[Cite as In re A.G., 2026-Ohio-26.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
IN RE: A.G., M.G., L.G., Ma.G., Le.G., C.A. Nos. 31490, 31491, 31492, 31493, Au.G. 31494, 31495, 31521, 31522, 31523, 31524, 31525, 31526
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE Nos. DN 20 09 0564 DN 20 09 0565 DN 20 09 0566 DN 20 09 0567 DN 20 09 0568 DN 22 11 0953
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 7, 2026
STEVENSON, Judge.
{¶1} Appellants, K.C. (“Mother”) and M.G. (“Father”), appeal from a judgment of the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated their parental rights
to their six minor children and placed the children in the permanent custody of Summit County
Children Services Board (“CSB”). This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Mother and Father are the biological patents of A.G., born November 22, 2012;
M.G., born November 5, 2014; L.G., born January 5, 2016; Ma.G., born February 10, 2017; Le.G.,
born September 15, 2018; and Al.G., born October 29, 2022. Mother and Father are not married,
but they have lived together as a couple for many years. 2
{¶3} According to stipulated facts in the record, Mother and Father and the four oldest
children had prior juvenile cases with CSB during July 2018, in which the juvenile court
adjudicated A.G., M.G., L.G., and Ma.G. abused, neglected, and dependent because of their
exposure to domestic violence and the deplorable conditions of the family home. The children
were later placed in their parents’ legal custody under an order of protective supervision. That
case was closed during December 2018.
{¶4} On September 8, 2020, prior to the birth of Al.G., CSB filed complaints to allege
that L.G. was abused and that all five children were neglected and dependent because of Father’s
excessive physical discipline of L.G., Father’s history of perpetrating domestic violence against
others in the home, Mother’s untreated bipolar disorder, and the deplorable condition of the home.
The parents later waived their rights to adjudicatory hearings and agreed that L.G. was abused and
dependent and that their other four children were dependent. The trial court adjudicated them
accordingly, placed them in the temporary custody of CSB, and adopted the case plan as an order
of the court.
{¶5} Shortly after the October 2022 birth of the parents’ youngest child, Al.G., CSB filed
a complaint to allege that she was also a dependent child because of the concerns adjudicated in
the other children’s ongoing cases. The trial court adjudicated Al.G. dependent but, because
Mother had been making progress on the case plan in the older children’s cases, the court allowed
Al.G. to remain in Mother’s legal custody under an order of protective supervision.
{¶6} CSB initially moved for permanent custody of the five oldest children, but the trial
court denied that motion on January 23, 2023. It reasoned that the parents had substantially
complied with the reunification requirements of the case plan and that it was in the children’s best 3
interest to be placed in the legal custody of Father. The trial court placed the five oldest children
in Father’s legal custody under an order of protective supervision.
{¶7} During April 2023, the trial court terminated protective supervision of all six
children and closed their cases. The trial court’s final orders placed the youngest child in Mother’s
legal custody and the older children in Father’s legal custody, but all parties were aware at that
time that Mother and Father resided together with the children in the same home.
{¶8} On December 21, 2023, CSB filed motions in each child’s case to “MODIFY
[THE] DISPOSITIONAL ORDER [OF] LEGAL CUSTODY” to the parent who held legal
custody of each child. The agency alleged that, since the trial court terminated protective
supervision of each child, it had received referrals about the children’s poor hygiene when they
came to school. Upon investigation, CSB discovered that Mother was no longer engaged in mental
health treatment, and that she was the primary caretaker of the home and the children while Father
worked, but that she was unable to meet the basic needs of the children without assistance. The
agency alleged a lack of supervision of the children, significant hygiene concerns about them, and
that the home was filthy. It explained that the home had sticky floors, trash, and flies everywhere,
and that there were numerous animals in the home that contributed to its poor condition. The
agency further alleged that the Summit County Humane Society planned to remove the family’s
animals because of the unsuitable condition of the home.
