Illinois Tool Works, Inc. Ex Rel. Simco Division v. Ion Systems, Inc.

250 F. Supp. 2d 477, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3730, 2003 WL 1143179
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 10, 2003
Docket2:02-mc-00175
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 250 F. Supp. 2d 477 (Illinois Tool Works, Inc. Ex Rel. Simco Division v. Ion Systems, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Illinois Tool Works, Inc. Ex Rel. Simco Division v. Ion Systems, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 477, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3730, 2003 WL 1143179 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

On January 14, 2002, plaintiff Illinois Tool Works, Inc. (“ITW”), by and through its SIMCO Division, filed a complaint for patent infringement against defendant Ion Systems, Inc. (“Ion”). In its complaint, ITW alleged that Ion manufactured a device that infringes an existing ITW patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,252,756 B1 (the “’756 Patent”). On June 6, 2002, Ion filed counterclaims for patent infringement against ITW, alleging that ITW had infringed three Ion patents: U.S. Patent No. 4,809,-127 (the “ ’127 patent”), U.S. Patent No. 5,930,105 (the “ ’105 patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 6,259,591 B1 (the “’591 patent”).

All the patents-in-suit involve technology for controlling electrostatic discharges. In particular, the claims concern ionization systems that control the amount of static electricity in a room. These ionizers produce positive and negative ions that are dispersed near devices and work areas that are sensitive to electrostatic discharges. The ionizers prevent the buildup of unwanted static charges by supplying ions of the opposite polarity that combine with and thereby neutralize errant charges. To maintain this neutral balance, the ionizers must continually produce ions and respond to shifting levels of electrostatic discharge. The difficulty of keeping a room or workspace static-free is compounded by the gradual degradation of the emitter modules that produce the neutralizing ions. These variables have posed a series of *481 problems for those industries in need of “clean,” or static-free, rooms. They have also spawned the series of patents at issue in this case.

On June 3, 2002, I informed the parties of the need, pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996), for a hearing on the issue of claim construction. Shortly thereafter, on June 10, they presented the court with a joint tutorial on the physics of room ionization systems. In preparation for the Mark-man hearing, Ion and ITW submitted numerous documents that presented arguments on how the court should construe the disputed claims. These submissions included copies of the patents-in-issue, declarations by defendant’s expert Dr. Mark Horenstein, the prosecution history for the various patents, proposed claim construction orders, and discussions of the relevant law. After the hearing, I requested additional briefing on the nature and scope of the court’s authority to define the disputed terms. 1 I have considered all of the submissions, including those documents and graphics that the parties presented both at the hearing and thereafter. Given the voluminous nature of the materials before me, however, I will not necessarily refer to each and every document.

Unsurprisingly, the parties presented conflicting interpretations of the disputed claim terms. This decision represents an effort to resolve their dispute. It begins by presenting the legal principles that govern how to construe a claim. It then identifies the disputed terms, the parties competing claim constructions, and the judicial construction of the terms’ proper scope and meaning.

PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

There are two stages in the litigation of patent infringement cases. First, the court must determine the scope and meaning of those patent claims disputed by the parties. Then, a judge or jury compares the judicially-defined claims with the device that allegedly infringes upon them. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1554 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). The first step, often referred to as “claim construction,” typically occurs after a court conducts a “Markman hearing,” wherein the parties present arguments for why the court should construe a claim a certain way. The second step occurs at trial, after the court has issued its decision on how the claims should be construed.

The language of a patent generally resolves how a court should define a patent’s disputed terms. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001); Phonometrics, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459 (Fed.Cir.1998). A court begins its claim construction analysis by examining the “intrinsic evidence,” which consists of the patent’s claims, specification, 2 and, if in *482 evidence, the prosecution history. 3 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). Intrinsic evidence is preferred over extrinsic evidence. 4 Id. at 1583; Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed.Cir.1997). Where possible, the intrinsic evidence alone should determine the meaning of a claim term. Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed.Cir.2000); Bell & Howell Document Mgmt., 132 F.3d at 705.

Among the three different types of intrinsic evidence, the court “look[s] first to the claim language itself to define the scope of the patented invention.” Bell Atlantic Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed.Cir.2001). After looking at the claim language, the court can consider the remaining intrinsic evidence, Interactive Gift, 256 F.3d at 1331, however, the court “does not accord the specification, prosecution history, and other relevant evidence the same weight as the claims themselves.” Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1552 (Fed.Cir.1997) overruled on other grounds by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1452-1455 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc).

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250 F. Supp. 2d 477, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3730, 2003 WL 1143179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/illinois-tool-works-inc-ex-rel-simco-division-v-ion-systems-inc-paed-2003.