In Re: Andrena Diane Crockett

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: July 20, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2019-2944
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE:

ANDRENA DIANE CROCKETT DEBTOR/APPELLANT Civ. Action No. 19-2944 (EGS)

Bankr. Case No. 19-101 (Chapter 13)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Andrena Diane Crockett (“Ms. Crockett”) appeals the

Bankruptcy Court’s Order Overruling Objection to Claim of

Nationstar Mortgage LLC D/B/A Mr. Cooper (the “Order Overruling

Objection to Claim”); Memorandum Decision and Order Granting

Motion to Reconsider in Part, Sustaining Debtor’s Objection to

Nationstar’s Proof of Claim in Part, and Otherwise Denying

Debtor’s Motion to Reconsider (the “First Memorandum Decision”);

and Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Nationstar’s Motion

to Alter Order Regarding Debtor’s Motion to Reconsider (the

“Second Memorandum Decision”). See Notice of Bankruptcy Appeal

Record (“A.R.”), ECF No. 2 at 155 (Order Overruling Objection to

Claim), 166-73 (First Memorandum Decision); Suppl. Notice of

Bankruptcy Appeal Record (“Suppl. A.R.”), ECF No. 5 at 3-8. 1 Upon

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, this Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the filed document. 1 consideration of the briefing, the applicable law, and the

entire record, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s Order

Overruling Objection to Claim; AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s

First Memorandum Decision; and AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s

Second Memorandum Decision.

I. Background

Ms. Crockett is the owner of property located at 1249

Carrollsburg Place, SW, Washington, D.C. 20024 (“Carrollsburg

Place Property”). See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 50-51 (Deed of Trust).

She is also the borrower on a May 11, 2007 loan in the original

amount of $340,000.00 secured by a Deed of Trust on the

Carrollsburg Place Property. See id. at 46-49 (Note). The Deed

of Trust is currently assigned to Nationstar Mortgage LLC d/b/a

Mr. Cooper (“Nationstar”). See id. at 73 (Certificate of

Transfer/Assignment), 79 (Corporate Assignment of Deed of

Trust).

On February 1, 2010, Ms. Crockett entered into a Loan

Modification Agreement secured by the same property with a

principal balance of $412,891.81. See id. at 81-86 (Loan

Modification Agreement). She defaulted on the debt in June 2010.

See id. at 31 (Proof of Claim).

Nationstar thereafter initiated a judicial foreclosure

against Ms. Crockett in the Superior Court of the District of

Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”). Id. at 166 (First Memorandum

2 Decision). Ms. Crockett challenged Nationstar’s accounting, so

the D.C. Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing on January

19, 2017. Id. In a proceeding on June 8, 2017, that court

concluded that Ms. Crockett’s claims were not viable. Id. On

October 25, 2017, the D.C. Superior Court dismissed Ms.

Crockett’s counterclaims. Id. at 166-67. Ms. Crockett appealed

this order to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

(“D.C. Court of Appeals”). Id. at 167. That court affirmed the

D.C. Superior Court’s judgment on June 26, 2019. Id.

Meanwhile, on February 15, 2019, Ms. Crockett filed a

voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy

Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia

(“Bankruptcy Court”). See id. at 1. On April 5, 2019, Nationstar

submitted its Proof of Claim, which shows Ms. Crockett owed

$549,337.77 in total and $184,932.67 to cure the default as of

the petition date. See id. at 26-90 (Proof of Claim).

Ms. Crockett filed an Objection to Creditor, Nationstar

Mortgage LLC, Proof of Claim (“Objection”), challenging

Nationstar’s accounting in the Proof of Claim and alleging that

Nationstar failed to file all the required documents. See id. at

96-99 (Objection). The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the

Objection on July 18, 2019. See id. at 156, 157 (audio

recordings of hearing attached to PDF documents). In an oral

decision, the Bankruptcy Court determined that Ms. Crockett did

3 not meet her burden to show that there was an error with

Nationstar’s Proof of Claim. See id. at 155-57. The Bankruptcy

Court entered its order—the Order Overruling Objection to Claim—

on July 22, 2019. See id. at 155 (Order Overruling Objection to

Claim).

On August 5, 2019, Ms. Crockett filed a Motion to

Reconsider [the Order] Overruling Debtor’s Objections to

Creditor’s Proof-of-Claim (“Motion to Reconsider”). See id. at

158-64 (Motion to Reconsider). There, she argued that: (1) the

Bankruptcy Court impermissibly relied on a decision that the

D.C. Court of Appeals entered after the automatic stay was in

place; and (2) the Bankruptcy Court did not address all the

issues she raised in her Objection briefing. See id. at 158-63.

