In re Am. Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litig.
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Opinion
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.
In this set of consolidated antitrust actions (the "MP Actions"), the Merchant Plaintiffs (the "MPs")1 challenge under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
Pending before the court is Amex's motion seeking summary judgment as to the MPs' allegations of a one-sided market and the MPs' allegations of an Amex-only market. (See Notice of Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 835).) For the following reasons, Amex's motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this case-the procedural history, the restraints on competition, the workings of the credit-card market in general and Amex's platform in particular, etc.-have been discussed at great length in this court's previous opinions in this matter and in the related case brought by the federal government. See In re Am. Exp. Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litig. (In re Amex ), No. 11-MD-2221 (NGG),
A. Factual Overview
The MPs are retail merchants that have each entered into an American Express Card Acceptance Agreement (the "Agreement") with Amex. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) In those Agreements, "and in virtually every other such Agreement that Amex has entered into with a merchant," Amex has included the NDPs, which prevent the merchant "from differentially pricing the use of payment cards, stating a preference for any form of payment, or allowing the retail customer to use different payment cards on differing terms or conditions established by the merchant." (Id.; see id. ¶¶ 2-3 (describing the NDPs).) The MPs claim that these restraints are anticompetitive "because they nullify the operation of the price mechanism, impede competition among credit card networks and suppress output." (Id. ¶ 4; see id. ¶¶ 4-6.) As a result, the MPs allege, "merchant fees and the net two-sided transaction price for Amex and other credit card networks are higher than the competitive level and higher than they otherwise would be in the absence of Amex's anticompetitive restraints [and] the number of credit card transactions is lower than it otherwise would be in the absence of the Amex restraints." (Id. ¶ 7.)
The MPs allege that the NDPs "have had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole ... in that they have reduced output, quality and consumer choice and increased price and barriers to entry in each of the relevant markets and/or submarkets." (Id. ¶ 53.) The MPs seek to proceed to trial with respect to four formulations of the relevant market:
1. a one-sided, all-general purpose credit card ("GPCC") market;
2. a one-sided, Amex-only market;
3. a two-sided, all-GPCC market; and
4. a two-sided, Amex-only market.
(Id. ¶ 11, see id. ¶¶ 56-57, 64.) The MPs assert claims under each cause of action with respect to all four formulations of the relevant market and submarket. (See id. ¶¶ 68-85.)
B. Procedural History
In 2008, certain of the MPs brought suit against Amex in this court. See In re Amex,
Meanwhile, in October 2010, the Department of Justice and the attorneys general of eighteen states filed suit against Amex, MasterCard, and Visa (the "Government Action").2 The MP Actions and the Government Action proceeded to coordinated discovery. In late 2013, Amex moved for summary judgment in both the Government Action and the MP Actions, and moved to consolidate the actions for trial. The court denied Amex's motion for summary judgment in the Government Action in May 2014. See United States v. Am. Exp. Co.,
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NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.
In this set of consolidated antitrust actions (the "MP Actions"), the Merchant Plaintiffs (the "MPs")1 challenge under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
Pending before the court is Amex's motion seeking summary judgment as to the MPs' allegations of a one-sided market and the MPs' allegations of an Amex-only market. (See Notice of Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 835).) For the following reasons, Amex's motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this case-the procedural history, the restraints on competition, the workings of the credit-card market in general and Amex's platform in particular, etc.-have been discussed at great length in this court's previous opinions in this matter and in the related case brought by the federal government. See In re Am. Exp. Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litig. (In re Amex ), No. 11-MD-2221 (NGG),
A. Factual Overview
The MPs are retail merchants that have each entered into an American Express Card Acceptance Agreement (the "Agreement") with Amex. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) In those Agreements, "and in virtually every other such Agreement that Amex has entered into with a merchant," Amex has included the NDPs, which prevent the merchant "from differentially pricing the use of payment cards, stating a preference for any form of payment, or allowing the retail customer to use different payment cards on differing terms or conditions established by the merchant." (Id.; see id. ¶¶ 2-3 (describing the NDPs).) The MPs claim that these restraints are anticompetitive "because they nullify the operation of the price mechanism, impede competition among credit card networks and suppress output." (Id. ¶ 4; see id. ¶¶ 4-6.) As a result, the MPs allege, "merchant fees and the net two-sided transaction price for Amex and other credit card networks are higher than the competitive level and higher than they otherwise would be in the absence of Amex's anticompetitive restraints [and] the number of credit card transactions is lower than it otherwise would be in the absence of the Amex restraints." (Id. ¶ 7.)
