; Kristi Spangler - caseworker with RCCSB; A.W.’s foster
mother; and Michelle Vitello - the guardian ad litem (“GAL”).
1 A.W.’s father was also subject to the motion for permanent custody. In a companion case, this Court upheld the award of permanent custody of A.W. to RCCSB. See In re A.W., 2024-Ohio- 5791 (5th Dist.). {¶10} A.W.’s foster mother testified that when A.W. was placed in her home at
approximately 18 months of age, she appeared developmentally delayed, she was
nonverbal, and devoid of emotion. She was non-responsive to her name, showed no
interest in age-appropriate toys, did not interact with other children in the home, and had
the appearance of “a blank little girl.” She was demonstrably fearful of men and reacted
negatively to raised voices. She was unfamiliar with table food and consumed only a
bottle with PediaSure and baby food mixed in. She was unfamiliar with a spoon and would
suck on food rather than try to chew it. Based on these observations, the foster mother
referred A.W. to occupational, physical and speech therapy, including food/eating
therapy. A.W. quickly showed signs of improvement.
{¶11} Spangler testified that while appellant did progress with her case plan, she
continued to fail at remaining drug free. Indeed, even after the motion for permanent
custody was filed on November 2, appellant tested positive for drugs on November 6,
2023. Spangler ultimately concluded that it was in A.W’s best interest to award
permanent custody to RCCSB. Ms. Vitello, the GAL, investigated the case and filed a
report as to her recommendations. Ms. Vitello testified that she believed it was in A.W’s
best interest to award permanent custody to RCCSB. The toxicologist, Mr. Levitas,
testified regarding the process and procedure surrounding the drug test samples and
maintained that no improper tainting of said samples occurred. Mr. Levitas was fully
cross-examined on this issue. Once the hearing concluded, the Magistrate took the
matter under advisement.
{¶12} On March 26, 2024, after considering the testimony and evidence, the
magistrate granted RCCSB’s motion for permanent custody. The Magistrate issued very detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant timely filed objections to
the Magistrate's Decision. On July 31, 2024, after considering the objections and
reviewing the evidence relied upon by the magistrate, the trial court overruled the
appellant's objections and approved the Magistrate's Decision in a Judgment Entry. The
Entry states “Children Services presented sufficient evidence to grant permanent custody
to the Agency and to find that such an order is in the best interests of the child. All of the
specific findings made by the Magistrate are supported by the transcript.” Appellant timely
filed this appeal.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶13} I. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO APPELLEE, RICHLAND COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES, SINCE APPELLEE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT GROUNDS EXISTED FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY, AND SINCE THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶14} II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO APPELLEE, RICHLAND COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES, SINCE APPELLEE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT GROUNDS EXISTED FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY, AND SINCE THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
{¶15} III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO APPELLEE, RICHLAND COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES, BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT COMPETENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT APPELLEE MADE “REASONABLE EFFORTS” TO REUNIFY THE FAMILY.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶16} In the first and second assignments of error, appellant asserts that the
judgments of the trial court were against the sufficiency and manifest weight of the
evidence. We disagree. For ease of argument, the two assignments of error will be
addressed together. A companion case involving A.W.’s father was recently decided by the Fifth District and is instructive regarding the standard of review in permanent custody
cases. See In re A.W., 2024-Ohio-5791, ¶ 15. The Court succinctly stated as follows:
The Ohio Supreme Court recently addressed the standard of review in
permanent custody cases in In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703. Under R.C.
2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to
the agency that moved for permanent custody if the court determines, “by
clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child” to
do so and that any of five factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
through (e) applies. “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or
degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’
but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable
doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of
facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.”
Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three
of the syllabus.
We have described an appellate court's task when reviewing a trial court's
application of the clear-and-convincing-evidence burden of proof as follows:
“Where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court
will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient
evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel,
55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990), citing Ford v. Osborne, 45 Ohio
St. 1, 12 N.E. 526 (1887), paragraph two of the syllabus; accord Cross at
477, 120 N.E.2d 118. ... sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence
standards of review are the proper appellate standards of review of a
juvenile court's permanent-custody determination, as appropriate
depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the parties.
