In re Activision Blizzard, Inc.

86 A.3d 531, 2014 WL 717541, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedFebruary 21, 2014
DocketC.A. No. 8885-VCL
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 86 A.3d 531 (In re Activision Blizzard, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Activision Blizzard, Inc., 86 A.3d 531, 2014 WL 717541, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24 (Del. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

OPINION

LASTER, Vice Chancellor.

Plaintiff Anthony Pacchia has challenged a transaction through which Activision Blizzard, Inc. (“Activision” or the “Company”) and an entity controlled by Activision’s two senior officers acquired over 50% of the Company’s outstanding shares from Vivendi S.A., its controlling stockholder, for approximately $8 billion in cash. The plaintiff contends that Vivendi and the members of the Activision board of directors (the “Board”) breached their fiduciary duties by entering into the transaction. Six of the eleven individual defendants who served on the Board and approved the transaction were senior officers of Vivendi (the “Vivendi Directors”).

[533]*533In response to document requests that the plaintiff served, Vivendi objected generally on the grounds that French law barred the production of discovery (i) except pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Evidence Convention”) and (ii) unless electronic documents were handled in accordance with French Law No. 78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties (the “Data Protection Act”). With one exception, the Vivendi Directors joined in this objection. The exception was a Vivendi Director who lives in California and who agreed to search for and produce responsive documents located in the United States. Vivendi similarly offered to produce files located in the United States, but cautioned that all of its electronic documents were housed on servers in Paris, France, and could not be produced.

The plaintiff has filed a motion to compel seeking an order requiring Vivendi and the Vivendi Directors (together, the “Vi-vendi Defendants”) to produce documents in their possession, custody, and control, wherever located, in accordance with the Court of Chancery Rules and without regard to any contrary provisions of French law (the “Motion to Compel”). The Motion to Compel also seeks a ruling that depositions will be conducted in the United States in accordance with the Court of Chancery Rules. The Vivendi Defendants ask that the motion be denied and a protective order be entered providing that discovery only proceed in conformity with the Evidence Convention and that any production of electronic information comply with the Data Protection Act.

The Motion to Compel is largely granted. Discovery shall proceed as described in this decision.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts for purposes of the Motion to Compel are drawn from the allegations of the Verified Second Amended Class and Derivative Complaint (the “Complaint”) and the exhibits, affidavits, and declarations submitted with the briefing on the Motion to Compel. What follows are not formal factual findings, but rather how the court views the record for purposes of a discovery ruling.

A. Activision And Vivendi

Activision is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Santa Monica, California. Its stock is listed on Nasdaq under the symbol “ATVI.” The Company is a leading player in the interactive entertainment software industry and one of the largest video game publishers in the United States.

Vivendi is a société anonyme organized under the laws of France with its headquarters in Paris, France. Vivendi is a French multinational mass media and telecommunication company that operates in the music, television and film, publishing, telecommunications, the Internet, and video games sectors. Vivendi has experience litigating in the United States. In addition to the current litigation, it has been a plaintiff at least four times1 and named a defendant at least twice.2

[534]*534On December 1, 2007, Activision, Vi-vendi, and certain of their wholly owned subsidiaries entered into a business combination agreement (the “Business Combination Agreement” or “BCA”). Pursuant to the BCA, Activision acquired a Vivendi subsidiary, Vivendi Games, Inc., in exchange for issuing 295.3 million shares of Activision common stock to a different Vi-vendi subsidiary, VGAC LLC. In addition, Activision issued 62.9 million shares of its common stock to Vivendi for approximately $1.7 billion. This decision refers to the transaction as the “Business Combination.”

The Business Combination closed in 2008. As part of the transaction, Vivendi gained the right to appoint six directors to the eleven-member Board.

B. The Challenged Transaction And This Litigation

On July 25, 2013, Activision, Vivendi, and defendant ASAC II LP (“ASAC”) entered into a stock purchase agreement (the “Stock Purchase Agreement” or “SPA”). Pursuant to the SPA, Activision agreed to purchase a Vivendi subsidiary for $5.83 billion, and ASAC agreed to purchase 171,-968,042 shares of Activision common stock from Vivendi at $13.60 per share. ASAC is an entity controlled by defendants Robert Kotick and Brian Kelly, the Company’s two most senior executives. The transaction closed in October 2013. This decision refers to that transaction as the “Restructuring.”

During the time when the Restructuring was being negotiated, and when it was approved, the Vivendi Directors who served on the Activision Board were Philippe Capron, Frédéric Crépin, Régis Tur-rini, Lucian Grainge, Jean-Yves Charlier, and Jean-Frangois Dubos. Each of the Vivendi Directors was a senior executive officer of Vivendi or one of its U.S. subsidiaries.

The Complaint alleges that Vivendi caused Activision to enter into the Restructuring because Vivendi desperately needed liquidity. It alleges that the Vi-vendi Directors threatened to take actions to generate liquidity for Vivendi if a sale of Vivendi’s control position was not promptly achieved. The Complaint asserts that after the Board created a special committee to negotiate with Vivendi, the Vivendi Defendants forced the committee to disband. According to the Complaint, Vivendi then negotiated directly with Kotick and Kelly to structure the Restructuring to their mutual benefit. Through the transaction, Vi-vendi got the liquidity it needed, Kotick and Kelly got control of Activision, and their investment vehicle, ASAC, got to purchase shares of stock from Vivendi at a discount to the market price. The announcement of the transaction led to an increase in Activision’s stock price. As a result of the transaction bump and the discounted price, ASAC had an unrealized gain of over $725 million as of the first day of public trading after the transaction closed. The Complaint alleges that faithful fiduciaries would have sought and obtained a transaction that generated greater value for Activision and its stockholders.

C. The Document Requests And The Objections

On October 14, 2013, the plaintiff served a first request for production of documents on the Vivendi Defendants. On December 11, the plaintiff served a second request. The document requests call for the Vivendi Defendants to produce documents relating to the Restructuring.

On January 3, 2014, counsel for the Vi-vendi Defendants emailed the plaintiffs counsel and noted that the Vivendi Defendants would object to producing docu-[535]*535merits located in France. Vivendi’s counsel took the position that French Statute No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, as amended in 1980, commonly known as the “Blocking Statute,” made it a criminal offense for the Vivendi Defendants to respond to the document requests.

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Bluebook (online)
86 A.3d 531, 2014 WL 717541, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-activision-blizzard-inc-delch-2014.