In re A.H.

2025 IL App (4th) 250118-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 250118-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is June 11, 2025 not precedent except in the NO. 4-25-0118 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re A.H., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Knox County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 22JA52 v. ) Patricia H., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Curtis S. Lane, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE GRISCHOW delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court did not err in finding termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minor’s best interest.

¶2 On January 21, 2025, the trial court entered an order terminating the parental rights

of respondent, Patricia H., to her minor child, A.H. (born July 2019). Respondent appeals, arguing

the court erred in finding termination of her parental rights was in the minor’s best interest. We

affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 A. Case Opening

¶5 On September 1, 2022, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship. The

petition alleged A.H. was (1) abused (count I) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i) (West 2022)) and

(2) neglected (count II) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)) because she was in an environment injurious to her welfare in that she had “significant bruising and scratches to her face,” multiple

abrasions, and other bruising and scarring on her body for which respondent did not seek medical

treatment. That same day, the trial court placed temporary custody and guardianship with the

Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

¶6 On April 25, 2023, the trial court adjudicated A.H. neglected pursuant to

respondent’s stipulation to count II. Following the dispositional hearing, the trial court made A.H.

a ward of the court and continued her custody and guardianship with DCFS.

¶7 B. Termination Petition

¶8 On April 15, 2024, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental

rights. The petition alleged respondent was an unfit parent in that she (1) failed to make reasonable

efforts to correct the conditions that caused the minor to be removed during a nine-month period

after the minor was adjudicated neglected (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2022)), (2) failed to

make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor to her care during a nine-month period

after the minor was adjudicated neglected (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)), and (3) failed

to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the minor’s welfare (750

ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022)). The relevant time period alleged by the State was June 5, 2023, to

March 5, 2024. The State eventually filed a second amended petition to terminate respondent’s

parental rights on May 21, 2024, alleging the same allegations against respondent and adding an

allegation of unfitness against all known and unknown fathers of A.H. (The record shows no one

claiming paternity of A.H. appeared and the trial court found the unknown father of A.H. to be in

default.)

¶9 C. Fitness Hearing

¶ 10 The trial court commenced the fitness hearing on July 23, 2024. Respondent did

-2- not appear. Tara Wilder testified she was A.H.’s caseworker during the relevant time period.

According to Wilder, respondent was required to (1) participate in domestic violence classes,

(2) complete a mental health evaluation, (3) complete a substance abuse evaluation, (4) participate

in parenting education classes, (5) participate in visitation, (6) obtain stable housing and income,

and (7) participate in random drug drops. During the relevant time period, respondent failed to

complete a substance abuse evaluation. Wilder noted respondent “did schedule one with

Bridgeway, but she did not show for it.” Further, respondent did not comply with any drug drops.

Wilder described her contact with respondent as intermittent and inconsistent. While respondent

did complete a mental health assessment, she did not engage in the recommended counseling

services and was unsuccessfully discharged due to lack of participation. Wilder indicated she never

received proof of income from respondent, despite respondent’s assertion that she was working at

Midstate Manufacturing. Respondent did obtain housing through the Knox County Housing

Authority. At the time of the fitness hearing, respondent had not participated in parenting classes,

nor had she participated in domestic violence classes. Regarding visitation, Wilder stated

respondent’s visitation was scheduled during A.H.’s lunch hour, “so [A.H.] missed lunch at school

and [respondent] was not bringing her food.” As a result, Wilder testified, “[T]hey would have to

end the visit early because [A.H.] *** was hungry and didn’t want to stay so it got to the point

where the school would just hold a lunch for her just in case that happened.” Respondent’s visits

were reduced to one hour a week because she was not providing lunch for A.H. Wilder observed

respondent was “nurturing during the visit time and was appropriate but she would not bring proper

supplies.”

¶ 11 After arguments from the parties, the trial court found the State had proven

respondent unfit as alleged in all three counts of the second amended petition to terminate parental

-3- rights. Specifically, the court noted, “[T]here’s been a complete lack of completion of any

services.”

¶ 12 D. Best Interest Hearing

¶ 13 The trial court conducted a best interest hearing on January 21, 2025. The best

interest report filed on July 29, 2024, noted A.H. had been in care for 692 days. According to the

report, A.H. was bonded with her foster family and her physical, mental, and emotional needs were

being met by her foster parents.

¶ 14 Wilder testified A.H. had been in her current foster placement since August 2022,

and she was currently involved in T-ball and swimming. Wilder noted A.H. was well integrated

into her foster family and, they provided [A.H.] “with everything she needs and she’s nurtured.”

With regard to the foster parents, Wilder indicated A.H. referred to them as “Mom and dad.”

Wilder testified A.H. sought out her foster mother for comfort and care, noting the foster mother

was A.H.’s “comfort zone.” Regarding respondent, Wilder stated she was still participating in

visits with A.H. Further, at the time of the best interest hearing, respondent was participating in

domestic violence classes, mental health services, and substance abuse services.

