In re A.H.

2025 Ohio 2758

Opinion

[Cite as In re A.H., 2025-Ohio-2758.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

IN RE: R.L. C.A. Nos. 31235 A.H. 31242 31243 31244

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE Nos. DN 22 04 0408 DN 22 04 0409

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: August 6, 2025

STEVENSON, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Appellants Mother, Father B., and Father L. appeal the judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated their parental rights and placed

their children in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Board (“CSB” or

“the agency”). Because the evidence supports the juvenile court’s judgment, and Father L. has not

demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective, this Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} Mother is the biological mother of A.H., born January 26, 2013; and R.L., born

September 11, 2015. Father B. is A.H.’s biological father, while Father L. is the biological father

of R.L. The children lived with Mother and Father L. in North Carolina for about three years until

Mother returned to Ohio with the children around 2018. Father L. remained in North Carolina. In 2

2019, CSB removed the siblings from Mother’s home based on an incident involving a lack of

parental supervision. Mother was ultimately convicted of child endangering based on the incident.

The juvenile court adjudicated A.H. and R.L. neglected and dependent children. North Carolina

completed an Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (“ICPC”) assessment of Father L.

but found his home unsuitable and denied placement with him. In April 2021, the juvenile court

returned the children to Mother’s legal custody.

{¶3} One year later, in April 2022, Mother’s lack of parental supervision again played a

key role in CSB’s second removal of the children from her home. The agency filed complaints

alleging that A.H. and R.L. were abused, neglected, and dependent children. CSB alleged the

following: Mother and the children were living with three maternal uncles, all of whom had

criminal histories. One of the uncles was sexually abusing then nine-year-old A.H. Both Mother

and then six-year-old R.L. were aware of the sexual abuse, but only R.L. attempted to stop it. The

home was infested with roaches. Mother had an outstanding warrant on a charge of felony theft.

{¶4} Mother waived her right to an adjudicatory hearing and stipulated that both children

were abused, neglected, and dependent as the agency alleged. Father L. appeared for the

adjudication of R.L., and CSB presented evidence regarding that child. Father B. did not appear

for the adjudication of A.H., and CSB presented evidence regarding that child. The juvenile court

adjudicated A.H. and R.L. abused, neglected, and dependent children.

{¶5} By the time of the initial dispositional hearing, Mother had been arrested on her

outstanding warrant and was incarcerated at Oriana House, a community corrections facility.

Mother and Father L. appeared for the hearing, while Father B. did not. The juvenile court placed

the children in CSB’s temporary custody and adopted the agency’s case plan as an order. The case

plan required Mother to obtain a mental health assessment, participate in parenting education, 3

submit a housing referral application, make a plan for appropriate supervision of the children, and

demonstrate that she can meet the family’s basic needs. The case plan ordered Father L. to

cooperate in relation to an ICPC assessment with CSB and the child welfare agency in North

Carolina where he continued to reside, follow recommendations arising from the assessment,

identify family members for possible placement of R.L., and sign all requested releases of

information. Father B. was directed to contact CSB if he was interested in pursuing visitation or

legal custody of A.H.

{¶6} As the case progressed, North Carolina denied Father L. for placement, so he

relocated to Ohio. Mother remained incarcerated, transferring from various community based

correctional facilities to others. Father B. requested visitation with A.H., but he declined to follow

up further. Based solely on Mother’s involvement in services while incarcerated, CSB moved for

a first six-month extension of temporary custody. The juvenile court granted the extension after a

hearing.

{¶7} With Father L. living in Ohio and Father B. expressing an interest in pursuing a

relationship with A.H., CSB amended the case plan to add requirements for both fathers. The case

plan, which the juvenile court adopted, required Father L. to maintain a safe home, demonstrate

his ability to provide for R.L.’s basic needs, obtain a mental health assessment and follow all

recommendations, execute releases of information, and follow the recommendations arising from

his recent ICPC assessment or from his treatment providers. Father B.’s objectives included

demonstrating his ability to meet the basic needs of A.H., cooperating with the agency regarding

a background check, submitting to random drug screens, resolving his criminal cases, and

executing releases of information. 4

{¶8} Mother was released from incarceration and placed on probation. She and Father

L. began visiting regularly with the children but otherwise were not participating in case plan

services. Father B. was arrested for various crimes, later convicted, and sentenced to multiple

years in prison.

{¶9} Eighteen months into the cases, CSB moved for permanent custody, amending its

motion twice. During that time, Father L.’s attorney moved to withdraw from further

representation, asserting that communications between him and Father L. had broken down, and

that Father L. had become hostile and uncooperative. The juvenile court allowed counsel to

withdraw and appointed a new attorney for Father L.

{¶10} Father L.’s new counsel moved to continue the permanent custody hearing to allow

her time to review the record and file a Civ.R. 60(B) motion she deemed appropriate. The juvenile

court granted the continuance.

{¶11} On March 30, 2024, Father L. moved: (1) to remove and replace the assigned CSB

caseworker and caseworker’s supervisor; (2) for legal custody of R.L. to Father L., alternatively

legal custody to Mother, or alternatively shared legal custody of R.L. to Mother and Father; and

(3) to vacate pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(2)/(5) “Journal Entries of the Proceedings After January

22nd, 2023[.]” In his motion to vacate, Father L. alleged newly discovered evidence that CSB had

“manipulated” his case “into failure” by delivering incomplete records to the guardian ad litem.

