In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation

233 F.R.D. 542, 2005 WL 3299763
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedDecember 5, 2005
DocketNo. C04-2676 YRW(JL)
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 233 F.R.D. 542 (In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation, 233 F.R.D. 542, 2005 WL 3299763 (N.D. Cal. 2005).

Opinion

DISCOVERY ORDER

LARSON, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

Introduction

The district court (Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker) referred this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule 72 for resolution of a discovery dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendant Bank of America Corporation (“BAC”). This Court issued an order for further briefing and the parties complied. The matter was submitted without oral argument as provided by Civil Local Rule 7-6.

Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and class certification is on for hearing December 8, 2005 before Chief Judge Walker.

Plaintiffs propounded discovery

Plaintiffs propounded requests for production of documents and a request for admissions to all named defendants, including BAC. Plaintiffs also propounded a second set of document requests focusing primarily on class certification issues. Plaintiffs also served interrogatories and proposed 30(b)(6) depositions substantially limited to document and electronic data storage and management issues.

Defense counsel objected and the parties met and conferred

The parties exchanged letters and e-mails. Defense counsel requested an extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, which Plaintiffs granted. The parties debated whether Plaintiffs should subpoena non-party Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) as provided by FRCP Rule 45 or amend their complaint to add BANA as a party (Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice at Ex. A, September 15, 2005 letter from Tara Steeley to Bart Cohen). BAC would not guarantee a response from BANA unless Plaintiffs added BANA as a party. (Steeley Declaration in support of BAC’s November 16, 2005 letter brief at Exs. C & D)

BAC also objected to providing discovery from any of its other subsidiaries on the grounds that this would “impose substantial and completely unnecessary burdens on BAC.” (Defendant’s November 16, 2005 letter brief at page 4)

The Court finds that the parties satisfied the requirements of Civil Local Rule 37 to [544]*544meet and confer to attempt to resolve their dispute.

Legal Analysis and Conclusion

BAC’s subsidiaries are wholly-owned and possess discoverable information

BAC argues that it has no duty to respond on behalf of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, including BANA, although Defendants concede BANA possesses responsive documents and other information called for in Plaintiffs’ discovery requests. There is no dispute that BAC wholly owns BANA and that BANA possesses discoverable documents. (Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice at Ex. B, Bank of America 2004 Annual report, describing BANA as “a wholly owned subsidiary of the Corporation” (BAC)) See also Id. at Ex. D, 10-K form to Securities and Exchange Commission: BAC “owns” BANA; November 18, 2005 letter brief of Paul A. Moore III at Ex. A — BAC003520 (organizational chart).

BAC believes that “BANA is the entity that would be expected to have information potentially relevant to this litigation.” (Steeley declaration in support of BAC’s November 16, 2005 letter brief at Ex. E). In its initial disclosures BAC provided “the following list of names and contact information of current employees of Bank of America Corporation and affiliated entities who are likely to have non-privileged information relevant to disputed facts pleaded with particularity in the pleadings ...” The list included five employees of BANA, two in Charlotte, North Carolina, two in St. Louis, Missouri and one in Jonesborough, Tennessee. BAC also listed seven categories of relevant documents, all located at BANA’s offices in Charlotte, North Carolina. (Ex. A to Steeley Declaration in Support of BAC letter brief of November 16, 2005)

With respect to its other subsidiary banks, BAC concedes that “certain of its affiliates may have possession, custody or control of potentially relevant documents.” Id.

BAC has legal control of its subsidiaries and of documents in their possession

Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permits a party to discover relevant non-privileged information from another party. Rule 34 provides that in response to a request for production of documents a party produce any relevant documents in its possession custody or control. (Emphasis added)

BAC concedes that its wholly-owned subsidiary BANA and “certain of its other affiliates” have possession and custody of responsive documents. However BAC claims it has no control over those documents and that to obtain them Plaintiffs must either subpoena them from BANA as provided by FRCP Rule 45 or add BANA as a party and propound its requests to BANA directly. Defendants characterize BAC as a “holding company” and BANA as “a separate legal entity.” (September 22 letter from Tara Steeley to Chief Judge Walker).

Plaintiffs rely on a Ninth Circuit decision that “[a] corporation must produce documents possessed by a subsidiary that the parent corporation owns or controls.” United States v. International Union of Petroleum and Industrial Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir.1989). The Ninth Circuit stated this in dictum but in dictum that is cited by numerous courts throughout the United States for the same proposition, that for purposes of compliance with Rule 34, a parent company has control of documents in the custody and possession of its wholly owned subsidiary.1

See also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir.1999) (court affirmed the “legal control” test as the standard for a parent’s obligation to produce documents in the possession and custody of its subsidiary)(“Even if International Union does not conclusively settle the question, we conclude-consistently with all of our sister circuits who have addressed the issue — that the legal control test is the proper standard under Rule [545]*54545). See Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1229-30 (Fed.Cir. 1996); In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir.1995); Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1426 (7th Cir. 1993); Gerling Int’l Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 131, 140-41 (3d Cir.1988); Searock v. Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 653 (11th Cir.1984).” Id. at 1107-1108.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Nugent v. Secretlab US, Inc.
N.D. California, 2024
Smart v. NCAA
E.D. California, 2023
Colon v. NCAA
E.D. California, 2023
Jones v. PGA Tour, Inc.
N.D. California, 2022
In Re Atm Fee Antitrust Litigation
768 F. Supp. 2d 984 (N.D. California, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
233 F.R.D. 542, 2005 WL 3299763, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-atm-fee-antitrust-litigation-cand-2005.