In re A.B.

2025 IL App (4th) 250410-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: September 10, 2025
• Docket: 4-25-0410
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (4th) 250410-U

NOS. 4-25-0410, 4-25-0411, 4-25-0412, 4-25-0413, 4-25-0414, 4-25-0415, 4-25-0416,

4-25-0417 cons. NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under IN THE APPELLATE COURT September 10, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate OF ILLINOIS limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). FOURTH DISTRICT

In re A.B., Ma. B., Au. B. and M.B., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Lee County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 23JA31 v. ) 23JA32 Michael B. and Jill J., ) 23JA33 Respondents-Appellants). ) 23JA34 ) ) Honorable ) Theresa M. Friel-Draper, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vancil and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court dismissed the appeal for respondents’ failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. October 1, 2020).

¶2 In October 2024, the State filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of

respondents, Michael B. and Jill J. (referred to individually as father and mother) to their minor

children, A.B. (born August 2023), Ma. B. (born April 2010), Au. B. (born March 2018), and M.B.

(born June 2022). Following the fitness and best-interest hearings, the trial court granted the State’s

petitions and terminated respondent’s parental rights.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In September 2022, in Kane County, Illinois, respondents stipulated to a finding the minors, Ma. B., Au. B, and M.B., were in an environment injurious to their welfare as defined

by section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-

3(1)(b) (West 2022)). The adjudication order noted the State’s evidence showed a “sibling was

born substance exposed to cocaine,” both respondents had a “history of substance abuse and have

not completed services,” and there was “a history of domestic violence *** between April and

May 2022,” while mother was pregnant. In October 2022, the trial court entered a dispositional

order making Ma. B., Au. B., and M.B. wards of the court. Custody and guardianship was placed

with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Respondents were ordered

to cooperate with all directives from DCFS.

¶5 In August 2023, in La Salle County, Illinois, the State filed a petition for

adjudication of wardship regarding A.B., contending respondents’ other children, Ma. B., Au. B.,

and M.B., were already in the care of DCFS “due to issues of substance abuse and domestic

violence.” In September 2023, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order, finding A.B.’s

environment was injurious to her welfare as defined by the Juvenile Court Act (id.). The court

subsequently entered a dispositional order making A.B. a ward of the court and placing her in the

custody of DCFS. Respondents were again ordered to cooperate with all directives from DCFS.

¶6 The matter involving A.B. was transferred to Lee County, Illinois, in September

2023. The matters involving Ma. B., Au. B., and M.B. were transferred to Lee County in October

2023.

¶7 On October 18, 2024, the State filed petitions to terminate respondents’ parental

rights as to all minors. The petitions alleged both respondents had (1) failed to maintain a

reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors’ welfare (750 ILCS

50/1(D)(b) (West 2024)), (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that caused

-2- the minors to be removed during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect (id.

§ 1(D)(m)(i), and (3) failed to make reasonable progress toward the return home of the minors

during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). The relevant

nine-month period was defined as November 6, 2023, to August 6, 2024.

¶8 A. Fitness Hearing

¶9 On February 24, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s petitions to

terminate respondents’ parental rights. The court took judicial notice of numerous client service

plans and a certified conviction for father, showing he had been convicted of unlawful delivery of

a look-alike substance in De Kalb County, Illinois, in July 2024 and sentenced to 200 days in jail,

commencing October 1, 2024.

¶ 10 Felicia Carter testified on behalf of the State. Carter was the caseworker for the

minors and respondents. She stated the case originated with “intact services for domestic

violence.” She also stated mother and M.B. tested positive for cocaine during pregnancy. Carter

referred mother for a substance abuse assessment in November 2023, which she completed in July

2024. The substance abuse assessment recommended 30 hours of treatment and aftercare, which

mother began working on in August 2024. She stated mother failed to successfully complete

substance abuse treatment during the relevant nine-month period. From December 2023 through

June 2024, mother missed numerous drug screenings. Carter agreed that during the “few times”

mother submitted to drug testing, she tested positive for cocaine. She stated mother was referred

for a mental health assessment in November 2023, but she failed to complete the assessment

because the agency required her to first complete substance abuse treatment. Carter stated mother

was not referred for domestic violence classes or “couples counseling” until the substance abuse

and mental health issues were addressed. Carter stated mother had been on a waiting list for

-3- parenting classes since November 2023, so the classes had not been completed. She said mother

was involved in a car accident in the summer of 2024, which impacted her ability to travel.

Although mother cooperated with signing paperwork for the agency, was renting an apartment in

Mendota, Illinois, and had been working at a restaurant since January 2025, the apartment was not

large enough for four children. She confirmed mother had failed to complete any of the ordered

services from the integrated assessment during the relevant nine-month time period, although

mother interacted appropriately with the minors during supervised visits.

¶ 11 Regarding father, Carter stated she referred him for a substance abuse assessment

in November 2023. He completed the assessment in July 2024 and was recommended to complete

“50 to 75 hours” of treatment with “1 to 6” months of after care. She said father began treatment

in August 2024 but had not completed treatment at the time of the fitness hearing. Carter stated

father also missed numerous drug screenings during the nine-month period and tested positive for

cocaine in June 2024. She stated father also failed to complete the mental health assessment. She

said father successfully completed parenting education classes in August 2023, but she was unable

to verify his employment. She described father’s interactions with the minors during supervised

visits as appropriate. Carter confirmed father had not completed any ordered services during the

relevant nine-month time period.