{¶9} The same day, the trial court issued an ex parte order to remove the children from
their parents’ custody and place them in CSB’s emergency temporary custody. In the same order,
it scheduled a “motion hearing” for the next day. Before the scheduled hearing, with the assistance
of counsel, each parent executed a written “WAIVER OF TRIAL RIGHTS” form, by completing
and signing the Summit County Juvenile Court’s preprinted form designed for, and specifically 4
identified as, a parent’s waiver of his or her right to a contested dispositional hearing. The
magistrate later filed decisions that placed all six children in CSB’s temporary custody. The trial
court adopted the dispositional decisions the same day. Neither parent objected to the children’s
temporary custody decisions.
{¶10} On April 2, 2024, CSB moved for permanent custody of these children. Father later
moved to dismiss the permanent custody motion and the children’s cases. Mother joined in that
motion. The argument for dismissal was that the trial court had violated the parents’ constitutional
rights and exceeded its continuing subject matter jurisdiction when it removed the children from
their legal custody and placed them in CSB’s temporary custody without CSB filing a new
complaint and the trial court conducting a new adjudication of the children. The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss, reasoning that it had continuing subject matter jurisdiction under R.C.
2151.353(F) because the court had previously adjudicated these children dependent.
{¶11} At the permanent custody hearing, the parents renewed the motion to dismiss, again
arguing that the trial court improperly reopened this case in December 2023, because there had
been no new complaint or adjudication of the children. The trial court again denied their motion
to dismiss. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court terminated parental rights and placed
A.G., M.G., L.G., Ma.G., Le.G., and Al.G. in the permanent custody of CSB.
{¶12} Mother and Father appeal and each raise two assignments of error. This Court will
consolidate some of their assignments of error to facilitate review.
II.
FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND PLAIN ERROR IN DENYING FATHER’S MOTION TO DISMISS. 5
MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY ABSENT SOME DETERMINATION THAT THE CHILDREN’S PARENTS WERE UNSUITABLE.
MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EXPLICITLY DETERMINE THAT THE CHILDREN OR PARENT’S CIRCUMSTANCES HAD CHANGED.
{¶13} This Court must emphasize that the parents do not assign error to the evidentiary
merits of the permanent custody decision. Instead, these assigned errors challenge the procedure
followed in December 2023 when CSB reopened the children’s dependency cases and the trial
court removed the children from their home and placed them in CSB’s temporary custody. This
Court will first address their arguments about the legal standard that the trial court was required to
apply when it terminated the prior legal custody orders in this case. Next, this Court will determine
whether Mother preserved her challenge to the trial court’s application of that legal standard for
review in this appeal.
Legal Standard
{¶14} Both parents assert through their first assignments of error that, because the trial
court returned the children to the legal custody of either Mother or Father and closed their cases in
April 2023, the trial court implicitly found them to be “suitable” parents again, despite the earlier
adjudications of the children as dependent children. Therefore, they assert that the trial court had
authority to reopen the children’s dependency cases only if CSB filed new complaints and the trial
court again adjudicated the children as abused, neglected and/or dependent or otherwise found the
parents to be unsuitable under common law. See, e.g., In re Hockstok, 2002-Ohio-7208, ¶ 17.
{¶15} The parents suggest that the juvenile court exceeded its continuing jurisdiction in
this case, but the reopening of this case was explicitly within the subject matter jurisdiction of the 6
trial court. “Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that ‘[t]he courts of
common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters
. . . as may be provided by law.’ Therefore, the general subject-matter jurisdiction of Ohio courts
of common pleas is defined by the legislature.” In re K.K., 2022-Ohio-3888, ¶ 52. R.C.
2151.23(A)(1) grants the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction over these six children
because they were alleged to be dependent in the complaints that CSB filed in September 2020
and October 2022.
{¶16} After the trial court adjudicated these children dependent and ultimately entered the
legal custody dispositional orders under R.C. 2151.353(A)(3), it retained continuing jurisdiction
over them until they are emancipated or adopted. R.C. 2151.353(F)(1). Furthermore, R.C.
2151.353(F)(2) grants “[a]ny public children services agency” explicit authority “at any time” to
“request the court to modify or terminate any order of disposition” issued pursuant to R.C.