The MPs allege that the NDPs "have had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole ... in that they have reduced output, quality and consumer choice and increased price and barriers to entry in each of the relevant markets and/or submarkets." (Id. ¶ 53.) The MPs seek to proceed to trial with respect to four formulations of the relevant market:
1. a one-sided, all-general purpose credit card ("GPCC") market;
2. a one-sided, Amex-only market;
3. a two-sided, all-GPCC market; and
4. a two-sided, Amex-only market.
(Id. ¶ 11, see id. ¶¶ 56-57, 64.) The MPs assert claims under each cause of action with respect to all four formulations of the relevant market and submarket. (See id. ¶¶ 68-85.)
B. Procedural History
In 2008, certain of the MPs brought suit against Amex in this court. See In re Amex,
Meanwhile, in October 2010, the Department of Justice and the attorneys general of eighteen states filed suit against Amex, MasterCard, and Visa (the "Government Action").2 The MP Actions and the Government Action proceeded to coordinated discovery. In late 2013, Amex moved for summary judgment in both the Government Action and the MP Actions, and moved to consolidate the actions for trial. The court denied Amex's motion for summary judgment in the Government Action in May 2014. See United States v. Am. Exp. Co.,
The Government Action proceeded to a bench trial during the summer of 2014. On February 19, 2015, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the specific NDPs challenged by the Government violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. After receiving additional briefing from the parties to the Government Action, as well as other interested parties including the MPs, the court issued a permanent injunction on April 30, 2015. United States. v. Am. Exp. Co., No. 10-CV-4496 (NGG),
On September 26, 2016, the Second Circuit reversed this court's judgment in the Government Action, holding that the court erred in excluding the market for cardholders from its definition of the relevant market. See U.S. v. Amex,
Following the Supreme Court's affirmance of the dismissal of the Government Action, matters resumed in the MP Actions. The court granted the MPs leave to file an amended complaint-intended to address some of the deficiencies with the Government Action raised by the Court in Ohio-and set a briefing schedule on various anticipated motions for summary judgment by Amex. (July 10, 2018, Order (Dkt. 811).) The MPs filed the amended complaint on July 27, 2018. (Am. Compl.) Under the original briefing schedule set by the court, Amex was to serve its motions for summary judgment-one as to the allegations of one-sided and Amex-only markets, and one "additional" motion as to the allegation of a two-sided market that includes all GPCCs-on the Merchant Plaintiffs by no later than August 17, 2018. (See July 10, 2018, Order.) On August 6, 2018, Amex requested that it "be given leave to file a summary judgment motion directed to the Merchant Plaintiffs' allegations regarding competitive harm in a two-sided market after the new discovery is complete." (Aug. 6, 2018, Letter (Dkt. 815) at 2.) The court granted Amex's request and set the briefing schedule on the motion for summary judgment as to the Merchant Plaintiffs' claims on the two-sided, all-GPCC market to take place following the completion of additional fact discovery. (See Aug. 6, 2018, Min. Entry; Aug. 17, 2018, Order.)
On August 17, 2018, Amex served on the Merchant Plaintiffs a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (Amex Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 828 at ECF p.6).) Amex did not answer the amended complaint. The MPs subsequently sought an order from this court compelling Amex to file its answer and defenses to the amended complaint. (Mot. to Compel (Dkt. 828 at ECF p.1).) On September 26, 2018, the court held that, because Amex did not "seek to dismiss any 'claims' in the amended complaint," its motion could not be considered a motion to dismiss, but rather one for summary judgment. In re Am. Exp. Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litig. (In re Amex ),
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court must grant summary judgment when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A 'material' fact is one capable of influencing the case's outcome under governing substantive law, and a 'genuine' dispute is one as to which the evidence *334would permit a reasonable juror to find for the party opposing the motion." Figueroa v. Mazza,
"In determining whether an issue is genuine, '[t]he inferences to be drawn from the underlying affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.' " SCW W. LLC v. Westport Ins. Corp.,
Finally, it bears noting that "[s]ummary judgment is not an all-or nothing proposition." In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig.,
III. DISCUSSION
In order for the MPs' antitrust claims against Amex to succeed, they must define a relevant market in which the allegedly uncompetitive behavior exhibited by Amex restrained trade. U.S. v. Amex,
For antitrust purposes, a relevant market has two components: a "product market" and a "geographic market." See Concord Assocs. v. Entm't Props. Tr.,
"[M]arket definition is a deeply fact-intensive inquiry." Chapman v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth,
Amex's motion for summary judgment requires the court to ask whether three of the MPs' four proposed market definitions can succeed as a matter of law. While Amex has not moved for summary judgment as to the MPs' two-sided, all-GPCC market definition, the other three definitions-one-sided, Amex-only; one-sided, all-GPCC; and two-sided, Amex-only-remain subject to this motion. The court agrees with Amex that these three market definitions cannot succeed as a matter of law, so the court GRANTS Amex's motion for summary judgment.