In addition, he questioned whether he had received competent representation by his prior attorney

who had failed to file anything or enlist the aid of the guardian ad litem to address Father L.’s

accusations of sex trafficking by CSB and the foster parents’ abuse of R.L. While acknowledging

Father L.’s challenging mental health and personality issues, his current counsel asserted that a

competent attorney could have controlled Father L. with “sufficient effort in coaching and 5

communication.” Three weeks later, this attorney too moved to withdraw, citing Father L.’s

“intrusive thoughts concerning the child welfare system[,]” intermittent grasp of facts, and

accusations that counsel was a criminal and child trafficker as reasons why she and Father L. no

longer had a functional attorney-client relationship. Counsel additionally moved for appointment

of both a new attorney and a guardian ad litem for Father L. The juvenile court ordered those

appointments.

{¶12} CSB objected to Father L.’s motions to remove and replace its caseworker and

supervisor and to vacate prior journal entries. The agency declined to comment on the prior

attorney’s effectiveness but asserted that that did not constitute newly discovered evidence to

support a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. The juvenile court summarily denied Father L.’s motions to vacate

journal entries and to remove the caseworker and supervisor from the cases without any analysis.

Father L. did not attempt to appeal the denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion.

{¶13} Father L. moved for additional visitation and requested unsupervised visits. CSB

opposed unsupervised visits, asserting that Father L. had not engaged in mental health or parenting

services and that some visits at the family enrichment center had been problematic due to Father

L.’s anger issues and his terminating visits early. The agency did not oppose increasing supervised

visits between Father L. and R.L. The juvenile court ordered that the agency may lengthen or

reduce Father L.’s visits in accord with its visitation program after consultation with the guardian

ad litem.

{¶14} The guardian ad litem moved for appointment of an attorney for the children

because both had expressed a desire to return to Mother’s legal custody. The trial court appointed

counsel for the children, but the attorney moved to withdraw as to R.L. after that child could not

articulate his wishes regarding custody. A.H.’s attorney moved for legal custody to Mother on 6

behalf of A.H. In the meantime, CSB filed a notice that the agency had placed A.H. in a residential

treatment facility based on the child’s mental health issues and behavioral concerns.

{¶15} Almost two and a half years after CSB filed its complaints, the juvenile court held

a two-day permanent custody hearing. The guardian ad litem had filed her report shortly before

the hearing, recommending permanent custody as to A.H., but guardedly recommending placing

R.L. in Father L.’s legal custody. After hearing the testimony of witnesses and other evidence,

however, the guardian ad litem withdrew her recommendation for legal custody of R.L. to Father

L. and opined that an award of permanent custody would be in both children’s best interest. The

juvenile court granted CSB’s motion for permanent custody and terminated Mother’s, Father L.’s,

and Father B.’s parental rights. All three parents appealed, filing a total of seven assignments of

error for review. This Court consolidates some assignments of error to facilitate review.

II.

Custodial disposition of A.H.

MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE [CSB] FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO TERMINATE [MOTHER’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS.

MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT’S TERMINATION OF [MOTHER’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

FATHER B.’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS GRANT OF PERMANENT CUSTODY TO [CSB], AND THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO TERMINATE THE PARENTS’ RIGHTS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 7

{¶16} Mother and Father B. argue that the juvenile court’s award of permanent custody

of A.H. to CSB is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. This Court disagrees.

{¶17} This Court recognizes the distinction between sufficiency and manifest weight

within the context of a permanent custody determination. “Sufficiency and weight of the evidence

are both quantitatively and qualitatively distinct.” In re D.J., 2024-Ohio-1876, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.),

citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 23. “‘[S]ufficiency is a test of adequacy. Whether

the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a [judgment] is a question of law.’” In re D.J. at ¶ 19

(9th Dist.), quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).

{¶18} In determining whether the juvenile court’s judgment is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, this Court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the

credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment]

must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Eastley at ¶ 20. When weighing the evidence, this Court “must always be mindful of the

presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶19} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody

of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs

of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary

custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another

child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that

the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and

(2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on 8

an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re

William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996).

{¶20} The best interest factors include: the interaction and interrelationships of the child,

the wishes of the child, the custodial history of the child, the child’s need for permanence and

whether that can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody, and whether any of the factors

outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); see In re R.G., 2009-

Ohio-6284, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Clear and convincing evidence is that which will “produce in the

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.”

(Internal quotations omitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), quoting

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶21} As its first prong grounds, CSB alleged that A.H. had been in the agency’s

temporary custody in excess of 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period under R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(d); and, alternatively, that A.H. could not or should not be placed with either

parent under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), based on various subsection (E) grounds. The juvenile court

found that CSB met its first prong burden by proving by clear and convincing evidence its 12 of

22 allegation. Mother and Father B. do not challenge that finding and the evidence supports it.

Accordingly, this Court reviews only the juvenile court’s determination that an award of

permanent custody is in the best interest of A.H.

