An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-341
Filed 3 December 2025
Forsyth County, No. 23JT000155-330
IN THE MATTER OF: A.M.B.
Appeal by Respondent-Father from order entered 31 December 2024 by Judge
Thomas W. Davis, V in Forsyth County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
6 November 2025.
Camino Law, by Rebecca Perry, for Petitioners-Appellees.
Hooks Law, P.C., by Laura G. Hooks, for Respondent-Appellant Father.
No brief filed for guardian ad litem.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-Father appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental
rights to his minor child, Alana.1 On appeal, Respondent-Father argues that the trial
court erred in terminating his parental rights on the grounds of failure to legitimate
and willful abandonment because it failed to make necessary findings of fact to
1 A pseudonym has been used to protect the identity of the minor child. See N.C. R. App. P.
42(b). IN RE: A.M.B.
Opinion of the Court
support those grounds. He also contends the trial court abused its discretion in
concluding that termination of his parental rights was in Alana’s best interest. After
careful review, we affirm.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
This case arises from a private termination action filed by Petitioners, Alana’s
maternal great-grandparents. Alana was born in May 2015. Alana’s mother
(“Mother”), who has a long history of drug and alcohol use, lived with Petitioners
during her pregnancy and the first year of Alana’s life. Mother is not a party to the
current proceeding. Alana lived with petitioners on-and-off her for most of her life,
and began residing with them continuously in December 2021. Respondent-Father
and Mother were never married, and Respondent-Father is not listed on Alana’s birth
certificate as her father.
Respondent-Father saw Alana a few times in the first four years of her life.
Respondent-Father was then incarcerated for a term of 70 to 90 months for drug
trafficking.2
On 14 April 2022, Petitioners were awarded emergency custody of Alana until
a temporary custody order was entered on 26 July 2022, wherein Petitioners were
granted full legal and physical custody of Alana. On 13 March 2023, the court entered
an order granting Petitioners permanent sole legal and physical custody of Alana due
2 No evidence was presented regarding Respondent-Father’s exact dates of incarceration.
-2- IN RE: A.M.B.
to Mother’s drug usage, unemployment, unstable housing, domestic violence, and
driving “under the influence of drugs and alcohol while [Alana] was in the car.” The
trial court also ordered that neither Mother nor Respondent-Father were to have
visitation. At the time of the custody action, Respondent-Father remained
incarcerated.
On 31 June 2023, Petitioners filed a petition to terminate Respondent-Father’s
parental rights based on the grounds of failure to legitimate and willful
abandonment. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) and (7). Petitioners did not file a petition
to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
The matter came on for hearing on 19 September 2024. In an order entered 31
December 2024, the trial court found and concluded that grounds existed to terminate
Respondent-Father’s parental rights as alleged in the petition and that termination
of his parental rights was in Alana’s best interests. Respondent-Father filed timely
notice of appeal.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to review “[a]ny order that terminates parental
rights or denies a petition or motion to terminate parental rights.” N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1001(a)(7) (2023).
III. Standard of Review
A termination of parental rights proceeding consists of two parts: the
adjudicatory stage and the dispositional stage. At the adjudicatory stage, the
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petitioner bears the burden of proving “the facts justifying the termination by clear
and convincing evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(b) (2025). If a trial court’s finding of
fact is supported by such evidence, “it will be deemed conclusive even if the record
contains evidence that would support a contrary finding.” In re S.R., 384 N.C. 516,
520 (2023) (cleaned up). “Unchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by the
evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re M.S.E., 378 N.C. 40, 47 (2021). “A trial
court’s finding of an ultimate fact is conclusive on appeal if the evidentiary facts
reasonably support the trial court’s ultimate findings of fact.” In re G.C., 384 N.C.
62, 65 (2023) (cleaned up). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. In
re A.A., 381 N.C. 325, 334 (2022).
At the dispositional stage, the trial court determines whether termination of
parental rights is in the best interests of the child. In re C.B., 375 N.C. 556, 560
(2020). “The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best interests at the dispositional
stage is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6 (2019).
“We review the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to determine whether they
are supported by competent evidence.” In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 793 (2020).
IV. Analysis
A. Grounds for Termination
On appeal, Respondent-Father challenges the trial court’s adjudication of
grounds for termination of his parental rights under subsections 7B-1111(a)(5) and
(7).