On September 20, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court issued its

First Memorandum Decision, reversing its Order Overruling

Objection to Claim in part and reducing Nationstar’s claim by

$1,289.18. See id. at 166-73 (First Memorandum Decision). Then,

on October 7, 2019, Nationstar filed its Rule 9023 Motion

seeking reconsideration of the Bankruptcy Court’s First

Memorandum Decision. Id. at 175-77 (Rule 9023 Motion). The

Bankruptcy Court reversed its First Memorandum Decision in the

Second Memorandum Decision on December 11, 2019. See Suppl.

A.R., ECF No. 5 at 3-8 (Second Memorandum Decision).

4 Ms. Crockett filed a Notice of Appeal on September 26,

2019. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 6. This appeal is ripe for review.

II. Standard of Review

A. Appeals of Decisions by the Bankruptcy Court

This Court has jurisdiction over appeals of decisions of

the Bankruptcy Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (conferring

jurisdiction on federal district courts “to hear appeals . . .

from final judgments, orders, and decrees” of bankruptcy

courts). On appeal from a bankruptcy court, a district court

“may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s judgment,

order, or decree or remand with instructions for further

proceedings.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.

A district court reviews a bankruptcy court’s findings of

fact only for indication that they are clearly erroneous. Id.;

see also In re Johnson, 236 B.R. 510, 518 (D.D.C. 1999). “A

finding [of fact] is clearly erroneous when, although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.” In re Johnson, 236 B.R. at 518

(quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

(1948)). A bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions, however, are

reviewed de novo. See In re WPG, Inc., 282 B.R. 66, 68 (D.D.C.

2002) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405

(1990)). The party seeking to reverse the bankruptcy court’s

5 ruling bears the burden of proof and may not prevail by showing

“simply that another conclusion could have been reached.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Pro Se Litigants

“[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in

all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress,

No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR), 2006 WL 1877014, at *2 (D.D.C. July 5,

2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The

pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally

construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even

so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658

F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 656

F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply

with federal and local rules. See Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239;

Roosevelt Land, 2006 WL 1877014, at *2.

III. Analysis

A. The Bankruptcy Court Addressed All the Issues Ms. Crockett Raised in Her Objection

Ms. Crockett argues that the Bankruptcy Court “committed an

error of law and an abuse of discretion” because it did not

address every issue she raised in her Objection and Prehearing

6 Brief. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 17. 2 She states that the

Bankruptcy Court considered only one of the sixteen claims she

presented in her Prehearing Brief regarding Nationstar’s

inadequate accounting. Id. at 18. She also provides four

examples of how Nationstar “ignored its obligations under the

Federal Consumer Protection and Bankruptcy Code by maintaining

an accounting system that was incapable of properly making

payments in a Chapter 13 case.” Id. at 17; see also id. at 17-18

(reviewing accounting inadequacies).

Nationstar suggests that this Court may not consider this

argument because “the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning for its

ruling is . . . not part of this Court’s record on appeal.”

Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 14 at 9. This is incorrect. As

Nationstar acknowledges, see id.; the Bankruptcy Court rendered

an oral decision at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing

held on July 18, 2019 and then documented its order in the Order

Overruling Objection to Claim, see A.R., ECF No. 2 at 155.

However, as Ms. Crockett states in her reply brief, see

Appellant’s Reply, ECF No. 16 at 7; that evidentiary hearing—

2 Ms. Crockett also argues that the Bankruptcy Court did not address issues she raised in her Motion to Reconsider in its Order Overruling Objection to Claim. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 17. This Court will not consider this part of her argument, as Ms. Crockett did not file the Motion to Reconsider the Order Overruling Objection to Claim until after the Bankruptcy Court issued its Order Overruling Objection to Claim. 7 along with the Bankruptcy Court’s oral decision—is, in fact,

part of the record on appeal, see A.R., ECF No. 2 at 156 (audio

recording of first part of July 18, 2019 hearing attached to PDF

document), 157 (audio recording of second part of July 18, 2019

hearing attached to PDF document). This Court therefore may

consider the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning from its oral decision

as it evaluates the Order Overruling Objection to Claim.

