In re: Anthony Thomas and Wendi Thomas At Emerald, LLC

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 28, 2017
• Docket: NV-16-1058-KuLJu
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED MAR 28 2017 1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL 2 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP No. NV-16-1058-KuLJu ) 6 ANTHONY THOMAS and WENDI THOMAS;) Bk. Nos. 3:14-bk-50333 AT EMERALD, LLC, ) 3:14-bk-50331 7 ) (Jointly Administered) Debtors. ) 8 ________________________________) Adv. No. 3:14-ap-05022 ) 9 ANTHONY THOMAS; WENDI THOMAS, ) ) 10 Appellants, ) ) 11 v. ) MEMORANDUM* ) 12 KENMARK VENTURES, LLC, ) ) 13 Appellee. ) ________________________________) 14 Argued and Submitted on February 24, 2017 15 at Las Vegas, Nevada 16 Filed – March 28, 2017 17 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada 18 Honorable Bruce T. Beesley, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 19 20 Appearances: Laury Miles Macauley argued for appellants; Wayne A. Silver argued for appellee. 21 22 Before: KURTZ, LAFFERTY and JURY, Bankruptcy Judges. 23 24 25 26 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 28 See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 INTRODUCTION 2 Chapter 71 debtors Anthony and Wendi Thomas appeal from a 3 judgment determining that Mr. Thomas’ $4.5 million judgment debt 4 owed to Kenmark Ventures, LLC, is nondischargeable under 5 § 523(a)(2)(A). The Thomases argue on appeal that the bankruptcy 6 court made insufficient findings to support its judgment and that 7 the findings it did make were not adequately supported by facts 8 in the record. 9 The bankruptcy court found, among other things, that 10 Mr. Thomas fraudulently concealed certain facts regarding what is 11 known as the “Thomas emerald.” The emerald-related fraud 12 findings had adequate support in the record and were sufficient 13 by themselves to support the court’s nondischargeability 14 judgment. On that basis, we AFFIRM. 15 FACTS 16 Mr. Thomas2 was a major investor in Electronic Plastics, and 17 he has conceded that he acted on behalf of Electronic Plastics 18 from time to time. For instance, there is no genuine dispute 19 that Electronic Plastics needed funding and that Thomas met with 20 Kenmark’s principal Kenneth Tersini in May and June of 2007 in 21 1 22 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and 23 all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. 24 2 Wendi Thomas did not directly participate in the underlying 25 litigation or in the transactions from which the litigation 26 arose. Furthermore, with the exception of the penultimate paragraph of this decision, this decision does not purport to 27 address any concerns directly relating to her interests. Consequently, throughout the remainder of this decision, we refer 28 to Mr. Thomas as if he were the sole appellant in this appeal.

2 1 furtherance of Electronic Plastics’ desire to obtain funding from 2 Kenmark. The funding was supposed to tide over Electronic 3 Plastics until it started generating revenue from the sale of its 4 technology product: a biometric “smartcard” with security 5 features and applications that could be modified to suit the 6 needs of individual commercial customers. 7 Kenmark eventually funded $6.1 million to Electronic 8 Plastics over the course of roughly a year, beginning in June of 9 2007 and ending in May of 2008. Kenmark funded no less than 10 $4.1 million of the $6.1 million between October 2007 and May 11 2008, after all of the fraudulent conduct complained of allegedly 12 occurred. 13 Electronic Plastics ultimately was unable to generate any 14 sales of its smartcard, and Kenmark demanded repayment of the 15 $6.1 million. When neither Electronic Plastics nor Thomas repaid 16 the funds, Kenmark sued Electronic Plastics, Thomas and others in 17 state court. 18 Pursuant to a state court settlement, Mr. Thomas stipulated 19 to entry of a $4.5 million judgment against himself and in favor 20 of Kenmark if he did not timely make a $575,000 payment owed 21 under the settlement. Thomas never made the $575,000 payment. 22 After Thomas commenced his bankruptcy case, Kenmark obtained 23 relief from the automatic stay to permit it to have the 24 stipulated state court judgment entered. The stipulated judgment 25 resolved the issues of Thomas’ liability to Kenmark and the 26 amount of that liability but left open the issue of whether 27 28

