In Re Angel Mid-Jeff Joint Venture, LLP v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-26-00301-CV

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IN RE ANGEL MID-JEFF JOINT VENTURE, LLP

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Original Proceeding

County Court at Law No. 1 of Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 26CCCV0306

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this mandamus proceeding, Relator Angel Mid-Jeff Joint Venture, LLP (“AMJ”) asks the appellate court to compel the trial court to rescind its Order Authorizing Entry Upon Property Pending Condemnation Proceeding, dated July 6, 2026 (the “Entry Order”), and its Order Enforcing Order Authorizing Entry Upon Property and Confirming Rescheduled Entry Dates, dated July 21, 2026 (the “Enforcement Order”). Upon receiving the petition, we stayed the trial court’s orders and requested a response from the Real Party in Interest, Port Arthur Independent School District (“PAISD”).

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The underlying proceeding is a condemnation action that is presently in the administrative phase, and the commissioners have been appointed but have not yet

filed an award. 1 We conclude the trial court’s orders are premature, as the judicial 0F

phase of the condemnation has yet to commence, and the trial court’s jurisdiction to enforce any rights PAISD possesses to enter on the property has not otherwise been invoked. Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus relief.

Background

PAISD filed an Original Petition in Condemnation in April 2026 and served citation on the landowner through substituted service on June 1, 2026. On June 23, 2026, PAISD filed a motion for an order authorizing entry onto AMJ’s property “to complete engineering, surveying, environmental review, geotechnical evaluation, planning, and design activities associate with the public project.” AMJ filed a Special Appearance to Plea to the Jurisdiction on July 2, 2026, shortly before the hearing on PAISD’s motion for entry on land. 21F

1 See In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1, 493 S.W.3d 538, 542-43 (Tex. 2016) (orig.

proceeding) (“We have said that condemnation proceedings have two parts. The first part, involving the commissioners, we have characterized as administrative. … The second part of condemnation proceedings, following a proper objection to the commissioners’ award, we have deemed judicial.”) (footnotes omitted).

2 The Special Appearance to Plea to the Jurisdiction is the subject of an accelerated appeal docketed as Appeal Number 09-26-00271-CV, Angel Mid-Jeff Joint Venture, LLP v. Port Arthur Independent School District.

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PAISD explained in the hearing that it had been negotiating with the landowner to purchase the property for a new stadium and had appraisals for $2.5 and $2.7 million, but the landowner obtained an appraisal for $30 million. According to PAISD, the landowner would only agree to allow PAISD to conduct a survey if PAISD agreed to forego condemnation and accept the landowner’s valuation, and PAISD needed to perform a “feasibility study.” AMJ argued the condemnation proceeding must be dismissed for lack of prosecution because the trial court had not appointed commissioners within thirty days of the filing of the petition. The trial court signed an Order Authorizing Entry Upon Property Pending Condemnation Proceeding (the Entry Order). The Order allows PAISD to conduct surveying and topographical investigations, engineering evaluations, utility-location activities, environmental assessments, geotechnical investigations and soil borings, photography and drone operations, site staking and mapping, architectural and planning activities, and other “reasonably necessary due diligence activities related to the project.”

After the hearing, the trial court also signed an order appointing the commissioners, PAISD amended its condemnation petition, and AMJ exercised its strike of one of the commissioners. Meanwhile, AMJ filed a notice of appeal and filed a Motion to Stay Enforcement of Order Pending Interlocutory Appeal. On July 21, 2026, the trial court signed an Order Enforcing Order Authorizing Entry Upon

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Property and Confirming Rescheduled Entry Dates (the Enforcement Order), which gave specific dates and times when PAISD and its agents could enter the property and conduct the activities authorized by the Order dated July 6. AMJ sought mandamus relief.

Mandamus Standard

We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.

We determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments, considering whether extending mandamus relief will preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). An appeal is not an adequate remedy if the very act of proceeding to

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trial—regardless of the outcome—would defeat the substantive right involved. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

Issues

In its First Amended Emergency Application for Writ of Mandamus and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, AMJ identifies five alleged defects in the proceedings below that it argues warrant mandamus relief: (1) the Enforcement Order purports to nullify AMJ’s right to seek temporary relief in its accelerated appeal; (2) the property PAISD seeks to condemn is not sufficiently identified for jurisdiction to attach; (3) the special commissioners were not timely appointed; (4) PAISD failed to serve all necessary parties with notice of hearing; and (5) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to compel relief before the special commissioners conduct a hearing and file an award.

The Enforcement Order states that, “the filing or anticipated filing of a motion, special appearance, plea to the jurisdiction, interlocutory appeal, or request for stay shall not suspend the Court’s July 6, 2026 Order or this Order unless a court with authority to do so enters a written order granting a stay or other temporary relief.”

To the extent AMJ claims the trial court violated rights granted to an appellant by Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(7) and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.2, we disagree with that argument.