{¶22} Both Mother and Father B. focus their arguments challenging the juvenile court’s

best interest determination on Mother’s case plan compliance and her bond with A.H. Neither

parent argues that Father B. made any progress on his case plan objectives or that he had

established a relationship with his daughter. Moreover, at the time of the hearing, Father B. had

recently begun serving a seven to ten-year prison sentence for multiple counts of aggravated 9

vehicular homicide and would not be available to provide a home for the child for the foreseeable

future.

{¶23} A.H. was eleven years old at the time of the permanent custody hearing. CSB had

removed the child twice from Mother’s home, resulting in A.H.’s placement in CSB’s temporary

custody for more than four and a half years of her life. The child spent one year in Mother’s home

between her first removal in 2019 and her current removal in 2022. She has never lived with

Father B. and has only seen him four times during her life. While in CSB’s temporary custody,

A.H. resided in therapeutic foster homes and, later, at Ohio Guidestone, a qualified residential

treatment program.

{¶24} A.H. requires long-term services to address certain challenges and limitations. She

has experienced significant trauma during her life, including sexual and physical abuse by an

uncle, alleged sexual abuse by Father L., multiple removals from home and placement disruptions,

abandonment by Father B., and the negative impact of Mother’s deficient parenting skills. She

has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, adjustment disorder with mixed

disturbances of emotions and conduct, and unspecified intellectual disability. Although she was

eleven years old, she functioned on the intellectual level of a 5-7-year-old. A.H. is prone to violent

outbursts, spewing profanity, and threatening self-harm and harm to others. She engages in

sexualized behaviors and has touched R.L. inappropriately. She was removed from her most recent

foster home after she tried to force her way into a bathroom to see a younger boy changing clothes.

{¶25} A.H.’s aggression and other inappropriate behaviors have caused tensions in her

therapeutic foster homes. The caseworker and guardian ad litem testified that Mother and A.H.

share a close bond. Mother visits consistently and often brings food and activities. The child

questions Mother frequently about the status of the case. Instead of refocusing the child, Mother 10

discusses matters the agency requested she avoid. Accordingly, Mother allows A.H. to dictate

their interactions. A.H. has also visited with her brother. R.L.’s foster mother testified that the

siblings share a strong bond.

{¶26} In her current residential treatment facility, A.H. receives education and trauma-

based therapy. As she had only recently been placed there, there was little information to report

except that she would require many more months of treatment to address her aggressive and

sexualized behaviors, as well as her mental health issues. One of A.H.’s therapists testified that,

while the child is able to repeat information discussed during therapy sessions, A.H. is unable to

apply any of those lessons in her daily life.

{¶27} A.H. expressed her desire to return to Mother’s legal custody. Father B. supported

his daughter’s return to Mother’s care. The guardian ad litem opined that an award of permanent

custody was in the child’s best interest. The guardian ad litem based her recommendation on

Father B.’s long-term incarceration, Mother’s failure to comply successfully with her case plan

objectives, and Mother’s lack of insight regarding the severity of A.H.’s trauma which necessitates

specialized services, consistency, and close supervision.

{¶28} After close to five years in agency custody during the past six years, A.H. deserves

and needs permanence. Father B. is not a permanency option due to his incarceration and lack of

an established relationship with the child. Although CSB worked diligently with Mother to address

the issues necessitating the child’s removal from her home, Mother demonstrated minimal

compliance with her case plan objectives and failed to attain insight into the child’s needs and

issues and her own accountability for ensuring a safe environment for A.H.

{¶29} Under the case plan, Mother had mental health, parenting, and basic needs

objectives. Her basic needs objective included obtaining adequate and stable housing, maintaining 11

employment to provide financially for the family, ensuring a safe and secure environment for any

children in the home, and addressing her criminal cases.

{¶30} Mother testified that she has been involved in mental health treatment at Ever Well

Community Health (“Ever Well”) for two years. She was not involved in mental health counseling

during her nine-month incarceration near the beginning of the case. The caseworker agreed that

Mother worked with Ever Well upon her release but that her attendance had been inconsistent.

She missed many appointments early on and continued to occasionally oversleep and fail to appear

for sessions. Mother had developed some coping skills to address her depression but still relied

on daily (unprescribed) marijuana use in lieu of healthier options. The caseworker testified that

Mother made insufficient progress on her mental health objective.

{¶31} Because CSB removed Mother’s children both times based on incidents arising

from the lack of parental supervision, and given A.H.’s need for consistent services to address her

trauma experiences, the agency referred Mother for parenting education designed to help her

develop a plan to keep the children safe and attain insight into the children’s particular needs. The

caseworker testified that when she tried to discuss A.H.’s sexualized behaviors and cognitive

limitations with Mother, Mother responded by accusing the caseworker of calling A.H. a “pervert”

and “retarded.”

{¶32} The guardian ad litem expressed concerns about Mother’s parenting abilities. For

example, she testified that Mother was aware of the maternal uncle’s sexual abuse of A.H. but

failed to protect the child, instead ignoring the child’s disclosure because Mother needed childcare

and her brother was available to provide it. In addition, the guardian ad litem testified that Mother

failed to recognize the significance of A.H.’s efforts to enter a bathroom in her foster home to see

an unclothed young boy. When pressed on the matter, Mother refused to acknowledge her 12

daughter’s inappropriate sexualized behavior or ask what she could do to address A.H.’s issues

and instead blamed the foster parents for the incident. CSB added a parenting objective to the case

plan to address such attitudes and responses by Mother.