3 1 Thomas’ debt to Kenmark was nondischargeable.3 2 According to Tersini, Thomas fraudulently concealed and 3 affirmatively misrepresented a number of different matters. For 4 purposes of our decision, the most important nondisclosures 5 concerned a 21,000 carat uncut emerald, known as the “Thomas 6 emerald.” Tersini testified that Thomas offered the Thomas 7 emerald as collateral to secure all of the money Kenmark lent and 8 that Thomas executed two promissory notes, a security agreement 9 and a security agreement addendum to document the secured loan 10 transaction. On the other hand, Thomas ultimately claimed that 11 the $6.1 million Kenmark funded to Electronic Plastics was meant 12 to be an equity investment rather than a loan and that his 13 signatures on the loan documents were forged. 14 The parties agree that they discussed the Thomas emerald and 15 its value before funding occurred. They also agree that Thomas 16 presented to Tersini an appraisal stating that the Thomas emerald 17 was worth $800 million. According to Tersini, Thomas told him 18 the Thomas emerald was given to him by the owners of a Brazilian 19 mine in gratitude for his efforts in saving the mine by utilizing 20 specialized boring techniques. Tersini further asserted Thomas 21 never disclosed that the same appraiser who gave him the 22 3 23 The original oral settlement agreement terms, stated in open court, provided for entry of judgment against Thomas on 24 Kenmark’s two fraud causes of action in the event of nonpayment of the settlement amount. The stipulation for entry of judgment 25 provided for the same thing. Nonetheless, before holding trial 26 on Kenmark’s nondischargeability complaint, the bankruptcy court ruled that the stipulated state court judgment did not have any 27 preclusive effect on any of the fraud or nondischargeability questions at issue in the nondischargeability litigation. This 28 ruling has not been appealed.

4 1 $800 million appraisal a few months earlier had given him a 2 $400,000 appraisal for the same stone. Additionally, Thomas 3 later admitted that he paid $20,000 for the emerald. On yet 4 another occasion, he stated he paid $60,000 for it. 5 Tersini testified that he did not learn of the $400,000 6 appraisal or the various claimed purchase prices until well after 7 he loaned the $6.1 million to Electronic Plastics. He further 8 testified that, had he known about these facts before funding, he 9 would not have loaned any money against the Thomas emerald. 10 Other nondisclosures Kenmark complained of included: (1) the 11 fact that Electronic Plastics founder, Chief Executive Officer 12 and managing member Michael Gardiner was a convicted felon; and 13 (2) the fact that Electronic Plastics was in the midst of 14 litigation with a company called e-smart over ownership of the 15 technology used in the smartcard. The e-smart litigation had 16 caused Electronic Plastics to incur hundreds of thousands of 17 dollars in attorney’s fees, and – as a result of the litigation – 18 Electronic Plastics decided to redesign its smartcard. 19 Thomas testified that Tersini was advised (orally and in 20 writing) of both the Gardiner conviction and the e-smart 21 litigation before the Kenmark funding occurred. On the other 22 hand, Tersini testified that he did not know about either of 23 these facts until after Kenmark had funded the full $6.1 million. 24 Kenmark also complained of affirmative misrepresentations, 25 particularly concerning the development status of the smartcard. 26 Tersini testified that Thomas advised him the smartcard was fully 27 functional and ready for manufacture. Tersini further maintained 28 that Thomas led him to believe that a Korean bank was ready to

