Imperial Bottle Cap & Machine Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.

139 F. 312, 71 C.C.A. 442, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 3879
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJuly 7, 1905
DocketNo. 506
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 139 F. 312 (Imperial Bottle Cap & Machine Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Imperial Bottle Cap & Machine Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 139 F. 312, 71 C.C.A. 442, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 3879 (4th Cir. 1905).

Opinion

BRAWEEY, District Judge.

The validity of the Painter patent, No. 468,258, which the court below adjudged to have been infringed by defendants, was not challenged in the argument here when the case was submitted, but pending our consideration of the appeal, and prior to decision, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit delivered its opinion in Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Standard Stopper Co., 136 Fed. 841, holding this patent invalid for want of patentable novelty. In view of the importance of having uniformity of adjudication in the federal tribunals, especially in patent causes, where the Supreme Court is reluctant to issue its writs of certiorari, involving, as they generally do, merely questions of fact, we ordered a reargument at the May term, and the case is now before us for our determination. It is not claimed that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit is controlling in the sense that the question is res adjudicata, but the high respect we have for the ability, learning, and experience of the judges of that court is a very persuasive reason for following it, when by so doing we may assist in securing that uniformity which is very desirable, thus avoiding confusion and preventing repeated litigation of the same question; but the parties before us have the right to our individual judgment, and considerations of convenience and expediency must give way to demands of duty, from which we cannot be absolved by the doctrine of comity. “Comity persuades,” says Mr. Justice Brown in Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 488, 20 Sup. Ct. 708, 44 L. Ed. 856, “but it does not command. It declares not how a case shall be decided, but how it may with propriety be decided. It recognizes the fact that the primary duty of every court is to dispose of cases according to the law and the facts; in a word, to decide them.right. In doing so the judge is bound to determine them according to his own convictions. If he be clear in those convictions, he should follow them. It is only in cases where in his own mind there may be a doubt as to the soundness of his views that comity comes in play, and suggests a uniformity of ruling, to avoid confusion until a higher court has settled the law. It demands of no one that he abrogate his individual judgment, but only that deference shall be paid to the judgments of other co-ordinate tribunals.”

Many of the considerations that give weight to adjudications in other courts of equal and final authority are absent here. There [314]*314has been no concordance of opinion among several courts, nor has the decision stood for a series of years with general acquiescence therein, where business interests in reliance thereon have adjusted themselves thereto, and public policy requires adherence. If there had been anything like unanimity of opinion among learned judges whose experience in patent causes is so much greater than ours, it would so far awaken doubts as to the correctness of any opinion that we might entertain in opposition thereto that we would be inclined to defer to it. That was the case in Beech v. Hobbs, 92 Fed. 146, 34 C. C. A. 248, cited by defendants, where a carefully considered opinion of Judge Coxe was unanimously affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, and followed in the First Circuit. Here we have two circuit judges on one side, and two circuit judges on the other. Therefore we cannot feel ourselves permitted to accept this judgment as controlling, and proceed, not without misgivings, to state our conclusions:

The patent in suit was granted to William Painter February 2, 1892. It is one of a number of bottle-sealing devices by which Painter had undertaken to provide a substitute for the long cork which prior to this time was generally used as a stopper for bottles. One of his patents was before us in 1901, and in the opinion reported (Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., 108 Fed. 845, 48 C. C. A. 72) some account is given of the condition of the industry and of the state of the art before his inventions were put on the market, which need not be repeated. The device embraced in the patent is generally known as the “crown seal,” .and for convenience will be so designated,' and for the same reason the appellants will be herein referred to as the defendants, and appellee as the plaintiff.

The proofs show that the “crown seal” went rapidly into public use, that it is fast superseding all other bottle-stopping devices ; that demand for it is constantly increasing, and that during the year preceding the taking of the testimony over 425,000,000 were sold; that the cost is about one-fourth or one-third of the old method; that it is capable of rapid application and easy removal, and is thoroughly sanitary. All of these advantages have secured for it phenomenal commercial success.

There are nine claims in the patent, and they have been referred to — perhaps truly — as unnecessarily verbose, and it does not seem necessary to recite them all. The patent is for a combination, and does not purport on its face to be a pioneer. As shown in the exhibits in the preferred form, the device is a hard metal cap, in which there is a sealing disk of cork about one-ninth of an inch in thickness, encircled by the cap, which is provided with corrugated, vertical flanges, extending substantially throughout its depth. The flanges of the cap are bent by suitable pressure, by a machine adapted to the purpose, under the shoulder, which is some distance below the bottle mouth. The locking of the cap under the shoulder holds the cap and the cork disk inside of the cap in sealing contact with the bottle head, and the lower edge of the flange, under the overhanging shoulder, projects sufficiently to permit a [315]*315prong or lever to easily pry off. The corrugations of the flange serve as a sort of cushion or yielding material between the metal and the glass, thus overcoming the difficulty incident to a rigid compression of metal against glass. They also, while permitting the inner ridges to yield and conform to the inequalities inseparable from glass bottles, enable the excess of material incident to the compression of the circumference of the flange around the bottle neck to be taken up. The apices or outer ridges of the corrugations serve as fingers or prongs, which the engaging tool can readily take hold of for the purpose of separating the cap from the bottle. This brief description, which will have to be enlarged upon hereafter in considering the case in another aspect, will, it is believed, suffice to present the question which lies upon the threshold; that is, whether there is sufficient patentable novelty to support the patent.

It may be conceded at the outset that none of the elements of the combination are new. The history of the patent in its progress through the Patent Office, as shown by the contents of the file wrapper, takes more than 50 pages of the record, and shows what was disclaimed, what was rejected, and what was allowed. Metallic sealing caps are admittedly old, the pendant flanges are old, and there is nothing new in corrugated metal. The patents which in the opinion of the court of the Second Circuit led to the conclusion that Painter’s patent was void will be considered in the order in which they are presented in that opinion:

(1) Whittlesey patent, granted May 19, 18'63. The claims are-for “a cap for sealing fruit cans, etc., having a flat top, tapering slightly, and corrugated flange edge.” That the Whittlesey cap has a visual resemblance to Painter’s cap is undisputed, but there all resemblance ends. It does not profess to be a device for stopping bottles containing gaseous liquids.

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Bluebook (online)
139 F. 312, 71 C.C.A. 442, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 3879, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/imperial-bottle-cap-machine-co-v-crown-cork-seal-co-ca4-1905.