A. One-Sided Market Allegations
1. One-Versus Two-Sided Markets
Because Amex moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the MPs' one-sided market allegations are faulty as a matter of law, the court begins its analysis by defining "one-sided" and "two-sided" platforms and examining how the Supreme Court construed these terms in Ohio.
"[A] two-sided platform offers different products or services to two different groups who both depend on the platform to intermediate between them." Ohio, 138 S.Ct. at 2280 ; see also id. at 2298 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]here are four relevant features of [two-sided platforms] on the majority's account: they (1) offer *336different products or services, (2) to different groups of customers, (3) whom the 'platform' connects, (4) in simultaneous transactions."). As the Court has stated, a credit-card network is an example of a two-sided platform because of the simultaneous transactions it facilitates between cardholders and merchants:
For cardholders, the network extends them credit, which allows them to make purchases without cash and to defer payment until later.... For merchants, the network allows them to avoid the cost of processing transactions and offers them quick, guaranteed payment.
Id. at 2280 (majority op.); see U.S. v. Amex,
While "it is not always necessary to consider both sides of a two-sided platform" when defining the relevant market for antitrust purposes, courts must consider both sides of the platform when it exhibits two features typical of two-sided platforms. See Ohio, 138 S.Ct. at 2286. First, the court must ask if the platform exhibits "what economists call 'indirect network effects.' " Id. at 2280 (citation omitted). As this court has previously recognized, "[i]ndirect network effects exist when the number of agents or the quantity of services bought on one side of a two-sided platform affects the value that an agent on the other side of the platform can realize." U.S. v. Amex,
In Ohio, the Supreme Court held that credit-card networks are two-sided platforms.4 Id. at 2285. The court found that credit-card networks exhibit indirect network effects: the value of a credit card to cardholders increases when more merchants accept the card, and the card is more valuable to merchants when more cardholders use it. Id. at 2281. On the flip side, a credit-card network that raises the price on either cardholders or merchants risks entering "a feedback loop of declining demand" due to the likelihood that members of the affected side will leave the platform, thus decreasing the value to the other side and increasing the risk that members of that side will in turn leave the platform. See id. at 2281, 2285. As for interconnected pricing and demand, the Court noted that credit-card networks "often charge cardholders a lower fee than merchants because cardholders are more price sensitive." Id. at 2281. But even if the network is losing money on the cardholder side-usually because the network offers rewards, such as airline miles, as an incentive for cardholders to use the card-the network is able to remain viable "because increasing the number of cardholders increases the value of accepting the card to merchants and, thus, increases the number of merchants who accept it." Id.; see also id. at 2286 ("To optimize sales, the network must find the balance of pricing *337that encourages the greatest number of matches between cardholders and merchants."). The network "can then charge those merchants a fee for every transaction (typically a percentage of the purchase price)." Id. at 2281.5 Taken together, these features confirm that "courts must include both sides of the platform-merchants and cardholders-when defining the credit-card market." Id. at 2286.
2. Stare Decisis
The doctrine of stare decisis compels a district court to abide by the legal decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdiction.6 See, e.g., Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
Although stare decisis is, as a formal matter, concerned with fidelity to precedent, it often functions as a type of preclusion doctrine-similar to res judicata, or "law of the case." See 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.5, at 814 (2d ed. 2002). Modern commentators have argued that there is little difference functionally between precedent and preclusion: both operate inflexibly to bind nonparties to prior decisions, and both can bind as to certain questions of law or fact. See Max Minzner, Saving Stare Decisis: Preclusion, Precedent, and Procedural Due Process, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597, 608-11 ; Trammell, supra note 7, at 585-86; see also 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449, at 335 & n.30 (3d ed. 2017) ("[I]n some special settings [a judgment] may achieve a particularly potent force that approaches preclusion under the name of stare decisis...."). At the same *338time, the argument for applying stare decisis inflexibly-that is, for a court to declare itself constrained by a higher court's prior judgment-is more persuasive where the question is one that has already been the subject of litigation "between the same parties." See 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4425, at 701 (3d ed. 2016).
