Friedlander v. Union

150 F. Supp. 849, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 320, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3790
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedMay 10, 1957
DocketCiv. No. 8616
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 150 F. Supp. 849 (Friedlander v. Union) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Friedlander v. Union, 150 F. Supp. 849, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 320, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3790 (D. Md. 1957).

Opinion

R. DORSEY WATKINS, District Judge.

This is a complaint for patent infringement brought by Thomas A. Friedlander (Friedlander), holder of United States Letters Patent No. 2,615,505, issued on October 28, 1952 to Friedlander, on an application filed October 22, 1948. Infringement by Lucas Brothers (Lucas) and others is alleged. Plaintiff prays that the patent be declared valid and that plaintiff is the owner thereof; that defendants have infringed the patent; that injunctions be issued against the defendants ; and for an accounting, costs and attorneys’ fees.

Substantially similar answers have been filed by all but one of the defendants, and in addition, Lucas filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement. Lucas has moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it for patent infringement and sustaining its counterclaim for declaratory judgment. It has been agreed that the decision in the Lucas case shall be controlling with respect to the other defendants. The following discussion will therefore be confined to the position of Lucas.

The answer by Lucas admits the jurisdictional averments under United States Code, Title 35 and Title 28, §§ 1338 and 1400. It contains the usual defenses that Friedlander “was not the original, first and sole inventor” in that the alleged invention had been, more than one year prior to the application date of October 22, 1948, fully described and set forth in letters patent and publications; that the alleged invention is devoid of substantial novelty and utility in view of the well-known state of the art; and that [850]*850the patent set forth old and familiar products and processes of common knowledge, in general use and knowledge long prior to the invention, and well within the reach and ability of any worker in the field. The answer also alleges limitations of the patent and claims “to such certain particular features that plaintiff is estopped from obtaining a construction thereof as would include any of the products made and sold by” defendant; and that the patent application of plaintiff was not properly examined, but that “the application and examination thereof in the United States Patent Office was hurried, scanty, insufficient and lacking in thoroughness; and that said letters patent No. 2,615,505 were granted without the best available art being cited there-against by the Patent Office Examiner.”

Lucas also counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement.

Lucas filed interrogatories which were answered by plaintiff and then filed its motion for summary judgment on the complaint; the answer of Lucas; its interrogatories and plaintiff’s answers thereto; and an affidavit with supporting exhibits.1 No opposing affidavit or exhibit was filed by plaintiff. The motion was briefed and argued.

The court finds that the pleadings, the plaintiff's answers to interrogatories containing certain admissions, affidavit and exhibits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. That summary judgment may properly be invoked in patent infringement cases on the infringement aspect has been expressly held by the Fourth Circuit, in Smith v. General Foundry Mach. Co., 1949, 174 F. 2d 147, 151, certiorari denied 1949, 338 U.S. 869, 70 S.Ct. 144, 94 L.Ed. 533. The court cited and relied upon decisions of courts in the Second, Third and Sixth Circuits. Of the cited cases, two (Rubinstein v. Silex Co., D.C.N.Y.1947, 73 F.Supp. 336 and Brown v. Ford Motor Co., D.C.Mich.1944, 57 F.Supp. 825) involved infringement only. The others involved questions only of invalidity (Allen v. Radio Corporation of America, D.C.Del. 1942, 47 F.Supp. 244; Jno. T. McCoy, Inc. v. Schuster, D.C.N.Y.1942, 44 F. Supp. 499; Juniper Mills, Inc. v. J. W. Landenberger & Co., D.C.Pa.1947, 6 F.R. D. 463), or of both infringement and invalidity (Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corporation, 3 Cir., 1948, 169 F.2d 580, and S. R. Leon, Inc. v. Parfums Schiaparelli, Inc., D.C.N.Y.1940, 35 F.Supp. 641).

The decisions subsequent to Smith v. General Foundry Mach. Co., supra, have approved the use of summary judgment in determining patent validity. Vermont Structural Slate Co., Inc. v. Tatko Brothers Slate Co., Inc., 2 Cir., 1956, 233 F.2d 9, affirming D.C.N.Y.1955, 134 F.Supp. 4; Bobertz v. General Motors Corporation, 6 Cir., 1955, 228 F.2d 94, affirming D.C.Mich.1954, 126 F.Supp. 780; Park-In-Theatres v. Perkins, 9 Cir., 1951, 190 F.2d 137; Davison Chemical Corp. v. Joliet Chemicals, 7 Cir., 1950, 179 F.2d 793; W. E. Plechaty Co. v. Heckett Engineering, Inc., D.C.Ohio 1956, 145 F. Supp. 805.

The court therefore concludes that summary judgment procedure is applicable to suits involving questions of patent validity as well as questions of infringement.

. In this case the patented structure (as well as the accused one) is relatively simple, and the history in the patent office is clear. No expert testimony is needed, nor could it in any event alter the case made by the record. While fully recognizing the “unusual caution” that should be exercised in granting summary judgment in patent cases, the court concludes that this case is a proper one for such [851]*851procedure. Cf. Vermont Structural Slate Company, Inc. v. Tatko Brothers Slate Company, 2 Cir., 1956, 233 F.2d 9, 10.

Plaintiff’s patent is for a chair construction. Initially, plaintiff sought the allowance of claims for such construction in which the only significant element was the rearward extension of the lower portion of the rear chair legs so as to prevent contact of the top of the chair back with a wall or other vertical surface. All of the original claims were rejected, some of them after two amendments. Subsequently, four new claims were filed, on which the patent issued.2 These claims covered said rearward extension in combination with (a) a specific form of joint “including interlocking portions having coaeting vertical bearing surfaces and angularly disposed surfaces”; (b) rear legs “having a gradually increasing taper toward” the lower portion with structural members connected thereto at the thickest section of said legs; (c) the rear legs having a curved configuration; (d) the rear portion of the rear legs having curved upper and lower portions; and (e) joint means having coaeting vertical bearing surfaces and angularly disposed surfaces, connecting said rear legs and horizontal structural members. A comparison of original claims 1 and 12 with claim 1 in the patent as issued will clearly disclose the limitations inserted by the inventor:

Original 1

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Bluebook (online)
150 F. Supp. 849, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 320, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3790, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/friedlander-v-union-mdd-1957.