** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **
Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX 02-SEP-2025 08:43 AM Dkt. 133 OP IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---oOo--- ________________________________________________________________
In the Matter of the Application of PIONEER MILL COMPANY, LIMITED, to register title and confirm its title to land situate at Lāhainā, Island and County of Maui, State of Hawaiʻi, and KAHOMA LAND LLC, Substituted Applicant as to Lots 1, 2 and 3A ________________________________________________________________
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; LD. CT. APP. NO. 439 amended; LD. CT. CASE NO. 09-0300)
SEPTEMBER 2, 2025
RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, EDDINS, AND DEVENS, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE KAWASHIMA, IN PLACE OF GINOZA, J., RECUSED
OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
I. Introduction
This appeal concerns a land court application filed in
1919, not prosecuted for decades at a time, then summarily
decided 100 years later. ** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **
In 1919, Pioneer Mill Company, Limited (“Pioneer Mill”) 1
filed land court Application No. 439 (“land court application”)
to register fee simple title to land in Lāhainā, Maui. The land
was identified as Lots 1 (Puou), 2 (Kuholilea), and 3 (Kuhua,
Aki, Puʻuki). Pioneer Mill asserted it had title to the parcels
through deed or adverse possession. Decades later, Lot 3 was
divided into Lots 3A through 3E.
The adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A is the subject of
this certiorari proceeding.
A 1919 report by the Examiner concluded that Pioneer Mill
held paper title to Lots 1 and 2 but did not have good paper
title to Lot 3. The Examiner said Pioneer Mill may have
acquired Lot 3, which includes Lot 3A, by adverse possession,
indicating adverse possession was not clear.
Charles Kanaʻina (“Kanaʻina”)2 was identified as the last
owner holding title to Lot 3A. His heirs at his 1877 death
included Princess Ruth Keʻelikōlani and Princess Bernice Pauahi
1 Kahoma Land LLC (“Kahoma”) substituted for Pioneer Mill in 2009. Pioneer Mill and Kahoma are sometimes collectively referred to as the “Applicants.” It appears Pioneer Mill itself went through some business organization changes that are immaterial to our disposition.
2 Kanaʻina was an aliʻi and was the father of William Charles Lunalilo, who became the sixth and first elected monarch of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi. The title documents referenced in this opinion do not include ʻokina and kahakō and we do not include them when quoting the documents. But we attempt to provide appropriate diacritical marks in the text of our opinion. We apologize for any inadvertent errors.
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Bishop. The record does not reflect any attempt to personally
serve the land court application on his heirs or their
descendants. A great majority of interests held by his heirs’
descendants were defaulted by the land court after various
attempts to serve by publication. Some apparent descendants of
the heirs of Kanaʻina (“Kanaʻina descendants”) appeared at
various times during this 100-year saga to challenge Pioneer
Mill’s (and its successors’) claims.
The 1919 land court application was not prosecuted for
decades at a time. There was a trial in 1967, but this court
nullified Judge Samuel P. King’s decision in 1972, and the
matter was remanded for a new trial. No trial took place after
1972, with long periods of dormancy. The land court application
was decided in 2019 and 2020, when the land court filed three
documents. The first awarded fee simple title to Lots 1 and 2
to Pioneer Mill’s successor based on paper title. The second
and third awarded a 78.704% interest in Lot 3A based on adverse
possession, the remaining 21.296% representing interests of
Kanaʻina descendants who appeared in the case and contested the
claim. These three documents are:
1. Amended Decree No. 2016 of May 27, 2020 (awarding Lots 1 and 2 to Kahoma based on paper title)(“Decree 2016”); 2. September 24, 2019 “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law regarding Orders Filed on February 13, 2018 and May 2, 2018” (finding Kahoma has a 78.704% interest in Lot 3A based on adverse possession)(“September 24, 2019 FOF/COL”); and
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3. Amended Decree No. 2017 of May 27, 2020 (awarding Kahoma 78.704% of Lot 3-A) (“Decree 2017”)
On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”)
affirmed.
Petitioners on certiorari allege several errors.
We discern no genuine issues of material fact regarding
paper title to Lots 1 and 2, and we therefore affirm the ICA and
land court regarding Decree 2016.
With respect to Lot 3A, however, we address two dispositive
errors raised on certiorari.
First, contrary to the ICA, we hold that petitioners on
certiorari, as cotenants of Kanaʻina heirs, had standing to also
defend their cotenants’ title against the adverse possession
claim.
Second, we hold that, in any event, the adverse possession
claim as to Lot 3A should have been dismissed based on laches.
Laches requires two essential elements: (1) an unreasonable
delay by the plaintiff in bringing or advancing the claim, and
(2) resulting prejudice due to the delay.