While it is not necessary at this juncture to define the full scope of the doctrine of stare decisis, it bears emphasizing that a decision can be given stare decisis effect even when the facts of the subsequent case are dissimilar. See Haith ex rel. Accretive Health, Inc. v. Bronfman,
3. Whether the MPs May Proceed Under a One-Sided Market Theory
Ohio's holding is clearly stated: "[C]redit-card networks are two-sided platforms." 138 S.Ct. at 2285. Despite this seemingly ironclad language, the MPs contend that the holding in Ohio is irrelevant to the instant action because market definition is a question of fact. (Opp'n at 3; see id. at 6.) Further, they submit that it would be inappropriate to apply the Ohio holding to this case given that these are different "cases based on different facts." (Id. at 3.) In response, Amex states that the Supreme Court's holding in Ohio binds this court to reject the MPs' one-sided market allegations because the Supreme Court set forth a "conclusion[ ] of law" contrary to the MPs' legal formulation, and because "the economic activity and the basic facts are the same" between the Government Action and the MP Actions. (Reply at 3-4 & n.6.) The court agrees with Amex.
It strains credulity for the MPs to claim that this case is essentially dissimilar from the Government Action. (See Opp'n at 3-4.) As in the Government Action, the plaintiffs claim that Amex is liable under the Sherman Act for restraining trade by including the NDPs in its merchant contracts. As in the Government Action, the plaintiffs' allegations are dependent on the economic realities of the credit-card market and the unique features of how Amex operates. And as in the Government Action, the plaintiffs seek to define the "relevant market" for Sherman Act purposes at least in part by reference to Amex's interactions with merchants alone, rather than by simultaneously scrutinizing Amex's interactions with merchants and cardholders.7
*339The MPs argue that this case is distinguishable from the one that both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit decided in Amex's favor because the MPs "have come forward with different relevant market facts." (Opp'n at 4.) As far as the court can tell, the MPs do not argue that there is actually anything different about the facts at issue in this action. Rather, the MPs want the chance to make arguments that they claim were not properly presented in the Government Action and that would, in their estimation, result in a different legal outcome from that reached in Ohio. These arguments include: that Amex is a "mature" market, thus calling into question whether it exhibits indirect network effects (Opp'n at 9-12); and that "there is abundant evidence that Amex does not 'balance' the prices on the two sides of its platform and that those prices are not 'relative' to each other or 'interconnected' " (id. at 12-15). The MPs are first incorrect that the Supreme Court must have explicitly considered an argument in order for its opinion to be binding as to that argument.8 While the Ohio opinion does not mention the arguments made by the Government and its amici as to market maturity (see Opp'n at 12), the Court still held that "two-sided transaction platforms exhibit more pronounced indirect network effects" and thus that both sides of the platform must be included in the relevant-market analysis, Ohio, 138 S.Ct. at 2286-87.9 Similarly, while the Ohio opinion may not critically engage with the claim that "Amex brings merchants and cardholders together and that credit card transactions occur simultaneously on both sides of the platform" (Opp'n at 14), it is clear that the Supreme Court based its holding on this assumption, even if it was "unchallenged" (see id. ). See Ohio, 138 S.Ct. at 2286 ("[T]wo-sided transaction platforms exhibit ... interconnected pricing and demand.... In the credit-card market, these transactions are jointly consumed by a cardholder, who uses the payment card to make a transaction, and a merchant, who accepts the payment card as a method of payment." (internal quotation marks omitted) ). The upshot of this analysis is that the MPs are wrong that Ohio"did not ...
*340hold that credit card platforms"-in particular, the Amex platform-"are two-sided markets as a matter of law." (Opp'n at 6.) While this rule is still subject to case-by-case application, cf. U.S. Airways,
Nor are the MPs owed an opportunity to upset the Supreme Court's holdings on this matter. As Amex properly identifies, the relevant question is not whether the MPs are precluded as a matter of collateral estoppel and res judicata from making their arguments as to market maturity and the interconnectedness of the Amex platform; the question is whether Ohio held as a matter of law that the MPs' one-sided allegations cannot succeed.10 (See Reply at 5-6 (citing Taylor v. Sturgell,
The court also rejects the MPs' argument that Ohio does not bind this court on the grounds that market definition is typically thought of as a question of fact. (See Opp'n at 3.) The MPs are correct that, as a general rule, the question of market definition "is a highly factual one best allocated to the trier of fact." Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC,
* * *
"[L]ike cases should be treated alike." 18 Moore, supra, § 134.01[1], at 134-9. Taking that command seriously, the court is compelled by the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio and the Second Circuit's decision in U.S. v. Amex to reject the MPs' one-sided market arguments as a matter of law. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the court grants Amex's motion for summary judgment as to the MPs' one-sided market allegations.
