In re: Ana Celis Estrada Lopez

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJuly 10, 2013
Docket12-09126
StatusUnknown

This text of In re: Ana Celis Estrada Lopez (In re: Ana Celis Estrada Lopez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re: Ana Celis Estrada Lopez, (prb 2013).

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2 3 IN RE: : CASE NO. 12-09126 (ESL) : 4 ANA CELIS ESTRADA LOPEZ : CHAPTER 7 Debtor : 5 ____________________________________: 6 OPINION AND ORDER 7 This case is before the court upon the Chapter 7 Trustee’s Objection to Claimed Exemptions 8 (the “Objection”, Docket No. 18), the Debtor’s Opposition thereto (Docket No. 24) and the Chapter 9 7 Trustee’s Reply (Docket No. 25). The Chapter 7 Trustee moves for the denial of the Debtor’s 10 homestead exemption alleging that although the homestead deed was filed pre-petition at the Puerto 11 Rico Property Registry, it was not recorded or registered by the Property Registrar pre-petition, 12 which contravenes Article 9 of Puerto Rico’s Home Protection Act No. 195 enacted on September 13 13, 2011 (in Spanish titled “Ley del Derecho a la Protección del Hogar Principal y el Hogar 14 Familiar”, hereinafter the “2011 PR Home Protection Act”), as amended by Act No. 257 of 15 September 15, 2012, and therefore fails to comply with subsequent Article 12. Conversely, the 16 Debtor sustains that she filed her homestead deed at the Property Registry pre-petition, which 17 complies with the 2011 PR Home Protection Act. For the reasons stated below, Chapter 7 Trustee’s 18 Objection is denied. 19 Factual and Procedural Background 20 On April 12, 2012, the Debtor executed Deed No. 112 before Notary Public Juan Rosa 21 Marcano to declare her principal residence as homestead (the “Homestead Deed”). The Debtor filed 22 the Homestead Deed at the Puerto Rico Property Registry, Humacao Section, on September 11, 23 2012. See Docket No. 24, p. 5. 24 On November 15, 2012, the Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition (Docket No. 1). The 25 meeting of creditors was held and closed on January 4, 2013 (Docket No. 13). 26 On February 2, 2013, the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Object 27 to Debtor’s Claimed Exemptions (Docket No. 14), to which the Debtor opposed on February 3, 2013 28 (Docket No. 15), arguing that the motion was untimely and proffered no clear cause as to why it should be granted. 1 On February 7, 2013, the court entered an Order granting 21 days for the Chapter 7 Trustee 2 to reply to the Debtor’s opposition (Docket No. 16). On February 12, 2013, the Chapter 7 Trustee 3 filed a Response to Debtor’s Objection to Extension of Time and Objection to Claimed Exemptions 4 (Docket No. 18) averring that she had until February 4, 2013 to file object to the Debtor’s 5 exemptions and thus, the objection was timely. She also objects to the homestead exemption 6 claimed by the Debtor arguing that the Homestead Deed was not recorded at the Puerto Rico 7 Property Registry prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In addition, she also objects to the 8 exemption on household goods under 32 L.P.R.A. § 1130 for lack of specificity. 9 On March 10, 2013, the Debtor filed a Request for Extension of Time to Oppose Trustee’s 10 Objections to Exemptions (Docket No. 19), which court granted on March 12, 2013 (Docket No. 20). 11 On March 13, 2013, the Debtor filed a Notice of Amended Schedules [B & C] and Statement 12 of Purpose of the Amendment (Docket No. 21). In Schedule B, the Debtor itemized the personal 13 household appliances in response to the Chapter 7 Trustee’s Objection. In Schedule C, the Debtor 14 itemized the personal household appliances claimed also in response to the Chapter 7 Trustee’s 15 Objection. See Docket No. 21, p. 1, ¶¶ 1-2. 16 On May 1, 2013, the Debtor filed an Opposition to Trustee’s Objection to Exemptions 17 (Docket No. 24) sustaining that she complied with the 2011 PR Home Protection Act. She also 18 avers that the objection to the household goods had become moot upon the filing of her amended 19 schedules and relies on the fact that the Chapter 7 Trustee had more than 30 days to object to the 20 amendments, which she had not. 21 On May 14, 2013, the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a Reply to Debtor’s Opposition To Objection 22 to Exemptions (Docket No. 25) seeking the denial of the homestead exemption because it had not 23 been “qualified” by the Puerto Rico Property Registrar nor had the appropriate marginal annotations 24 in the Debtor’s principal residence been made in the Property Registry. She further alleges that non 25 compliance of Article 12 of the 2011 PR Home Protection Act must result in the denial of the 26 homestead exemption. As to her previous objections to the itemization of Debtor’s household 27 exemptions, she acknowledges that the same became moot upon the Debtor’s Amended Schedules 28 B and C. See Docket No. 25, p. 5, ¶ 7. 2 1 No further replies or briefs were filed. 2 Legal Analysis & Discussion 3 | (4) — Exemptions in General 4 When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, all of his/her/its assets become property of the 5 || bankruptcy estate [11 U.S.C. § 541] subject to the debtor's right to reclaim certain property as 6 || exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 642 (1992). A 7 || property becomes exempt by operation of law when no objections are filed. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(1). 8 || But the mere fact that debtors claim an exemption does not necessarily mean that they are entitled 9 || to it, since there must be compliance with statutory requirements and then an order that effect. See 10 |} 9A Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 1392; In re Gutierrez Hernandez, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2735 at *8, 11 |} 2012 WL 2202931 at *2 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012); In re Rolland, 317 B.R. 402, 412 (Bankr. C.D.Cal. 12 || 2004); In re Colvin, 288 B.R. 477, 483 (Bankr. E.D.Mi. 2003); Carlucci & Legum v. Murray (In re 13 || Murray), 249 B.R. 223, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). Exemptions are an integral component of a debtor’s 14 || fresh start and thus are liberally construed. Hon. Nancy C. Dreher, Hon. Joan N. Feeney and 15 || Michael J. Stepan, Esq., Bankruptcy Law Manual § 5:34 (5" ed. 2012-2); In re Farr, 278 B.R. 171, 16 || 48 (B.A.P. 9" Cir. 2002) (exemptions aid a debtor’s fresh start by enabling debtor to emerge from 17 || bankruptcy with adequate assets); In re Toppi, 378 B.R. 9, 11 (Bankr. D. Me. 2007) (exemptions are 18 || liberally construed); In re Wegrzyn, 291 B.R. 2, 8-9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003) (exemptions should be 19 || construed liberally in favor of debtor to further the fresh start); Christo v. Yellin in re Christo), 228 20 || B.R. 48, 50 (B.A.P. 1* Cir. 1999) aff'd 192 F.3d 36 (1* Cir. 1999). A “fresh start”, however, does 21 || not translate to a “head start”. In re Goldberg, 59 B.R. 201, 208 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986). “The 22 || basis for exemption laws is that by providing a debtor to retain a minimum level of property, the 23 || debtor and his or her family will not be completely destitute and thus a burden to society.” Id. at 24 || 208. “A fundamental component of an individual debtor’s fresh start in bankruptcy is the debtors 25 || ability to set aside certain property as exempt from the claims of creditors.” Allan N. Resnick and 26 || Henry J. Sommes, 4 Collier on Bankruptcy §] 522.01 (16" ed. 2013). 27 Homestead exemptions are to be construed liberally on behalf of the homesteader. In re 28 || Dougan, 484 B.R. 529, 534 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013); In re Haseltine, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3449, at