We hold that the 100-year delay in deciding the Lot 3A
adverse possession claim was blatantly unreasonable. Also,
Kanaʻina descendants were prejudiced because witnesses, including
Kanaʻina descendants themselves, as well as their knowledge of
facts concerning the alleged adverse possession of Lot 3A before
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1919, were gone. Therefore, the land court abused its
discretion in denying the certiorari petitioners’ 2015 and 2016
motions to dismiss based on laches.
Hence, we vacate the ICA’s July 17, 2024, judgment on
appeal to the extent it affirmed the land court’s decisions as
to Lot 3A. In other words, we vacate the land court’s September
24, 2019, FOF/COL as well as its Decree 2017 awarding 78.704% of
Lot 3A to Kahoma. We affirm the ICA’s judgment on appeal to the
extent it affirmed the land court’s Decree 2016 regarding paper
title to Lots 1 and 2.
We remand to the land court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion, which is to include dismissal of
the land court application as to Lot 3A. Although this
dismissal is without prejudice, if a new application to quiet
title as to Lot 3A is filed, current Hawaiʻi law will govern.
II. Background
A. Factual background and filing of land court application
In June 1919, Pioneer Mill filed the instant land court
application to register and confirm fee simple title to the
following five land parcels in Lāhainā: (1) the whole of “Puou,”
a portion of Apana 2 of Land Commission Award 8520 to Josua
Kaʻeo, Lot 1 (104.5 acres); (2) three-eighths of “Kuholilea,” a
portion of Apana 26 of Land Commission Award 6559-B to W.C.
Lunalilo, Lot 2 (166.5 acres); (3) the whole of “Kuhua,” a 5 ** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **
portion of Land Commission Award 7582 to Eseta Kipa, now Lot 3A;
(4) “Aki,” a portion of Land Commission Award 11216 to
Kekauʻōnohi and Grant 3584 to P. Isenberg and C.F. Horner, now
Lots 3B and 3C; (5) “Puʻuki,” a portion of Land Commission Award
11292 to Mamaki, now Lots 3D and 3E.
Pioneer Mill asserted two bases for its claims to these
parcels: (1) via deed from P. Isenberg and C.F. Horner, recorded
June 29, 1895, in the Office of the Registrar of Conveyances of
the Territory of Hawaiʻi; and/or (2) via adverse possession.
At the time, Pioneer Mill sought to register and confirm
title to “Kuhua,” “Aki,” and “Puʻuki,” as one parcel identified
as Lot 3 which, altogether, totaled 1,529 acres. It was not
until decades later that Lot 3 was divided into Lots 3A through
3E. On certiorari, we focus on Lot 3A, Kuhua, a portion of Land
Commission Award 7582 to Eseta Kipa. The Kuhua parcel, Lot 3A,
consists of 240.90 acres.
With respect to the background of the Kuhua parcel, in An
Act Relating to the Crown Government and Fort Lands, June 7,
1848, King Kamehameha III reserved the ahupuaʻa of Kuhua I and
Kuhua II as private lands for the use of himself, his heirs, and
successors.3
3 Apparently, there were four different parcels known as Kuhua - the one owned by Eseta Kipa, at issue here, one owned by Princess Ruth Keʻelikōlani, and two known as Kuhua I and Kuhua II that were part of the Mahele and reserved for King Kamehameha III. Again, the “Kuhua” addressed in this case
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In 1855 Eseta Kipa received Land Commission Award 7582
giving her title to Kuhua – Lot 3A and upon her death, title to
all her lands vested in her sole heir, Levi Haʻalelea. Levi
Haʻalelea deeded portions of Eseta Kipa’s estate to others and
devised the remainder to two devisees: (1) Charles Kanaʻina and
(2) Hazaleleponi K. Kapakuhaili, who subsequently deeded her
interest to Charles Kanaʻina.
In 1877, Charles Kanaʻina died intestate. His estate was
probated.4 His heirs and their interests were identified as:
2/9th Bernice Pauahi Bishop 1/9th Ruth Keelikolani 1/9th Hana Lilikalani, Edward Lilikalani, and Naihe 1/9th A.W. Halilio, Levi Haalelea and Kahuakaiola 1/9th Pahau 1/9th Kaaua 1/9th Heirs of Kilinahe 1/36th KAIAPOEPOE (=2.777%) 1/36th Nahuhuleua & Namilimili, wife and husband 1/36th NAMAKALELE (=2.777%) 1/36th PUAHI (=2.777%) 1/9th Heirs of unidentified person 1/45th KAHONU (=2.222%) 1/45th Kukahiko 1/45th Heirs of Kaupae 1/135th PAMAHOA (=0.741%) 1/135th Kaneikolia 1/135th Maele 1/45th Heirs of Kaeakamahu: Kaupae, Kalepa, Maihui 1/45th Kamakamohaha
is the whole of “Kuhua,” a portion of Land Commission Award 7582 to Eseta Kipa, Lot 3A.
