FILED DEC 23 2021 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. WW-21-1124-LBS ADELINA MORENO, Debtor. Bk. No. 20-42855-BDL
KATHRYN A. ELLIS, Trustee, Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM ∗ ADELINA MORENO, Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington Brian D. Lynch, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: LAFFERTY, BRAND, and SPRAKER, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 7 1 trustee Kathryn A. Ellis (“Trustee”) appeals the
bankruptcy court’s order overruling in part her objection to the debtor’s
exemption of a portion of debtor’s 2020 federal income tax refund and
∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, and all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 1 denying her motion for turnover. The bankruptcy court concluded that the
portion of the refund comprised of the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”)
and the Additional Child Tax Credit (“ACTC”), was “federal aid
assistance” under Revised Code of Washington (“RCW”) § 74.04.280 and
was thus properly exempted under that statute and therefore not subject to
turnover.
We AFFIRM.
FACTS 2
Appellee Adelina Moreno (“Debtor”) filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition on December 30, 2020. About a month later, Debtor filed her 2020
federal income tax return and received a refund of $10,631, comprised of
$572 from taxes withheld, $2,800 from the Recovery Rebate Credit (“RRC”),
$1,709 from the Additional Child Tax Credit (“ACTC”), and $5,550 from
the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”).
Shortly thereafter, Debtor filed amended Schedules B and C,
disclosing the tax refund and claiming it fully exempt under various
Washington statutes, including those that provide exemptions for public
assistance and child support.
Trustee promptly filed an objection to Debtor’s amended exemptions
and a motion for turnover of a portion of the tax refund. Because the last
2 Where necessary, we have exercised our discretion to take judicial notice of the dockets and imaged papers filed in Debtor’s bankruptcy case. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 2 day of the 2020 tax year fell postpetition, Trustee prorated Debtor’s tax
refund to exclude approximately 0.3%, leaving a total of $10,599.11
potentially available to the estate. Trustee conceded that certain portions of
Debtor’s prorated tax refund were exempt. She did not dispute Debtor’s
right to retain the full RRC of $2,800. She also conceded that Debtor was
entitled to an exemption of $2,630, representing the remainder of Debtor’s
exemption under RCW § 6.15.010(1)(d)(ii) 3 after using that subsection to
claim $370 in cash and checking accounts as exempt.
Trustee sought to recover the remaining prorated refund of $5,169.11.
In response, Debtor argued that none of the tax refund was property of the
estate because it was received post-petition. Alternatively, Debtor argued
that the refund was exempt. Specifically, Debtor argued that the amounts
sought to be turned over were comprised of the EITC and the ACTC,
which qualified as “public assistance” under RCW § 74.04.005(11), i.e.,
“federal aid assistance” under RCW § 74.04.005(8), and were thus exempt
under RCW § 74.04.280. Alternatively, Debtor argued that the EITC and
ACTC qualified as “child support” under RCW § 6.16.010(1)(d)(iv). She
requested that the bankruptcy court certify the exemption question to the
Washington Supreme Court. Trustee replied, disputing that the EITC and
ACTC qualified as exempt but not opposing certification.
3That subsection permits (with certain limitations not applicable here) an exemption for “other personal property” not to exceed $3,000. 3 After a hearing, the bankruptcy court issued a memorandum
decision declining to certify the matter to the Washington Supreme Court
and ruling on the merits that: (1) 99.7% of the tax refund was property of
the estate; (2) the EITC and ACTC portions of the refund were not exempt
as child support; but (3) those portions were exempt under Washington
law as “public assistance,” i.e., “federal aid assistance.” The bankruptcy
court entered an order denying Debtor’s request for certification and
Trustee’s motion for turnover and sustaining in part and overruling in part
Trustee’s objection to exemptions. Trustee timely appealed. Debtor did not
file a cross-appeal of the issues decided against her.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(2)(B) and (E). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
ISSUE
Did the bankruptcy court err in concluding that the EITC and ACTC
portions of Debtor’s tax refund were exempt under Washington law?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we
review de novo. Salven v. Galli (In re Pass), 553 B.R. 749, 756 (9th Cir. BAP
2016). Under de novo review, we look at the matter anew, as if it had not
been heard before, and as if no decision had been rendered previously,
giving no deference to the bankruptcy court's determinations. Freeman v.
DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006).
4 DISCUSSION
This appeal requires us to determine whether the EITC and ACTC
are “assistance given under” RCW Title 74 and thus eligible for exemption
under Washington law. No Washington court, state or federal, has
analyzed that question. Tax credits are not specifically addressed in the
relevant Washington statutes, and nothing in the pertinent legislative
history sheds any light on the issue.
We begin with the language of the relevant statutes. Title 74 of the
RCW is entitled “Public Assistance.” Chapter 74.04 is entitled “General
Provisions – Administration.” Section 74.04.280, which is entitled
“Assistance nontransferable and exempt from process,” provides:
“Assistance given under this title shall not be transferable or assignable at
law or in equity and none of the moneys received by recipients under this
title shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other
legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.”
Although “assistance given under this title” is not defined in the
statute, the definitional subsection of Title 74, entitled “Definitions—
Eligibility,” defines “public assistance” or “assistance” as “public aid to
persons in need thereof for any cause, including services, medical care,
assistance grants, disbursing orders, work relief, benefits under RCW
74.62.030 and 43.185C.220, and federal aid assistance.” RCW 74.04.005(11).
Subsection (11) defines “federal aid assistance” as
5 the specific categories of assistance for which provision is made in any federal law existing or hereafter passed by which payments are made from the federal government to the state in aid or in respect to payment by the state for public assistance rendered to any category of needy persons for which provision for federal funds or aid may from time to time be made, or a federally administered needs-based program. RCW § 74.04.005(8).
As discussed below, case law from bankruptcy courts in other states
with similar exemption statutes supports the conclusion that both tax
credits are exempt under Washington law, particularly when that law is
liberally construed, as mandated by the Washington Supreme Court. See
Anthis v. Copland, 270 P.3d 574, 576 (Wash. 2012) (Washington “[e]xemption
statutes should be liberally construed to give effect to their intent and
purpose.” (citations omitted)).
A. The ACTC qualifies as “public assistance” under Title 74 of the Revised Code of Washington. Bankruptcy courts interpreting broadly-worded exemption statutes
similar to Washington’s (i.e., “public assistance benefits”) have reached the
conclusion that the ACTC is exempt. In In re Farnsworth, 558 B.R. 375
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2016), the bankruptcy court, interpreting Idaho law, held
that the portion of debtors’ tax refund attributable to ACTC was exempt as
a benefit received under public assistance legislation. The relevant
exemption statute is Idaho Code § 11-603(4), which provides an exemption
for “[b]enefits the individual is entitled to receive under federal, state, or
6 local public assistance legislation[.]” The bankruptcy court applied a three-
part inquiry developed in previous Idaho bankruptcy court decisions to
determine whether the tax credit was public assistance:
[F]irst, what is the purpose and policy of the tax credit, as enunciated by the courts or established by legislative history, and in particular is that policy one of “public assistance” as found in [In re Jones, 107 B.R. 751 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1989)]. Second, what is the nature of the debtor/taxpayer’s access to the credit, i.e., is it a refundable credit. 4 Third, when and at what income levels is the credit phased down and/or eliminated. In re Farnsworth, 558 B.R. at 377 (quoting In re Steinmetz, 261 B.R. 32, 33
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (other citations omitted)).
In Steinmetz, the Idaho bankruptcy court had ruled that the ACTC
was not a public assistance benefit that could be exempt under the Idaho
statute. 261 B.R. at 35. That ruling was based primarily on the fact that, at
the time, the ACTC was available to taxpayers with significant incomes: it
had an income threshold of $110,000 for phase-out of the credit.
Accordingly, the court held that the ACTC was not specifically intended to
benefit only low-income households. Id. at 34.