1 || *4, 2007 WL 2932807, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007); In re Rolland, 317 B.R. at 413; Garran v. SMS 2 || Fin. V, LLC (In re Garran),

Related

Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz
503 U.S. 638 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Caron v. Farmington National Bank
82 F.3d 7 (First Circuit, 1996)
Christo v. Yellin (In Re Christo)
192 F.3d 36 (First Circuit, 1999)
Garran v. SMS Financial V, LLC (In Re Garran)
338 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2003)
Soto-Rios v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico
662 F.3d 112 (First Circuit, 2011)
Shamban v. Perry
357 B.R. 175 (First Circuit, 2006)
In Re Arrol
207 B.R. 662 (N.D. California, 1997)
In Re Goldberg
59 B.R. 201 (N.D. Oklahoma, 1986)
In Re Rolland
317 B.R. 402 (C.D. California, 2004)
S & C Home Loans, Inc. v. Farr (In Re Farr)
278 B.R. 171 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
Carlucci & Legum v. Murray (In Re Murray)
249 B.R. 223 (E.D. New York, 2000)
In Re Colvin
288 B.R. 477 (E.D. Michigan, 2003)
In Re Wegrzyn
291 B.R. 2 (D. Massachusetts, 2003)
In Re Toppi
378 B.R. 9 (D. Maine, 2007)
Ingebretsen v. McNamer
137 Cal. App. 3d 957 (California Court of Appeal, 1982)
Goldman v. Salisbury (In re Goldman)
70 F.3d 1028 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)
In re Dougan
484 B.R. 529 (D. Massachusetts, 2013)
In re Hernandez
487 B.R. 353 (D. Puerto Rico, 2013)
Hernández v. Benet
23 P.R. Dec. 6 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 1915)
Marty Pérez v. Ramírez Cuerda
75 P.R. Dec. 858 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 1954)

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