5 1 sign an order for ten million smartcards and that Thomas’ oral 2 misrepresentations were bolstered by Electronic Plastics’ 3 business plan, which made similar claims. Thomas testified, in 4 essence, that he was a mere conduit for information from 5 Electronic Plastics to Tersini, that he was not knowledgeable 6 about the technical aspects of the smartcard and that he relied 7 on Electronic Plastics’ technical experts to provide him with 8 information regarding the development status of the smartcard. 9 He further denied advising Tersini that a Korean bank was ready 10 to place an order for 10 million smartcards. 11 After a four-day trial, the bankruptcy court orally rendered 12 its findings of fact and conclusions of law in open court. The 13 court stated the basic elements for establishing nondischargeable 14 fraud, as set forth in Turtle Rock Meadows Homeowners Ass’n v. 15 Slyman (In re Slyman), 234 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000). The 16 court then made a number of findings regarding the above- 17 referenced nondisclosures. 18 The court suggested that the nondisclosures concerning the 19 Thomas emerald and its value were the most important for purposes 20 of its nondischargeability determination. In fact, of the 21 roughly seven pages of hearing transcript comprising the court’s 22 findings, nearly four of those pages concern the issue of the 23 loan and the pledging of the Thomas emerald as security. 24 The court specifically found that Thomas signed the notes, 25 the security agreement, and the addendum to the security 26 agreement – both personally and on behalf of Electronic Plastics 27 – thereby securing their obligation to repay the monies Kenmark 28 lent using the Thomas emerald as collateral. The bankruptcy

6 1 court opined that Thomas’ forgery claim was inconsistent with his 2 response to Kenmark’s requests for admissions and with a letter 3 his counsel Joseph Kafka sent Kenmark in response to Kenmark’s 4 demand for repayment of the $6.1 million loan. The forgery claim 5 also was inconsistent with admissions in Thomas’ answer to 6 Kenmark’s complaint. 7 The bankruptcy court also found that Thomas gave Tersini the 8 $800 million appraisal for the emerald, but did not share with 9 him the same appraiser’s $400,000 appraisal, which was dated a 10 few months before the $800 million appraisal. Additionally, the 11 bankruptcy court noted that Thomas made a number of inconsistent 12 statements regarding the purchase price he paid for the emerald 13 (variously, $20,000 and $60,000), which in turn were inconsistent 14 with statements he made to Tersini indicating that the emerald 15 was a gift from the mine owners. 16 The bankruptcy court further found that Thomas failed to 17 disclose Electronic Plastics principal Michael Gardiner’s felony 18 fraud conviction and its then-pending intellectual property 19 litigation with e-smart. 20 In addition to the nondisclosures, the bankruptcy court 21 found that Thomas presented to Tersini Electronic Plastics’ 22 business plan, which contained affirmative misrepresentations 23 regarding the “commercial availability” of the smartcard and 24 regarding Electronic Plastics’ “current projects” (1) in Europe 25 for a publicly-traded company; and (2) in Asia for South Korea’s 26 largest bank. The only other statement in the bankruptcy court’s 27 findings alluding to other affirmative misrepresentations was its 28 rather nebulous comment that “[t]he biometric card was

7 1 unfortunately not developed or produced as quickly as Kenmark had 2 anticipated, based on the representations made by Mr. Thomas.” 3 Hr’g Tr. (Feb. 8, 2016) at 5:18-20. 4 The bankruptcy court went on to discuss justifiable reliance 5 and the facts in the record supporting its determination that 6 Kenmark justifiably relied on Thomas’ fraudulent conduct. 7 However, there is no discussion of the fraud elements concerning 8 Thomas’ state of mind – whether he knew of the falsity of the 9 misrepresentations when he made them and whether he made them 10 with the intent to deceive. 11 The bankruptcy court entered its judgment determining that 12 Thomas’ $4.5 million judgment debt to Kenmark is 13 nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2) on February 19, 2016, and 14 Thomas timely appealed. 15 JURISDICTION 16 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 17 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(I), and we have jurisdiction under 18 28 U.S.C. § 158. 19 ISSUE 20 Did the bankruptcy court commit reversible error when it 21 determined that Thomas’ $4.5 million judgment debt to Kenmark is 22 nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)? 23 STANDARDS OF REVIEW 24 Generally speaking, the dischargeability of a particular 25 debt is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review 26 de novo. Peklar v. Ikerd (In re Peklar), 260 F.3d 1035, 1037 27 (9th Cir. 2001). Even so, the bankruptcy court’s findings made 28 as part of its dischargeability ruling are reviewed for clear