¶ 15 Upon further inquiry from the trial court, Wilder explained respondent’s visits with

A.H. were reduced from once a week to once a month because A.H.’s “therapist recommended it

because [A.H.] had a lot of behaviors revolved around visitation.” Wilder described these

behaviors as “[o]utbursts and just not adjusting well to coming back home,” and she stated that it

“was just hard to regulate back into [A.H.’s] routine after visitation.”

¶ 16 Respondent testified she had been employed at Hallcon for three months.

Respondent testified she had recently completed parenting classes and she was “getting

successfully discharged from substance abuse counseling tomorrow.” Moreover, she was currently

-4- participating in mental health counseling and domestic violence classes. When asked about her

relationship with A.H., respondent stated they “have always been really close. *** She feels

comfortable with me to talk to me. *** We just have a really strong bond.”

¶ 17 Following arguments, the trial court found termination of respondent’s parental

rights was in A.H.’s best interest. The court began by noting A.H. had spent “nearly the majority

of her life” in her foster placement. The court continued, “I don’t dispute that [A.H.] has some type

of bond with her mother but, obviously, there have been behaviors surrounding around those

visits.” The court concluded, after considering the statutory factors, A.H.’s foster parents were

“meeting her needs” and it was in A.H.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights be

terminated.

¶ 18 This appeal followed.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 At the outset, we note respondent does not challenge the unfitness findings.

Respondent’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court’s best interest finding was against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 21 When a trial court finds a parent to be unfit, “the court then determines whether it

is in the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347,

352 (2004). “[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child

relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364.

The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in

the minor’s best interest. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366. In making the best interest determination, the

court must consider the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS

405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)). These factors include:

-5- “(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s

identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and

religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity,

and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive placement alternative; (5) the

child’s wishes; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence,

including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parental figures

and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to

substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the

child.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009) (citing 705 ILCS

405/1-3(4.05) (West 2008)).

“The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each of these

factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in affirming

its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. “A reviewing court affords great

deference to a trial court’s best-interest finding because the trial court is in a superior position to

view the witnesses and judge their credibility.” In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33. On

review, “[w]e will not disturb a court’s finding that termination is in the child[ ]’s best interest

unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961

(2005).

¶ 22 Here, the record supports the trial court’s determination it was in A.H.’s best

interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. A.H. had been living with her foster family since

2022, which was most of her life. The record indicated A.H.’s physical safety, stability, welfare,

sense of attachment, and identity stemmed from her relationship with her foster parents. The

admitted DCFS status report dated December 10, 2024, showed A.H. continued to thrive in her

-6- current placement and the foster family was committed to A.H. The court appointed special

advocate’s report filed on January 13, 2025, was also admitted without objection. The court

appointed special advocate noted the foster parents offered a stable and secure environment for

A.H. and expressed their intention to achieve permanency through adoption.

¶ 23 The testimony of the DCFS caseworker showed A.H. had two biological siblings

residing with her in the foster home. A.H. attended school regularly, participated in outside

activities, and did not have any medical concerns. The caseworker spoke with A.H., and despite

her young age, she expressed her desire to remain in the foster home, as she felt safe and liked

living there. It was the opinion of the DCFS caseworker that the parental rights of respondent

should be terminated. The basis for this opinion was respondent had not been consistent in

completing her services and A.H. was acclimated and doing well in her current environment.

¶ 24 Respondent argues, “While it is true that A.H. had been placed in her foster home

for over 2 years, that alone should not lead to the conclusion that the parental rights of [respondent]

should be terminated.” This argument mischaracterizes the trial court’s findings. Indeed, here, the

best interest report showed A.H. was thriving in her foster placement, was well bonded to her

foster family, and her physical and emotional needs were being met. According to Wilder, A.H.

referred to her foster parents as “[m]om and dad.” The court recognized A.H. had “some type of

bond with her mother.” However, the court emphasized the need for permanency, highlighting the

caseworker’s testimony regarding the outbursts A.H. experienced after visits with respondent and

the request by A.H. to cease visits, indicating her desire for a normal routine. Understandably,

respondent wishes to remain in A.H.’s life; however, the focus of the best interest portion of

termination proceedings is on the child’s best interest. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. “The issue is no

longer whether parental rights can be terminated; the issue is whether, in light of the child’s needs,

-7- parental rights should be terminated.” (Emphases in original.) D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. All told, the

evidence in the record shows A.H. is in a good home, her needs are being met and she is taken

care of by people who love her, all of which supports the court’s decision that terminating

respondent’s parental rights served A.H.’s best interest, meaning the decision is neither

unreasonable nor arbitrary. See In re Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16 (stating a trial

court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion

is apparent or when the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence). Thus, we

conclude the trial court’s best interest finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence

because we cannot say that the evidence adduced clearly calls for the opposite conclusion.

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 27 Affirmed.

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