{¶33} Mother participated in parenting classes during her incarceration, but the

caseworker was unable to determine the substance of those courses. Because Mother demonstrated

no insight regarding the children’s issues and the need to provide close supervision to keep them

safe, the caseworker encouraged Mother to take advantage of the more particularized parenting

education available. Mother refused, believing she had complied with her objective by taking

parenting classes while incarcerated.

{¶34} The caseworker also connected Mother with a provider at OhioRISE, an

organization involved with addressing A.H.’s behavioral health needs, to help Mother understand

the significance of the child’s behavioral and trauma-based struggles and learn how she can

become more involved in A.H.’s treatment. Mother missed many sessions with the provider from

the beginning. She finally began meeting with the provider by Zoom but Mother tended to focus

on her own stress instead of the child. The caseworker testified that Mother continued to lack any

insight or even acknowledge A.H.’s needs and issues. Accordingly, both the caseworker and

guardian ad litem testified that they observed no improvement in Mother’s parenting skills or

ability to provide a safe and healthy environment for A.H.

{¶35} As for basic needs, Mother was able to secure a three-bedroom apartment eleven

months before the hearing. While she was not facing eviction, she consistently paid her rent late

which required her to pay a ten percent late fee of $64.50 each month. Mother claimed the children

for tax purposes one year when she was not authorized to do so. After receiving a $10,000 tax 13

refund, Mother furnished her apartment to provide beautifully decorated bedrooms for the

children. She did not buy clothing for the children, however.

{¶36} Mother does not have a vehicle and relies on her sister or the bus system for

transportation. Mother told the caseworker that she had planned to use her $10,000 tax refund to

buy a car, but Mother did not follow through on that plan.

{¶37} Upon her release from incarceration, Mother obtained employment at two

businesses, although she was only working as a line cook at one restaurant at the time of the

hearing. Mother earns $16 per hour. While she testified that she normally worked 32-40 hours

per week, she admitted that her hours fluctuate and that recently she had been working only 15

hours a week. Mother discussed seeking a second job with the caseworker who counseled her on

prioritizing money for necessities rather than home decorations and Uber rides. By the time of the

hearing, Mother had not sought additional employment.

{¶38} The guardian ad litem testified that Mother frequently runs out of money between

paychecks. At the last visit before the hearing, Mother had no money to buy food for the children,

so the guardian ad litem provided food for them.

{¶39} While Mother failed to pay her rent on time, buy a car she needed, or put money

aside to provide food for the children during visits, she admitted that she spends $5 to $10 each

day on marijuana. Mother does not have a prescription for marijuana. Moreover, she is forbidden

under her rules of probation from using any intoxicating substance, whether legal or illegal.

{¶40} Mother is subject to other rules of probation which she has also violated, thereby

placing her at risk for additional terms of incarceration which would impede her ability to provide

a home for any child. Her probation officer testified that Mother has failed to report in four times,

failed to submit to seven drug screens, tested positive for marijuana the seven times she did submit 14

to screens, and failed to make her monthly restitution payments. The probation officer testified

that Mother’s restitution payments may be in “any amount she can afford.” Nevertheless, Mother

has made only two payments, six months apart. While she paid $1000 towards restitution in one

of her criminal cases, she maintained a substantial unpaid balance. Based on her non-compliance

with her rules of probation, Mother was scheduled for arraignment on a probation violation. The

probation officer planned to recommend additional incarceration for Mother at an overflow facility

for the county jail.

{¶41} Mother argued at the hearing that she had resolved her outstanding warrant, thereby

addressing her criminal cases. Her warrant was pending for over a year. Despite the repeated

encouragement by the guardian ad litem to Mother to turn herself in on the warrant, Mother

declined to do so. The warrant was only resolved when Mother was arrested after a court hearing

early in these juvenile cases, not by any action by Mother to address the matter. Under the

circumstances, Mother has not been proactive in resolving her criminal cases and, in fact,

exacerbated the situation by failing to comply with her current rules of probation.

{¶42} Mother’s final basic needs requirement was to demonstrate the ability to provide a

safe environment for any children in her home. A.H.’s inappropriate sexual behaviors, particularly

towards other children, necessitate close supervision of the child, as well as acknowledgment by

Mother of the gravity of the situation. Throughout the case, Mother never developed a reasonable

supervision plan to protect both A.H. and R.L. The guardian ad litem was particularly concerned,

given that A.H. and R.L. had a history of engaging in sexual activity with each other by “play[ing]

doctor.” Moreover, Mother repeatedly minimized concerns raised by mental healthcare providers,

the caseworker, and the guardian ad litem regarding A.H.’s inappropriate behaviors. Accordingly,

the evidence established that Mother was not yet in a position or state of mind to ensure that A.H. 15

would receive the supervision and interventions required to raise the child in a safe and healthy

environment.

{¶43} None of the factors set out in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) are applicable here.

Although Father B. had very little contact with A.H. during her life, CSB did not allege in its

permanent custody motion, and the juvenile court did not find abandonment by Father B. under

subsection (E)(10).