B. Amex-Only Market Allegations
The second part of Amex's motion for summary judgment requires the court to ask whether this case may proceed to trial under the theory that Amex restrained competition within an Amex-only market.
As stated above, the MPs bear the burden of defining a relevant market within which Amex allegedly restrained trade. There is no dispute as to the geographical market at issue in this case. There is, however, a dispute as to the product market: While both sides agree that the MPs may define the product market by reference to all GPCCs, Amex argues that the MPs may not define a relevant submarket limited to Amex-only credit-card transactions. The court agrees with Amex and grants its motion for summary judgment as to an Amex-only market.
1. Doctrinal Overview
a. Defining a Relevant Market
"Defining a relevant product market is 'a process of describing those groups of producers which, because of the similarity of their products, have the ability-actual or potential-to take significant amounts of business away from each other.' " Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll.,
"Reasonable interchangeability sketches the boundaries of a market, but there may also be cognizable submarkets which themselves constitute the appropriate market for antitrust analysis." Geneva Pharm.,
*343between the brand name drug and its chemically identical generic equivalent).
b. Single-Brand Markets
It is an understatement to say that single-brand markets are disfavored. From nearly the inception of modern antitrust law, the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism of single-brand markets, stating that courts should not look at the power that certain manufacturers "have over their trademarked products" when asking whether monopolization exists, but rather that "[i]llegal [market] power must be appraised in terms of the competitive market for the product." E.I. du Pont,
To illustrate the difficulties that plaintiffs seeking to define a single-brand market face, the court turns to the seminal case of Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,
There is one situation in which courts generally agree that single-brand markets can succeed: an "aftermarket," which is "a type of derivative market consisting of consumable goods or replacement components that must be used for the proper functioning of some primary good," IIA Phillip Areeda et al., Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶ 564b, at 421 (4th ed. 2014). See Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc.,
It is important to make clear that single-brand market definitions are not formally limited to the aftermarket context. See Mooney,
2. Application
The key question regarding the viability of MPs' Amex-only market allegations is whether the transactions14 produced *345by Amex are reasonably interchangeable with the transactions produced by other GPCCs, such as Visa, MasterCard, and Discover.15 All parties agree that, from a cardholder's perspective, the transactions are interchangeable; that is, "if Amex raises its net two-sided price by increasing the price on the cardholder side (i.e., by reducing rewards), ... [Amex] will lose cardholders and sales to MasterCard, Visa or Discover." (Opp'n at 20; see Amex Mem. at 10.) In Amex's view, that is the end of the inquiry: because "competition between two-sided transaction platforms does not exist just on one side of the platform or the other," the admission that competition for transactions exists on the cardholder side of the platform precludes the court from defining an Amex-only market. (Amex Mem. at 10.) Not so, argue the MPs: they submit that they will be able to present evidence at trial that cross-elasticity of demand on the merchant side of the platform is "weak or non-existent"-in other words, that "Amex can raise its net two-sided price by increasing merchant fees while leaving rewards alone without losing sales to other credit cards"-thus making it inappropriate for the court to grant summary judgment as to the single-brand submarket allegations. (Opp'n at 20.)
The court does not think it prudent to state, as a matter of law, that cross-elasticity of demand on one side of a two-sided market forecloses the possibility that a single-brand market or submarket may be appropriate. It is true that one group of participants in the two-sided market before the court-the cardholders-treats Amex cards interchangeably with other credit cards. But it is misguided to end the analysis there. If there is a disputed question of fact regarding whether the merchants treat Amex as interchangeable, there remains an open question as to whether the product at issue-the transactions-is actually interchangeable. This analysis is not, as Amex claims, an "attempt to segment the substitutability analysis." (Mem. at 10.) As the MPs point out, the Supreme Court has commanded that, in the case of a two-sided transaction market, courts "must look to 'both sides of the platform.' " (Opp'n at 22 (quoting Ohio, 138 S.Ct. at 2286 ); see id. at 21 (stating that there is "no rational basis" to look only at the cardholder side of the platform "where the anticompetitive restraint is directed only at the merchant side of the platform).)