4 Probate No. 2426
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B. Land court proceedings before the 1972 remand
1. Before the 1967 trial [1919-1967]
On July 8, 1919, the land court appointed Arthur Smith as
Examiner of Titles5 to investigate records relating to Pioneer
Mill’s application and to file a report regarding title to the
subject parcels. Smith’s Report of Examiner, dated December 1,
1919, concluded that Pioneer Mill: (1) had paper title to all of
Lot 1 in fee simple absolute; (2) had paper title to three-
eighths of Lot 2 in fee simple absolute; (3) did not have good
paper title to “Kuhua” (Lot 3A), but it may have acquired it by
prescription; (4) did not have good paper title to “Aki” (Lots
3B and 3C); and (5) did not have good paper title to “Puʻuki”
(Lots 3D and 3E).
5 In 1919 Revised Laws of Hawaiʻi (“RLH”) Act 56, section 12 (1903) provided:
Examiners of Title; appointment, removal. The Judge of land registration may appoint one or more examiners of title in the first judicial circuit, or when necessary in any other judicial circuit, who shall be persons of good moral character and shall have been declared by the supreme court of the Territory to be qualified for said office after examination in term or vacation. They shall be subject to removal by the supreme court of the Territory.
Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 501-11 (2018) currently provides:
§501-11 Examiners of title; appointment, removal. The [land court] judge may appoint one or more examiners of title in the first judicial circuit, or when necessary in any other judicial circuit, who shall be persons of good moral character, and shall have been declared by the supreme court to be qualified for the office after examination. They shall be subject to removal by the supreme court.
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On June 2, 1920, the land court ordered that notice of
Pioneer Mill’s application be provided by registered mail6 and
publication in the Wailuku Times. After publication, five
respondents appeared and filed answers: (1) Thomas Duncan, who
claimed ownership to a one-third undivided interest of all the
land in Pioneer Mill’s application; (2) the Territory of Hawaiʻi,
which claimed ownership of Lot 3; (3) Titus Napoliona (aka Titus
Napoleon), who claimed Pioneer Mill had no title to Lots 2 and
3; (4) J.H.S. Kaleo, who claimed Pioneer Mill had no title to
Lots 2 and 3; and (5) Kaneikolia (W) who claimed Pioneer Mill
had no title to Lots 2 and 3, to which she claimed an undivided
interest.
On September 23, 1920, the land court entered default
against all parties who had failed to respond to Pioneer Mill’s
application by July 3, 1920.
But then, for decades, nothing happened in the application.
In 1935 and 1941, ten respondents appeared and moved to re-open
6 The record shows that service by registered mail was effectuated, but there are no receipt records.
HRS § 669-3 (2016) now provides:
Notice by publication or registered mail. In any action brought under section 669-1(a) or (b)[adverse possession], unknown persons and any known persons who do not reside within the State or cannot after due diligence be served with process within the State may be served as provided by [other sections].
In other words, when possible, personal service would now be required.
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the September 23, 1920, default. These respondents included
Lucy Moeikauhane, et al., who filed an answer and claim on
August 9, 1935, and Hattie Chun Fook, et al., who also filed an
answer and claim on November 22, 1935. It is unclear what
happened to the motions to re-open,7 but aside from them being
filed, the case remained inactive from 1920 to 1965.8
On March 2, 1965, the State of Hawaiʻi (“State”), not
Pioneer Mill, moved for the matter to be set for trial. The
land court issued a publication notice, which appeared in the
Honolulu Advertiser and the Sunday Star-Bulletin and Advertiser,
setting trial for August 31, 1965. The notice said that all
those who failed to appear would have default entered against
them. Essentially, the land court re-opened the 1920 default
proceeding with the August 31, 1965, trial date serving as a new
return date.
Several respondents did appear on August 31, 1965, and the
land court later entered default against all those who failed to
appear. In May of 1966, the Estate of John Mamaki filed a
7 The record consists of least 85 volumes of a record on appeal that are not necessarily filed in chronological order, consisting of thousands of unpaginated pages, making it difficult to follow. This is another consequence of the lengthy delay.
8 In 1961, American Factors, Ltd. (“Amfac”) apparently had the assets of the original Pioneer Mill conveyed to a newly formed Pioneer Mill Company Limited, and the latter was apparently merged into Amfac, but Amfac does not appear to have been included as a party.
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motion to set aside the default. The land court set aside the
default against both the Estate of John Mamaki and the Estate of
Mary K. Sylva (aka Mary M. Brown), allowing them to appear as
respondents.