Nationstar also defends the substance of the Bankruptcy

Court’s Order Overruling Objection to Claim. Nationstar claims

that the Bankruptcy Court made one of two possible conclusions:

(1) that Ms. Crockett “did not meet her burden to negate the

prima facie validity of the filed claim”; or (2) that Nationstar

“proved the validity of the claim by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 14 at 9. Nationstar does not

cite any evidence from the record to support this argument. See

generally id. at 8-9.

Upon review of the record, this Court concludes that the

Bankruptcy Court considered all issues Ms. Crockett raised in

her Prehearing Brief in its Order Overruling Objection to Claim.

See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 156-57. To successfully object to

Nationstar’s Proof of Claim, Ms. Crockett needed to “produce

evidence which, if believed, would refute at least one of the

allegations that is essential to the claim’s legal sufficiency.”

In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 954 F.2d 167, 173–74 (3d Cir.

8 1992). The Bankruptcy Court considered the following evidence

from Ms. Crockett: the Objection, the Prehearing Brief, 12

exhibits presented at the evidentiary hearing, and Ms.

Crockett’s testimony at the hearing. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 156-

57. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court

determined that: (1) the D.C. Superior Court had already decided

most of Ms. Crockett’s objections in Nationstar’s favor; (2) the

remaining objection—concerning the fees Nationstar charged

following the D.C. Superior Court’s decision—failed because the

more recent fees were of the same character and of similar

amounts as the fees that the D.C. Superior Court had already

adjudicated; and (3) Ms. Crockett had not produced sufficient

evidence to meet her burden of proof to show an error in the

Proof of Claim. See id. at 157. Accordingly, this Court

concludes that the Bankruptcy Court appropriately considered

every issue Ms. Crockett raised in her Objection.

B. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Rely on the Memorandum Opinion and Judgment by the D.C. Court of Appeals

Ms. Crockett next argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred

when it considered the Memorandum Opinion and Judgment issued by

the D.C. Court of Appeals while the automatic stay was in place.

See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 10-15.

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, a bankruptcy filing

“trigger[s] an automatic stay in” judicial foreclosure

9 proceedings. Maddox v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 374 F. Supp. 3d

146, 148 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362); see also Giron

v. Zeytuna, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 3d 29, 38 (D.D.C. 2022)

(collecting cases). Here, Ms. Crockett filed her Chapter 13

bankruptcy petition on February 15, 2019. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at

1. This resulted in the judicial foreclosure proceedings

initiated by Nationstar in D.C. Superior Court being

automatically stayed that same day. At that time, the D.C.

Superior Court had already concluded that Ms. Crockett’s claims

were not viable and issued an order dismissing her

counterclaims. See id. at 167-68. The D.C. Court of Appeals did

not issue its Memorandum Opinion and Judgment until after Ms.

Crockett filed her bankruptcy petition. See id. at 168

(affirming decision of D.C. Superior Court on June 26, 2019).

Nationstar argues that the Bankruptcy Court did not rely on

the Memorandum Opinion and Judgment by the D.C. Court of Appeals

to render its Memorandum Decision. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No.

14 at 10-11. This Court agrees with this assessment. In the

First Memorandum Decision, the Bankruptcy Court expressly

considered and rejected Ms. Crockett’s argument that it had

impermissibly relied on the decision by the D.C. Court of

Appeals. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 169-70. The Bankruptcy Court

stated that it “did not rely on the holding of the [D.C.] Court

of Appeals decision” and that the D.C. Court of Appeals decision

10 “was not a deciding factor in this court’s overruling [Ms.

Crockett]’s objections to Nationstar’s Proof of Claim.” Id. at

170. The Bankruptcy Court further clarified that it considered

the D.C. Court of Appeals decision only “to find what issues had

been litigated and decided in the [D.C.] Superior Court.” Id. at

169-70.

Nevertheless, Ms. Crockett asserts that these statements

“conflict[] with the many references” in the First Memorandum

Decision to the D.C. Court of Appeals decision. Appellant’s

Reply, ECF No. 16 at 9; see also Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at

13-15 (listing references to the D.C. Court of Appeals decision

in the First Memorandum Decision). This Court is persuaded,

however, that each reference was appropriate. In its First

Memorandum Decision, the Bankruptcy Court discussed the D.C.

Court of Appeals decision twice: first in reviewing the

procedural history of this case and the related litigation in

the D.C. Courts; and second in discussing Ms. Crockett’s

argument about the D.C. Court of Appeals decision. See A.R., ECF

No. 2 at 167-70. These references are consistent with the

Bankruptcy Court’s statement that it did not rely on the D.C.

Court of Appeals decision.