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A person may appeal from an interlocutory order that “grants or denies the special appearance of a defendant under Rule 120a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, except in a suit brought under the Family Code” and filing an accelerated appeal “stays the commencement of a trial in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7), (b). Rule 29.2 allows a trial court to “permit an order granting interlocutory relief to be superseded pending an appeal from the order in accordance with Rule 24.” Tex R. App. P. 29.2. This matter does not involve a special appearance for lack of personal jurisdiction, nor does it pertain to a governmental entity asserting a plea to the jurisdiction.

AMJ also argues “PAISD fails to provide a legally sufficient description of the property sought to be condemned for jurisdiction to attach.” AMJ appears to argue that PAISD must have a metes and bounds description of the property before it may obtain an order to enter on the property to perform a survey so they can create a metes and bounds description of the property. AMJ has not shown where it presented this argument to the trial court. “Due to the extraordinary nature of the remedy, the right to mandamus relief generally requires a predicate request for action by the respondent, and the respondent’s erroneous refusal to act.” In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (citation omitted). AMJ has not established an abuse of discretion by the trial court on this issue. See id.

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Next, AMJ argues that because the trial court appointed the commissioners eighty-eight days after PAISD filed its original petition, neither the commissioners nor the trial court possess jurisdiction “to proceed further with authorizing access to the property in the administrative phase before the administrative hearing or appointment of special commissioners.” Property Code section 21.014(a) requires that the trial court appoint commissioners not later than the 30th calendar day after the petition is filed. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.014(a). The statutory requirements in condemnation proceedings may be mandatory without being jurisdictional. Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172, 183- 84 (Tex. 2004) (holding the “unable to agree” requirement in the condemnation statute is mandatory but not jurisdictional). The remedy for the trial court’s failure to appoint commissioners within thirty days after the filing of the condemnation petition is to seek a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to appoint commissioners. In re Bay Runner Pipeline, LLC, No. 13-25-00383-CV, 2025 WL 2329590, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 12. 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). AMJ has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion.

AMJ argues the condemnation proceeding must be dismissed because PAISD failed to serve all necessary parties with notices required by statute. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 21.014(d) (requiring notice of the trial court’s order appointing commissioners); 21.016 (requiring notice of special commissioner’s hearing).

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According to AMJ, non-parties with possessory interests have not been joined. AMJ’s arguments are unsupported by the record, which shows that the special commissioners have not held their hearing. Furthermore, the record does not show that AMJ alerted the trial court to the alleged defect in parties. AMJ has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion.

Finally, AMJ argues that until the special commissioners file their award and the administrative phase of the condemnation proceeding concludes, the trial court does not have the jurisdiction to issue and enforce the Entry Order and the Enforcement Order. PAISD argues the Education Code expressly authorizes a preliminary entry right distinct from possession after an award issues, and PAISD relies upon Education Code section 11.155(b) for its argument.

“In a condemnation by a school district, the trial and all other proceedings, including the assessing of damages, shall be in compliance with the statutes that apply to condemnation by a railroad.” Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.155(b).

A railroad company is entitled to make an examination and survey for the company’s proposed railway, to be performed as necessary to select the most advantageous route for the proposed railway, and, subject to Subsection (c), may enter on the lands or waters of any person or corporation for that purpose.

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 112.051(a).

Except for the purposes of performing a lineal survey, a railroad company may not enter on private real property for the purpose of condemning the property or any material on the property for any purpose until the company agrees with and pays the owner of the

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property all damages that may be caused to the owner’s property by the condemnation of the property and by the construction of the company’s road.

Id. § 112.051(c). We agree that PAISD could have filed an injunctive proceeding in a separate suit to exercise its right to enter the property for purposes of performing a lineal survey. See id. But, the current proceeding remains in the administrative phase, and the trial court exceeded its authority at this stage by issuing the Entry Order and the Enforcement Order.

PAISD also cites Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc. v. City of Port Neches, for the proposition that a non-invasive Phase I assessment is reasonably implied from the condemnation authority granted to PAISD. 11 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2000, no pet.). We note that the posture of that case is different from what we have before us. In Coastal, the trial court was not acting within the administrative phase of a condemnation suit.

We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the Entry Order and the Enforcement Order during the administrative phase of the condemnation proceeding. AMJ lacks an adequate remedy by appeal because the entry on land will occur before it can appeal.

Conclusion

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and Relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. Accordingly, we lift our order granting temporary relief

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and we conditionally grant mandamus relief. We are confident that the trial court will vacate its Order Authorizing Entry Upon Property Pending Condemnation Proceeding, dated July 6, 2026, and its Order Enforcing Order Authorizing Entry Upon Property and Confirming Rescheduled Entry Dates, dated July 21, 2026. The writ shall issue only in the event the trial court fails to comply.

PETITION CONDITIONALLY GRANTED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on August 14, 2026 Opinion Delivered August 27, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.