In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation

96 F.R.D. 587, 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1368
District Court, E.D. New York·Decided January 20, 1983·No. MDL No. 381·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

[588] PRETRIAL ORDER NO. 44

GEORGE C. PRATT,* Circuit Judge.

In this multidistrict litigation, Vietnam veterans and members of their families seek to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of exposure to various herbicides, particularly “Agent Orange”, which defendants manufactured and supplied to the government for use in the Vietnam war. In an order dated January 18, 1980, the court held that the deposition of a plaintiff who was likely to be unavailable to testify at trial due to incapacity or death could be taken by videotape in order to preserve for future use, if needed, an accurate and true-to-life account of his testimony. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 28 Fed.R.Serv.2d 408 (E.D.N.Y.1980). In that order, the court outlined temporary procedures for the taking of videotaped depositions of other plaintiffs in similar situations, if circumstances warranted.

In June 1981, after 10 additional plaintiffs moved to have their videotaped depositions taken, defendants cross-moved for an order establishing guidelines for the taking of in extremis depositions. The court directed counsel to discuss the matter and prepare proposed orders for the court’s consideration. On April 29, 1982, the court appointed Sol Schreiber as special master to supervise discovery for the Phase I trial, and counsel for plaintiffs and defendants submitted to him proposed orders for the taking of in extremis depositions.

On December 2, 1982, the special master submitted to the court a “Recommended Order Governing Depositions of In Extremis Plaintiffs”. Defendants objected to certain provisions of the special master’s recommendation by a memorandum filed December 20, 1982. The court has considered defendants’ memorandum and the exhibits attached thereto, as well as the special master’s memorandum in support of his recommendation, in concluding that the special master’s order should be adopted, with minor modifications.

The factors militating in favor of the taking of videotaped depositions in situations where a plaintiff faces a high risk of unavailability for trial are discussed in detail in the court’s order of January 18,1980, and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to note that a videotaped deposition provides the best means for the court and the jury to judge the demeanor of the witness if he is unavailable for trial due to his incapacity or illness. At the same time, defendants need to be able to prepare fully and thoroughly for cross-examination at these depositions, which by definition must occur on short notice due to an in extremis plaintiff’s medical condition. The special master’s order, reproduced with the court’s modifications in the appendix, represents a fair balancing of these interests and provides workable procedures to accommodate the needs of both plaintiffs and defendants.

In brief, the order provides that a plaintiff may notice an in extremis deposition for 30 days after his counsel has furnished defendants with answers to in extremis interrogatories to be agreed upon by the parties, and copies of plaintiff’s military or service records, records of medical examinations in the possession of plaintiff, and the affidavit of the plaintiff’s treating physician attesting to the seriousness of plaintiff’s medical condition. The order also provides that if plaintiff’s counsel believes that his or her client will die within 30 days from the time a notice of deposition could be filed, the attorney may seek an order to [589] show cause to take the deposition on less than 30 days’ notice. Counsel for defendants may cross-examine the plaintiff at the time the videotaped deposition is taken, and any defendant may, on 10 days’ notice, continue the cross-examination upon receipt of additional information or documents.

Defendants’ Objections.

Defendants’ first objection to the special master’s proposed order is that it does not permit defendants to conduct a discovery deposition before taking the permanent videotaped deposition. They argue that they will not be able to conduct an informed and meaningful cross-examination if they are not given the opportunity to examine the plaintiff before the videotaped deposition. Further, they argue that ¶9 of the order, which provides that a defendant may continue cross-examination on 10 days’ notice after the receipt of additional information, encourages plaintiffs to hold back documents, and prevents further cross-examination unless such documents are produced.

While the court recognizes defendants’ desire to be fully prepared to conduct cross-examination of an in extremis plaintiff, the special master’s proposed order provides adequate protections for defendants. First, the order provides that, in the ordinary situation, before the deposition may be scheduled, counsel for defendants must be given the answers to “in extremis interrogatories”, plaintiff’s military records, medical records, and medical records and reports relating to the current state of plaintiff’s health. In addition, ¶ 8 of the proposed order provides that defendants may notice a physical or mental examination of any plaintiff who has noticed an in extremis deposition. These provisions give defendants an adequate opportunity to prepare for the videotaped deposition. At the same time, implicit in the order is the recognition that an in extremis plaintiff is gravely ill and should be subjected to the least amount of disruption consistent with protection of the defendants’ ability to conduct a meaningful cross-examination.

If a plaintiff whose in extremis deposition has been taken has additional information to provide to defendants, it is expected that he or she will comply quickly. If a plaintiff denies defendants access to documents or information to which they are entitled, this factor will be taken into account in determining whether plaintiff may use the videotaped deposition at trial. Bad faith by the plaintiff in depriving defendants of reasonable cross-examination would be grounds for excluding such a deposition from evidence. However, in addition, defendants should be able to conduct further cross-examination of an in extremis plaintiff after the original videotaped deposition even without receiving additional materials from the plaintiff. The order has been modified to reflect this.

Defendants’ second objection to the order is that it does not require plaintiffs to produce medical or military records not in the possession or control of plaintiff. This objection borders on the frivolous.

The order requires in extremis plaintiffs to provide defendants with copies of their military or service records as well as all records of past medical examinations, treatments and hospitalization in their possession. In addition, they must provide all medical records and reports pertaining to their current state of health. Presumably, this requirement will result in defendants’ receiving at least most of the relevant records, since, in preparation for this litigation, plaintiffs will have gathered together their medical records to determine the validity of their claims, and these records will fall within the material to be turned over to defendants before the videotaped deposition. In this respect, as with all matters arising during discovery, the court expects that all parties will act in good faith to insure the availability of all relevant information prior to trial.

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In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 96 F.R.D. 587, 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1368 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).

96 F.R.D. 587 (In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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