2. 1967 trial and its aftermath
On September 25, 1967, trial commenced.9 On that day, Judge
King dismissed the claims of Lucy Moeikauhane, et al., and Chun
Fook, et al., without prejudice, who had moved to set aside
defaults and filed claims in 1935, finding they did not claim
interest through any of Charles Kanaʻina’s heirs. This left
Titus Napoleon, the Estate of John Mamaki, and the Estate of
Mary M. Brown, aka Mary K. Sylva, as challengers of Pioneer
Mill’s application.
On November 15, 1967, Judge King orally ruled from the
bench. But he also stated that the decision would be effective
upon filing of the decision and order. No written decision was
filed at the time.
Then, on February 3, 1970, Judge King publicly declared his
candidacy for the position of governor. Application of Pioneer
Mill Co., 53 Haw. 496, 497-98, 497 P.2d 549, 550-51 (1972).
After this announcement, on March 13, 1970, Judge King
entered a written decision containing 107 findings of fact and
9 The Honorable Samuel P. King presiding.
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24 conclusions of law regarding the land court application. He
concluded that Pioneer Mill was the owner in fee simple of Lots
1, 2, 3A, 3B, 3C, but not 3D and 3E, and ordered amendments to
the maps to divide Lot 3 into those separate parcels. On April
16, 1970, the State Surveyor amended the map pursuant to this
order.
C. Initial appeal
In April of 1970, the State and the estates of Mary K.
Sylva (aka Mary K. Brown) and John Mamaki appealed.
Their appeal was based on the land court’s refusal to grant
their request to dismiss the application “because the issues had
not been framed within a certain time.” Application of Pioneer
Mill Co., 53 Haw. at 498, 497 P.2d at 551. In other words, even
more than fifty years ago, parties had sought dismissal based on
a failure to prosecute.
Instead of addressing the delay issue, this court requested
supplemental briefing regarding “a more basic issue . . . posed
by the Land Court judge’s announcement relating to his candidacy
for public office[.]” Id. At the time, Article V, Section 3 of
the Hawaiʻi Constitution provided that “[a]ny justice or judge
who shall become a candidate for elective office shall thereby
forfeit his office.” Haw. Const. art. V, § 3.
Based on this provision, after supplemental briefing, this
court went on to hold that Judge King lacked the power to
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execute decisions after he declared his intention to run for
public office and nullified his decision regarding this land
court application. Application of Pioneer Mill Co., 53 Haw. at
497-98, 497 P.2d at 550-51.
This court then remanded the case for a new trial.
Application of Pioneer Mill Co., 53 Haw. at 498, 497 P.2d at
551. A trial never took place.
D. Land court proceedings after 1972 remand
1. 1972 to 2008
After the remand, nothing happened in the case, this time
for another ten years. In 1982, the land court, not Pioneer
Mill, initiated a status conference with counsel, and set trial
for April 1983.
Between the setting of trial and March 1983, six motions to
set aside default and for leave to file answer were filed. On
April 22, 1983, disclaimers of interest were filed regarding
five of the six motions to set aside default. The last motion
to set aside default was resolved by a stipulation entered
between Myrtle N. Lee (“Lee”) and Pioneer Mill, which withdrew
the motion to set aside default and substituted Lee as a party.
But for reasons unknown, trial did not take place in April
1983. On September 29, 1983, the land court sent a letter to
Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright (“Cades”), which represented
Pioneer Mill, and another to Lee, regarding a new trial date of
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November 25, 1983. Then, on October 20, 1983, another letter was
filed by the land court, this time addressed only to Cades,
saying that the trial was again being rescheduled to January 13,
1984, per Pioneer Mill’s request.
And yet another decade elapsed without any action in the
case. In late 1993, the State filed a disclaimer and
stipulation between itself and Pioneer Mill; the State
disclaimed any interest in Lots 1, 2, 3A, 3B, and 3C, and
stipulated that Pioneer Mill had title suitable for registration
to these lots. Apparently as part of this stipulated
disclaimer, in 1994, Pioneer Mill quitclaimed Puʻuki, Lots 3D and
3E, to the State.
2. 2009 and Kahoma’s substitution motion
Once again, nothing happened in the case, this time for
more than fifteen years. Pioneer Mill had apparently
transferred Lots 1, 2, 3A, 3B, and 3C to Kahoma on August 28,
2000. And on December 21, 2006, Kahoma sold Lots 3B and 3C to
Frank Valenta.
But Kahoma waited nine years after it obtained title, until
July 14, 2009, to move for it be substituted for Pioneer Mill as
the applicant on the land court application as to Lots 1, 2, and
3A. On August 28, 2009, the land court granted the motion.