Z.C. at ¶7-8, 11.
{¶17} The Court went on to define sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight
as follows:
Sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence are distinct
concepts and are “ ‘both quantitatively and qualitatively different.’ ” Eastley
v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 10,
quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997),
paragraph two of the syllabus. We have stated that “sufficiency is a test of
adequacy,” Thompkins at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541, while weight of the evidence
“ ‘is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing
belief’ ” (emphasis sic), id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to
sustain a verdict is a question of law.” Id. at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. “When
applying a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a court of appeals should
affirm a trial court when “ ‘the evidence is legally sufficient to support the
jury verdict as a matter of law.” ’ ” Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio
St.3d 291, 2007-Ohio-4918, 874 N.E.2d 1198, ¶ 3, quoting Thompkins at
386, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Black's at 1433. But “even if a trial court judgment is sustained by sufficient evidence, an
appellate court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.” Eastley at ¶ 12. When reviewing for
manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and
determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Id. at ¶ 20. “In
weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the
presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21.
In re A.W., 2024-Ohio-5791, ¶¶ 15-16, quoting, Z.C., ¶ 13-14.
Permanent custody
{¶18} “[T]he right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.’” Matter of
T.C., 2020-Ohio-882, ¶ 35; In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Court is mindful that a parent has a fundamental
liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of his or her child and an essential
and basic civil right to raise his or her children. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 156,
(1990). That right, however, is not absolute. “The natural rights of a parent * * * are always
subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to
be observed.” Matter of R.M., Jr., 2018-Ohio-395, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.) quoting, In re
Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979).
{¶19} As stated, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) mandates that, prior to granting a motion for
permanent custody, the juvenile court must make specific findings by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.J., 2024-Ohio-110, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.); In re A.M., 166 Ohio
St.3d 127, 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 18. First, the court must find “that one or more of the
conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies.” Id. And second, that the grant
of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. Id.
{¶20} The factors contained in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) include:
(a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, * * * and the child cannot be
placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should
not be placed with the child's parents;
(b) the child is abandoned;
(c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are
able to take permanent custody; or
(d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies or private child placement agencies for twelve or
more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period * * *.
(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from
whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an
abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any
court in this state or another state.
{¶21} For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be considered
to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is
adjudicated pursuant to R.C. 2151.28 or the date that is sixty days after the removal of
the child. Here, there can be no serious dispute the child was in RCCSB’s temporary
custody for approximately twenty-one (21) months, well beyond the required 12 or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. RCCSB sought and obtained
temporary custody on February 16, 2022, and filed for permanent custody on November
1, 2023.2 Thus, the first prong of R.C. 2151.414(B) is met and the court proceeds to a
determination of best interest. N.B., ¶¶ 18-20.
{¶22} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing,
R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates the trial court consider all relevant factors, including, but not
limited to the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's
parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as expressed
directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the
maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child's need for a legally
secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody; and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this
section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶23} The court must consider each factor in R.C. 2151.414(D), and any other
relevant factors, and no one factor is given greater weight than the others. In re Schafer,
11 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532. The focus of the “best interest”
determination is upon the child, not the parent. R.C. 2151.414(C) expressly prohibits the
court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the
2 Although R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is clearly met, the trial court alternatively found that clear and convincing evidence exists under (B)(1)(a)– the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents.
This Court will not engage in any unnecessary analysis where it is clear that the child was in RCCSB’s temporary custody for more than 12 months of a consecutive twenty-two month period, even considering the two 30-day “trial” periods in September/October 2023. parents. N.B., ¶¶ 35-36, citing, In re Awkal, 85 Ohio App.3d 309 (8th Dist. 1994).
Importantly, a child's best interests are served by the child being placed in a permanent
situation that fosters growth, stability, and security. T.C., ¶ 54.