But, the Farnsworth court noted, Congress has amended the ACTC
over the years, and “those amendments were clearly intended to benefit
low-income families, and in particular, to ‘lift them out of poverty’ through
the refundable portion of the ACTC.” 558 B.R. at 380. Although the
4A refundable tax credit is one that a taxpayer may receive in excess of taxes withheld. 7 maximum income threshold of $110,000 remained unchanged, the
minimum threshold has been reduced. 5 And taking into consideration the
fact that the ACTC is a refundable tax credit and that “the bulk of [ACTC]
refunds go to parents with very modest incomes, and likely small or no tax
liabilities,” the court found the ACTC to be exempt as public assistance. Id.
at 380–81.
Courts applying the laws of Missouri, Iowa, and Illinois have reached
the same conclusion. See Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1197 (8th
Cir. 2015) (holding that the ACTC is exempt as a “public assistance benefit”
under Missouri law); In re Hatch, 519 B.R. 783, 791-92 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
2014) (same, under Iowa law); In re Vazquez, 516 B.R. 523, 526–28 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2014) (same, under Illinois law); In re Koch, 299 B.R. 523, 527–28
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (same). 6
The Hardy court conducted a thorough review of the legislative
history of the amendments to the ACTC, which included several comments
by legislators supporting the conclusion that those amendments were
intended to benefit low-income families. 787 F.3d at 1193-96. The court
commented, “[a]s evidenced by the various amendments to the initial CTC
and the accompanying legislators’ comments about those changes, the
5 The current minimum threshold is $2,500. 26 U.S.C. § 24(h)(6). 6 Missouri law provides an exemption for a person’s right to receive “[a] Social
Security benefit, unemployment compensation or a public assistance benefit[.]” Mo. Stat. § 513.430 (10)(a). Iowa’s and Illinois’ exemption statutes contain virtually identical language. See Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(a); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/12-1001(g)(1). 8 intent of the legislature when modifying the ACTC was to benefit low-
income families. The ACTC has fulfilled Congress’s goals. In practice, it
appears to overwhelmingly benefit low-income families.” Id. at 1196.
Some courts have found that the ACTC is not exempt, but most of
them were interpreting an older version of the credit that was not explicitly
aimed at benefiting lower income families. E.g., In re Steinmetz, 261 B.R. 32.
Other courts decided the issue based on the individual states’ statutes,
which either implicitly or explicitly excluded the ACTC from exemption.
E.g., In re Jackson, No. 12–9635–RLM–7A, 2013 WL 3155595 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
June 20, 2013). In that case, the bankruptcy court denied the debtor’s
claimed exemption in the ACTC because the Indiana exemption scheme set
exemptions by reference to specific sections of the Internal Revenue Code
(“IRC”), and while the scheme referred to section 32 of the IRC, providing
an exemption for the EITC, it did not mention IRC § 24 regarding the
ACTC. Id. at *1.
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the bankruptcy court’s
conclusion that the ACTC is a federally administered needs-based program
that qualifies for exemption under RCW § 74.04.280.
B. The EITC also qualifies as “public assistance” under Title 74 of the Revised Code of Washington. As with the ACTC, courts in other states with similar, broadly-
worded statutes have found the EITC to be exempt. Unlike the ACTC, the
EITC has generally been held to benefit low-income taxpayers. See In re
9 Jones, 107 B.R. 751, 751-52 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1989) (“the primary purpose [of
the EITC] was clearly to afford economic relief to low income heads of
household who work for a living.” (quoting In re Searles, 445 F. Supp. 749,
752 (D. Conn. 1978))). In Jones, the court held that the EITC was exempt
under Idaho’s exemption statute, which, as noted above, exempts benefits
under federal public assistance legislation. Idaho Code § 11-603(4).
Similarly, the bankruptcy court in In re Tomczyk, 295 B.R. 894 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 2003), held that the EITC was exempt under Minnesota’s
exemption statute, Minn. Stat. § 550.37, Subd. 14, which stated at that time:
Public Assistance. All relief based on need, and the earnings or salary of a person who is a recipient of relief based on need, shall be exempt from all claims of creditors including any contractual setoff or security interest asserted by a financial institution. For the purposes of this chapter, relief based on need includes MFIP, work first, general assistance medical care, supplemental security income, medical assistance, Minnesota supplemental assistance, and general assistance . . . . Id. at 895-96. The Tomczyk court found the EITC exempt as “all relief based
on need,” because the EITC’s purpose is to provide relief for lower-income
families. Id. at 896. The Tomczyk court noted that this characterization was
supported by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sorenson v. Secretary of
Treasury of U.S., 475 U.S. 851 (1986), in which the Court stated:
[t]he earned-income credit was enacted to reduce the disincentive to work caused by the imposition of Social Security taxes on earned income (welfare payments are not similarly taxed), to stimulate the economy by funneling funds to persons
10 likely to spend the money immediately, and to provide relief for low-income families hurt by rising food and energy prices. Id. at 864.