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3. Kahoma’s motions for default and summary judgment
Then, on November 2, 2009, Kahoma filed a motion for
default judgment as to Lots 1, 2, and 3A, Kuhua. On December
24, 2009, the land court ordered publication of notice of its
intent to grant the motion. The publication was advertised in
the Maui News and the Honolulu Star Advertiser with a return
date of March 29, 2010. The publication did not identify who
might be a claimant, i.e., whose descendants’ interests might be
at issue. It merely invited those with objections to either
file written objections or appear on that date to orally object.
Some objections were filed over the months leading up to
the hearing. On October 21, 2010, the court initially denied
the motion for default judgment and ordered that any interested
party now had until November 1, 2010, to file a claim of
interest. Additional claims of interest were filed.
Then, in April 2011, Kahoma filed a motion for entry of
default against all parties who failed to file a claim of
interest by the November 1, 2010, deadline. On November 15,
2011, the land court granted this motion and entered default for
those who had not met that deadline.
In the interim, on August 3, 2011, Kahoma filed a motion
for summary judgment requesting confirmation and allowing
registration of its title to Lot 1, outlining the chain of title
as to that lot. On October 26, 2011, the land court granted the
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motion, confirming Kahoma’s ownership in fee simple to Lot 1 and
ordered registration of Kahoma’s title, but denied Kahoma’s
request for Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (“HRCP”) Rule 54(b)
certification.
In July of 2012, Kahoma moved for summary judgment to
confirm its title to Lot 2. Kahoma asserted it had unbroken
title as to that lot also. On January 16, 2013, the land court
granted this motion.
4. Motions to dismiss based on laches/lack of prosecution
On November 19, 2015, self-represented certiorari
petitioner Edward Kakalia (“Kakalia”) filed a motion asserting
the case had been pending for too long.10 No order appears to
have entered regarding this motion, but it was implicitly denied
as the land court went ahead and later ruled on the merits.11
On July 29, 2016, some other Kanaʻina descendants, who are
also petitioners on certiorari (collectively referred to as
“Schneider descendants” based on Gladiola Aloha Schneider being
the first named), filed a motion to dismiss based on laches as
well as HRCP Rule 41(b). Schneider descendants argued that
laches bars stale claims, especially when material witnesses
10 “Taking to[o] Long; On the Brief; Allodial Title Undisputed; Respondents Interest; No Adverse Claim; Conclusion; Summary Judgment.”
11 On August 16, 2017, Kakalia filed another motion, this one seeking dismissal with prejudice based on the merits regarding the adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A, which was denied.
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have passed away. They also argued that the case should be
dismissed based on HRCP Rule 41(b) based on the failure to
prosecute, arguing that the delay was deliberate and
contumacious. The land court denied this motion on December 13,
2016.
5. Kahoma’s motion to confirm undivided 78.704% interest in Lot 3A
Then, on January 17, 2017, Kahoma filed a motion seeking
confirmation of a 78.704% interest in Lot 3A by adverse
possession. The motion asserted that by the November 1, 2010,
deadline set by the land court for filing claims of interest to
Lot 3A, claims totaling a 21.296% interest had been filed by
Kanaʻina descendants.
Kahoma requested that the land court enter a decree giving
Kahoma title to the remaining 78.04%. This percentage
represented the interests of defaulted Kanaʻina descendants.
Kahoma said if the motion was granted, it would stipulate to the
substitution of Kanaʻina descendants who had filed claims as
applicants to the remaining undivided 21.296% interest in Lot
3A. Kakalia opposed, raising various concerns, including that
he, as well as other descendants, were entitled to a fair trial
and reasserting that the case had been pending for more than 90
years. Various Kanaʻina descendants also opposed this motion.
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On May 17, 2017, the land court issued an order saying that
“default judgment against the non-appearing parties whose
defaults have been previously entered herein as to Lot 3-A is
granted, but subject to a determination of Substituted Applicant
Kahoma Land LLC’s interest, if any[.]” The order denied without
prejudice Kahoma’s request to register ownership to 78.04% of
Lot 3A.
Kahoma then moved for an interlocutory appeal of the May
17, 2017, order, which the land court denied. But in its
denial, the court indicated it would entertain a motion for
reconsideration. Kahoma then filed a motion for reconsideration
on July 18, 2017. The land court then granted Kahoma’s motion
for reconsideration and entered default judgment for Kahoma as
to 78.704% of Lot 3A. Motions for reconsideration were filed by
various descendants, but all were denied.
6. Land court’s findings and decrees
The land court then filed its September 24, 2019, FOF/COL
and its Decree 2017 granting Kahoma a 78.04% interest in Lot 3A
based on adverse possession, as well as its Decree 2016
confirming Kahoma’s paper title to Lots 1 and 2.
In its September 24, 2019, FOF/COL, the land court relied
heavily on transcripts of witness testimony from the 1967 trial.