{¶44} After a thorough review, this Court concludes that the record demonstrates that the

evidence is legally sufficient to support an award of permanent custody relating to A.H. See

Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 11, quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386. In addition, there is

nothing in the record to demonstrate that the juvenile court clearly lost its way and created a

manifest miscarriage of justice in finding that it is in A.H.’s best interest to be placed in the

permanent custody of CSB. See Eastley at ¶ 20. The evidence established that neither Father B.,

by his own admission, nor Mother was in a position to provide an appropriate home for A.H.

Although A.H. wished to live with Mother, Mother lacked insight regarding the significance and

severity of the child’s mental health and cognitive issues. Moreover, Mother had not addressed

her own mental health, substance use, parenting, or criminal issues. In addition, she struggled to

meet her financial obligations even with no children in the home to support. Under the

circumstances, the juvenile court did not err by finding that permanent custody is in the best

interest of A.H.

{¶45} The juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s and Father B.’s parental rights as to

A.H. is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Accordingly, Mother’s first and second assignments of error relating to A.H. and Father B.’s sole

assignment of error are overruled. 16

Custodial disposition of R.L.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE [CSB] FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO TERMINATE [MOTHER’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS.

THE TRIAL COURT’S TERMINATION OF [MOTHER’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

FATHER L.’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE[RE] WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY AND A TERMINATION OF [FATHER L.’S] RIGHT TO PARENT R.L.

FATHER L.’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT’S PERMANENT CUSTODY AWARD WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

{¶46} Mother and Father L. argue that the juvenile court’s award of permanent custody

of R.L. to CSB is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the

{¶47} Our standards of review for sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence, the

agency’s burden of proof, and statutory factors the juvenile court must consider when determining

whether to grant a motion for permanent custody are set forth earlier in this opinion.

{¶48} As she did in regard to A.H., Mother focuses her sufficiency challenge as to R.L.

on her argument that she complied with her case plan objectives. This Court reviewed the evidence

regarding her case plan compliance above and concluded that CSB presented sufficient evidence

to establish that Mother had not successfully completed her objectives so that she might provide a

safe and stable home for any of her children. Mother failed to address her mental health issues

consistently, was struggling financially and failing to prioritize basic needs over nonessentials and 17

was again facing the possibility of incarceration. Significantly, she refused to engage in parenting

education required by CSB to emphasize the importance of parental supervision, particularly

critical because the agency had removed her children both times based on incidents arising out of

the lack of supervision. In fact, the first removal was premised on an incident involving R.L.

Accordingly, the juvenile court’s award of permanent custody of R.L. to CSB is supported by

sufficient evidence.

{¶49} Father L., like Mother, does not challenge the juvenile court’s first prong finding

that R.L. was in CSB’s temporary custody in excess of 12 months of a consecutive 22-month

period. Moreover, he does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings regarding the best interest

of the child except to argue that permanency could have been achieved by granting legal custody

to R.L.’s foster parents, thereby preserving the established bond between father and child. See

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d). We note that Mother also cites various statutory provisions relevant to

foster parents assuming the status of kin; however, Mother makes no argument as to why that law

renders the juvenile court’s findings in support of permanent custody insufficient as a matter of

law. Nevertheless, by addressing Father L.’s argument, this Court necessarily addresses any

related issue Mother has attempted to raise.

{¶50} Father L. argues that R.L.’s foster parents attained the status of kin after having

established a long-standing relationship or bond with R.L. under R.C. 2151.4115(A)(1). See also

R.C. 5101.85(F). The juvenile court found that the foster parents became kin. The evidence of

the child’s long-term placement and bond with the foster parents supports that finding. Father L.

then argues that the juvenile court erred by not placing R.L. in the foster parents’ legal custody, a

disposition that would have given the child the permanence he required while avoiding the

termination of parental rights concomitant with an award of permanent custody. 18

{¶51} The foster parents informed the caseworker that they wished to adopt R.L. There

is no evidence in the record that they indicated a willingness to seek legal custody of the child and

assume the responsibilities of maintaining contact with the parents and facilitating their residual

parental rights. Although R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) allows the juvenile court to award legal custody to

any person where the person or any party has moved for legal custody on the person’s behalf, there

was no motion for legal custody to the foster parents pending for the trial court’s consideration.

Neither CSB nor the foster parents moved for legal custody of R.L. to his foster parents. While

Father L. moved for legal custody of the child to himself, to Mother, or to himself and Mother

jointly, he did not include a fourth alternative request for legal custody to the foster parents.

{¶52} Father L. does not cite any authority, and this Court has found none, to allow a

juvenile court to award legal custody to any person on whose behalf it was not requested and who

has not expressed any interest in obtaining legal custody. Moreover, the foster parents did not

execute the statutorily required statement of understanding for legal custody, therefore precluding

the trial court from granting them legal custody. See R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(a)-(d). No viable third-

party legal custodians existed in this case. Under the circumstances, Father L.’s argument that the

juvenile court’s failure to place R.L. in the legal custody of his foster parents rendered its finding

that permanency could not be achieved without a grant of permanent custody insufficient is not

well taken. Accordingly, Father L.’s first assignment of error is overruled. Moreover, to the extent

that Mother’s first assignment of error can also be construed as having challenged the juvenile

court’s failure to award legal custody of R.L. to his foster parents, it is overruled. Mother’s first

assignment of error is overruled in full based on our prior discussion that CSB presented sufficient

evidence to demonstrate that permanent custody is in R.L.’s best interest. 19

{¶53} As for the parents’ manifest weight arguments, this Court reiterates that neither

parent challenges the trial court’s first prong 12 of 22 finding. The record supports the finding that

R.L. was in CSB’s temporary custody for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period.

