In Interest of Tina, (Mar. 5, 1999)

1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 2785
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedMarch 5, 1999
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 2785 (In Interest of Tina, (Mar. 5, 1999)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Interest of Tina, (Mar. 5, 1999), 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 2785 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On December 9, 1997, the Department of Children and Families, hereafter "DCF", filed petitions for the termination of parental rights of Lorraine A. to her three children, Tina, Blake and Amanda. The children are now nine, six and four years of age respectively. The biological fathers of Tina and Amanda are unknown. The petition concerning Blake seeks the termination of the parental rights of the two putative biological fathers. Heath T. and Antonio H. The children's. mother, Lorraine A., has had ongoing mental health and drug use problems which led to the placement of Tina, her oldest child, with DCF on four occasions and for the younger two children on three occasions. Because it appeared to DCF that Lorraine had the capacity to improve her parenting and to provide for these children, they were returned to her after each removal, in the hopes that she could parent them. Unfortunately, Lorraine was never able to do so adequately. The children were last removed from their mother on January 30, 1996 and have been in foster care since that time.

At trial DCF proceeded pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(B), alleging that Lorraine had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of her children, she could assume a responsible position in their lives. Other grounds had been alleged, but were CT Page 2786 abandoned. As to the putative fathers of Blake, DCF alleged that each had abandoned this child and that neither had an on-going parent child relationship with him. On the first day of trial, January 11, 1999, Lorraine A. filed a motion for dismissal, contending that DCF has not complied with the court order of May 19, 1998, permitting Lorraine to have therapeutic visitation with her children. The motion also requested in the alternative that the matter be continued to permit further visitation and for DCF to fulfill its obligations pursuant to the court's order. The motion was consolidated with the termination petitions for trial. The trial concluded on January 15, 1999. As set forth below, the court grants the termination petitions as to Lorraine A. and the putative biological fathers of Blake A. and denies the motion for dismissal and/or continuance.

1. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

Failure to Provide Legally Adequate Notice to the Unknown Biological Fathers of Tina A. and Amanda A.:

The biological fathers of Tina A. and Amanda A. are unknown, although Lorraine A. has made statements that one of the named fathers of Blake, Heath T., may be the father of Amanda. Lorraine has been uncommunicative and hostile to DCF and its involvement in her life and there is not a great deal of information about the circumstances of her life during the time either of these children was conceived. No one claiming to be the father of either Tina or Amanda has come forward during the pendency of this matter. No individual has been involved with Lorraine over an extended period of time, who has acted in the role of a parent to these children. Further, there was no publication of notice of the proceedings to either Heath T. or the unknown fathers, using the customary appellation of "John Doe." Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that notice to the unknown biological fathers is legally defective.

The United States Supreme Court has held that parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in their children and that "(w)hen the State moves to destroy the weakened familial bond, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982). Many years prior to its holding in the termination of parental rights context, the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank TrustCo., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1949) held that the constitutional requirement that no person be deprived of due process of law was CT Page 2787 violated where a person was given only newspaper publication notice of proceedings against him, unless that person could not be located after the exercise of reasonable diligence. The court stated:

"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."

The Mullane court noted the difficulties inherent with notice by publication. Nonetheless, it held:

"This court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning. Thus it has been recognized that, in cases of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights." Mullane atp. 317, internal citations omitted.

As to the detailed procedure to be followed, the court approves of the reasoning set forth in Bank Mart v. Langley,39 Conn. Sup. 198, 201, 202, 474 A.2d 491 (1984) where the court stated:

"Nevertheless, if notice by publication is to be utilized, the plaintiff must clearly and in detail set forth in affidavit form all the steps taken to determine whether notice in some other form could be given so that the court may make an independent determination of the adequacy of the notice."

In this case, notice by publication would have been proper, but this important step was not performed. Based on the due process protections to which the unknown biological fathers, of Tina and Amanda are entitled, the court continues the case as to them to permit such publication and schedules a brief hearing on April 8, 1999 to make such further findings as may be required.

2. FACTS

The court has heard testimony from the DCF social workers, CT Page 2788 two psychologist evaluators, the foster parents of the children, the director of a substance abuse treatment agency who completed a drug evaluation of the mother, a community parent educator, a detective from the New Haven police department who investigated allegations of possible sexual abuse of Tina by Terry H. and Lorraine, the therapists who conducted therapeutic supervised visits with Lorraine and the three children in two separate programs, and from the mother herself. The court received many exhibits including transcripts of the orders entered on May 19, 1998 by the court, transcripts of the previous court testimony of another psychologist evaluator as well as Lorraine's mental health therapist, who treated her for a period of time in 1997.

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Related

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
339 U.S. 306 (Supreme Court, 1950)
Santosky v. Kramer
455 U.S. 745 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Bank Mart v. Langley
474 A.2d 491 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1984)
In re Luis C.
554 A.2d 722 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1989)
Shew v. Freedom of Information Commission
714 A.2d 664 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1998)
Cole v. Planning & Zoning Commission
671 A.2d 844 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1996)
In re Jessica M.
714 A.2d 64 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1998)

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Bluebook (online)
1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 2785, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-interest-of-tina-mar-5-1999-connsuperct-1999.