8 1 error. Candland v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (In re Candland), 90 F.3d 2 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1996); Oney v. Weinberg (In re Weinberg), 3 410 B.R. 19, 28 (9th Cir. BAP 2009), aff’d, 407 Fed.Appx. 176 4 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2010). Thus, whether a creditor has proven 5 an essential element of a cause of action under § 523(a)(2)(A) is 6 a factual determination reviewed for clear error. Anastas v. Am. 7 Sav. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1283 (9th Cir. 1996); 8 Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc. v. Vinhnee 9 (In re Vinhnee), 336 B.R. 437, 443 (9th Cir. BAP 2005). 10 “A court’s factual determination is clearly erroneous if it 11 is illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.” 12 Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010) 13 (citing United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–62 & n.21 14 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). “Where there are two permissible 15 views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them 16 cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 17 N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). When factual findings are based 18 on credibility determinations, we must give even greater 19 deference to the bankruptcy court’s findings. See Anderson, 20 470 U.S. at 575. 21 DISCUSSION 22 The bankruptcy court correctly recited the general standard 23 for finding nondischargeable fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). This 24 standard requires the following elements: 25 (1) misrepresentation, fraudulent omission or deceptive conduct by the debtor; (2) knowledge of the falsity or 26 deceptiveness of his statement or conduct; (3) an intent to deceive; (4) justifiable reliance by the 27 creditor on the debtor’s statement or conduct; and (5) damage to the creditor proximately caused by its 28 reliance on the debtor’s statement or conduct.

9 1 In re Weinberg, 410 B.R. at 35 (citing In re Slyman, 234 F.3d at 2 1085). 3 On appeal, Thomas mainly complains that the bankruptcy court 4 made insufficient findings to support its nondischargeability 5 ruling and that the trial record was insufficient to support the 6 findings it did make. We will focus on the nondisclosures 7 pertaining to the Thomas emerald and its value because the 8 bankruptcy court’s decision hinged on them. Thomas contends that 9 there was no evidence presented at trial from which the 10 bankruptcy court could have determined what the “true value” of 11 the emerald was at the time Kenmark funded Electronic Plastics, 12 so Kenmark failed to establish: (1) that Thomas made a false 13 statement regarding the emerald’s value; and (2) that Thomas knew 14 this value statement was untrue at the time he made it. 15 Thomas misconstrues the nature of his “false statement” in 16 connection with the emerald’s value. For purposes of finding 17 nondischargeable fraud, when the charged fraud concerns an 18 undisclosed fact, the undisclosed fact is treated as if the 19 debtor-defendant made an affirmative misrepresentation that the 20 undisclosed fact did not actually exist. Tallant v. Kaufman 21 (In re Tallant), 218 B.R. 58, 65 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (citing 22 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 551 (1976)). The Restatement 23 (Second) of Torts can be used to help define the metes and bounds 24 of fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 68–70 25 (1995); Apte v. Romesh Japra, M.D., F.A.C.C., Inc. (In re Apte), 26 96 F.3d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir. 1996). In relevant part, 27 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 551 provides: 28 (1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he

10 1 knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is 2 subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he 3 has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to 4 disclose the matter in question. 5 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(1) (1977) (emphasis added). 6 Under Tallant, Apte and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 7 § 551, the nondisclosures of the $400,000 appraisal and the 8 $20,000 purchase price were the equivalent of Thomas 9 affirmatively representing that he did not have a $400,000 10 appraisal at the time he sent the $800 million appraisal to 11 Kenmark and that he did not pay $20,000 for the emerald. Thomas 12 indisputably knew both of these misrepresentations were untrue at 13 the time he “made” them (i.e., at the time he failed to disclose 14 the true facts). He admitted knowledge of both facts at the time 15 the transaction was entered into. 16 While the bankruptcy court did not specifically find that 17 Thomas failed to disclose facts regarding the emerald with the 18 intent to deceive, the intent finding was implicit in the court’s 19 ruling. The court correctly stated the intent element and also 20 held that Kenmark had established all of the elements for a 21 nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(2)(A) by a preponderance of 22 the evidence. See In re Tallant, 218 B.R. at 66 (inferring an 23 implicit finding from a similar bankruptcy court ruling); see 24 also Wells Benz, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Mercury Elec. Co., 25 333 F.2d 89, 92 (9th Cir. 1964) (“whenever, from facts found, 26 other facts may be inferred which will support the judgment, such 27 inferences will be deemed to have been drawn.”). 28 Meanwhile, the creditor typically is not required to prove