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). Moreover, Mother’s best interest challenge again focuses on her case

plan compliance. We have thoroughly reviewed the evidence and adhere to our prior conclusion

that Mother did not successfully complete her objectives. Mother’s lack of parenting insight and

any plan for R.L.’s supervision, even in the absence of A.H. from the home; failure to consistently

address her mental health issues; precarious financial status arising in part from her failure to

prioritize basic needs; and ongoing involvement with the criminal justice system and likely

additional incarceration, support the juvenile court’s finding that permanent custody of R.L. with

respect to Mother is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother’s second assignment

of error is overruled.

{¶54} Father L. does not address the statutory best interest factors. Instead, he argues that

an award of permanent custody of R.L. to CSB is against the manifest weight of the evidence based

on his “relative level of misbehavior as compared to the facts that more ordinarily give rise to

parental termination proceedings.” Unlike criminal sentencing factors such as R.C. 2929.12(B)

and (C) that require a trial court to consider, before imposing the sentence, whether the offender’s

conduct is more or less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense, there are no such

comparative provisions in the permanent custody factors.

{¶55} Father L. argues that he is not a serial drug abuser, has never starved a child in his

care, or suffered long periods of incarceration that impacted his availability to parent. While

accurate, he ignores his uncooperative attitude throughout the case and failure to address many

concerns underlying his specific case plan objectives. 20

{¶56} During the 2019 case, Father L. was living in North Carolina. Accordingly, CSB

requested that North Carolina perform an ICPC assessment. The assessment recommended that

Father L. obtain a mental health assessment and work on managing his mental health issues.

Placement with Father L. became moot when the juvenile court returned R.L. to Mother’s legal

custody. After CSB initiated the current case, the agency again asked North Carolina to assess

Father L.’s home. North Carolina refused because Father L. had not provided documentation that

he had successfully engaged in mental health treatment. An ICPC assessment became moot after

Father L. moved to Ohio in February 2023. At that time, CSB added case plan objectives for

Father L.

{¶57} The agency’s objectives required Father L. to obtain a mental health evaluation,

comply with any treatment recommendations, and demonstrate that he could meet R.L.’s basic

needs. Father L. receives social security disability income and works “odd jobs” to supplement

his finances. After relocating to Ohio, he was unable to secure housing for a couple months until

his assigned Veterans Affairs (“VA”) case manager found him a home. Father L. refused to grant

the caseworker access to his home to assess whether it is safe and appropriate for the child.

{¶58} Father L.’s mental health issues presented the biggest concerns for the caseworker

and guardian ad litem. Throughout the case, Father L. was argumentative, uncooperative, and

accused CSB and some of his attorneys of criminal acts involving R.L. In addition to calling

everyone associated with CSB perjurers, he accused the agency of egregious crimes like

kidnapping, child trafficking, and rape. There was no evidence of such wrongdoing. Visitation

supervisors and the guardian ad litem frequently had to redirect Father L. during visits because he

would have inappropriate conversations with R.L. about the case. 21

{¶59} The caseworker discussed mental health services at Community Support Services

and parenting education at Red Oak, but Father L. would not engage in any services beyond some

limited interaction with a VA counselor late in the case. Although Father L. purportedly executed

a release of information for a prior assessment through the VA, CSB was unable to obtain that

assessment because the release was not effective.

{¶60} Father L. later submitted to a mental health evaluation at the end of 2023. The

assessor diagnosed him with adjustment disorder with a “rule-out diagnosis” of bipolar with

psychosis and schizoaffective disorder of bipolar type. The counselor explained that a rule-out

diagnosis indicates some evidence to support the diagnosis but not enough information to make a

formal diagnosis. She testified that Father L.’s speech and behaviors were common to individuals

with a bipolar element to their illness. Moreover, the counselor testified that Father L. made

statements indicative of paranoia. He was hard to redirect and maintain on topic. Father L. spoke

of satanic cults and reported that numerous entities like the police, courts, and foster care system

were “out to get him.”

{¶61} Father L. attended two therapy sessions after the assessment, at which time his

counselor left her position with the VA. Father L. declined additional services because he did not

want to meet with a new therapist. His counselor testified that Father L. did not successfully

complete mental health treatment because they did not work together long enough to even fully

develop treatment goals.

{¶62} During interactions with the caseworker, visitation supervisors, and library staff

where community visits had begun, Father L. was argumentative, aggressive, and belligerent.

Library staff were concerned when Father L. left a dog in his car during a scheduled two-hour

visit. When staff tried to discuss the issue with Father L., he began yelling and berating others in 22

front of R.L., and he left the visit an hour early. Thereafter, CSB returned his visits to the family

enrichment center. Within a month, Father L. ceased visiting with R.L. for six months because he

did not see any point given “the atrocity” of CSB’s involvement and handling of the case.