The land court also concluded that the Kanaʻina descendants who
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had appeared and objected were precluded from defending the
title of Kanaʻina’s defaulted heirs.
E. ICA proceedings
A joint notice of appeal as well as cross-appeals were
filed by various Kanaʻina descendants, including the Schneider
descendants and Kakalia.
Relevant here, the errors alleged by the Schneider
descendants and Kakalia included the land court’s (1)
determination that Kahoma has a 78.04% interest in Lot 3A
representing the percentages allocable to the defaulted Kanaʻina
descendants, and determining that cotenants do not have standing
to defend commonly held property on behalf of all cotenants
against an adverse possession claim; and (2) denial of their
motions to dismiss based on the delays in prosecuting this case.
In response, Kahoma argued that (1) the appellants lacked
standing to defend the interests of the defaulted heirs of
Kanaʻina and (2) the land court properly exercised its discretion
in denying the motions to dismiss because the appellants failed
to establish deliberate delay, contumacious conduct, or actual
prejudice to the appellants.
The ICA agreed with Kahoma and ruled in a memorandum
opinion that appellants lacked standing to challenge title to
Lot 3A for the defaulted Kanaʻina descendants. In re Pioneer
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Mill Co. & Kahoma Land LLC, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2024 WL
3085307, at *7-9 (Haw. App. June 21, 2024) (mem. op.). Citing
its opinion in Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Silva, 124 Hawaiʻi
476, 482, 248 P.3d 1207, 1213 (App. 2011), the ICA ruled “it is
well-established in Hawaiʻi that a respondent may not defeat a
petitioner’s [applicant’s] claim to title by showing that even
though they have no title, a third-party not in the action has
superior title to the petitioner [applicant].” In re Pioneer
Mill, 2024 WL 3085307, at *9. The ICA then determined it did
not need to reach the merits of appellants’ other allegations of
error. Id.
The ICA filed its judgment on appeal on July 17, 2024.
F. Certiorari proceedings
Kakalia and the Schneider descendants filed timely
certiorari applications.12
Kakalia raises various historical perspectives and issues,
including the ICA’s ruling that Kanaʻina descendants lack
standing to raise claims on behalf of other Kanaʻina descendants
as well as the fact that this case had been pending for 100
years. The Schneider descendants also raise various issues,
12 Various other Kanaʻina descendants appeared in the land court and ICA but did not file timely certiorari petitions. Our holdings in this opinion based on the Kakalia and the Schneider descendants’ certiorari petitions will, however, also inure to their benefit.
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including those two, which are dispositive as to Kahoma’s
remaining claim for adverse possession of Lot 3A.
Kakalia and the Schneider descendants are sometimes jointly
referred to as “Petitioners.”
III. Standards of Review
A. Standing
The issue of standing is reviewed de novo on appeal. Tax
Found. of Haw. v. State, 144 Hawaiʻi 175, 185, 439 P.3d 127, 137
(2019).
Standing is that aspect of justiciability focusing on the party seeking a forum rather than on the issues he wants adjudicated. And the crucial inquiry in its determination is whether the plaintiff has alleged such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant their invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on their behalf.
Tax Found. of Haw., 144 Hawaiʻi at 196, 439 P.3d at 148 (cleaned
up).
B. Laches
A trial court’s application of the equitable doctrine of
laches is reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of
discretion occurs where the trial court has clearly exceeded the
bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or
practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.
Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of State of Hawaiʻi, 106
Hawaiʻi 416, 430, 106 P.3d 339, 353 (2005).
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IV. Discussion
A. Cotenants have standing to assert the interests of other cotenants against a party claiming adverse possession
The ICA held that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge
Decree 2017 because “it is well established in Hawaiʻi that a
respondent may not defeat a petitioner’s [applicant’s] claim to
title by showing that even though they have no title, a third-
party not in the action has superior title to the petitioner
[applicant].” In re Pioneer Mill, 2024 WL 3085307 at *9
(emphasis added). In so ruling, the ICA cited to its 2011
opinion in Silva, 124 Hawaiʻi at 482, 248 P.3d at 1213.
But Silva is clearly inapplicable based on its own
language. It involved claims to title by defendants having no
title. Unless adverse possession is established, actual Kanaʻina
descendants are in the chain of title to Lot 3A. It is Kahoma
that is without title to Lot 3A without establishing adverse
possession. In any event, Silva did not involve plaintiffs
seeking to quiet title based on adverse possession; rather, it
involved competing claims to title based on paper title. Silva,
124 Hawaiʻi at 478, 248 P.3d at 1209.
This case, in contrast, involves a claim to quiet title
based on adverse possession, which requires proof of actual,
open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession
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for the statutory period. Wailuku Agribusiness Co. v. Ah Sam,
114 Hawaiʻi 24, 33, 155 P.3d 1125, 1134 (2007).
And in cases involving possessory interests to real estate,
co-tenants have the right to defend not only their individual
interests, but the interests of all their cotenants, with whom
they are tenants in common. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
tenancy in common as “[a] tenancy by two or more persons, in
equal or unequal undivided shares, each person having an equal
right to possess the whole property but no right of
survivorship.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
Thus, as each cotenant has an equal right to possess the
whole property, each cotenant is entitled to possession of the
commonly held property against everyone but their cotenants, and
one cotenant “may recover the entire property from a stranger.”