But this is not the end of the inquiry. The "prevailing rule against single-brand markets" has multiple underpinnings which must be dealt with before the court may conclude that a single-brand market is appropriate. (See Mem. at 11.) Chief among these is the rule that a market of "otherwise identical products" cannot be rendered "non-interchangeable" simply by a plaintiff's assumption of contractual restraints. Queen City Pizza,
The MPs assert that Amex is unlawfully restraining trade through its imposition of anti-steering rules in the cardholder acceptance agreements that it enters into with merchants. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) Amex argues that the MPs' claims as to an Amex-only market are barred because this market definition is "based on the contractual restraints at issue." (Mem. at 14.) In order to understand whether this defense is on-point, the court once again turns to Queen City Pizza. In Queen City Pizza, the franchisee plaintiffs alleged that Domino's was restraining trade in the market for Domino's-approved pizza ingredients and supplies because franchisees could not use non-Domino's-approved products without violating the franchise agreement.
The same seems true here: the MPs would be permitted to steer customers away from using Amex cards but for the inclusion of the NDPs in the contracts which the MPs voluntarily entered into with Amex; the only thing allegedly restraining competition for "Amex" transactions-and thereby distinguishing those transactions from transactions using any other credit card-are the NDPs. As Amex points out, the MPs have admitted to the fact that their single-brand market theory is based solely on the NDPs. (See Amex Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts (Dkt. 837) ¶ 36 ("[W]ith its Merchant Restraints in place, AmEx operates in a product market unto itself...." (quoting Expert Report of Dr. Christopher A. Vellturo ("Vellturo I") (Dkt. 840-5) (under seal) ¶ 104) ).) Indeed, in their brief in opposition to Amex's motion for summary judgment, the MPs seemingly do not dispute the contention that their "allegation for an Amex-only submarket is 'based on the contractual restraints at issue.' " (Opp'n at 22 (quoting Mem. at 14).) Instead, the MPs state that Queen City Pizza does not preclude their Amex-only market definition because here, unlike in Queen City Pizza, Amex has "pre-contract economic power that gives it the ability to compel merchants to accept its cards and agree to the anti-steering rules." (Id. at 24; see id. at 23.)
The MPs' Amex-only market allegations founder at this juncture, due to the fact that the MPs impermissibly seek to prove Amex's pre-contract market power by reference to "critical loss analysis." In general, a critical loss analysis "identifies the volume of business a supplier would have to lose (or correspondingly, the number of customers who would have to threaten to shift to another supplier) for a posited price increase to be rendered unprofitable." (Vellturo I ¶ 106; see id. ¶¶ 109-13.) In this case, the MPs argue that a critical loss analysis would show that they are unable to respond to increases in Amex's merchant fees by ceasing to accept Amex cards. (Opp'n at 23-24; see Vellturo I ¶ 114.) This is so because a merchant that stops accepting Amex would suffer a greater "loss of profits on purchases by customers who no longer shop at the merchants because AmEx is no longer accepted" than it would gain profits from "a reduction in its payment acceptance costs on customers that it retains who now use a lower cost card rather than AmEx." (Vellturo *347I ¶ 107; see Opp'n at 24 ("[A] small loss of sales causes the merchant a greater loss than does the Amex anticompetitive overcharge.").) In other words, the supposed pre-contract power that Amex possesses that allegedly compels merchants to accept the terms of their cardholder agreement-including the NDPs-comes from the fact that Amex cardholders would rather take their business to an Amex-accepting merchant than use a different card to shop at a merchant that has ceased accepting Amex.
As Amex correctly identifies, this is cardholder insistence by another name.16 (See Amex Reply at 8.) In the Government Action, this court relied on cardholder insistence-which refers to "the segment of Amex's cardholder base who insist on paying with their Amex cards and who would shop elsewhere or spend less if unable to use their cards of choice"-for its finding that Amex possessed sufficient market power to cause an adverse effect on competition. See U.S. v. Amex,
Because the MPs cannot define a single-brand market without reference to the contractual restraints at issue in this case, and because the MPs have not made a legally permissible allegation that Amex possessed pre-contract market power that compelled acceptance of the NDPs, the MPs' Amex-only market fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court grants Amex's motion for summary judgment as to the MPs' Amex-only market allegations.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Amex's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 835). Counsel for both sides are DIRECTED, by no later than January 25, 2019, to provide the court with a joint update regarding the anticipated length of trial in light of this memorandum and order. Both sides are also DIRECTED to confer and contact the court's Deputy at 718-613-2545 to schedule a status conference to discuss pretrial issues.
SO ORDERED.
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