{¶63} R.L. has some behavioral and attention deficit issues, has seen the same counselor

for over two years, and has been in a therapeutic foster home since the beginning of the case. He

requires a caregiver who understands his history of trauma and will ensure his ongoing

participation in mental health services. Although Father L. testified that he would continue the

child in counseling, he also asserted that he would enroll R.L. in a different school district, thereby

removing him from in-school therapy with his long-term counselor. The caseworker testified that

Father L. has not developed coping skills or dealt with his own issues arising from the recent death

of his 29-year-old son. Accordingly, there was a concern that he would not focus on R.L.’s mental

health issues. The guardian ad litem went further and questioned whether Father L. would be able

to independently parent the child without the consistent help of his VA case manager who attended

visits and semiannual review hearings, found housing for Father L., coordinated bus routes for

Father L. to attend visits, and provided other transportation as needed.

{¶64} Father L. has seven children and a history of a lack of ability to parent any of them.

All seven children were involved in various child welfare systems. Father L. blamed the mothers

of his children for being “inadequate” and took no responsibility for the circumstances leading to

agency involvement. He testified that his four oldest children are in their 40’s and he does not

“bother with them.” He has had no relationship with a younger daughter for some time, and he

blames the child welfare system for “murder[ing]” his 29-year-old son. In this case, Father L.

ceased visiting with R.L. because of his intense dislike and distrust for CSB and the child welfare

system in general. 23

{¶65} Finally, the guardian ad litem testified and clarified why she was changing her

recommendation from what she had written in her report. The report guardedly recommended

legal custody of R.L. to Father L. The guardian ad litem testified, however, that after listening to

Father’s L.’s testimony on the second day of the hearing, she was recommending an award of

permanent custody to CSB. She explained that Father L.’s fixation on identifying those involved

in the case as “perjurers and child molesters” emphasized his unresolved mental health issues. The

transcript of Father L.’s testimony evidences his utter distrust and vitriol for the agency and legal

system involved with R.L. Moreover, his testimony was disjointed, rambling, and difficult to

follow much of the time.

{¶66} Based on a thorough review of the record, this is not the exceptional case in which

the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice by finding that an

award of permanent custody is in R.L.’s best interest. Father L. does not challenge the juvenile

court’s findings on most of the best interest factors. Nevertheless, the record supports the findings

that Father L. has never had custody of the child; that the two share a bond, although Father L.’s

behavior and focus causes stress for the child; that R.L. could not articulate his desire regarding

custody at the time of the hearing; that the guardian ad litem recommended permanent custody in

the child’s best interest; and that Father L. had abandoned R.L. for almost six months during the

case. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), (b), (c), and (e); R.C. 2151.414(E)(10). As to the child’s need

for a legally secure permanent placement and whether permanency can be achieved without

permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d), Father L.’s lack of case plan compliance,

particularly as it relates to his untreated mental health issues, supports the award of permanent

custody. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s judgment is not against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Father L.’s second assignment of error is overruled. 24

FATHER L.’S ASSIGMENT OF ERROR III

[FATHER L.] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

{¶67} Father L. argues that his trial counsel failed to provide him with effective assistance

of counsel. This Court disagrees.

{¶68} “The test for ineffective assistance of counsel in permanent custody cases is the

same as that applicable to criminal cases.” In re A.R., 2021-Ohio-2573, ¶ 36 (9th Dist.), quoting

In re C.M., 2007-Ohio-3999, ¶ 27 (9th Dist.). A party claiming ineffective assistance must

demonstrate both deficient performance by the attorney and resulting prejudice. Id., citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136

(1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. This Court applies an objective standard of reasonableness

when determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland at 687-688.

Ineffective assistance requires a “substantial violation of . . . counsel’s essential duties” to the

client. Bradley at 141, quoting State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396 (1976). “To establish

prejudice, the appellant must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” In re A.R. at ¶ 36 (9th Dist.),

citing Strickland at 694. The test is conjunctive and requires proof of both prongs; accordingly,

“this Court may dispose of the claim based solely on the appellant’s failure to demonstrate either

deficient performance or the requisite prejudice.” In re A.R. at ¶ 36 (9th Dist.), citing Bradley at

142-143.

{¶69} Father L. argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) object to

R.L.’s adjudication as an abused and neglected child, and (2) timely obtain ICPC documents and

object to hearsay concerning Father L.’s previous ICPC applications. 25

{¶70} As to the adjudication, Father L. concedes that R.L.’s home environment supported

his adjudication as a dependent child. He argues only that there was insufficient evidence to

establish the child was abused and neglected, and counsel did not file objections to the magistrate’s

findings.1

{¶71} Father L. did not ensure that the appellate record contained a transcript of the

adjudicatory hearing. “[I]t is the duty of the appellant to ensure that the record on appeal is

complete.” In re R.A., 2008-Ohio-6745, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.). Accordingly, this Court must presume

regularity in the trial court proceedings. In re G.G., 2022-Ohio-1654, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.).

{¶72} Moreover, Father L. has not demonstrated that he suffered any prejudice based on

trial counsel’s failure to object to the adjudication. By conceding that R.L.’s home environment

supported a finding of dependency, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over the child and

parents. In re C.T., 2024-Ohio-5083, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.) (“The adjudication of a child as dependent,

neglected, or abused is the jurisdictional ‘hook’ which allows for the on-going intervention by the

State in the lives of children and their parents.”)