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Under subsection 7B-1111(a)(5):
The trial court may terminate parental rights upon a finding [that]:
The father of a juvenile born out of wedlock has not, prior to the filing of a petition or motion to terminate parental rights, done any of the following:
a. Filed an affidavit of paternity in a central registry maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services. . . .
b. Legitimated the juvenile pursuant to provisions of G.S. 49-10, G.S. 49-12.1, or filed a petition for this specific purpose.
c. Legitimated the juvenile by marriage to the mother of the juvenile.
d. Provided substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to the juvenile and the mother.
e. Established paternity through G.S. 49-14, 110-132, 130A-101, 130A-118, or other judicial proceeding.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2023). When basing the termination of parental rights on
this ground, “the court must make specific findings of fact as to each subsection.” In
re J.M.K., 261 N.C. App. 163, 167 (2018) (brackets omitted).
Respondent-Father argues the trial court’s order is devoid of any finding
specifically addressing subsection (e). We disagree.
While the court’s findings do not specifically track the language of the statute,
the findings sufficiently address subsection (e) and whether Respondent-Father
failed to establish paternity through sections 49-14, 110-132 (affidavit of parentage),
-5- IN RE: A.M.B.
130A-101 (appearing on birth certificate), and 130A-118 (amendment of the birth
certificate).
The court found that Respondent-Father’s name does not appear on Alana’s
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-341
Filed 3 December 2025
Forsyth County, No. 23JT000155-330
IN THE MATTER OF: A.M.B.
Appeal by Respondent-Father from order entered 31 December 2024 by Judge
Thomas W. Davis, V in Forsyth County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
6 November 2025.
Camino Law, by Rebecca Perry, for Petitioners-Appellees.
Hooks Law, P.C., by Laura G. Hooks, for Respondent-Appellant Father.
No brief filed for guardian ad litem.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-Father appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental
rights to his minor child, Alana.1 On appeal, Respondent-Father argues that the trial
court erred in terminating his parental rights on the grounds of failure to legitimate
and willful abandonment because it failed to make necessary findings of fact to
1 A pseudonym has been used to protect the identity of the minor child. See N.C. R. App. P.
42(b). IN RE: A.M.B.
Opinion of the Court
support those grounds. He also contends the trial court abused its discretion in
concluding that termination of his parental rights was in Alana’s best interest. After
careful review, we affirm.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
This case arises from a private termination action filed by Petitioners, Alana’s
maternal great-grandparents. Alana was born in May 2015. Alana’s mother
(“Mother”), who has a long history of drug and alcohol use, lived with Petitioners
during her pregnancy and the first year of Alana’s life. Mother is not a party to the
current proceeding. Alana lived with petitioners on-and-off her for most of her life,
and began residing with them continuously in December 2021. Respondent-Father
and Mother were never married, and Respondent-Father is not listed on Alana’s birth
certificate as her father.
Respondent-Father saw Alana a few times in the first four years of her life.
Respondent-Father was then incarcerated for a term of 70 to 90 months for drug
trafficking.2
On 14 April 2022, Petitioners were awarded emergency custody of Alana until
a temporary custody order was entered on 26 July 2022, wherein Petitioners were
granted full legal and physical custody of Alana. On 13 March 2023, the court entered
an order granting Petitioners permanent sole legal and physical custody of Alana due
2 No evidence was presented regarding Respondent-Father’s exact dates of incarceration.
-2- IN RE: A.M.B.
to Mother’s drug usage, unemployment, unstable housing, domestic violence, and
driving “under the influence of drugs and alcohol while [Alana] was in the car.” The
trial court also ordered that neither Mother nor Respondent-Father were to have
visitation. At the time of the custody action, Respondent-Father remained
incarcerated.
On 31 June 2023, Petitioners filed a petition to terminate Respondent-Father’s
parental rights based on the grounds of failure to legitimate and willful
abandonment. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) and (7). Petitioners did not file a petition
to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
The matter came on for hearing on 19 September 2024. In an order entered 31
December 2024, the trial court found and concluded that grounds existed to terminate
Respondent-Father’s parental rights as alleged in the petition and that termination
of his parental rights was in Alana’s best interests. Respondent-Father filed timely
notice of appeal.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to review “[a]ny order that terminates parental
rights or denies a petition or motion to terminate parental rights.” N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1001(a)(7) (2023).
III. Standard of Review
A termination of parental rights proceeding consists of two parts: the
adjudicatory stage and the dispositional stage. At the adjudicatory stage, the
-3- IN RE: A.M.B.
petitioner bears the burden of proving “the facts justifying the termination by clear
and convincing evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(b) (2025). If a trial court’s finding of
fact is supported by such evidence, “it will be deemed conclusive even if the record
contains evidence that would support a contrary finding.” In re S.R., 384 N.C. 516,
520 (2023) (cleaned up). “Unchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by the
evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re M.S.E., 378 N.C. 40, 47 (2021). “A trial
court’s finding of an ultimate fact is conclusive on appeal if the evidentiary facts
reasonably support the trial court’s ultimate findings of fact.” In re G.C., 384 N.C.
