An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-999 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 6 May 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
A.L.E., Jr. and A.K.E. Wake County Nos. 11 JT 241-42
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 13 May 2013
by Judge Monica M. Bousman in Wake County District Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 27 March 2014.
Roger A. Askew, for petitioner-appellee Wake County Human Services.
Pamela Leonard Cassels, for guardian ad litem.
Sandlin Family Law Group, by Debra A. Griffiths, for respondent-appellant mother.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent-mother (“respondent”) appeals from the trial
court’s order terminating her parental rights to her minor
children Adam and Amanda1 (collectively “the children”).
1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identities of the minor children. -2- Respondent-father did not appeal the trial court’s order and
thus, is not a party to this appeal. We affirm.
In October 2010, Wake County Human Services (“WCHS”)
received reports of domestic violence and substance abuse by the
children’s parents. On 19 October 2010, respondent obtained a
Domestic Violence Protective Order (“DVPO”) against the
children’s father. Respondent and WCHS agreed upon a case plan
that required respondent to abide by the DVPO. However,
respondent failed to comply with this requirement and continued
to have contact with the children’s father.
On 13 September 2011, respondent and the children attended
a hearing at the Wake County Courthouse to set aside
respondent’s DVPO against the father. During the hearing,
respondent stated she was unable to provide for the children and
that she did not have the means to take care of them. Upon
leaving the hearing, respondent was seen yelling profanity at
the children and hitting Adam. As a result, WCHS filed a
juvenile petition alleging that the children were neglected
juveniles and obtained nonsecure custody of both children.
On 19 October 2011, the court adjudicated the children as
neglected juveniles. Respondent was ordered to comply with a
Family Services Agreement, which required her to: (1) obtain and -3- maintain housing and employment sufficient for herself and the
children; (2) complete parenting education and demonstrate
parenting skills; (3) follow through with the visitation plan;
(4) obtain a psychological evaluation and follow through with
any recommendations; and (5) obtain a substance abuse assessment
and comply with the recommendations of the resulting treatment
plan.
Respondent failed to comply with the trial court’s order.
As a result, on 10 August 2012, the trial court ceased further
reunification efforts and ordered WCHS to make reasonable
efforts to place the children, in a timely manner, in accordance
with the permanent plan of adoption. On 27 November 2012, WCHS
filed a motion for termination of parental rights on the grounds
of dependency, neglect, willfully leaving the children in foster
care for more than twelve months without making reasonable
progress to correct the conditions which led to the removal of
the children from the home, and willfully abandoning the
children. On 13 May 2013, the trial court entered an order
which concluded that multiple grounds existed for termination of
respondent’s parental rights and that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the
children. Based upon these conclusions, the court terminated -4- respondent’s parental rights to both children. Respondent
appeals.
Respondent contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in concluding that the termination of parental rights
was in the best interests of her children. We disagree.
“After an adjudication that one or more grounds for
terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall determine
whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s
best interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). This
determination is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard
and thus, will only be reversed if it is “manifestly unsupported
by reason.” Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63
(1980). When determining the best interests of the children,
the court is required to consider the following statutorily-
mandated factors and make findings regarding those factors which
are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. -5-
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). In the instant case, the
trial court made findings regarding each of the required
statutory factors.
Among the trial court’s findings was that respondent’s bond
with the children was “not an appropriate parent[-]child bond.”
Respondent asserts that the trial court’s finding is not
supported by the evidence because it failed to adequately
consider the full extent of the bond between her and the
children. However, while the social worker did testify to
appropriate interactions between respondent and the children
during visitations, there was also evidence that respondent did
not consistently attend visitation with the children, that
during at least one visit the Wake County Sheriff’s Office was
called to the visitation because respondent became extremely
angry after Amanda referred to her foster mother as “mommy,” and
that respondent neglected the children on multiple occasions.
This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the bond
between respondent and the children was not appropriate. -6- The trial court also found that adoption of the children
was “very likely.” Respondent asserts that this finding is
erroneous because there was no evidence presented that adoption
of the children is guaranteed and because there were several
characteristics of the children which would make adoption
difficult. Specifically, respondent notes that the children are
twins who must be adopted together and that they have special
emotional and developmental needs, such as ADHD. However, the
trial court took these special needs into consideration and
determined that these needs would not be a barrier to their
adoption. This finding is supported by the testimony of the
social worker, who testified that she did not see any
significant barriers to the children being adopted.
Furthermore, the court found that the children’s current foster
parents were considering adoption, and even if that potential
adoption does not come to fruition, the Juvenile Code does not
require that termination of parental rights lead to adoption in
order for it to be in the children’s best interests. See In re
M.M., 200 N.C. App.
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-999 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 6 May 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
A.L.E., Jr. and A.K.E. Wake County Nos. 11 JT 241-42
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 13 May 2013
by Judge Monica M. Bousman in Wake County District Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 27 March 2014.
Roger A. Askew, for petitioner-appellee Wake County Human Services.
Pamela Leonard Cassels, for guardian ad litem.
Sandlin Family Law Group, by Debra A. Griffiths, for respondent-appellant mother.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent-mother (“respondent”) appeals from the trial
court’s order terminating her parental rights to her minor
children Adam and Amanda1 (collectively “the children”).
1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identities of the minor children. -2- Respondent-father did not appeal the trial court’s order and
thus, is not a party to this appeal. We affirm.