2151.353(A) “by filing a motion with the court[.]”
{¶17} R.C. 2151.353(F)(2) further provides that “[t]he court shall hold a hearing upon the
motion [to modify a dispositional order] as if the hearing were the original dispositional hearing
and . . . [i]f applicable, the court shall comply with [R.C.] 2151.42[.]” This language clearly
authorized CSB to file a motion to modify any prior order of disposition, including the prior final
orders of legal custody to Mother or Father. In fact, the trial court’s statutory authority to modify
prior dispositional orders makes explicit reference to R.C. 2151.42, “if applicable[.]”
{¶18} R.C. 2151.42(B) provides:
An order of disposition issued under division (A)(3) of section 2151.353, division (A)(3) of section 2151.415, or section 2151.417 of the Revised Code granting legal custody of a child to a person is intended to be permanent in nature. A court shall not modify or terminate an order granting legal custody of a child unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since the order was issued or that were unknown to the court at that time, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child 7
or the person who was granted legal custody, and that modification or termination of the order is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.
(Emphasis added.) Under its continuing jurisdiction over an existing dependency case, a juvenile
court has authority to modify or terminate a prior order of legal custody to “a person” (including a
parent) as set forth in R.C. 2151.42(B). In re A.S., 2025-Ohio-1349, ¶ 19-20 (9th Dist.).
{¶19} As Mother’s brief recognizes, this Court addressed and rejected a similar
“suitability” argument in In re A.S. at ¶ 16-20 (9th Dist.), based on the explicit language of R.C.
2151.42(B) and this Court’s prior reasoning set forth in In re I.S., 2009-Ohio-6432 (9th Dist.). In
re A.S. also involved a dependency case that was reopened after a child was returned to the parents’
legal custody and the case was closed. 2025-Ohio-1349, at ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). In that case, however,
the trial court found a change of circumstances under R.C. 2151.42(B), but Mother argued on
appeal that it should have instead found Mother to be unsuitable. This Court found no support for
such an argument under established Ohio law. Consequently, this Court concluded that the
applicable standard is set forth in R.C. 2151.42(B). Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶20} This Court’s decision in In Re A.S. is currently pending before the Ohio Supreme
Court on this issue as both a discretionary appeal and a certified conflict. See Ohio Supreme Court
case numbers 2025-1224 and 2025-1225. Until the Ohio Supreme Court decides this legal issue,
this Court will continue to apply its prior precedent based on the clear language of the statutes
involved.
{¶21} Consequently, before modifying or terminating the prior orders of legal custody to
the parents, in addition to considering the children’s best interest, R.C. 2151.42(B) required the
trial court to find a change of circumstances of the children or the legal custodians. Mother is the
only party who has alternatively assigned error to the trial court’s failure to explicitly apply the
R.C. 2151.42(B) standard when it removed the children from the parents’ legal custody and placed 8
them in the temporary custody of CSB. The record submitted to this Court supports Mother’s
assertion that the trial court made no explicit finding of the requisite change of circumstances in
its December 2023 temporary custody order, but Mother raises this issue for the first time on
appeal. Moreover, Mother did not request a transcript of the hearing before the Magistrate, so the
record is incomplete. Therefore, this Court will next address whether Mother preserved this issue
for appellate review.
Waiver/Forfeiture
{¶22} Mother asserts that the trial court’s failure to apply the R.C. 2151.42(B) legal
standard to terminate or modify a prior order of legal custody is an issue of law that need not be
preserved for appellate review and cannot be waived or forfeited by the appellant. She relies
primarily on this Court’s decision in In re I.S., 2009-Ohio-6432, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), in which the
appellant did not raise the applicability of R.C. 2151.42(B) in the trial court or on appeal.
Nevertheless, this Court raised this issue sua sponte because it was “obvious that the trial court
applied the wrong legal standard.” Id. at ¶ 8. However, since the In re I.S. decision, this Court
has recognized that a challenge to the trial court’s failure to apply the R.C. 2151.42(B) change of
circumstances standard is not preserved for appeal if it was not properly raised in the trial court.
See In re N.G., 2012-Ohio-2825, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.).