86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 162 (2024).
This concept of cotenants being able to assert the
interests of other cotenants has historically been recognized in
case law. For example, in 1875, the Supreme Court of California
stated in Chipman v. Hastings, 50 Cal. 310 (1875), as follows:
The court below found that the plaintiff Caroline is the owner in fee of an undivided half of the premises as a tenant in common with persons other than the defendant, and held that, as such tenant in common, she was entitled to the possession of the whole of the premises as against all persons having no title, and that the defendant tortiously entered upon the premises and ousted her. Upon these facts the judgment was correctly entered below that she recover the whole of the premises.
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Chipman, 50 Cal. at 314. Applying this passage from Chipman to
our facts, Petitioners here are “owners in fee” as “tenant[s] in
common with persons [other Kanaʻina descendants] other than the
defendant [here, Kahoma],” and are “entitled to the possession
of the whole of the premises as against all persons having no
title [Kahoma].”
Similarly, in 1891, the Supreme Court of Texas, in an
action for trespass, ruled that “one tenant in common may
recover the whole land as against a stranger, and that the
recovery will inure to the benefit of his cotenants.” Boon v.
Knox, 80 Tex. 642, 644, 16 S.W. 448, 450 (1891) (emphasis
added).13
Also, in 1941, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in an ejectment
action, held that “a tenant in common may maintain an action of
ejectment for recovery of possession of the property against the
strangers to title.” Nat’l Surety Corp. v. Smith, 168 Or. 265,
269-70, 114 P.2d 118, 119-120 (1941) (emphasis added).
13 Also, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, addressing an action over mineral rights, stated that when “a cotenant seeking to recover the entire tract of land proves title in himself and his cotenants, the burden is not upon him to go further and make proof that his cotenants have not parted with their title.” Freeman v. Southland Paper Mills, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 822, 824 (1978). Correlatively, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in an action for conversion and trespass of property, stated “that in an action to recover real property one tenant in common may recover possession of the entire tract as against all persons except his cotenants.” Carlson v. McNeill, 114 Colo. 78, 83, 162 P.2d 226, 229 (1945).
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Thus, the common law has traditionally recognized that
cotenants have standing to assert possessory interests of other
cotenants against a stranger seeking possession.
And in Hawaiʻi, we have recognized that a tenant in common
shares a general fiduciary relationship with their cotenants.
City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. Bennett, 57 Haw. 195, 208, 552 P.2d
1380, 1390 (1976). Further, almost fifty years ago, we took
judicial notice of the critical attitude towards previous over-
generous rules of adverse possession. Bennett, 57 Haw. at 208,
552 P.2d at 1389. And although our holding today is not limited
to our indigenous peoples, we note that Native Hawaiian
descendants have a collective stake in the protection of their
ʻāina rights through being able to assert their non-appearing
cotenants’ interests against adverse possession claims.14
We therefore hold that cotenants have standing to assert
the interests of other cotenants against a party claiming
adverse possession.
B. The land court abused its discretion by denying the motions to dismiss based on laches
The second issue we address on certiorari resolves the
adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A.
14 There are various reasons parties might not respond to a quiet title action. In this case, it does not appear personal service on Kanaʻina descendants was ever even attempted. Also, most people do not read notices in newspapers. And here, the 2010 notice did not even say the notice was directed to heirs of Charles Kanaʻina.
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After erroneously determining that Petitioners lacked
standing to assert their cotenants’ interests, the ICA did not
address Petitioners’ assertions of error based on the land
court’s denial of their motions to dismiss. As noted, in 2015
and 2016, Kakalia and the Schneider descendants filed motions to
dismiss based on the lengthy delay, which were expressly or
implicitly denied by the land court. The Schneider desendants’
motion explicity asserted both laches and HRCP Rule 41(b).
Although Kakalia did not specifically use the word “laches,” he
repeatedly objected to the lengthy delay, and submissions of
self-represented litigants are to be interpreted liberally.
Waltrip v. TS Enters., Inc., 140 Hawaiʻi 226, 239, 398 P.3d 815,
828 (2016).
We hold that the land court abused its discretion by
refusing to dismiss the Lot 3A adverse possession claim based on
laches.