11 1 justifiable reliance when the fraud charged is premised upon an 2 actionable nondisclosure. See In re Apte, 96 F.3d at 1323; 3 In re Tallant, 218 B.R. at 67-69. Instead, justifiable reliance 4 is presumed, so long as the undisclosed facts were material. Id. 5 As for causation, for the same reasons we construed the 6 bankruptcy court’s ruling to include an implicit finding of an 7 intent to deceive, we similarly construe the ruling to include an 8 implicit finding that Thomas’ emerald-related nondisclosures 9 induced Kenmark to loan $6.1 million to Electronic Plastics.4 10 There was sufficient evidence in the record to support this 11 implicit finding, inasmuch as Tersini testified that, had he 12 known about the $400,000 appraisal and the $20,000 purchase 13 price, he would not have loaned the funds to Electronic Plastics. 14 Nor is there anything in the record to persuade us that the 15 bankruptcy court’s implicit causation finding was illogical, 16 implausible or without support in the record. 17 This leaves us with two issues peculiar to fraudulent 18 concealment cases: materiality and duty to disclose. With 19 respect to materiality, a nondisclosure is not actionable under 20 § 523(a)(2)(A) unless it was material. In re Apte, 96 F.3d at 21 1323. A fact is considered material if a hypothetical reasonable 22 person would have considered it important to know before entering 23 into the transaction. Id.; see also Shannon v. Russell 24 (In re Russell), 203 B.R. 303, 312 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) 25 4 26 While Apte and Tallant arguably could be read as entirely displacing the reliance and causation elements in the context of 27 material nondisclosures, we elsewhere have held that this is not the case. See Hillsman v. Escoto (In re Escoto), 2015 WL 28 2343461, at *4 n.2 (Mem. Dec.) (9th Cir. BAP May 15, 2015).

12 1 (elaborating on materiality element and citing additional cases). 2 Here, the bankruptcy court found that the nondisclosures 3 were “important”, which was tantamount to a finding that they 4 were material. Furthermore, we agree with this finding. A 5 reasonable person securing a $6.1 million loan with the emerald 6 would want to know that the same appraiser who appraised the 7 emerald at $800 million had shortly before appraised it at 8 $400,000. And a reasonable person also would want to know that 9 the borrower only paid $20,000 for it. 10 Thomas further contends that he had no duty to disclose. 11 We may look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 551, for help 12 in ascertaining whether a party to a transaction had a duty to 13 disclose. In re Apte, 96 F.3d at 1324. Restatement § 551 14 provides in relevant part: 15 (2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other 16 before the transaction is consummated, 17 (a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other 18 similar relation of trust and confidence between them; and 19 (b) matters known to him that he knows to be 20 necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading; and 21 (c) subsequently acquired information that he 22 knows will make untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed 23 to be so; and 24 (d) the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it would be acted upon, if he 25 subsequently learns that the other is about to act in reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and 26 (e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows 27 that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of 28 the relationship between them, the customs of the