{¶23} In addressing whether Mother preserved this issue for appellate review, we begin
by comparing the distinct concepts of waiver and forfeiture. An affirmative waiver is the
“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a right” and will not be recognized on appeal even
as plain error. State v. Payne, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 23. Forfeiture, on the other hand, “is a failure
to preserve an objection” and does not extinguish a claim of plain error. Id. CSB has argued on
appeal that Mother affirmatively waived this issue because she executed a written waiver of the 9
temporary custody hearing in December 2023. The trial court also questioned Mother to ascertain
that she had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently executed her waiver of the dispositional
hearing.
{¶24} As noted already, Mother executed the juvenile court’s preprinted form for waiving
her right to a dispositional hearing. Because she completed the standard form, which appears to
be designed for a parent’s waiver of a dispositional hearing following adjudication, the form refers
only to a waiver of the requirement that the agency prove that the disposition is in the children’s
best interest. Notably, the standard form does not mention any requirement that CSB prove a
change of circumstances since the prior dispositional order. This Court is reluctant to construe the
written waiver executed by Mother as affirmative waiver of the requirement that CSB prove, and
the trial court find, a change of circumstances under R.C. 2151.42(B).
{¶25} Assuming without deciding Mother may not have affirmatively waived this issue
for appellate review, the record is clear that she forfeited the issue by failing to object to the
magistrate’s dispositional decision or to raise this issue at any time prior to the permanent custody
decision. After the magistrate issued the dispositional decision, which failed to explicitly find the
requisite change of circumstances, Mother had the opportunity to file a timely, written objection
but she did not. Had she filed an objection, the trial court could have resolved this issue in a timely
manner. Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv) provides that “[e]xcept for a claim of plain error,” a party shall
not assign error to the trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decision unless the party has filed
proper objections.
{¶26} Mother has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to explicitly apply the
change of circumstances set forth in R.C. 2151.42(B) rose to the level of plain error in this case.
This Court has not yet determined whether the criminal or civil plain error standard applies to 10
permanent custody appeals. In re Z.S., 2021-Ohio-2022, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.), citing In re K.J., 2019-
Ohio-123, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Under either standard, however, it would be Mother’s burden to
demonstrate a significant amount of prejudice that either amounted to a “manifest miscarriage of
justice” or “challeng[ed] the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” In re Z.S. at ¶ 8
(9th Dist), quoting In re S.G., 2015-Ohio-2503, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). In her brief on appeal, Mother
asserts that, “but for the error, the outcome of the trial would have been different[.]” Nevertheless,
she has failed to demonstrate that, had the trial court held a contested hearing after the reopening
of this case and explicitly applied the R.C. 2151.42(B) standard, it could not have found the
requisite change of circumstances based on the allegations in CSB’s motion to modify. See In re
E.H., 2023-Ohio-470, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). Because the parents have failed to demonstrate reversible
error in the trial court’s initial disposition that placed the children in CSB’s temporary custody,
Mother’s assignments of error and Father’s first assignment of error are overruled.
FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR IN NOT GRANTING A CONTINUANCE WHEN REQUESTED BY FATHER’S COUNSEL.
{¶27} Father’s second assignment of error is that the trial court erred when it denied his
oral request for a continuance of the permanent custody hearing because he and Mother were still
facing criminal charges at the time the hearing commenced. Pursuant to Juv.R. 23, “[c]ontinuances
shall be granted only when imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties.” The decision to
grant or deny a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, which requires a
balancing of “any potential prejudice to a [party against] concerns such as a court’s right to control
its own docket and the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice.” State v.
Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67 (1981). 11
{¶28} To control the flow of its docket and avoid unnecessary delay and prejudice to the
parties, counsel, and witnesses who appear for scheduled hearings, the Summit County Juvenile
Court has also adopted local rules about when and why the court will exercise its discretion to
grant a continuance of a scheduled hearing. Loc.R. 5.03(B) provides that, absent demonstration
of an emergency or unforeseen circumstances, “[a]ll requests for continuances must be made in
writing and filed seven days before the scheduled hearing date.” Loc.R. 5.03(A) further provides
that a continuance will be granted only if the requesting party demonstrates an emergency or
unforeseen circumstance. “Absent such a circumstance, the hearing or trial shall proceed as
scheduled.” Id.