The doctrine of laches reflects the equitable maxim that
equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights
and is a defense to cases brought in law and in equity.
Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Royal Aloha v. Certified Mgmt.,
Inc., 139 Hawaiʻi 229, 231, 234, 386 P.3d 866, 868, 871 (2016).
delay by the plaintiff in bringing or advancing the claim, and
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(2) resulting prejudice due to the delay. Herrmann v. Herrmann,
138 Hawai‘i 144, 153, 378 P.3d 860, 869 (2016).
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Johnston v.
Standard Mining Co., 148 U.S. 360, 370 (1893), “It has been
frequently held that the mere institution of a suit does not, of
itself, relieve a person from the charge of laches, and that if
[they] fail[] in the diligent prosecution of the action the
consequences are the same as though no action had been begun.”
Our court also recognizes that laches can be raised in response
to undue delays occurring during litigation, not just at the
commencement of an action. See Herrmann, 138 Hawai‘i at 155, 378
P.3d at 871; HawaiiUSA Fed. Credit Union v. Monalim, 147 Hawai‘i
33, 37-38, 464 P.3d 821, 825-26 (2020).15
15 In Monalim, this court considered a laches defense raised based on a four-year delay in filing a motion for deficiency judgment after a foreclosure judgment. 147 Hawaiʻi at 36, 464 P.3d at 824. The mortgagor argued that this delay was both unreasonable and prejudicial, as they had made financial adjustments based on the assumption that no further claims would be pursued. See id. This court vacated the deficiency judgment and remanded for consideration of laches, affirming that laches can apply to delays occurring within litigation itself when those delays result in undue prejudice to the opposing party. Monalim, 147 Hawaiʻi at 44, 464 P.3d at 832.
In Herrmann, this court addressed a laches defense raised in a post- decree motion for reimbursement of child support overpayments. 138 Hawaiʻi at 153, 378 P.3d at 869. The father waited seven years before seeking reimbursement for overpayment, and the mother argued that the delay was unreasonable and had prejudiced her, as her financial situation had changed during that time. Herrmann, 138 Hawaiʻi at 153-55, 378 P.3d at 869-71. We remanded for the family court to assess whether the delay was unreasonable and whether it caused prejudice to the mother. Herrmann, 138 Hawaiʻi at 157, 378 P.3d at 873.
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Here, the 100-year delay in prosecuting this case to
conclusion is unprecedented and is obviously unreasonable.
Kahoma stands in the shoes of Pioneer Mill, which did not pursue
the case for many decades at a time, as outlined above. Kahoma
itself waited another nine years after receiving its deeds from
Pioneer Mill before prosecuting the case. The delays in this
case were blatantly unreasonable, satisfying the first element.
With respect to the second element, prejudice, the adverse
possession claim as to Lot 3A was based on possession that
allegedly occurred before the 1919 filing of the land court
application. The Examiner was not able to make a determination
regarding adverse possession, indicating there were factual
issues. By the time Petitioners filed their motions to dismiss
in 2015 and 2016, witnesses, Kanaʻina descendants, oral
histories, and memories, were simply gone. Petitioners were
also unable to cross-examine the 1967 trial witnesses, upon
which the land court relied in its adverse possession ruling.
The prejudice is obvious.
Therefore, the land court abused its discretion by denying
Petitioners’ motions to dismiss based on laches.16
16 We therefore need not address HRCP Rule 41(b).
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V. Conclusion
For these reasons, we vacate the ICA’s July 17, 2024,
judgment on appeal to the extent it affirmed the land court’s
September 24, 2019, FOF/COL as well as the land court’s Decree
2017. We vacate the land court’s September 24, 2019, FOF/COL as
well as its Decree 2017 awarding 78.704% of Lot 3A to Kahoma.
We affirm the ICA’s judgment on appeal to the extent it affirmed
the land court’s Decree 2016 regarding title to Lots 1 and 2.
consistent with this opinion, which is to include dismissal of
dismissal is without prejudice, if a new application to quiet
title as to Lot 3A is filed, current Hawaiʻi law will govern.
Michael J. Matsukawa /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald for petitioners Gladiola Aloha Schneider, et al. /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
Edward P. Kakalia /s/ Todd W. Eddins pro se petitioner /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza W. Keoni Shultz and Calvert G. Chipchase /s/ James S. Kawashima for respondent Kahoma Land LLC
David B. Kaapu for respondents Arlene K. Kakalia, et al.
Lance D. Collins, Bianca Isaki, Ryan D. Hurley, and Diego A. Rivera
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for amici curiae Kuleana Kuʻikahi, Aha Moku O Maui, Nā ʻAikāne O Maui, Kiaʻi Kauaula, Ka Malu O Kahālāwai, Nā Mamo Aloha ʻAina O Honokōhau, and West Maui Preservation Association