13 1 trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts. 2 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (1977). 4 The bankruptcy court did not make any determination 5 regarding Thomas’ duty to disclose, nor is there anything in the 6 bankruptcy court’s decision suggesting that the court considered 7 the issue. Nonetheless, on this record, the issue is 8 straightforward enough that we can resolve it without remanding. 9 See, e.g., In re Apte, 96 F.3d at 1324 (resolving duty to 10 disclose issue even though bankruptcy court did not address it). 11 We are convinced that Thomas’ emerald-related nondisclosures 12 fall squarely within clause (b) of Restatement (Second) of Torts 13 § 551(2). That clause imposes a duty on a party to disclose 14 additional facts about a matter when the party presents partial, 15 incomplete or ambiguous facts that may mislead the adverse party 16 into thinking that he or she has been told the whole truth about 17 the matter. As explained in the Restatement, “[a] statement that 18 is partial or incomplete may be a misrepresentation because it is 19 misleading, when it [falsely] purports to tell the whole truth 20 . . . . When such a statement has been made, there is a duty to 21 disclose the additional information necessary to prevent it from 22 misleading the recipient.” Id. at cmt. g; see also Smith v. 23 Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Restatement 24 (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(b) and stating “often [the duty to 25 disclose] arises in the absence of any special relationship – 26 arises just because the defendant’s silence would mislead the 27 plaintiff because of something else that the defendant had 28 said”).

14 1 Without a doubt, when Thomas gave the $800 million appraisal 2 to Tersini, it created the impression that the emerald was worth 3 far more than Kenmark was considering lending to Electronic 4 Plastics. This impression of value seemed complete on its face; 5 in order to prevent it from misleading Kenmark, it was incumbent 6 on Thomas to disclose the $400,000 appraisal and the $20,000 7 purchase price, so that Kenmark would have the whole truth 8 regarding the indicia of value readily available to Thomas. 9 There is only one other issue Thomas has raised on appeal 10 implicating the bankruptcy court’s reliance on the emerald- 11 related nondisclosures. Thomas argues that the bankruptcy court 12 erred in finding that Kenmark’s funding was a loan rather than an 13 equity investment and erred in finding that Thomas agreed to 14 secure the alleged loan with the emerald. The executed loan 15 documents the bankruptcy court found to be genuine and to be 16 signed by Thomas are wholly inconsistent with Thomas’ claims. We 17 acknowledge that some of the evidence presented at trial could 18 have been viewed as supporting Thomas’ forgery claims – namely 19 Thomas’ own unsubstantiated testimony. But the bankruptcy court 20 obviously did not credit Thomas’ testimony on this point, and the 21 bankruptcy court’s credibility finding was supported by a number 22 of inconsistencies in the factual positions Thomas took over the 23 course of the nondischargeability litigation and in other 24 litigation. At bottom, the conflicting evidence presented might 25 have enabled the court to reasonably view the transaction 26 consistent either with Tersini’s testimony or with Thomas’ 27 testimony. The bankruptcy court’s choice between those two 28 permissible views of the evidence was not clearly erroneous.

15 1 Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. 2 In sum, the bankruptcy court did not err in determining the 3 $4.1 million judgment debt nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) 4 based on the emerald-related nondisclosures. Analysis of the 5 bankruptcy court’s findings regarding the other nondisclosures 6 and misrepresentations would not add significant additional 7 weight to our decision. In our view, those other alleged 8 nondisclosures and misrepresentations were cumulative of and 9 incidental to the bankruptcy court’s principal fraud finding, 10 which relied on the emerald-related nondisclosures. 11 Unrelated to his other arguments on appeal, Thomas complains 12 that the bankruptcy court’s judgment incorrectly determined that 13 Thomas’ judgment debt also is nondischargeable as against Thomas’ 14 wife. We see nothing on the face of the judgment to support this 15 interpretation. That being said, we give significant deference 16 to the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of its own orders. 17 Rosales v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 490 B.R. 898, 906 (9th Cir. 18 BAP 2013). If Thomas really believes that the judgment is 19 susceptible to his proffered interpretation, he should seek 20 relief from the bankruptcy court in the first instance, in the 21 form of a motion to correct or interpret the judgment. 22 CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons set forth above, the bankruptcy court’s 24 nondischargeability judgment is AFFIRMED. 25 26 27 28