ANALYSIS
{¶24} After a thorough review of the record, we find sufficient evidence that, while
appellant made some minimal efforts to engage in the case plan after lengthy delay, she
failed to substantially remedy the conditions that caused A.W. to be removed in the first
instance. A.W., ¶ 21. It is evident from the Magistrate’s Decision that the trial court fully
considered the factual issues and engaged in a rigorous analysis as required by Ohio
law. Similarly, the permanent custody award is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. The Magistrate (and trial judge) did not clearly lose its way and create such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed. To the contrary,
significant evidence exists to support the award of permanent custody to RCCSB.
{¶25} Regarding best interest factors (1) and (3), the evidence demonstrates that
although the child was familiar with and seemed bonded to appellant, the child has been
with the foster family for an extensive amount of time, since November 4, 2021, minus
two 30-day trial visitations. When A.W. was in the exclusive care of her parents from birth
to 18 months, she did not do well. She was nutritionally deficient, her parents used
substances of abuse, and her father engaged in acts of violence against appellant while
appellant minimized such behaviors. When A.W. entered the foster home, she was
nonverbal, lacked emotion, and was still eating baby food from a bottle mixed with
PediaSure. These facts demonstrate appellant’s lack of attention and effort to raise and
support A.W. properly. {¶26} The foster family quickly noticed the above issues and, unlike appellant or
A.W’s father, they referred A.W. to occupational, physical, and speech therapy. As a
result of the therapy sessions, A.W. quickly improved in many areas. The testimony
further demonstrates that A.W. is extremely bonded with her foster family, appears to
thrive in their home, and is fully integrated into their family.
{¶27} Although the Magistrate found that the child is too young to express her
wishes at age 3 as contemplated “best interest” factor (2), “her exceedingly happy and
contented demeanor and the open love and affection she expresses for her foster family
is clear and compelling evidence that the child wishes to remain.” Magistrate’s Decision
at p. 12. The Magistrate was able to see A.W. and observe her demeanor. It was clear
that A.W. was not only integrated into the foster family, but A.W. was happy, comfortable,
and thriving in their home.
{¶28} Turning to factor (4), a child's need for a legally secure placement and
whether it can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody, the evidence reveals
that appellant continues to choose drugs over A.W. Indeed, during the October 25, 2023,
unannounced visit, appellant tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. On October 31,
2023, A.W. herself tested positive for marijuana. Such positive screens are significant
given that appellant began to achieve some of the case plan goals, to an extent that A.W.
was permitted to stay at appellant’s home for two 30-day “trial” periods. Again, these
positive screens show appellant’s lack of commitment to rectify the conditions underlying
A.W.’s removal.
{¶29} Although appellant claims that her results may be inaccurate due to an
alleged interaction with her prescription medications, there is insufficient evidence to support the assertion. The toxicologist’s testimony establishes that the lab properly tested
the samples, and he authenticated the results at the hearing. Counsel had the opportunity
to fully cross-examine the individual on this issue. Relatedly, A.W., a toddler, was also
positive for marijuana after having stayed with her parents, both of whom have a lengthy
drug history and contemporaneous positive results.
{¶30} It is significant that appellant - and A.W.’s father - waited almost one year
after initial consultation and evaluation with Family Life Counseling to attempt the
treatment and counseling goals set forth in the case plan. Appellant simply fails to take
responsibility for her actions, she minimizes her husband’s actions, and she demonstrates
an unwillingness to remain on a path towards success. Contrary to appellant’s assertion
that the caseworker had “no concerns” with appellant, the caseworker in fact
recommended that RCCSB be awarded permanent custody. The GAL similarly
recommended permanent custody to RCCSB because it was in A.W.’s best interest.
{¶31} In the final analysis, clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that
appellant's mental health and chemical dependency rendered her unable to provide an
adequate permanent home for A.W. The Court of Appeals must not “reconsider” the trial
court’s decision and substitute its own judgment provided there is credible evidence in
the record to support the trial court’s conclusions. And, as noted above, the best interest
analysis is focused on the child, not the parent. Accordingly, the trial court properly
granted Appellant’s motion for permanent custody. Appellant’s first and second
assignments of error are overruled.