In October 2010, Wake County Human Services (“WCHS”)
received reports of domestic violence and substance abuse by the
children’s parents. On 19 October 2010, respondent obtained a
Domestic Violence Protective Order (“DVPO”) against the
children’s father. Respondent and WCHS agreed upon a case plan
that required respondent to abide by the DVPO. However,
respondent failed to comply with this requirement and continued
to have contact with the children’s father.
On 13 September 2011, respondent and the children attended
a hearing at the Wake County Courthouse to set aside
respondent’s DVPO against the father. During the hearing,
respondent stated she was unable to provide for the children and
that she did not have the means to take care of them. Upon
leaving the hearing, respondent was seen yelling profanity at
the children and hitting Adam. As a result, WCHS filed a
juvenile petition alleging that the children were neglected
juveniles and obtained nonsecure custody of both children.
On 19 October 2011, the court adjudicated the children as
neglected juveniles. Respondent was ordered to comply with a
Family Services Agreement, which required her to: (1) obtain and -3- maintain housing and employment sufficient for herself and the
children; (2) complete parenting education and demonstrate
parenting skills; (3) follow through with the visitation plan;
(4) obtain a psychological evaluation and follow through with
any recommendations; and (5) obtain a substance abuse assessment
and comply with the recommendations of the resulting treatment
plan.
Respondent failed to comply with the trial court’s order.
As a result, on 10 August 2012, the trial court ceased further
reunification efforts and ordered WCHS to make reasonable
efforts to place the children, in a timely manner, in accordance
with the permanent plan of adoption. On 27 November 2012, WCHS
filed a motion for termination of parental rights on the grounds
of dependency, neglect, willfully leaving the children in foster
care for more than twelve months without making reasonable
progress to correct the conditions which led to the removal of
the children from the home, and willfully abandoning the
children. On 13 May 2013, the trial court entered an order
which concluded that multiple grounds existed for termination of
respondent’s parental rights and that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the
children. Based upon these conclusions, the court terminated -4- respondent’s parental rights to both children. Respondent
appeals.
Respondent contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in concluding that the termination of parental rights
was in the best interests of her children. We disagree.
“After an adjudication that one or more grounds for
terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall determine
whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s
best interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). This
determination is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard
and thus, will only be reversed if it is “manifestly unsupported
by reason.” Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63
(1980). When determining the best interests of the children,
the court is required to consider the following statutorily-
mandated factors and make findings regarding those factors which
are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. -5-
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). In the instant case, the
trial court made findings regarding each of the required
statutory factors.
Among the trial court’s findings was that respondent’s bond
with the children was “not an appropriate parent[-]child bond.”
Respondent asserts that the trial court’s finding is not
supported by the evidence because it failed to adequately
consider the full extent of the bond between her and the
children. However, while the social worker did testify to
appropriate interactions between respondent and the children
during visitations, there was also evidence that respondent did
not consistently attend visitation with the children, that
during at least one visit the Wake County Sheriff’s Office was
called to the visitation because respondent became extremely
angry after Amanda referred to her foster mother as “mommy,” and
that respondent neglected the children on multiple occasions.
This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the bond
between respondent and the children was not appropriate. -6- The trial court also found that adoption of the children
was “very likely.” Respondent asserts that this finding is
erroneous because there was no evidence presented that adoption
of the children is guaranteed and because there were several
characteristics of the children which would make adoption
difficult. Specifically, respondent notes that the children are
twins who must be adopted together and that they have special
emotional and developmental needs, such as ADHD. However, the
trial court took these special needs into consideration and
determined that these needs would not be a barrier to their
adoption. This finding is supported by the testimony of the
social worker, who testified that she did not see any
significant barriers to the children being adopted.
Furthermore, the court found that the children’s current foster
parents were considering adoption, and even if that potential
adoption does not come to fruition, the Juvenile Code does not
require that termination of parental rights lead to adoption in
order for it to be in the children’s best interests. See In re
M.M., 200 N.C. App. 248, 258, 684 S.E.2d 463, 470 (2009) (noting
that “nothing within N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–1110 (2007) requires
that termination lead to adoption in order for termination to be
in a child’s best interests.”). Based upon the evidence at the -7- termination hearing, the trial court properly found that
adoption of the children was very likely.
Finally, respondent challenges the trial court’s finding
that termination of her parental rights aides in the
accomplishment of the permanent plan for the children.
Respondent asserts that this finding is erroneous because she is
intent on carrying out her case plan and has the goal to
complete the plan such that the court should not have terminated
her parental rights. However, the evidence at the termination
hearing demonstrated that the children had already been in WCHS
custody for several months when respondent’s case plan was
implemented on 13 September 2011. Respondent’s renewed efforts
to attempt to comply with the plan did not begin until February
2013, shortly before the termination hearing. Thus, while
respondent may be intent on completing her case plan in the
future, she failed to make adequate progress on the plan for
more than a year while the children were in WCHS custody. As
this Court has previously noted, “the child[ren] and [their]
best interests are at issue here, not respondent’s hopes for the
future.” In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 614, 543 S.E.2d
906, 911 (2001). Consequently, based upon respondent’s previous
behavior, the trial court’s finding that termination will aide -8- in the children’s permanent plan was supported by evidence at
the termination hearing.
Ultimately, we conclude that the above-challenged findings
were supported by competent evidence, and that these findings
and other unchallenged findings in the trial court’s order
establish that the court did not abuse its discretion when
determining that it was in the children’s best interests to
terminate respondent’s parental rights. The trial court’s order
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges ELMORE and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).