The Tomczyk court also considered cases from other courts examining
the issue, some of which had found the EITC exempt as a need-based
public assistance benefit, In re Fish, 224 B.R. 82 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1998); In re
Brown, 186 B.R. 224 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1995); 7 In re Goldsberry, 142 B.R. 158
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992); In re Davis, 136 B.R. 203 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1991), and
others that had found to the contrary, Luster v. Collins (In re Collins), 170
F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding EITC not exempt under Louisiana’s statute,
which exempted “money payments under this Title” because the title in
question dealt with state welfare and assistance); 8 Trudeau v. Royal (In re
Trudeau), 237 B.R. 803 (10th Cir. BAP 1999) (finding the EITC not exempt
because it was neither earnings nor a welfare grant);9 In re Rutter, 204 B.R.
57 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997) (finding that Oregon’s public assistance exemptions
7 Kentucky law defines “public assistance” as “money grants, assistance in kind, or services to or for the benefit of needy aged, needy blind, needy permanently and totally disabled persons, needy children, or persons with whom a needy child lives or a family containing a combination of these categories[.]” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 205.010(3). 8 The Louisiana statute provides that “[a]ll assistance shall be inalienable by any
assignment or transfer and shall be exempt from levy or execution under the laws of this state.” La. Rev. Stat. § 46:111. “Assistance” is defined as “money payments under this Title.” La. Rev. Stat. § 46:1(6). 9 Wyoming allows an exemption for a portion of earnings, Wyo. Stat. § 1-15-408,
and for “public assistance and social services provided by this article,” Wyo. Stat. § 42- 2-113(b). “Public assistance” is defined as ”financial assistance in the form of a performance payment, vendor payment, food stamps or a payment under the minimum medical program.” Wyo. Stat. § 42–2–102(a)(vi). 11 were limited to funds provided by the Oregon Adult and Family Services
Division of the Department of Human Resources); 10 In re Beagle, 200 B.R.
595 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (finding that the repeal of Ohio’s exemption
statute related to public assistance made the EITC nonexempt).
Based on these cases, courts have generally regarded the EITC as a
form of needs-based public assistance. Where courts have found the EITC
to be nonexempt, it was because the language of the relevant statute so
mandated. But where statutes broadly exempt any “public assistance,”
courts have trended in favor of finding the EITC is exempt. See, e.g., Hamm
v. James (In re James), 406 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding EITC
exempt under Alabama law). 11
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the bankruptcy court that the
EITC is a “federally administered needs-based program.”
C. Trustee’s arguments are not persuasive.
Trustee argues that (1) neither the ACTC nor the EITC is a federal
needs-based program, and she distinguishes cases from other jurisdictions
finding tax credits exempt; and (2) no exemption statute in Washington
provides for the exemption of federal public assistance, and the statute
debtor relies upon pertains to the eligibility standards for assistance given
under Washington state law. We do not find these arguments persuasive.
10 O.R.S. § 411.760 provides an exemption for all moneys granted under various state statutes, all of which deal with state public assistance. 11 Alabama law exempts “public assistance to needy persons.” Ala. Code § 38-4-8.
12 To begin, Trustee argues that the tax credits are not “federal aid
assistance.” Although she acknowledges that the tax credits are designed to
benefit lower-income individuals, she contends that they are not “federal
programs.” She directs the Panel to the Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance (“CFDA”) a “government-wide compendium of Federal
programs, projects, services, and activities that provide assistance or
benefits to the American public.” https://taggs.hhs.gov/ReportsCFDA (last
visited Dec. 22, 2021). Because tax credits do not appear on the list, Trustee
argues that the EITC and ACTC cannot be federally administered needs-
based programs.
