In Re Anthony J. Robertson and Charles L. Scripps

169 F.3d 743, 49 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1949, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3224
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedFebruary 25, 1999
Docket98-1270
StatusPublished
Cited by57 cases

This text of 169 F.3d 743 (In Re Anthony J. Robertson and Charles L. Scripps) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Anthony J. Robertson and Charles L. Scripps, 169 F.3d 743, 49 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1949, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3224 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Opinions

Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge FRIEDMAN, in which Circuit Judge PAULINE NEWMAN joins. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge RADER.

FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:

This appeal challenges the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) that claim 76 in the appellants’ patent application was anticipated by and obvious over United States Patent No. 4,895,569 (the Wilson patent). We reverse.

I

Both claim 76 and Wilson involve fastening and disposal systems for diapers. In both, the body of the diaper features a small front and a larger rear section. The outer edges of those sections are attached at the wearer’s waist in the hip area. Once the diaper is soiled and then removed, the smaller front section is rolled up into the larger rear section and secured in this rolled-up configuration by fasteners.

The appellants’ application is for “an improved mechanical fastening system for ... disposable absorbent articles [i.e., diapers] that provides convenient disposal of the absorbent article.” Claim 76 covers:

[A] mechanical fastening system for forming side closures ... comprising
a closure member ... comprising a first mechanical fastening means for forming a closure, said first mechanical fastening means comprising a first fastening element;
a landing member ... comprising a second mechanical fastening means for forming a closure with said first mechanical fastening means, said second mechanical fastening means comprising a second fastening element mechanically engageable with said first element; and
disposal means for allowing the absorbent article to be secured in a disposal configuration after use, said disposal means comprising a third mechanical fastening means for securing the absorbent article in the disposal configuration, said third mechanical fastening means comprising a third fastening element mechanically engageable with said first fastening element ...

Claim 76 thus provides for two mechanical fastening means to attach the diaper to the wearer and a third such means for securing the diaper for disposal.

The Wilson patent discloses two snap elements on fastening strips attached to the outer edges of the front and rear hip sections of the garment. The fastening strips may also include “secondary load-bearing closure means” — additional fasteners to secure the garment; they may be identical to the snaps.

Wilson also states:
[Disposal of the soiled garment upon removal from the body is easily accomplished by folding the front panel ... inwardly and then fastening the rear pair of mating fastener members ... to one another, thus neatly bundling the garment into a closed compact package for disposal.

[745]*745In other words, Wilson does not provide a separate fastening means to be used in disposing of the diaper. Instead, it suggests that disposal of the used diaper may be “easily accomplished” by rolling it up and employing the same fasteners used to attach the diaper to the wearer to form “a closed compact package for disposal.”

In holding that the invention claim 76 covers was anticipated by Wilson, the Board did not hold that Wilson set forth a third fastening means. Instead, it found that Wilson anticipated claim 76 “under principles of in-herency.” Applying the language of claim 76 to the operation of Wilson, it concluded that “an artisan would readily understand the disposable absorbent garment of Wilson ... as being inherently capable of [making the secondary load-bearing closure means] (third fastening element) mechanically engageable with [the other snap fasteners on the fastening strip] (first fastening element)” — i.e., using the secondary closure not with its mate, but with one of the primary snap fasteners. The Board summarily affirmed the examiner’s alternative ruling that claim 76 would have been obvious in light of Wilson because “claim 76 lacks novelty.”

II

Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) requires that “each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1051, 1053 (Fed.Cir.1987).

A. The Wilson patent does not expressly include a third fastening means for disposal of the diaper, as claim 76 requires. That means is separate from and in addition to the other mechanical fastening means and performs a different function than they do. Indeed, Wilson merely suggests that the diaper may be closed for disposal by using the same fastening means that are used for initially attaching the diaper to the body.

If the prior art reference does not expressly set forth a particular element of the claim, that reference still may anticipate if that element is “inherent” in its disclosure. To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence “must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.” Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1746, 1749 (Fed.Cir.1991). “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” Id. at 1269, 948 F.2d 1264, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1749 (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581, 212 U.S.P.Q. 323, 326 (C.C.P.A.1981)).

In finding anticipation by inherency, the Board ignored the foregoing critical principles. The Board made no attempt to show that the fastening mechanisms of Wilson that were used to attach the diaper to the wearer also “necessarily” disclosed the third separate fastening mechanism of claim 76 used to close the diaper for disposal, or that an artisan of ordinary skill would so recognize. It cited no extrinsic evidence so indicating.

Instead, the Board ruled that one of the fastening means for attaching the diaper to the wearer also could operate as a third fastening means to close the diaper for disposal and that Wilson therefore inherently contained all the elements of claim 76. In doing so, the Board failed to recognize that the third mechanical fastening means in claim 76, used to secure the diaper for disposal, was separate from and independent of the two other mechanical means used to attach the diaper to the person. The Board’s theory that these two fastening devices in Wilson were capable of being intermingled to perform the same function as the third and first fastening elements in claim 76 is insufficient to show that the latter device was inherent in Wilson.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira Inc.
221 F. Supp. 3d 497 (D. Delaware, 2016)
Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc.
640 F. App'x 951 (Federal Circuit, 2016)
W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.
146 F. Supp. 3d 595 (D. Delaware, 2015)
Malibu Boats, LLC v. Nautique Boat Co.
997 F. Supp. 2d 866 (E.D. Tennessee, 2014)
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc.
994 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D. New York, 2014)
Virginia Innovation Sciences, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.
983 F. Supp. 2d 713 (E.D. Virginia, 2014)
Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Motorola Mobility, LLC
13 F. Supp. 3d 369 (D. Delaware, 2014)
Alexsam, Inc. v. Idt Corporation
715 F.3d 1336 (Federal Circuit, 2013)
Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Laboratories, Inc.
939 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Delaware, 2013)
Frontline Technologies, Inc. v. CRS, Inc.
880 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2012)
ALLERGAN, INC. v. Sandoz, Inc.
818 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Texas, 2011)
In Re Jung
637 F.3d 1356 (Federal Circuit, 2011)
Therasense, Inc. v. Beckton, Dickinson and Co.
593 F.3d 1325 (Federal Circuit, 2010)
Sepracor Inc. v. Dey, L.P.
657 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D. Delaware, 2009)
Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
575 F.3d 1312 (Federal Circuit, 2009)
In Re Comiskey
Federal Circuit, 2009
Henrob Ltd. v. Böllhoff Systemtechnick GmbH & Co.
625 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Michigan, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
169 F.3d 743, 49 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1949, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3224, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-anthony-j-robertson-and-charles-l-scripps-cafc-1999.