{¶29} In this case, Father’s counsel did not file a timely, written request for a continuance,
nor did he demonstrate an emergency or unforeseen circumstance that would have justified
continuance of the scheduled hearing. The parties knew that the parents would still be facing
criminal changes at the time of the scheduled permanent custody hearing, so Father’s counsel
should have filed a timely, written request for a continuance. Because Father did not file a timely
request and did not demonstrate an emergency of unforeseen circumstances, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Father’s request for a continuance of the permanent custody
hearing. Father’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶30} The parents’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. 12
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
SCOT STEVENSON FOR THE COURT
CARR, J. CONCURS.
FLAGG LANZINGER, P. J. DISSENTING.
{¶31} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I do not agree that the R.C.
2151.42(B) change of circumstances standard should apply under the circumstances of this case.
Although I concurred in this Court’s decision in In re A.S., 2025-Ohio-1349 (9th Dist.) that R.C.
2151.42(B) was the appropriate standard to apply in that case, the facts of this case are sharply
distinguishable. 13
{¶32} To begin with, in In re A.S., the trial court actually applied the R.C. 2151.42(B)
standard to the facts of the case and found that CSB had proven the requisite change of
circumstances because the father, the children’s primary custodian, had recently died; the mother
had not taken on a primary role in raising the child; and environmental factors in the mother’s
home posed a significant risk to the child. Id. at ¶ 23-35. In the case currently before this Court,
it is clear from the record that CSB did not allege, and the trial court did not find, a change of
circumstances under R.C. 2151.42(B). There is no indication in the record on appeal that R.C.
2151.42(B) or its legal standard were even considered at the time the children were placed in
CSB’s temporary custody and the prior final orders of legal custody to the parents were terminated.
{¶33} More significantly, unlike the facts of In re A.S., the reopening of this case was not
initiated by relatives who were seeking legal custody of the child. Id. at ¶ 16-20. CSB sought to
reopen this case, and it was not seeking a change in legal custodians. Instead, after receiving
temporary custody based merely on an agreement about the children’s best interest, CSB moved
for permanent custody less than four months later. Permanent custody proceedings have been
described as “the family law equivalent of the death penalty” and Ohio courts have long
emphasized that parents “must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law
allows.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted). In re C.W., 2004-Ohio-6411, ¶ 23. In this
case, because the trial court did not find a change of circumstances under R.C. 2151.42(B), these
parents were afforded no procedural protection prior to their children being removed and placed
in CSB’s temporary custody.
{¶34} I agree that the juvenile court maintained continuing subject matter jurisdiction over
these children after it returned them to the legal custody of one of their parents and closed this
case. Nevertheless, I agree with Father’s argument that the court implicitly found that the parents 14
were able to parent their children at that point. CSB must have an obligation to demonstrate to the
juvenile court that there was an adequate reason to reopen this case, lest there be a revolving door
in and out of this family’s life.
{¶35} The majority concludes that the change of circumstances standard set forth in R.C.
2151.42(B), if applied here, would have protected the parents’ fundamental rights. I believe that
R.C. 2151.27(C), which authorized CSB to file new complaints to allege abuse, neglect, or
dependency, is more appropriately tailored to these circumstances than R.C. 2151.42(B), as
applied in this court’s prior cases. Given that the apparent goal of CSB was to reopen this case so
it could seek permanent custody of these children, it should have filed a new complaint and sought
permanent custody as its initial disposition of the children. See R.C. 2151.27(C). Had it done so,
the parents’ constitutional rights would have been protected because CSB would have been
required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the children were abused, neglected, or
dependent. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
APPEARANCES:
ANDREW KARAS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHUBHRA AGARWAL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and AARON B. CAMPBELL, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
NOWAR KATIRJI, Attorney at Law, for the Children.
JAMES E. BRIGHTBILL, Guardian ad Litem.