Trustee did not make this argument to the bankruptcy court. We thus
need not consider it. O’Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887
F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1989). But because Debtor has addressed this
argument in her brief, and it bears primarily on an issue of law, we exercise
our discretion to consider it. See Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 505 B.R.
914, 920 (9th Cir. BAP 2014). We do not find the CFDA persuasive as to the
definitions at issue here. Nothing on the cited web page suggests that the
CFDA, or its definition of “federal domestic assistance program” 12 is
12A "Federal domestic assistance program" may in practice be called a program, an activity, a service, a project, a process, or some other name, regardless of whether it is identified as a separate program by statute or regulation. It will be identified in terms of its legal authority, administering office, funding, purpose, benefits, and beneficiaries. "Assistance" or "benefits" refers to the transfer of money, property, services, or anything of value, the principal purpose of which is to 13 relevant to the determination of the allowance of an exemption under state
law: it is a “summary of grant dollars allocated by the CFDA program,
OPDIV, and by one or more fiscal years.” The summary “contains financial
and nonfinancial assistance programs administered by departments and
establishments of the Federal government.” Nothing more. And the
February 7, 2000 GSA press release cited by Trustee begins: “Looking for
federal grants or loans for flood control, food and nutrition programs,
education and training, or small business development? How about help
for community development programs, childcare, or mental health
research?” 13 As such, the CFDA appears to be a mechanism by which
individuals and organizations can find programs relevant to their needs—
not a reference for determining whether a tax credit qualifies as a federally
administered needs-based program under state law for purposes of
exemption.
accomplish a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by Federal statute. Assistance includes, but is not limited to grants, loans, loan guarantees, scholarships, mortgage loans, insurance, and other types of financial assistance, including cooperative agreements; property, technical assistance, counseling, statistical, and other expert information; and service activities of regulatory agencies. It does not include the provision of conventional public information services. . . .” https://taggs.hhs.gov/ReportsCFDA (last visited Dec. 22, 2021). 13U.S. General Services Administration, New Website for the Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance http://www.cfda.gov, https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/news- releases/new-website-for-the-catalog-of-federal-domestic-assistance-http-wwwcfdagov (Feb. 7, 2000). 14 Trustee attempts to distinguish the cases involving broad, general
language, such as the Idaho statute at issue in Farnsworth. She points out
that the Idaho statute interpreted in that case was a general exemption
statute that explicitly exempted “[b]enefits the individual is entitled to
receive under federal, state, or local public assistance legislation[.]” Idaho
Code § 11-603(4). See also In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1197 (Missouri statute
(Mo. Rev. Stat. § 513.430) exempts, without limitation, a “public assistance
benefit”); In re Hatch, 519 B.R. at 791-92 (Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(a), includes
“any public assistance benefits”; In re Vazquez, 516 B.R. at 526-28 (child tax
credit exempt under 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/12-1001(g)(1), exempting
right to receive a public assistance benefit); In re Brown, 186 B.R. at 229-30,
(EITC exempt under Ky. Rev. Stat. 205.220(3), which exempts “public
assistance,” defined as “money grants, assistance in kind or services to or
for the benefit of needy aged, needy blind, needy permanently disabled
persons, needy children or persons with whom a needy child lives or a
family containing a combination of these categories); In re Goldsberry, 142
B.R. at 159 (same); and In re Tomczyk, 295 B.R. at 896 (EITC exempt under
Minn. Stat. § 550.37, Subd. 14 as “all relief based on need”).
Trustee argues that the cases finding tax credits non-exempt are
analogous. But unlike the Washington statute, the exemption statutes in
those states contained specific language that the courts found did not allow
for the exemption of the tax credits at issue here. In In re Garrett, 225 B.R.