Ms. Crockett also suggests that the Bankruptcy Court must

have relied on the D.C. Court of Appeals decision because it

“did not state what were the deciding factors in rendering the

11 decision.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 14. She further argues

that the Bankruptcy Court did not consider the Proof of Claim or

the evidence she submitted. See id. at 14-15. This Court is

unpersuaded by these claims. In the First Memorandum Decision,

the Bankruptcy Court explained the deciding factor in its

decision: that Ms. Crockett “had not met her burden to show that

there was an error with Nationstar’s Proof of Claim, because

[her] evidence was unclear and confusing.” A.R., ECF No. 2 at

168. Accordingly, because the Bankruptcy Court did not rely on

the Memorandum Opinion and Judgment by the D.C. Court of

Appeals, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court did not

impermissibly rely on any decision issued while the automatic

stay was in place. 3

C. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Ms. Crockett’s Motion to Reconsider Without Requiring Nationstar To Explain the Proof of Claim

Ms. Crockett contends that the Bankruptcy Court abused its

discretion because it denied her Motion to Reconsider without

requiring Nationstar “to explain the issues confusing to the

[c]ourt.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 16. This argument

misunderstands the procedural posture of the case, the burden on

3 Ms. Crockett also makes several arguments regarding actions taken by the D.C. Superior Court and D.C. Court of Appeals in the judicial foreclosure proceedings. See generally Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 10-12, 15. Because this appeal concerns only Bankr. Case No. 19-101, this Court will not reach those arguments. 12 the parties, and the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion. As

Nationstar explains in its opposition briefing, see Appellee’s

Br., ECF No. 14 at 8-9; the Proof of Claim constitutes prima

facie evidence of the validity of the amount of Nationstar’s

claim, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f); and the objecting party—

Ms. Crockett here—bore the burden of “produc[ing] evidence

sufficient to negate the prima facie validity of the filed

claim,”—that is, “evidence equal in force to the prima facie

case,” In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 954 F.2d at 173.

Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court considered Ms. Crockett’s

Objection, her Prehearing Brief, the exhibits and testimony she

presented at the evidentiary hearing, and her Motion to

Reconsider, and it concluded that her evidence—not Nationstar’s

Proof of Claim—“was unclear and confusing.” A.R., ECF No. 2 at

168.

Ms. Crockett also argues that this Court “should use ‘the

least sophisticated consumer’ standard in assessing these

claims.” Id. (citing Wallace v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d

323, 326 (6th Cir. 2012); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar,

503 F.3d 504, 509-10 (6th Cir. 2007)). This standard applies to

actions concerning the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, see

Wallace, 683 F.3d at 326; and is therefore inapplicable here.

13 D. Nationstar Did Not Deceive the Bankruptcy Court to Reach the Second Memorandum Decision

Finally, Ms. Crockett asserts that the Bankruptcy Court

“was deceived into committing an error of law and an abuse of

discretion when Nationstar filed its” Rule 9023 Motion and

supporting exhibits. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 18. She

contends that Nationstar’s submission of new evidence from 2013

“rais[es] the question whether [it] has other information,

previously withheld” and makes the Proof of Claim inaccurate.

Id. 4

This Court is not persuaded that the Bankruptcy Court erred

or abused its discretion. Ms. Crockett cites no authority—and

this Court is unaware of any—that prevents Nationstar from

supplementing its Proof of Claim in a Rule 9023 motion. See

generally id. Ms. Crockett also fails to present any evidence

showing that Nationstar deliberately withheld information to

deceive the Bankruptcy Court. See generally id. Moreover, as

Nationstar discusses in its opposition briefing, see Appellee’s

Br., ECF No. 14 at 12; the Bankruptcy Court reasonably found

that Nationstar “set[] forth evidence demonstrating that the

$1,289.18 item disallowed by the [First Memorandum Decision]

ought to be allowed instead, and set[] forth an adequate basis

4 Ms. Crockett also refers to errors in the “Alternation Foreclosure Agreement” but does not explain their relevance to this argument. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 18. 14 under Rule 59(e) for altering the [First Memorandum Decision].”

Suppl. A.R., ECF No. 5 at 6. This Court therefore AFFIRMS the

Second Memorandum Decision issued by the Bankruptcy Court.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Court AFFIRMS the

Bankruptcy Court’s Order Overruling Objection to Claim; AFFIRMS

the Bankruptcy Court’s First Memorandum Decision; and AFFIRMS

the Bankruptcy Court’s Second Memorandum Decision. An

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge July 20, 2023