In re Acquiring Title by the City of New York to Certain Lands

132 Misc. 774, 230 N.Y.S. 411, 1928 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 997
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 28, 1928
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 132 Misc. 774 (In re Acquiring Title by the City of New York to Certain Lands) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Acquiring Title by the City of New York to Certain Lands, 132 Misc. 774, 230 N.Y.S. 411, 1928 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 997 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1928).

Opinion

Levy, J.

This is a proceeding in condemnation to fix the awards to be made to former owners of property located in the borough of Manhattan, city of New York, between East Twenty-ninth street and East Thirtieth street, and First avenue and the East river, which property was acquired by the city in December, 1926, for the construction of a psychopathic pavilion for Bellevue Hospital. There are thirteen parcels involved, ten of which are of the old-fashioned tenement house type, and three occupied by factories or plants. I have viewed the property, as required by section 1445 of the charter of the city of New York, and have carefully analyzed the diversity of opinion presented by the proofs. The testimony involves the usual conflict between experts and presents, on the whole, mere issues of facts, except as to parcel [776]*776No. 13. There, in addition, several perplexing questions of law appear. As it is the largest and most valuable parcel in the damage area, it will be considered first. It is property covering the water front block between Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth streets, consisting of 52,889 square feet of upland, 5,160.29 square feet under water between the existing bulkhead and the War Department bulkhead line as fixed prior to the date of title vesting in the city; and 13,428.02 square feet between the United States bulkhead line and the exterior line of the grant. Under deed from the city of New York in 1849 to claimant’s predecessor in title, this grant included all the land under water to the westerly line of a theoretical street, then under water and designated on the city map as Avenue A. The purchaser was bound, as part of the consideration for the grant, to construct at his expense that portion of Avenue A fronting on the property, together with portions of Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth streets then under water; and to maintain these streets. The construction, however, was not to be made until it was called for by the city, and up to December 16, 1926, no such demand had been made, for the probable reason that Avenue A lay outside of the War Department bulkhead line, and the filling in of the area necessary to complete the street would indeed infringe upon the paramount rights of the Federal government. Since the vesting of title in the city, the United States bulkhead fine has been relocated and Avenue A is now within the area unconditionally owned by the city,

In addition to asking compensation for the upland and the land under water as far as the westerly line of potential Avenue A, claimant asks to be reimbursed for the loss of the use of 15,800 square feet of land in the bed of that avenue. Notwithstanding the fact that its grant did not include that area, it nevertheless claims the right to the usé of it until the city should direct the construction of the avenue. It bases its demand upon Appleby v. City of New York (271 U. S. 364); Appleby v. Delaney (Id. 403), and Burns Bros. v. City of New York (178 App. Div. 615; affd., 232 N. Y. 523). In both the Appleby and Burns cases there was a full grant of waterfront, reserving in the city certain lands under water for purposes of public streets, to be constructed by the grantees at their expense. Here the grant extends only to the westerly line of the potential street, with the same obligation on the grantee’s part to construct the portion of it, and includes marginal wharfage and cranage rights in the grantee, as in the other cases.

In the Burns case it was held that the owner of the upland and the abutting land under water had an easement upon the land reserved for access to the water. In the Appleby cases the ruling was that [777]*777the land under water belonged to the grantee, subject to the city’s enforcement of its right to demand the construction of public streets in the areas reserved; that the owner could construct platforms over his land to the pier head line established by the War Department; and any occupation of that land by the city for dredging purposes constituted trespass. Whether the right existed in the grantee to construct such platforms over an intervening area reserved for street purposes, is not very clear from the decision. However, drawing inferences most favorable to the claimant here, its largest right in the area of Avenue A and the adjoining cross streets under water, would be an easement of access and light. Such an easement could hardly include the right to erect a platform over areas not belonging to it.

The fact is that the city has been charging other waterfront owners for the privilege of erécting such platforms over its land under water, pursuant to revocable licenses. All that the claimant’s, easement would substantially cover is the right of access over this area. But under its grant this could be destroyed by the erection of a public street, which would only leave the grantee the privilege of erecting wharves upon the margin of such street. Not only would its access by water from the upland to the waterfront be barred by the intersecting street, but an expensive reorganization of its plant would undoubtedly be necessary, by reason of the fact that its upland property would no longer be on the waterfront. The claimant’s easement of access to the water would thus become valueless, and obviously it could not only be destroyed without compensation, but the destruction would entail a large expense on its part for the building and the maintenance of the new streets. Under these circumstances a valuation of four dollars per square foot upon the 15,800 square feet lying in the bed of Avenue A is not only grossly excessive, but absolutely unwarranted. No allowance, therefore, should be made for this whatsoever.

The question remains, however, as to what compensation should be made for the loss of wharfage and cranage advantages which would result to the claimant — after the loss of its easement upon the building of the public street — from its right upon the exterior line of the street. Such rights usually have only a slight value for public renting purposes in view of the very low rates at which the city, where it owns bulkhead rights, leases them on a per diem basis. They can have a substantial value only in connection with upland property to which they are appurtenant. In the instant case they would not be contiguous to such property, by reason of the intervening street, and that fact would have a depreciating [778]*778tendency upon the value of the upland. In appraising the wharfage and cranage rights we must, therefore, make allowance for the necessity of the construction of new physical bulkheads to make them available, for the fact that they would no longer be appurtenant to the upland, for the expense to which the claimant would be subjected in the erection and maintenance of the new streets, and for the expense in reorganizing the location of the units of the plant to meet the new waterfront situation. The resulting gain would be easily balanced by the involved outlay. I consider I would be justified in allowing nothing for these wharfage rights. I have endeavored, however, to give the claimant the benefit of the doubt by making no deduction for the theoretical loss in value of the upland by reason of its ceasing to be waterfront property, and by assigning sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the full value of the upland to the portion under water, instead of the forty per cent estimated by the city.

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132 Misc. 774, 230 N.Y.S. 411, 1928 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 997, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-acquiring-title-by-the-city-of-new-york-to-certain-lands-nysupct-1928.