In Re Aldape Telford Glazier, Inc.

410 B.R. 60, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3083, 51 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 263, 2009 WL 2216594
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Idaho
DecidedJuly 23, 2009
Docket09-00834
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 410 B.R. 60 (In Re Aldape Telford Glazier, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Aldape Telford Glazier, Inc., 410 B.R. 60, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3083, 51 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 263, 2009 WL 2216594 (Idaho 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

TERRY L. MYERS, Chief Judge.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Trustee (“UST”) seeks to dismiss this Chapter 7 case “for cause” under § 707(a) of the Code. 1 That section contains a nonexclusive list of potential grounds constituting cause and, like its Chapter 11 equivalent, § 1112(b), which was analyzed in In re Jayo, 06.3 I.B.C.R. 71, 2006 WL 2433451 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2006), the Court is not constrained to find an itemized ground but may consider any “cause” established by the record and evidence.

By agreement of the parties, the evidence consists of Exhibits 100-104 and the declarations with attached exhibits, Doc. Nos. 22 and 23, in addition to what is otherwise of record. Fed.R.Evid. 201. The Court determines that the UST’s motion will be granted. 2 FACTS

This Chapter 7 case was commenced by a petition filed on April 3, 2009. The *62 Debtor is identified as “Aldape Telford Glazier, Inc.” (“ATG”). ATG is an Idaho corporation. Per the UST’s evidence, ATG filed its articles of incorporation with the Idaho Secretary of State on November 25, 2005, and it was in good standing as a corporation as of September 2008, a date about seven months before the petition. Ex. 100.

According to the statement of financial affairs (“SOFA”), the owners of the corporation are Tom Glazier, Jeff Aldape, and James Telford, each owning a 38.33% interest. Doc. No. 1 at SOFA, resp. to question no. 21(b). 3 The “statement of corporate ownership” required by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7007.1 discloses the same three individuals. Doc. No. 5.

According to ATG’s owners and counsel, ATG itself owned two subsidiary business entities: “The Fence & Deck Store, LLC” and “M & W Fence Company, LLC.” ATG was the sole and “managing member” of both these Idaho limited liability companies.

The Fence and Deck Store, LLC, was a limited liability company filing articles with the Idaho Secretary of State on December 8, 2006. Ex. 101. M & W Fence Company, LLC, was a limited liability company with articles filed on December 21,2005. Ex. 102.

ATG also disclosed on its statement of financial affairs, in response to question 18, that ATG and each LLC had separate tax identification and employer identification numbers (TIN/EIN). Doc. No. 1 at 30.

Thus, it is clear that ATG and the two LLCs were three separate entities.

The UST and ATG agree that both LLCs were “dissolved.” Each LLC filed articles of dissolution on November 3, 2008. Exs. 101, 102. These articles asserted that “[a]ll assets reversed] to sole member, Aldape Telford Glazier, Inc.” Ex. 101 at 2; Ex. 102, at 2.

In its schedule B (personal property), ATG discloses numerous items of equipment, inventory and vehicles. Doc. No. 1 at sch. B, categories 25, 28-30. The listings indicate values for such assets, and does so under a caption that requires disclosure of the “Current value of Debtor’s interest in property[.]” (Emphasis added).

ATG concedes that some of the assets listed in this corporate case are, in fact, assets of the subsidiary LLCs. For example, the initial schedule B at Doc. No. 1 notes “M & W” by certain of the vehicles and items of equipment. ATG also submitted attachments to schedule B (filed separately at Doc. No. 6) that include a notation of “equipment and tools owned by Fence and Deck Store and M[ & W] Fence Co.” at two different locations. See, e.g., Doc. No. 6, attach. 1 at 3, 6. 4

ATG and its owners also indicated there was a lack of rigor in keeping assets, liabilities, and business affairs of the three legal entities separate. See, e.g., Doc. No. 23 at 2 (declaration of Telford and Aldape indicating that “the assets of these businesses were used interchangeably”). They also *63 note that all the “businesses were operated out of the same property.” Id.

DISCUSSION AND DISPOSITION

The UST argues that the instant chapter 7 case impermissibly combines the financial affairs of separate legal entities, and, in effect, creates a “joint petition” of such entities when the Code contemplates and allows but for only one joint petition, that of an individual and spouse. See § 302(a).

The UST is correct. See Fitzgerald v. Hudson (Matter of Clem), 29 B.R. 3, 4. 82 I.B.C.R. 205 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1982). In Clem, the Court stated:

It is clear, under § 302(a) of the Code, that spouses may file a joint petition for relief. However, an individual and his spouse are the only “persons,” as defined by § 101(30), which may file a joint petition. While a corporation or a partnership is also recognized as a “person” by the Code and may be a debtor under § 109, there is no provision in the Code authorizing such an entity to jointly file for relief with any other.

29 B.R. at 4, 82 I.B.C.R. at 206. Even though Bankruptcy Judge Young’s Clem decision is decades old, it is still good law. 5

In Clem, the Court refused to countenance a petition styled as “Laune D. Clem and Molly Lynn Clem, Clemco Development, M.P. Investments, D.L Properties, Alpha & Omega Investments, Debtor.” Id. at 4. Here, ATG filed its petition styled as “Aldape Telford Glazier, Inc. dba The Fence and Deck Store, LLC; dba M & W Fence Co., LLC.” Doc. No. 1 at 1. Though the “dba” (doing business as) designation did not appear in the Clem caption, this is a distinction without a difference. 6

ATG has not cogently or persuasively explained why the holding in Clem should not control. While the UST’s motion could be resolved by application of Clem to this record, the problems in this case extend *64 further than nomenclature or an attempted joint petition. There are, given Idaho law, fundamental errors involved in ATG’s approach.

This Court has often noted that defining “property of the [bankruptcy] estate” under § 541(a) is a question of federal law, but the nature and extent of a debtor’s interest in property — essential to analyze § 541(a)(1)’s capture of debtor’s “legal or equitable interests in property” as of the petition date — is determined by applicable state law. In re Fehrs, 391 B.R. 53, 70, 08.3 I.B.C.R. 116, 122 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2008) (citing cases, including Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979)).

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Bluebook (online)
410 B.R. 60, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3083, 51 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 263, 2009 WL 2216594, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-aldape-telford-glazier-inc-idb-2009.