In Re Admission to Bar of McDonald

171 N.E.2d 691, 241 Ind. 239, 1961 Ind. LEXIS 135

• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Decided: January 27, 1961
• Docket: 30,013
• Status: Published

Opinions

Achor, J.

Petitioner seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, as set out in Rule 3-2, to secure admission as an attorney to practice law in the State of Indiana, and, in support thereof, asserts that he has fulfilled all requirements set out in Rules 3-12, 3-13, 3-14 and 3-15, for admission on examination.

Specifically, petitioner asserts that on July 14 and 15, 1960, petitioner took the examination conducted and supervised by the State Board of Law Examiners and successfully passed said examination and received a grade equivalent to that prescribed by said Board as necessary to constitute a passing grade. Petitioner asserts, however, that the State Board of Law Examiners has failed and refused to certify to this court the correct result of said examination with respect to this petitioner, together with their recommendation that he be admitted to the practice of law as required by Rule 3-16.

In answer to this petition, Charles C. Baker, as Secretary-Treasurer of the State Board of Law Examiners, acting for and on behalf of said Board, has filed his answer admitting the allegations of the petition, except as to rhetorical paragraphs 3 and 4, which he denied; to-wit, that:

“3. Petitioner successfully passed said examination and received a grade equivalent to that prescribed by said State Board of Law Examiners as a passing grade or mark.

‘‘4. The State Board of Law Examiners has failed and refused to certify to this court the correct result of their examination, with respect to this petitioner, together with their recommendations, as required by Rule 3-16.”

An oral argument has been requested. However, because there is agreement regarding the factual basis of the controversy, and because the relevant facts are in the files of the Secretary of this court and are a matter of record of which we will take judicial knowledge, and because these facts are very limited it seems that no good purpose will be served by granting the request for oral argument. Therefore, the request is denied.

It appears from the record in this matter that petitioner with 117 other applicants took the examination on July 14 and 15, 1960, for admission to the Bar as alleged and that the examination books of the applicants — with the applicants being identified not by name but by number only — were assigned to the members of the Board and graded by them. These grades were returned to the Assistant Secretary of the State Board of Law Examiners, who is also Secretary to this court, on August 24, 1960. Thereafter, on August 25, according to custom of the Board, the Board, by its Assistant Secretary, published the names of the 112 persons who had successfully passed said examination and received a grade equivalent to that required by the Board as a passing grade.

Thereafter one of the members of the Board asked for and received from the Assistant Secretary the examination books of the petitioner, which he re-graded and thereupon informed the full Board that he had increased the grade or mark of this petitioner, whose grade thus increased met the total requirement of the State Board of Law Examiners as constituting a passing grade.

However, the Board, on considering the full matter as above indicated, refused to certify this petitioner to this court as having complied with the requirements of the Board for admission to the Bar, as indicated by the answer of the Secretary-Treasurer of the Board.

The onerous question this court must decide is whether we will accept the decision of the Board or whether we will overrule it, under the circumstances here presented. Our decision must be guided by the fact that for many years it has been the custom and established procedure of the Board to consider that upon the publication of the results of the examination by an authorized representative of the Board the same shall be considered conclusive and binding upon both the applicants and the Board. We acknowledge that this practice adopted by the Board is reasonable and necessary in order to avoid the injection of personalities into the actions of the Board, and that the decisions of the Board may be made final in both a judicious and orderly manner, which final determination is subject to review only by the full Board, based upon patent errors in the proceedings prior to such publication, and subsequent review by this court.

The reasonableness and necessity of the above stated rule, which provides a terminal point to the action of the Board, is demonstrated by the fact that, except for the rule, a single member of the Board could not only increase the grade of an applicant after publication, he could also with equal cause and propriety decrease the grade of an applicant and thus cause him to fail the examination even though the full Board had publicly announced that he had successfully passed the same.

The general rule is well established that this court will not disturb the decision of administrative boards unless the action of such boards is shown to be arbitrary or capricious or void because of other illegality. Phillips, et al. v. Officials of Valparaiso, etc., et al. (1954), 233 Ind. 414, 120 N. E. 2d 398; Slentz, et al. v. City of Fort Wayne, et al. (1954), 233 Ind. 226, 118 N. E. 2d 484. Although the Board of Law Examiners is appointed by this court, we see no reason why this court should adopt a different rule with regard to the administrative function imposed upon it. If there is disagreement among members of the Board regarding the procedure which it employs, the matter should be resolved within the Board itself.

There is no showing or contention made to the court that the decision of the Board as herein presented was either arbitrary or capricious and therefore it is the opinion of this court that the decision of the Board must be affirmed.

Petition denied.

Bobbitt, C. J., Jackson and Landis, JJ., concur. Arterburn, J., dissents with opinion.