301, 303 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998), the bankruptcy court held that the portion
15 of debtor’s tax refund attributable to EITC was not exempt under the New
York statute exempting “a social security benefit, unemployment
compensation or a local public assistance benefit” because the tax credit
was not a “local” benefit, and the court would not expand the definition
based on equitable considerations. In In re Collins, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, interpreting Louisiana law, determined that the EITC was not
exempt because the exemption statute applied to “money payments under
this Title.” 170 F.3d at 513. But Louisiana’s statutory scheme does not
contain the same broad definition of “public assistance” that is found in
Washington’s. See La. Rev. Stat. § 46:111 (exempting “all assistance”) and
La. Rev. Stat. § 46:1(6) (defining “assistance” as “money payments under
this Title” which pertains to state public welfare and assistance).
In In re Trudeau, 237 B.R. at 806, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the EITC was not exempt under Wyoming law because it did not
fall into any of the enumerated categories in the statute, which exempted
“public assistance and social services provided by this article.” Wyo. Stat.
§ 42–2–113(b). “Public assistance” is defined under Wyoming law as
“financial assistance in the form of a performance payment, vendor
payment, food stamps or a payment under the minimum medical
program.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 42–2–102(a)(vi).
And in In re Rutter, the Oregon bankruptcy court held that the
Oregon exemption statute did not include the EITC. There, the exemption
statute specified that it applied to “[a]ll monies granted under the
16 provisions of ORS 411.060, 411.070 and 411.710-411.730.” 204 B.R. at 60.
Those statutes refer to “public assistance” and “general assistance” and
indicate that only those funds granted by the Oregon Adult and Family
Services Division of the Department of Human Resources are exempt. Id.
As the bankruptcy court found, all of these cases are distinguishable
because their statutes contain language justifying the denial of the
Trustee points out that there is no express exemption for federal tax
credits under Washington law; rather, the exemption statute, RCW
§ 74.04.280, specifies an exemption only for “assistance given under this
title.” She contends that tax credits are not assistance under Title 74. While
this argument is not implausible, a comprehensive review of the definitions
contained in Title 74 and the title’s overall focus and purpose lead to the
opposite conclusion.
Title 74 does not define “assistance given under this title,” but the
title pertains to “public assistance.” As noted, the definition of “public
assistance” includes “federal aid assistance,” RCW § 74.04.005(11), which
we have concluded encompasses the tax credits at issue here. 14 Trustee
14 “Public assistance” is also defined in RCW § 74.04.004(5) pertaining to fraud and abuse. That statute provides that the definitions therein are applicable “throughout this chapter [74.04] unless the context clearly requires otherwise”:
“Public assistance” or “public assistance programs” means public aid to persons in need including assistance grants, food assistance, work relief, disability lifeline benefits, temporary assistance for needy families, and, 17 contends that the definitions contained in RCW § 74.04.005 are to be used
only for the determination of eligibility for Washington state assistance
benefits. Although the statute in question is entitled “Definitions–
Eligibility,” the definitions therein are prefaced by this language: “[f]or the
purposes of this title, unless the context indicates otherwise, the following
definitions shall apply[.]”
Trustee does not cite any portion of Title 74 that limits its application
to state public assistance programs, nor have we found any. Title 74 states
that “[t]he care, support, and relief of needy persons is hereby declared to
be a joint federal, state, and county function.” RCW § 74.04.040. And the
purpose and intent of Title 74 is “to provide for the public welfare by
making available, in conjunction with federal matching funds, such public
assistance as is necessary to insure to recipients thereof a reasonable
subsistence compatible with decency and health.” RCW § 74.98.040.
Further, RCW § 74.04.225 authorizes the establishment of an “online
opportunity portal . . . to provide the public with more effective access to
available state, federal, and local services.” Those “services” include federal
tax credits. RCW § 74.04.225(1)(c). Taken together, in light of the title’s
broad definition of “public assistance,” these provisions support the
conclusion that “assistance given under this title” includes federal needs-
for purposes of this section, working connections child care subsidies. This definition excludes medicaid and other medical programs as defined in chapter 74.09 RCW, and fraud and abuse committed by medical providers and recipients of medicaid and other medical program services. 18 based assistance. To the extent the statutory scheme is ambiguous, the
Washington Supreme Court has instructed that we must construe
exemptions liberally. Anthis, 270 P.3d at 576.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the bankruptcy court did not err in
overruling in part Trustee’s objection to exemption and denying her
motion for turnover. We AFFIRM.