{¶32} In the third assignment of error, appellant claims RCCSB did not make
reasonable attempts to reunify the family. Appellant claims that RCCSB could have done “more” by increasing visitation, updating professionals about case plan progress, and
finding suitable kinship placement. Appellant’s arguments are without merit. Notably,
appellant did not raise her “reasonable efforts” argument in her objections to the
Magistrate’s Decision regarding permanent custody. It is raised for the first time on
appeal. As such, the issue is waived unless appellant can demonstrate plain error. In re
B.F., 2021-Ohio-4251 at 923, ¶ 23 (3rd Dist) (citations omitted).
{¶33} The plain error doctrine may be applied only in the extremely rare case
involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the
trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
process, essentially challenging the legitimacy of the judicial process itself. B.F., ¶ 24,
citing In re K.M., 2019-Ohio-4252 (4th Dist.), quoting Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d
116 (1997), syllabus. Here, even though appellant desperately claims that RCCSB was
somehow inept, it is appellant (and her husband) who failed to rectify the circumstances
causing A.W.’s removal. Appellant fails to demonstrate plain error.
{¶34} Even assuming appellant somehow preserved this issue for appeal,
RCCSB clearly fulfilled its obligations. Generally, the agency has the duty to make
reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify a family unit, including preparing and maintaining
a case plan to bring the children back home. See R.C. 2151.412; Matter of D.D., 2023-
Ohio-4147, ¶ 20. “When the state intervenes to protect a child's health or safety, ‘[t]he
state's efforts to resolve the threat to the child before removing the child or to permit the
child to return home after the threat is removed are called “reasonable efforts.” ’ In re
B.F., 2021-Ohio-4251, ¶ 11, quoting In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28
(citations omitted). {¶35} Reasonable efforts means that a children's services agency must act
diligently and provide services appropriate to the family's needs to prevent the child's
removal or to attempt reunification of a child removed. In re H.M.K., 3d Dist. No. 16-12-
15, 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 95, quoting In re D.A., 6th Dist. No. L-11-1197, 2012-Ohio-1104,
¶ 30. An effort is reasonable where it is an honest, purposeful effort. In re R.L., 2022-
Ohio-1179, ¶31 (5th Dist.). Importantly, reasonable efforts do not equate to all available
efforts otherwise there would always be an argument that one more service, no matter
what, may have led to reunification. In re B.F., 3d Dist. No. 11-21-04, 2021-Ohio-4251.
What amounts to reasonable efforts will necessarily vary depending on the circumstances
of each case. Matter of D.D., ¶ 25.
{¶36} R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) requires the trial court to determine if the agency made
reasonable efforts to return a child home and applies at “adjudicatory, emergency,
detention, and temporary-disposition hearings, and dispositional hearings for abused,
neglected, or dependent children, all of which occur prior to a decision transferring
permanent custody to the state. Id, ¶ 21. Importantly, R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) does not refer
to permanent custody hearings, such that it “does not apply in a hearing on a motion for
permanent custody if the agency has established in earlier proceedings that reasonable
efforts have been made. Id. at ¶ 43. Here, the trial court made numerous findings in earlier
proceedings that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify.
{¶37} Notwithstanding, the record belies appellant’s assertions and in fact,
demonstrates RCCSB’ ongoing efforts. RCCSB established a detailed case plan,
provided numerous references to seek counseling and treatment, followed up on
appellant’s progress through case management, facilitated and supported foster placement, modified and facilitated visitation – even allowing two 30-day trial periods back
in the home – and repeatedly made visits and performed drug tests. The evidence
presented to the trial court clearly establishes that RCCSB made reasonable efforts to
prevent the continued removal of the child.
{¶38} In the end, appellant failed to hold herself and A.W.’s father accountable,
continued using drugs, and could not establish her commitment to A.W. There is simply
nothing in the record to suggest that RCCSB failed in its obligation to this family.
Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶39} For the reasons above, appellant’s first, second and third assignments of
error are overruled in their entirety. The judgment of the Richland County Court of
Common Pleas is AFFIRMED.
By: Montgomery, J.
King, P.J. and
Popham, J. concur.