{¶73} While he argues that his case plan objectives were “quantitatively and qualitatively

different” from what they would have been if the juvenile court had adjudicated R.L. only

dependent, Father L. has not explained how his basic needs and mental health objectives were

more onerous than they would have been had the juvenile court merely adjudicated the child

dependent. CSB was required to create case plan objectives, in consideration of the best interest

of the child, to help the parents address and eliminate any concerns preventing the child’s safe

1 In his reply brief, Father L. asserts that his trial counsel waived the adjudicatory hearing on his behalf and stipulated to adjudication. A review of the magistrate’s July 28, 2022 decision, however, indicates that only Mother waived her right to a hearing and the magistrate heard testimony in support of the allegations CSB alleged in its complaint. 26

return home. R.C. 2151.412(G)(1). The agency was aware of concerns regarding Father L.’s

mental health based on its prior involvement with him in the 2019 case, as well as Father L.’s

behavior and beliefs during the current case. In addition, while the ability to meet a child’s basic

and special needs is always a paramount concern, in this case, CSB was aware that Father L. had

not established housing for some months after he relocated to Ohio. Under these circumstances,

Father L. has not demonstrated, particularly in light of his concession that his son was dependent,

that trial counsel’s failure to object to R.L.’s adjudication as an abused and neglected child

prejudiced him.

{¶74} As to the ICPC documents, Father L. acknowledges that his attorney at the

permanent custody hearing had been recently appointed and reviewed all the numerous discovery

documents provided. Father L. takes issue with the failure of either of his prior two attorneys to

request the ICPC documents. However, because Father L. relocated to Ohio during the case,

placement or assumption of custody of the child by Father L. was not dependent on ICPC approval.

Accordingly, the substance of any ICPC assessments was not relevant, and counsel’s failure to

obtain those documents did not prejudice Father L.

{¶75} Nevertheless, Father L. argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to hearsay testimony regarding his ICPC assessments. He cites to five pages of the transcript

relevant to his argument. The first three pages are testimony by Father L. himself during which

he testified about his involvement in the 2019 case and his participation in a mental health

assessment on his own initiative, not under requirement by CSB. Father L. does not explain how

his own testimony served to prejudice him. Moreover, when the assistant prosecutor asked Father

L. whether he was “required to participate in some ICPC services,” his attorney objected to that

line of questioning. Thereafter, the juvenile court admonished the assistant prosecutor for 27

attempting to elicit testimony regarding the substance of Father L.’s ICPC. Under these

circumstances, Father L.’s counsel acted reasonably to protect his client.

{¶76} The remaining two pages Father L. cites involve testimony by the caseworker. On

the first page, Mother’s attorney questioned the caseworker as to how Father L. was noted on the

case plan. The caseworker testified that he was included under R.L.’s objectives on the case plan

because Father L. was living in North Carolina and CSB was not able to provide hands-on services.

Instead, the agency had to request an ICPC assessment by the North Carolina agency. The

caseworker noted that “the ICPC was rejected[,]” but she did not elaborate as to why. Accordingly,

there was no testimony regarding Father L.’s alleged failure to cooperate or address his mental

health to which counsel could have been expected to object.

{¶77} On the last page cited by Father L., his own attorney was questioning the

caseworker, merely following up on how the agency structured Father L.’s objectives on the case

plan. The caseworker testified that Father L.’s objectives addressed the need for him to engage

with CSB, cooperate with the ICPC process, sign releases, discuss family members, and respond

to correspondence regarding R.L. Again, the caseworker did not testify that Father L. had failed

to cooperate or address identified issues; she explained merely what the case plan required of him.

{¶78} For the above reasons, this Court cannot conclude that Father L.’s counsel rendered

ineffective assistance below. Father L. failed to establish deficient performance and/or prejudice

relating to counsel’s representation. Accordingly, Father L.’s third assignment of error is

overruled.

FATHER L.’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

CUMULATIVE ERROR [ARISING OUT OF THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL REQUIRES REVERSAL.] 28

{¶79} Father L. argues that the cumulative effect of the ineffective assistance of his trial

court deprived him of a fair hearing. This Court disagrees.

{¶80} This Court previously recognized a cumulative error argument challenging an

award of permanent custody in In re F.B., 2019-Ohio-1738, ¶ 46-47 (9th Dist.). We wrote that

“although individual errors during trial may not rise to the level of reversible error, the combined

prejudice resulting from those errors may rise to the level of reversible error.” Id. at ¶ 47, citing

State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191(1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. As in In re F.B., Father

L. has failed to argue or demonstrate any prejudice arising from trial counsel’s alleged

ineffectiveness. See In re F.B. at ¶ 47 (9th Dist.). As such, he cannot demonstrate cumulative

error. Father L.’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶81} Mother’s, Father B.’s, and Father L.’s assignments of error are overruled. The

judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 29

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed equally to Appellants.

SCOT STEVENSON FOR THE COURT

CARR, J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

ANDREW KARAS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

JASON JORDAN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

KIMBERLY STOUT-SHERRER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and AARON B. CAMPBELL, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.

ANNETTE POWERS, Guardian ad Litem.