In Re Apportionment of House of Representatives

315 A.2d 211, 1974 Me. LEXIS 356
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedFebruary 14, 1974
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 315 A.2d 211 (In Re Apportionment of House of Representatives) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Apportionment of House of Representatives, 315 A.2d 211, 1974 Me. LEXIS 356 (Me. 1974).

Opinion

*213 ORDER

Whereas the Supreme Judicial Court, the Justices unanimously agreeing thereto, has made the apportionment of the House of Representatives and has established one hundred eight (108) single member districts and eleven (11) multi-member districts for the choice of its one hundred fifty-one (151) members by order dated February 14, 1974.

Whereas the Supreme Judicial Court has caused said order, including a preliminary statement respecting principles used by the Court in the discharge of its constitutional obligation, to be deposited with the Secretary of State in the office of the Secretary of State,

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a copy of said order and preliminary statement of principles be deposited with the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice, kept and recorded as a permanent record of the redistricting of the House of Representatives pursuant to Article IV, Part First, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Maine.

Said order including preliminary statement of principles shall be recorded in the Maine Reporter.

Dated this 14th day of February, 1974. For the Court

s/ ARMAND A. DUFRESNE, Jr. Chief Justice

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

We, the Justices constituting the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, have noticed that, as is commonly known, the Maine Legislature failed to make an apportionment of the House of Representatives' by midnight of January 16, 1974, the end of the period in which the Legislature was required by the Constitution of Maine to make such apportionment.

Accordingly, as the Supreme Judicial Court, we have entered upon the discharge of the responsibilities constitutionally imposed upon us (Section 3, Part First, Article IV of the Constitution of Maine) to make the apportionment.

1.

Our investigations confirm as still correct the opinion given by the Justices on June 22, 1973 (in answer to particular questions then propounded by the House of Representatives) that a full compliance with the literal requirements of Sections 2 and 3 of Part First of Article IV of the Constitution of Maine renders a federally

. . constitutionally permissible reapportionment of the House of Representatives . . . unattainable as a practical matter . . . .” Opinion of the Justices, Me., 307 A.2d 198, 210 (1973)

The further questions now arise, however: (1) must the apportionment objectives and methods of the Constitution of Maine be totally discarded and (2) if not, must, or should, we retain as much of the letter and spirit of the apportionment mandates of the Maine Constitution as may be reasonably consistent with fulfillment of the governing federal constitutional standards?

Adequate understanding of the scope of the problem raised by these questions, and the formulation of satisfactory answers to them, necessitate that we delineate more extensively than was appropriate in the *214 Opinion of the Justices, supra, the federal constitutional principles which are controlling.

2.

When the Supreme Court of the United States first pronounced — in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964)—that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral State legislature must be apportioned to yield approximately equal population among the various legislative districts, the Court simultaneously observed that:

“A State may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, in designing a legislative apportionment scheme.” (p. 578, 84 S.Ct. p. 1390)

The reason for the “legitimacy” of such State policy was conceived to be that

“[l]ocal governmental entities are frequently charged with various responsibilities incident to the operation of state government. In many States much of the legislature’s activity involves the enactment of so-called local legislation, directed only to the concerns of particular political subdivisions.” (pp. 580, 581, 84 S.Ct. p. 1391)

Reynolds v. Sims warned, however, that in any particular apportionment of a legislative house a State policy of maintaining the integrity of the boundaries of political subdivisions will be “carried too far” if it causes

“a total subversion of the equal-population principle in that legislative body.” (p. 581, 84 S.Ct. p. 1391)

In 1973 the Supreme Court of the United States confronted, in an actual decisional context, the problem of indicating the limits of the range of deviation which, if resulting as an incident to a State policy of preserving integrity of political subdivision lines, is thereby “justified” to become a constitutionally “tolerable” range. In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973), and as we previously mentioned in the Opinion of the Justices, supra, a “16-odd percent maximum” total deviation was held justifiable;

“. . . suspect [would be] any appreciable excess . . . .” (p. 208 of 307 A.2d)

The subject of “tolerable” deviation was cast in a different mold in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973). Whereas in Mahan v. Howell, supra, the Court had been concerned with a large deviation from population equality as “prima facie” unconstitutional but “justifiable” by the State’s consistently followed policy of maintaining political subdivision boundaries fully intact, Gaffney v. Cummings established the principle that:

“. . .in the context of the eminently reasonable approach of Reynolds v. Sims, . . . minor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State.” (p. 745, 93 S.Ct. p. 2327)

In Gaffney v. Cummings the

“. . . House districts under the [Connecticut] State Apportionment Board’s plan varied in population from one another by a maximum of only about 8% and . . . the average deviation from the ideal House district was only about 2%.” (p. 751, 93 S.Ct. p. 2330)

As to such plan the Court decided:

“. . .we are quite sure that a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment was not made out.” (p. 751, 93 S.Ct. p. 2330)

It is now clearly settled, therefore, that a “de minimis” range of deviation *215

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Related

In re Apportionment of House of Representatives
316 A.2d 508 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1974)

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