62, 65 (2023) (cleaned up). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. In
re A.A., 381 N.C. 325, 334 (2022).
At the dispositional stage, the trial court determines whether termination of
parental rights is in the best interests of the child. In re C.B., 375 N.C. 556, 560
(2020). “The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best interests at the dispositional
stage is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6 (2019).
“We review the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to determine whether they
are supported by competent evidence.” In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 793 (2020).
IV. Analysis
A. Grounds for Termination
On appeal, Respondent-Father challenges the trial court’s adjudication of
grounds for termination of his parental rights under subsections 7B-1111(a)(5) and
(7).
-4- IN RE: A.M.B.
Under subsection 7B-1111(a)(5):
The trial court may terminate parental rights upon a finding [that]:
The father of a juvenile born out of wedlock has not, prior to the filing of a petition or motion to terminate parental rights, done any of the following:
a. Filed an affidavit of paternity in a central registry maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services. . . .
b. Legitimated the juvenile pursuant to provisions of G.S. 49-10, G.S. 49-12.1, or filed a petition for this specific purpose.
c. Legitimated the juvenile by marriage to the mother of the juvenile.
d. Provided substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to the juvenile and the mother.
e. Established paternity through G.S. 49-14, 110-132, 130A-101, 130A-118, or other judicial proceeding.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2023). When basing the termination of parental rights on
this ground, “the court must make specific findings of fact as to each subsection.” In
re J.M.K., 261 N.C. App. 163, 167 (2018) (brackets omitted).
Respondent-Father argues the trial court’s order is devoid of any finding
specifically addressing subsection (e). We disagree.
While the court’s findings do not specifically track the language of the statute,
the findings sufficiently address subsection (e) and whether Respondent-Father
failed to establish paternity through sections 49-14, 110-132 (affidavit of parentage),
-5- IN RE: A.M.B.
130A-101 (appearing on birth certificate), and 130A-118 (amendment of the birth
certificate).
The court found that Respondent-Father’s name does not appear on Alana’s
birth certificate, thereby showing he did not establish paternity through sections
130A-101 and -118 of our General Statutes. The court also found that the first
pleading Respondent-Father “has filed in any legal action regarding custody of
[Alana]” was his answer to the termination petition filed by his attorney on his behalf;
that Respondent-Father has not taken any practical or legal steps to be a part of
Alana’s life or obtain custody of her, and that Respondent-Father has never
legitimated Alana by marrying Mother or “pursuant to any other legal mechanism.”
Finally, the court found that Respondent-Father did not file an affidavit of parentage
with the Department of Health and Human Services. These findings demonstrate
that Respondent-Father did not establish paternity through filing a civil action under
section 49-14 and did not file an affidavit of parentage pursuant to section 110-132.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court’s findings adequately
address each subsection under subsection 7B-1111(a)(5) and are sufficient to support
termination of Respondent-Father’s parental rights based on his failure to legitimate.
Because we conclude the trial court did not err in finding at least one ground
existed to terminate Respondent-Father’s parental rights, we need not address his
arguments regarding subsection 7B-1111(a)(7). See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194
(2019) (“[A] finding of only one ground is necessary to support a termination of
-6- IN RE: A.M.B.
parental rights . . . .”).
B. Best Interests
Respondent-Father also argues the trial court abused its discretion in
concluding that terminating his parental rights was in Alana’s best interests.
Specifically, Respondent-Father challenges finding of fact 3 as “inaccurate,” and
argues that subsections 7B-1110(2) and (3) required “the court to consider adoption
and a permanent plan,” but there was no permanent plan and “no likelihood of
adoption of Alana as no one is seeking to adopt her[,] [and] Petitioners are not wishing
to be considered for adoption of Alana.” Respondent-Father also contends that the
trial court erred because there was no evidence that the relationship between Alana
and Respondent-Father was “truly unsafe,” and terminating his rights would
preclude any relationship with Alana.
“After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent’s
rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in
the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2023). In considering the best
interests of the minor child:
[T]he court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the
-7- IN RE: A.M.B.
juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
Id.
Here, the trial court made the following factual findings to support its
determination that termination of Respondent-Father’s parental rights was in
Alana’s best interests:
1. [Alana] knows who [Respondent-Father] is because she has been told who he is, and she has seen a photograph of him. [Respondent-Father] has had no contact with [Alana] in approximately five years. [Alana] refers to [Respondent- Father] as “my dad” or “[his first name].” They have no bond, nor does [Alana] bear [Respondent-Father] any ill will or get upset talking about him.
