In Re Anctil Plumbing & Mechanical Contractors

416 B.R. 333
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedApril 28, 2009
Docket19-10747
StatusPublished

This text of 416 B.R. 333 (In Re Anctil Plumbing & Mechanical Contractors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Anctil Plumbing & Mechanical Contractors, 416 B.R. 333 (Mass. 2009).

Opinion

416 B.R. 333 (2009)

In re ANCTIL PLUMBING & MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., Debtor.
In re Anctil Leasing, LLP, Debtor.
In re Robert Anctil, Debtor.

Nos. 05-17495-WCH, 05-21832-WCH, 05-21817-WCH.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts, Eastern Division.

March 10, 2009.
Opinion Denying Reconsideration In Part April 28, 2009.

*336 Enrique G. Colbert, Gordon N. Schultz, Schultz & Company, Boston, MA, Walter J. Onacewicz, Nair & Levin, P.C., Bloomfield, CT, for Debtors.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

WILLIAM C. HILLMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The matters before the Court are the Application of Schultz & Company For Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Counsel to the Chapter 11 Debtor Robert Anctil (the "Individual Fee Application"), the Application of Schultz & Company For Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Counsel to the Chapter 11 Anctil Plumbing & Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (the "Corporate Fee Application") filed by Gordon N. Schultz and Schultz & Company (collectively, "Schultz"), and the objections thereto filed by Donald R. Lassman, the Chapter 7 trustee of the estates of Anctil Plumbing & Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (the "Corporation"), Anctil Leasing, LLP ("Leasing"), and Robert Anctil ("Anctil") (collectively, the "Debtors"), (the "Trustee"). Through his objections, the Trustee asserts that the fees incurred preparing the Corporate Fee Application are excessive and unreasonable and that fees incurred during the pendency of Anctil's original Chapter 7 case prior to its conversion to Chapter 11 are nonrecoverable where he was not employed by the Trustee. For the reasons set forth below, I will sustain the objections and approve the Individual Fee Application and the Corporate Fee Application in part.

From the outset, I note that both fee applications are replete with mathematical errors. The spreadsheets attached to the Corporate Fee Application (the "Spreadsheets") contain numerous errors. Although the billing statements attached to the Individual Fee Application (the "Billing Statements") were produced using billing software, I am only able to reconcile the services and expenses listed with each statement's total and not the running "Balance Due."[1] The fee applications themselves fall victim to miscalculations generated from the time entries, and are also riddled with clerical and scrivener's errors. Despite spending over 50 hours preparing both the Corporate Fee Application and Individual Fee Application, the end result was sloppy and required a considerable expenditure of the Court's resources to review and correct. For purposes of this decision, I will reference only the corrected *337 values as the errors are too pervasive to identify individually.[2]

II. BACKGROUND

On August 19, 2005, the Corporation filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition. The Corporation was in the business of providing plumbing and mechanical services to commercial construction projects. Leasing filed its Chapter 11 case on October 11, 2005. On November 8, 2005, I granted a motion to substantively consolidate the two cases. Anctil's individual case was filed under Chapter 7 on October 13, 2005. In January, 2006, Anctil moved to convert his case to Chapter 11 and to jointly administer his case with the Corporation's and Leasing's cases.[3] The motion was granted on January 20, 2006, and his case has been treated in parallel to the other two cases. On March 20, 2008, the consolidated case, as well as Anctil's jointly administered case, was converted to Chapter 7 upon an uncontested motion filed by the United States Trustee.[4]

Schultz filed each case on behalf of the Debtors. He was subsequently employed as counsel for the Corporation on September 19, 2005, and as counsel to Anctil on April 4, 2006. A Disclosure of Compensation Paid to Schultz was attached to each application for employment. The disclosure attached to the application for employment in the Corporation's case (the "Corporate 2016(b) Disclosure") indicated that Schultz received a pre-petition retainer of $20,000 (the "Pre-Petition Retainer"), from which $3,500 had been withdrawn for pre-petition services and $893 for the filing fee. Similarly, the disclosure attached to the application for employment in Anctil's case (the "Individual 2016(b) Disclosure") revealed that Schultz had received $1,509 prior to the petition date, and that Anctil agreed to pay a retainer of $8,400 for services to be rendered in connection with the Chapter 11 proceeding, $3,400 of which he had already paid. On May 9, 2008, Schultz amended the Individual 2016(b) Disclosure to reflect that $5,000 was inadvertently paid to Schultz from the Corporation's funds and were remitted to the Trustee.[5] Presently, the balance of either retainer is unclear.

On February 19, 2008, four days after the United States Trustee filed her Amended Motion to Convert, the Corporation paid Schultz $2,500 by a check drawn from the Corporation's debtor-in-possession account (the "Chapter 7 Retainer"). Schultz subsequently filed two statements disclosing that the Corporation paid $2,500 to Schultz as a "flat fee retainer," and that Anctil agreed to a fee of $2,500, of which nothing was paid.[6] On May 21, 2008, the Trustee filed an adversary proceeding seeking turnover under 11 U.S.C. § 542 or recovery of the Chapter 7 Retainer as an unauthorized post-petition transfer under 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550, asserting that *338 Schultz was not entitled to be paid from estate funds under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) because he was not employed by the Trustee.[7] He also sought to surcharge the fees and costs of that proceeding against the balance of the Pre-Petition Retainer paid to Schultz or, in the alternative, to surcharge those amounts against fees to be paid to Schultz in the principal case.

Schultz moved to dismiss the Trustee's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, arguing that the Chapter 7 Retainer was appropriately paid under the "flat fee retainer exception" recognized by Lamie v. United States[8] and the subsequent decision by Judge Gorton of this District in In re CK Liquidation Corp.[9] After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, I took the matter under advisement. On September 15, 2008, I issued a Memorandum of Decision in which I stated:

[T]he Chapter 7 Retainer was, with a quiet nod to Lamie, denominated as a flat fee retainer. This, however, is an inadequate invocation of the exception as the Chapter 7 Retainer had been paid not only pre-conversion, but post-filing, and that makes all of the difference. When the petition is filed, property of the estate comes into being.[10]Lamie expressly states that 11 U.S.C. "§ 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors' attorneys from estate funds unless they are employed as authorized by § 327." While perhaps a bit confusing on its face, this statement is completely consistent with the previously quoted dicta on which Schultz relies.

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Related

Lamie v. United States Trustee
540 U.S. 526 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Juan E. Cruz v. Robert Savage, Etc.
896 F.2d 626 (First Circuit, 1990)
In Re Wedgestone Financial
142 B.R. 7 (D. Massachusetts, 1992)
In Re Bank of New England Corp.
142 B.R. 584 (D. Massachusetts, 1992)
In Re Tundra Corp.
243 B.R. 575 (D. Massachusetts, 2000)
White v. Burdick (In Re CK Liquidation Corp.)
11 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 901 (First Circuit, 2005)
In Re Iappini
192 B.R. 8 (D. Massachusetts, 1995)
In Re Rothman
206 B.R. 99 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1997)
In Re Bank of New England Corp.
134 B.R. 450 (D. Massachusetts, 1991)
In Re Act Manufacturing, Inc.
281 B.R. 468 (D. Massachusetts, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
416 B.R. 333, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-anctil-plumbing-mechanical-contractors-mab-2009.