¶ 12 On cross-examination by mother’s counsel, Carter agreed mother suffered

“significant” injuries from a car accident in the summer of 2024, which affected her ability to

complete services. During redirect examination, Carter estimated mother had been bedridden from

the car accident for a “couple months.” During cross-examination by father’s counsel, Carter

agreed father had completed 34 hours of substance abuse treatment prior to being incarcerated.

¶ 13 Father testified on his own behalf. He stated he successfully completed parenting

-4- classes but admitted he did not complete substance abuse or mental health treatment. He stated he

was discharged from services for being incarcerated and later for having to reschedule a Zoom

meeting because he was working at a hotel. He stated he was also involved in the car accident

where mother had been injured and that it had occurred in October 2023, not in 2024.

¶ 14 The trial court stated both respondents had failed to prioritize substance abuse

treatment in order to have their children returned home. The court was not persuaded by

transportation issues for either respondent because they had been encouraged to use agency

transportation services but chose to use their insurance services, which required longer advance

notice to arrange transportation. The court noted the older minors had been in substitute care for

“two and a half years” and A.B. had been in care for her entire life. The court concluded

respondents had failed to complete services and stated, during the relevant nine-month period,

“nothing was done.” The court granted the State’s petitions on all three counts and continued the

matter for a best-interest hearing.

¶ 15 B. Best-Interest Hearing

¶ 16 A best-interest hearing was conducted on April 14, 2025. Various best-interest

reports were noted by the trial court, with no additions or corrections requested by the parties.

Carter testified again on behalf of the State.

¶ 17 Carter stated Ma. B., Au. B., and M.B. had originally been placed with their

grandmother, and A.B. had been placed in traditional foster care. She noted the grandmother

passed away in January 2025, and the minors were placed with the same foster parents as A.B.

¶ 18 Ma. B. and Au. B. were eventually placed in a fictive kin home. Their foster parents

were willing to provide permanency for both. Carter described their placement as “[v]ery loving,

caring.” Ma. B. was involved in extracurricular activities and had begun attending counseling.

-5- ¶ 19 M.B. was placed in a different fictive kin home. Carter described the place as good

and stable and stated M.B. was “very happy.” Carter stated the foster parents facilitated sibling

visits more than four times a month. M.B.’s placement was willing to provide permanency.

¶ 20 A.B. remained in her foster placement, which Carter described as “loving and

supportive.” Carter stated A.B. was “developmentally delayed” and required specialized care. She

was in physical, occupational, and speech therapies. Her foster parents offered permanency

through adoption.

¶ 21 Respondents presented no evidence.

¶ 22 The trial court stated the testimony revealed the minors were in “safe, loving and

supportive environment[s] where it’s very nurturing for the siblings.” The court “commend[ed]”

the foster parents for facilitating sibling relationships for the minors. The court found the State had

shown by a preponderance of the evidence it was in the minors’ best interest to terminate

respondents’ parental rights.

¶ 23 This appeal followed.

¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25 On appeal, respondents contend the trial court’s determination they were unfit was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. They do not challenge the court’s best-interest finding;

therefore, we confine our review to the fitness hearing.

¶ 26 The State requests we dismiss respondents’ appeal for violating Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h)(7) requires the argument section of an appellant’s

brief to “contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the

authorities and pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

Compliance with Rule 341 is not a mere suggestion, and it is within this court’s discretion to strike

-6- an appellant’s brief and dismiss the appeal entirely for failing to comply. Niewold v. Fry, 306 Ill.

App. 3d 735, 737 (1999). However, if the violations of supreme court rules do not “hinder or

preclude our review,” the brief need not be stricken in whole or in part. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Gaston v. City of Danville, 393 Ill. App. 3d 591, 601 (2009).

¶ 27 “It is an elementary rule of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point

by merely stating it, without presenting any arguments or reasons in support of it[,] and this court

will not search through the record for possible errors on which a judgment may be reversed.”

Reichelt v. Anderson, 222 Ill. App. 176, 179 (1921). As a reviewing court, we are

“entitled to have the issues clearly defined and supported by

pertinent authority and cohesive arguments; [the appellate court] is

not merely a repository into which an appellant may ‘dump the

burden of argument and research,’ nor is it the obligation of this

court to act as an advocate or seek error in the record.” U.S. Bank v.

Lindsey, 397 Ill. App. 3d 437, 459 (2009) (quoting Obert v. Saville,

253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993)).

¶ 28 Our review of respondents’ brief on appeal confirms it is devoid of argument. The

only reason we were able to discern respondents’ main contention on appeal was because

respondents explicitly make it clear in the section entitled “Issues Presented for Review” and from

the heading of the argument section. The authorities cited by respondents in their brief are relevant

to the standard of review only. While the record is sufficiently straightforward to understand the

nature of the proceedings, respondents’ failure to comply with Rule 341(h)(7) is so egregious it

would require this court to take up the role of advocate and seek error in the record on their behalf.

We cannot endorse such a blatant violation of Rule 341(h)(7). Accordingly, we agree with the

-7- State and dismiss respondents’ appeal in its entirety. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 For the reasons stated, the appeal is dismissed.

¶ 31 Dismissed.

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