2. In the last several months, [Alana] has said she is not ready to meet [Respondent-Father] but may want to meet him when she is older.
3. [Alana]’s guardian ad litem, Mr. Jones, testified that terminating [Respondent-Father]’s parental rights is in [Alana]’s best interest.
4. Mr. Jones was concerned that [Petitioners] were not pursuing termination of [Mother’s] parental rights too. He also had some concern about [Petitioners’] respective ages, however, he noted that they are mindful of that issue, they have sufficient income to support themselves and [Alana], they have life insurance policies for which [Alana] is the beneficiary, and they have a plan for either of their adult
-8- IN RE: A.M.B.
children to take care of [Alana] should they predecease [Alana] reaching the age of majority.
5. [Alana] calls [Petitioner great-grandfather] “poppy” or “grampy” and [Petitioner great-grandmother] “grammy.”
6. [Alana] has a parent/child relationship with [Petitioners]. She looks to them for comfort and guidance. They have protected her and ensured that all her basic needs have been met since she was born.
7. [Petitioners] have enrolled [Alana] at [a Montessori school], a private school for which [Petitioners] pay out of pocket, where she is in the fourth grade.
8. [Alana] is nine years old at the time of the hearing.
9. Because [Petitioners] are not seeking termination of [Mother]’s parental rights at this time, they will not proceed with adoption should [Respondent-Father]’s parental rights be terminated.
10. [Petitioners] currently exercise sole legal and physical custody of [Alana].
11. Because this Petition is not being brought pursuant to an abuse, neglect, or dependency action, there is no permanent plan for [Alana].
Respondent-Father challenges finding of fact 3 by asserting that the guardian
ad litem (“GAL”) did not testify as to his recommendation about whether termination
was in Alana’s best interests, but instead responded by discussing his interview “with
Petitioners about their financial situation and Alana showing him around the house
and telling him about her life.” However, Respondent-Father also acknowledges that
“[t]he GAL testified that his recommendation was that the petition be granted, but
-9- IN RE: A.M.B.
that he had concerns about the age of Petitioners and that they were not seeking to
terminate Mother’s parental rights.” By testifying that his recommendation in this
case would be for the petition to be granted, in effect, the GAL agreed that
termination of Respondent-Father’s parental rights was in Alana’s best interests.3
Therefore, finding of fact 3 is accurate.
But even if finding of fact 3 were erroneous, the trial court’s findings
demonstrate that it considered each factor under section 7B-1110(a) before
concluding that termination was in Alana’s best interests. The court found: Alana
was nine years old at the time of the hearing; there was no bond between Alana and
Respondent-Father; Alana has a parent/child relationship with Petitioners and “looks
to them for comfort and guidance[;]” there was no permanent plan because this was
a private termination action; and Petitioners are not seeking to terminate Mother’s
parental rights at this time so “they will not proceed with adoption should
[Respondent-Father’s] parental rights be terminated.” The findings also demonstrate
that the court considered the GAL’s concerns regarding Petitioners’ ages and the fact
that they were not also pursuing termination of Mother’s parental rights in making
its decision.
Although the court found that Petitioners would not pursue adoption if
3 Though not testimony, the GAL report filed shortly before the hearing confirms that the
GAL’s opinion was “that terminating the parental rights of [Respondent-Father] is in [Alana’s] best interest.”
- 10 - IN RE: A.M.B.
Respondent-Father’s parental rights were terminated, this single factor is one of
many that a trial court considers, and it “becomes more relevant in a [termination of
parental rights] case in which a child is in the custody of a Department of Social
Services agency and termination of the parent’s rights leaves the child as a ward of
the State.” In re C.J.C., 374 N.C. 42, 49 (2020). This is a private termination action
initiated by the child’s maternal great-grandparents who have full legal and physical
custody of the child. Therefore, the likelihood of Alana’s adoption in this case “is not
a sufficiently relevant factor . . . in determining whether termination of [Respondent-
Father’s] parental rights was in [Alana’s] best interests.” Id.
Respondent-Father “essentially ask this Court to do something it lacks the
authority to do—to reweigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion than the
trial court.” In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504, 514 (2020). Based on the trial court’s findings,
which demonstrate that it considered each of the required factors, we are satisfied
that the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Respondent-Father’s parental
rights was in Alana’s best interests was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unsupported
by reason as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
V. Conclusion
The trial court did not err in determining that grounds existed to terminate
Respondent-Father’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5), nor did it
err in concluding that termination of Respondent-Father’s parental rights was in
Alana’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating
- 11 - IN RE: A.M.B.
Respondent-Father’s parental rights to Alana.
AFFIRMED.
Panel consisting of Judges ZACHARY, GORE, and FREEMAN.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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