In Re Attorneys Office Management, Inc.

29 B.R. 96
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California
DecidedFebruary 25, 1983
DocketBankruptcy No. LA-82-20633(CA), Adv. Nos. 82-43229, 82-43264, 82-43273, 82-43293, 82-43301, 82-43328, 82-43331, 82-43919, 82-43923, 82-44025, 82-44408, 82-44575, 83-0136 and 83-0137
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 29 B.R. 96 (In Re Attorneys Office Management, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Attorneys Office Management, Inc., 29 B.R. 96 (Cal. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

CALVIN K. ASHLAND, Bankruptcy Judge.

The issues presented in these adversary proceedings are:

Whether the provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 365(a) giving the trustee the power to assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor are affected by the provisions of § 362(d)?

What actions by the trustee will satisfy the requirements of § 363(e) to provide adequate protection to an entity whose interest in property is being used while the trustee decides to assume or reject an exec-utory contract or unexpired lease? BACKGROUND

On November 26, 1982 Attorney’s Office Management, Inc. (AOMI) filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition. Immediately thereafter, various lessors filed complaints seeking relief from the automatic stay alleging, among other things, that the debtor had no equity in the property subject to their leases and that the property was not necessary for an effective reorganization of the debt- or. The debtor s business is the leasing of office space and subleasing the space as office suites to attorneys. The suites are known as Fegen suites, so named after the debtor’s founder, attorney Paul Fegen. The debtor’s assets are the leases on this space. At the time these actions were filed, the debtor faced numerous similar actions concerning similar issues by the remaining lessors.

A preliminary hearing was commenced in accordance with the time constraints of § 362(e). Based upon the evidence and testimony, I concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the debtor would prevail at a final hearing. It was ordered that all rentals received by the debtor from its subtenants less general operating expenses and an allowance for administration, be paid to the plaintiffs on account of any claims by the plaintiffs for administrative rent. This amount was denominated “net rent” and was limited to the amount reserved under the lease. The plaintiffs were also given a super priority lien upon all leases owned by the debtor in possession until some other collateral could be substituted.

At the final hearing the only issue to be tried was what constituted adequate protection of the interests of 14 plaintiff-lessors who were not receiving “net rents” from the debtor in amounts equal to rent reserved in their respective leases. The debt- or proposed a collateral package composed of nine prime leases, on which debtor has been paying contract rent on a current basis. From the testimony of expert appraisers and evaluators, and the current chief executive officer of the debtor, I conclude that the collateral package satisfies the debtor’s obligation to provide adequate protection while the debtor decides whether to assume or reject the unexpired leases of the plaintiffs. The value of the nine leases exceeds the amount of rental which will accrue to the 14 plaintiffs.

ANALYSIS

Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases.

Section 365(a) provides that the trustee, subject to court approval, may assume or *98 reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. Under § 1107 the debtor in possession has the rights and powers of a trustee. Section 365(d)(2) provides that the trustee in a Chapter 11 case may assume or reject at any time before the confirmation of the plan. Before assumption or rejection, the only limitation on the trustee’s power is found in § 365(d)(2), where the court, on request of any party to the contract or lease, may order the trustee to assume or reject within a specified period of time. Until assumption or rejection, the lessors can take no action to impair the trustee’s right.

As a matter of equity receivership practice, the trustee or debtor in possession had a “reasonable time” within which to decide whether to adopt or reject the execu-tory contract or unexpired lease. See, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 365.03(1) at p. 365-20 (15th Ed.). There is, however, no test to determine a reasonable time. Instead, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See, In re Theatre Holding Corp. v. Mauro, 681 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir.1982).

Relief From Stay Provisions Inapplicable While Trustee Has Power to Assume or Reject Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases,

The plaintiffs argue that the relief from stay provisions of § 362(d) are applicable during the period where the trustee is making its decision to assume or reject. Such relief, however, would frustrate the purpose of § 365 which assures the trustee a sufficient amount of time to assume or reject these obligations. Therefore, the lessors must look only to the provision of § 365 for protection of their interests. The lessors’ remedy is to apply to the court under § 365(d)(2) for an order fixing a time within which the trustee must determine whether to assume or reject. If the rent reserved in the lease is current, it is reasonable that the debtor in possession should have at least through the period during which it may exclusively propose a plan in which to determine whether it wishes to assume or reject, and no date for doing so should be set by the court. However, where the rent reserved in the lease is not being paid, then the lessor’s interest in receiving such rentals must be given some form of protection.

Liability For Use and Occupancy Under the Unexpired Lease.

The lessor is entitled to a reasonable value for the use and occupancy of its premises. The debtor must provide protection to the lessor in the form of reasonable rent. Such rental begins to accrue on the date of the filing of the bankruptcy and continues until assumption or rejection. See, In re Rhymes, Inc., 14 B.R. 807, 808 (Bkrtcy.D.Conn.1981); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶365.03[2] at p. 365-24 (15th Ed.)).

The court must determine what a reasonable rent will be. The rate of rental reserved in the lease is merely evidence of what is reasonable.

The Lessor’s Interest Requires Adequate Protection.

The estate does not take title to an executory contract or unexpired lease until the contract or lease is assumed. Until that time, the estate is only liable for the value of the use of the premises. Section 363(e) provides, however, that any time an interest in property is used by the trustee, the court shall condition such use as necessary to provide “adequate protection” of such interest.

While the trustee is deciding whether to reject or assume the lease it is using an interest in property. The definition of that interest is broad enough to encompass the protections provided the lessor under § 363(e). The lessor has an interest in the leased property itself in the form of reserved title. For the use and occupation of the premises prior to assumption or rejection, the debtor must pay a reasonable amount of rental. To the extent that the rental is not paid, § 363(e) requires that the debtor provide the lessor with some form of adequate protection. This rental may be as much as the rent reserved in the lease, but *99 no more, and possibly less. See, In re Auto-Train Corp., 3 C.B.C.2d 239, 243-244 (B.Ct., D.D.C.1980).

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29 B.R. 96, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-attorneys-office-management-inc-cacb-1983.